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Re-working boundaries:  
values and legitimation at the climate science–policy interface 
 
Katherine Ruth Margrave Machen 
 
Abstract 
Acknowledging the science–policy interface as an important site through which climate 
change is framed; this thesis provides an examination of the politics of boundary work. 
Through an analysis of the Scottish climate science–policy interface, the thesis draws 
attention to the discursive value framings involved in the making of climate responses – 
understood as discourses in which value commitments and orientations towards 
particular outcomes have been foregrounded. Empirical research focuses specifically on 
boundary work undertaken by ClimateXChange, a boundary organisation established by 
the Scottish Government in 2011. Comparing the work of ClimateXChange with boundary 
work by other science–policy actors, the thesis examines how different forms of 
boundary work enable different types of knowledge to circulate. Practices such as 
translation, science communication, co-production and knowledge brokerage construct 
legitimate knowledge differently, contributing to the legitimation and reproduction of 
particular discursive value framings over others. Offering an in-depth analysis of these 
boundary processes, the thesis opens up critical questions about the concept of 
‘translation’, draws attention to how boundary practices construct claims for legitimacy, 
and to the multiple, cumulative and interacting micro-sites of boundary work through 
which passionate actors are legitimating different forms of political subjectivity. 
Combining an STS approach to science – policy boundary work with Chantal Mouffe’s 
political theory to foreground questions of values, legitimacy and hegemonic power, the 
thesis draws attention to the value commitments of discourse. In doing so the thesis 
suggests potential for re-theorising values from a post-structuralist perspective, in order 
to contest hegemonic claims to value neutrality and account for passionate affective 
relations with discourse. This attention to the politics of boundary work illustrates the 
way in which scientific knowledge circulating at the science–policy interface in Scotland 
frames possible responses to climate change through discourses of economic growth and 
quantifying and pricing carbon. Such moves reproduce hegemonic policy values and 
prompt critical engagement with moves towards demand-led science–policy interaction.  
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 Chapter 1.
Introducing the Value Politics of Boundary Work 
 
“Every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of 
contingent practices…predicated on the exclusion of other 
possibilities. It is always the expression of a particular 
configuration of power relations... never the manifestation of a 
deeper objectivity that would be exterior to the practices that 
brought it into being” (Mouffe, 2009: 549) 
 
 
This thesis examines the processes and practices of boundary work at the climate 
science–policy interface in Scotland and how these bring particular social orders into 
being. Boundary work is understood as the practices undertaken by actors, 
organisations, objects and processes to mediate between science and policy, and is 
recognised to both connect and demarcate science and policy communities (Jasanoff, 
1987; Halffman, 2005; Miller, 2001a; Guston, 1999; Guston, 2001; Gieryn, 1983; Gieryn, 
1999). The science–policy interface is an important site through which problems of 
climate change come to be framed, and policy responses are constructed; through which 
“knowledge is both made, and made mobile” (Meyer and Kearnes, 2013: 427). Boundary 
work is widely recognized to be political, through serving various interests (of science, of 
policy, or of boundary organizations themselves). This thesis understands the politics of 
boundary work not simply in terms of interests, but instead in terms of discursive value 
framings: discourses that frame particular value orientations. The thesis aim is to 
investigate the value politics involved in these processes of boundary work, asking which 
discursive value framings are produced and re-produced through boundary practices, 
and how particular discursive value framings come to matter and others become 
excluded through boundary work. Questioning which knowledges and policy responses 
are made legitimate, and how, this thesis focuses on a particular form of boundary work 
being described by practitioners as ‘translation’. It is through examining the processes of 
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translation alongside other forms of science–policy boundary working, that these 
questions of discursive value framings and legitimacy are explored. 
In recent geographical climate change literatures, Hulme has advocated for reframing 
climate change debates in terms of differences in values (Hulme, 2013; Hulme, 2009). 
Hulme has been joined by a number of scholars who focus attention on values as 
explanations for action, predictors of future policy acceptance, or approaches to risk 
through debates in journals such as Global Environmental Change and Wires Climate 
Change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Corner et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2013; Demski et al., 
2015). O’ Brien and Wolf suggest a values approach to climate change is necessary 
because of four reasons. Firstly, the existence of value pluralism means that climate 
change cannot be responded to in just one way. Secondly, in addressing climate change, 
value conflicts will arise. Thirdly, as values are temporal and dynamic today’s values will 
be different from those in future. Finally, climate change challenges us on a value level 
(O'Brien and Wolf, 2010). However, all these geographical approaches continue to 
conceptualise values in essentialist and structuralist ways. Departing from Hulme’s 
approach, this thesis takes a post-structural view of values, understanding values in more 
relational and political ways.  
Drawing from Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the thesis understands post-structuralism as an 
ontological and epistemological departure from essentialist claims to being and meaning. 
Post-structural ways of thinking disrupt the assumptions that underpin singular and 
naturalised claims to meaning and therefore the stability of dominant relations, and 
instead seek to demonstrate their constructed, contingent and contested condition. In 
doing so, conditions of plurality, multiplicity, contradiction and difference are 
foregrounded. It is suggested that a post-structural approach to thinking about values is 
important for three reasons. Firstly, by denying any singular, stable ground or reference 
point, yet at the same time recognising the passionate attachments and investments in 
particular discourses, a post-structuralist approach to values enables an examination of 
the value-commitments of particular discourses, whilst critiquing any final claim for 
closure. In effect, it re-claims territory for examining values critically and politically, 
whilst rejecting any essential, natural, stable, or final claim to meaning. Secondly, with 
environmental controversies such as climate change increasingly involving differences in 
value positions that are irreconcilable through appeals to science, a non-essential 
understanding of values offers the possibility of political space for values-based 
contestation along agonistic, rather than antagonistic, lines (c.f. Mouffe 2005 in which 
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agonism is defined as recognition of the legitimacy of positions of difference, and as such 
is dependent on non-essential claims). Thirdly, where anti-essentialist approaches have 
critiqued the concept of values (understood and evoked in essentialist terms) for closing 
down debate, boundary decisions over which discourses come to be positioned as 
values-rich, and which as value-free, escapes attention. This situation enables some 
discursive value framings to claim hegemonic power over others, unchallenged. Some 
way of discussing values that does not depend on essentialist claims is needed in order 
to render these boundary decisions subject to analysis. 
To this end the research takes a post-structuralist approach to investigate the politics of 
values and boundary work at the Scottish science–policy interface, exploring how 
questions of values and knowledge interact, and foregrounding questions of which 
values are enabled or disabled from circulating. In opening up these empirical questions, 
the theoretical problematic of re-conceptualizing values post-structurally becomes 
unavoidable. Building on O’Brien’s (2010) call for a broader interpretation of values than 
those defined in monetary worth but rejecting her understanding of values as 
“intrinsically desirable principles” (O'Brien and Wolf, 2010: 232), this thesis suggests that 
the political theory of Chantal Mouffe offers ways to think about values post-structurally, 
from which geographical thinking about values could benefit. Value plurality is a central 
tenet of Chantal Mouffe’s anti-essentialist approach, pushing us to think about values 
politically rather than morally or ethically (Mouffe, 2005b: 122). This is useful in 
developing an understanding of values that recognizes multiplicity and without relying 
on essentialised claims to right and wrong. Following Mouffe, this thesis suggests that 
values need to be thought in terms of political choices rather than intrinsic moral or 
ethical principles, for it is only in thinking values in non-essentialist ways that differences 
in values might take the relation of legitimate adversaries, about which there can be 
political debate. 
Existing research at the science–policy interface within boundary literatures has focused 
on the hybridity of knowledge and inseparability of fact from values (Miller, 2001a: 496; 
Wynne, 1979; Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 70; Jasanoff, 1990: vii; Backstrand, 2003: 38; 
van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 123; Jasanoff, 2003a: 160). However, greater attention has 
been given to the construction of scientific fact and objectivity, than to the construction 
and circulation of values.  In argumentative policy analysis, Shön (1983) and Rein and 
Shon (1993) both suggested that the persistence of complex social problems is due to 
“reconciling different value perspectives” (Head, 2008: 3). However, argumentative 
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policy studies moved away from the language of values because of its association with 
essentialist ways of thinking. Values, understood to be held by individuals, pre-existing 
discursive interactions, and often associated with moral or religious positions over right 
and wrong, were considered unhelpful as an analytical concept during wider 
foregrounding of discursive understandings of power and distributed notions of agency. 
The language of values therefore became replaced with a different language of 
discourse, frames and norms, which were considered to better reflect a constructivist 
and relational understanding of meaning. However, what this language fails to capture is 
the sense of why things matter to people (Sayer, 2011) and the passions embroiled in 
particular claims to meaning (Mouffe, 2005b).  
While the thesis remains grounded in STS approaches to science–policy boundary work, 
particular dimensions of Mouffe’s political thinking are explored to help re-think values, 
to foreground relationships between boundary work and hegemonic power, to focus 
attention on the political contingency of claims to meaning and the vibrant subjectivities 
and possibilities for alternatives from which these claims are never foreclosed. The shift 
away from essentialist understanding of values by argumentative science–policy scholars 
is an important move that should not be reneged, for mobilizing values in essentialist 
ways is problematic to the recognition of value plurality and the addressing of conflict 
(Mouffe, 2005b). Responding to the hybrid nature of discourse, it is argued, does not 
mean reasserting an essentialist pure notion of values any more than an essentialist pure 
notion of fact. Envisaging values, like facts, as constructed through processes of 
boundary work suggests that we should not accept their claim to purified essence (any 
more than we should accept the claims to purified fact) but instead, politically challenge 
the acts of power that try to fix these claims in static ways. 
 
1.1 Empirical focus and research questions 
These questions concerning the value commitments produced through processes and 
practices of boundary work are explored empirically through the case of Scottish climate 
science–policy interactions. Scotland’s climate science–policy interface underwent 
significant restructuring in 2011 with the establishment of a new Centre for Expertise in 
Climate Change Research called ClimateXChange (CXC). CXC’s goal is to establish a 
demand driven, rather than supply driven, relationship with scientific advice. The 
research focuses on CXC as a ‘boundary organization’ and the process of boundary work 
15 
 
CXC call ‘translation’. However to understand translation, it is also compared to other 
forms of boundary work at the Scottish climate science–policy interface.    
Examining the value politics involved in these processes of boundary work is pursued 
through the following research questions: 
1. How do values and knowledge interact during processes of boundary work at 
the climate science–policy interface in Scotland?  
 
2. Through what processes is legitimacy constructed for particular discursive 
value framings through boundary work?  
 
3. What effects do different processes of boundary work have on the types of 
policy action being considered in response to climate change? 
These questions were developed partly in response to previous experiences as a climate 
change policy practitioner and partly through theoretical engagement with science–
policy boundary literatures. As fieldwork progressed, three conceptual themes – values, 
translation and legitimation – began to shape the research and the narrative produced. 
The specific conceptual approach to each of these thematic concepts is discussed in 
section 2.6 and they provide the framework for conclusions in section 8.1. 
 
1.2 Unsettling climate change as a scientific problem 
Climate change is generally framed within policy and media settings as a scientific 
problem, amenable (with greater scientific knowledge) to various forms of organizational 
management that render it governable (Hoppe, 2010: 109). Diverse forms of 
(predominantly) natural but also social scientific research tend to be funnelled through 
computerized climate impact models that Sundberg argues have “become gatekeepers 
for claims about climate change” (2007: 473). This has led climate policy at many 
governance levels to turn to scientific advice in the development of policy responses, and 
development of a wide range of ‘boundary organisations’ to promote, perform and 
manage knowledge circulation between science and policy. However, many science–
policy theorists have pointed to the error of assuming a deficit of knowledge is at stake 
(Crow and Boykoff, 2014; Backstrand, 2003; Irwin et al., 1996), and some have also 
demonstrated that other forms of knowledge are also important (Jasanoff, 2010; Owens 
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et al., 2006). Although many practitioners recognise that scientific knowledge is only one 
among many components of decision-making, the predominant sources of information 
cited in public discourses still frame climate change in scientific terms, and science is 
looked to as a provider of answers to policy challenges (Miller, 2001a: 479; Hulme, 2008: 
5; Hoppe, 2010: 109; Demeritt, 2001; Dilling and Lemos, 2011). 
Framing climate change as a scientific problem evokes particular ontological and 
epistemological commitments. Despite diversity within scientific practices, narratives of 
science often rely on evoking neutrality and universality. As Jasanoff highlighted back in 
1987, “much of the authority of science in the twentieth century rests as well on its 
success in persuading decision-makers and the public that the Mertonian norms present 
an accurate picture of the way science 'really works'.” (1987: 196). In the thirty years 
since, despite many STS accounts of science challenging this value neutrality and 
revealing its careful construction (Jasanoff, 2012a), public and practitioner discourses 
around science continue to rely on ideas of neutrality. Climate science in particular, 
because of its disruptive implications for established interests, often finds its own 
epistemic neutrality the focus for attacks funded by those whose interests are 
threatened (Mann, 2013; Goldenberg, 2013). Under such circumstances it is 
understandable that climate scientists focus on re-asserting epistemic neutrality and 
consensus findings. Scientific approaches and knowledges that are open to contestation 
within science become hardened through presentation to non-scientific audiences. 
Further, they often become used by policy practitioners to try to ground policy responses 
in terms not open for political debate in order to guard against domination of policy by 
interests (Hajer, 1993: 57). In this way positivist understandings of science as neutral 
knowledge have benefitted the authoritative standing of both science and policy 
(Jasanoff, 2003b; Owens, 2012: 15). However, this rests on an opposition between 
interests and neutrality that obscures questions of values. Values and interests have 
become conflated in the struggle to assert neutrality. These claims to neutrality are 
thereby central not only to science but also to boundary and policy actors in the 
construction of climate change policy responses, such that as Hajer describes, “decision 
making cannot be based on social concern; it has to be legitimised through scientific 
discourse” (1993: 58).  
However conflicting anxieties are arising over the role of science in decision-making 
based on these tensions over neutrality. Scientists who wish to uphold a value free ideal 
(Wilhere et al., 2012) perceive neutrality as being under threat from an increase in mode 
17 
 
2 or ‘post-normal’ science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b) where science is increasingly 
being drawn into answering values questions (see Jasanoff, 2003b: 235). Post-normal 
scientific challenges are those in which the “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes 
high and decisions urgent”(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a: 86). In these cases, of which 
climate change is an example, the traditional fact-value distinction is unable to be upheld 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994: 1884) and uncertainty, diverse values, and plurality of 
legitimate perspectives are profiled (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003). At the same time, 
claims for neutrality are considered culpable in the de-politicisation of political questions, 
by Foucauldian science–policy theorists (Litfin, 1994; Hajer, 1993: 68-69), STS scholars 
(Jasanoff, 1996; Jasanoff, 2004; Jasanoff, 2008) and post-political theorists 
(Swyngedouw, 2010; Mouffe, 2005a), who all draw attention to the utilisation of science 
in de-politicising political debate. These theorists alert us to observations that debates 
over values are being played out through debates over facts (Litfin, 1994: 35) and that 
the “predominance of a managerial logic in all aspects of life” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 225). 
Reducing political questions to technical and administrative ones, is “reinforcing the 
boundaries that allow value judgements to be reduced into technical puzzles” (Lövbrand, 
2007: 45). As Kenis and Mathijs suggest framing climate change in terms of measurable 
volumes of carbon dioxide conveniently “narrows the debate to ignore the human-
societal root causes… and focus on technical solutions that remain within the parameters 
of what currently exists” (2014: 151).  
Far from insulating policy from interests, this vision of neutrality is obscuring attention to 
both which, and whose, values are being constructed as neutral. Addressing climate 
change involves highly political future-orientated values questions that are too important 
to be blinded by constant defence of neutrality, especially given the role of particular 
neoliberal hegemonic values in causing the climate change problem (Parr, 2014; Newell, 
2011; Newell and Paterson, 2010). Jorgensen and Phillips (2002: 37) suggest that the 
problem of emphasizing a scientific framing for climate change is science’s claim to 
objectivity that naturalises their truth claim, obscures the contingency of such claims, 
and denies possibility of alternatives; "Objectivity can therefore be said to be ideological” 
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 37). Further, while scientific knowledge has focused on 
demonstrating consensus over scientific knowledge (in order to build sufficient collective 
weight of opinion to initiate a political response), responding to scientific knowledge of 
climate change involves political decisions that concern differences in values that cannot 
be resolved inclusively through consensus (Goeminne, 2012; Hulme, 2015). Instead, 
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certain values are shaping climate policy futures whilst others are being excluded. As 
Pielke highlights, “science has exceedingly little capacity to reconcile differences in 
values” (2007: 137).  While his suggestion that “where value conflict exists, political 
debate thrives” (2007: 137) resonates with Mouffe’s approach, this PhD research is 
mindful of Jasanoff’s critique of Pielke’s oversimplification of science–policy interaction 
(Jasanoff, 2008). Further, his favouritism of the role of science as an honest broker 
retains the scientific ideal of value-free science.  
Rather than advocate for any one mode of science–policy interaction over another, as 
Pielke does, this PhD thesis attends to the politics of different forms of scientific 
boundary work – especially where an honest broker role is being claimed. During 
boundary work, knowledge, values and legitimacy are constructed through relations of 
power which privilege some discursive value framings over others and it is these 
relations that the thesis seeks to further understand. In particular, it is suggested that 
science has developed a resonant relationship with neoliberalism, understood as a 
contested family of approaches that favour markets over governments, liberalization and 
individual responsibility (Harvey, 2005: 2; Moore et al., 2011: 508). This relationship is 
less through any natural affinity, and more through their mutual co-production (Moore 
et al., 2011; Lave et al., 2010) and the increasing reliance on scientific authority under 
deregulation (Jasanoff, 2011a: 632; 1987; 1990). This produces “technical and 
administrative machinaries… based on narrow and dominatory scientific rationalism” 
(Healey, 1993: 233). Recognising both the neoliberal character of science and the failure 
of a science, that never was neutral, to proof policy from the influence of interests, this 
thesis seeks to disrupt these claims to neutrality and instead revive the value politics of 
science and of decision-making. This contributes to the work of a community of scholars 
who highlight processes through which science–policy interactions serve neoliberal 
agendas (Lave et al., 2010; Hess, 2013; Jasanoff, 2003b) whilst nevertheless recognizing 
that science’s role is not pre-fixed but “may be political or anti-political in its 
implications” (Barry, 2007: 290).  
 
1.3 Revisiting values 
There have been particularly significant revivals of interest within broader post-structural 
social science and political theory to conceptualising values differently - in recent work 
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by Latour (2013c) and the political theory of Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe, 2005b; Mouffe, 
2005a; Mouffe, 1999; Mouffe, 2002; Mouffe, 2013). Latour suggests: 
“I am all too well aware that the words ‘value’ and ‘institution’ can be 
frightening… What! Go back to values?... But isn’t this what we’ve finally 
gotten away from, what we’ve done away with, what we’ve learned to 
fight and even to dismiss with scorn?... the scope of the ecological crisis 
obliges us to reconsider a whole set of reactions, or rather conditioned 
reflexes… can certain of the concepts that we have learned to cherish be 
offered the opportunity for a type of development that the much too 
narrow framework of modernization has not given them?”(Latour, 2013c: 
7-8). 
 
In introducing his recent book An Enquiry into Modes of Existence Latour describes his 
task as “an inquiry into values” (2013c: 16) and concludes, “values, if they are not to 
disappear, have to be diplomatically negotiated” (2013c: 481). It is in this task of 
rethinking values that this thesis is interested. Yet it is not to Latour that the thesis turns 
primarily but the political theory of Chantal Mouffe for whom the plurality of values has 
had a longer centrality. Mouffe described that she and Latour (her good friend) agree on 
many things except she foregrounds question of hegemony which Latour admits his work 
does not well engage (Mouffe, 2012: online). In considering the discursive interactions of 
values through boundary work in this thesis, questions of power and hegemony are 
considered central to this analysis into values. The thesis contributes to the engagement 
of science–policy debates on climate change with Mouffe’s work, which has already 
begun to receive attention through the work of Hulme (2015) Machin (2013), Stephan et 
al. (2013), Goeminne (2012) and Chilvers (2008).  
So how might values be thought differently? Drawing from Mouffe’s deployment of 
values as relational, collective and political (section 2.5.2), this thesis understands values 
as relational orientations to the future that are neither fixed, nor pre-exist discursive 
interaction, neither individual, nor questions of right and wrong. Instead values are 
collective political choices, about what matters, with which we identify differently, and 
to which we come to hold passionate attachment. Inevitably discursively constituted, 
values hold a sticky, affectual attachment for those who align themselves politically with 
their reproduction. This sets values apart from rationalities or interests, which 
foreground rationality and instrumentality in their subjective connections. Values involve 
a commitment and an orientation towards action that fixes normative claims over the 
way things should be. Seeing values as relational processes of prioritisation, and as 
attachments to outcomes, enables values to be seen as political battlegrounds through 
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which particular realities are produced. Conflict around values is not eradicable, but 
necessary to the functioning of democratic responses to climate change (Machin, 2013; 
Hulme, 2015; Bayard and Clark, 1996: 138; Mouffe, 2005b: 122). In contrast bracketing 
out values from official narratives removes them from political debate (Sayer, 2011).   
The concept of values is preferred over interest because values extend to a broader 
range of meanings that we might hold to matter, and about which we may seek to act 
politically, without these necessarily being self-benefiting. Science and technology 
controversies are “increasingly framed as moral rather than as merely technical 
disputes” (Nelkin, 1992), and many argue that appealing to moral and ethical principles 
are the last grounds through which addressing climate change might be approached. 
Mouffe argues that it is vital not to understand values in moral or ethical terms, for these 
construct essentialist claims that reduce possibility for agonistic political expression 
(Mouffe, 2005b: 122; Mouffe, 2002: 11). Understanding climate change in terms of moral 
disputes frames problems in terms of right and wrong, which develop situations of 
antagonism with little compromise (section 2.5.2). It is precisely framing values as 
essential moral positions in opposition to rational scientific findings that has constructed 
science in such a strong position to be draughted in to “resolve” otherwise impassable 
disputes. It is in challenging this binary opposition, and the essentialist claim of values, 
that reclaiming a political space for values based debate might be achieved.  
Conceiving values as contingent political choices rather than essentialist battlegrounds 
enables refocusing of attention onto the political nature of decision-making, without 
evoking finalising claims of science or morality from which no legitimate alternatives 
might be envisioned. Understanding climate change in value terms constructs it as a far 
more difficult problem concerning the human-environmental relationship, than a 
management problem requiring more scientific knowledge, and one with even less 
certainty that any form of resolution is possible, let alone desirable. However, it does at 
least leave space for hope that as diverse and often divided global communities, we will 
be facing the difficulty of the matter head on and facing the decisions and consequences 
climate change is likely to bring, in all their political ramifications. As Castree suggested, 
“policy is too political – too much about power and values – to be simply passed off as a 
domain of technical judgements and practices” (2002: 360).  
Mouffe’s definition of hegemony as “the collapse of objectivity and power” (Mouffe, 
2000: 14) provides an important tool with which to contest claims to neutrality. 
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Hegemonic discourses stake a claim to neutrality that positions them as stable (therefore 
resistant to change); naturalised (therefore unquestionable and held outside of the space 
of political debate); and standing for the collective (therefore unified and universal). The 
fact that questions of values become an ‘elephant in the room’ for practitioners and 
academic analysis alike is convenient to the maintenance of hegemony, something which 
relies on the continued collapse of objectivity and power. Pointing to the values 
implicated within all discourses, but particularly those that claim to be natural and 
neutral, serves to disrupt any claim to objectivity and associated natural claim to power. 
Positioning these naturalized neutral claims instead as particular values that have 
achieved a degree of hegemonic power, enables them to be problematized as contingent 
and open to political debate. This helps to expose their value orientations and inverts 
structuralist approaches to values, which would tend to naturalise, fix and essentialise. 
Attention to the value dimensions of discourses can therefore serve as a tool of post-
structural critique, but only if values themselves are understood in post-structural terms.  
In this thesis, when examining the discursive circulation of particular values through 
processes of science–policy boundary work, the concept of ‘discursive value framing’ is 
deployed in order to distance the concept of values in the thesis from its traditional 
lineage. The concept of discursive value framing provides a temporary resting point in 
the process of rethinking values post-structurally, emphasizing both the relational, 
constructive discursive practices through which values emerge, and the inseparability of 
discourses from value orientations. It foregrounds the value commitments framed and 
embodied in discourses in ways which attend more to the stickiness of why some 
discourses matter and become the focus of passionate attachment than does the 
concept of discourse alone. 
 
1.4 A geographical approach to the value politics of  
boundary work  
The thesis approaches climate change and values through the discipline of human 
geography, which has long had society-nature and environmental interactions as a 
prevailing theme (Aspinall, 2010: 715; Castree, 2002: 357). As well as a thematically 
integrating role, taking a geographical approach offers spatial sensitivity and opens up a 
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particular set of critical questions around power, difference and inequality that attend to 
marginalized voices and context specific productions of power.  
Geographical research pays particular attention to ways of problem framing (O'Brien, 
2010) that foreground the situated provisional and partial nature of knowledge - seeking 
to contest a view from nowhere and related universalizing narratives and instead to 
situate and contextualize claims and reveal the contexts that shape both processes and 
outcomes (O'Brien, 2010). As recent approaches to systems of top-down global 
negotiations, quantification and trading of carbon are falling short on delivery (Pielke Jr, 
2009; Hoffmann, 2011: 155) and geographers are joining other science–policy scholars 
such as Jasanoff (2010) to draw attention to the way that scientific epistemologies 
addressing climate change through global universalizing and abstract knowledge 
generates placeless knowledge segmented from a wider whole and devoid of local 
meaning (Hulme, 2008: 8; Hulme, 2010). Demeritt (2001) has called for greater reflexive 
understanding of the role of science as a situated social activity and, together with 
Jasanoff (2010) Wynne (2010) and Hulme has expressed concerns about the way in 
which scientific knowledge generates detached ways of relating to climate change 
(Hulme, 2010; Demeritt, 2001). Such distancing fails to generate ownership of the 
climate change problem (Wynne, 2010) and encourages us to act as spectators 
(Demeritt, 2001). Attending to the situated production of meaning for scientific 
knowledge plays an important role in developing attention to differences in what 
matters to whom, where, why and when.   
Critical human geography in particular also embraces the tensions generated through 
sticky social situatedness that renders geographical knowledge always related to the 
world. It is in this sense that “critical scholarship realizes its role in society not to blindly 
reproduce existing social orders, but to create the conditions in which progressive 
change can occur” (Bauder and Mauro, 2008: 1). Political geographers join political 
scientists and international relations scholars to highlight a lack of attention to capitalism 
and/or neoliberalism as hegemonic powers in relation to climate change (Newell, 2011; 
Newell and Paterson, 2010; Parr, 2014; Head and Gibson, 2012). These approaches 
profile socio-economic and political questions about relationships with oil, capital and 
profit, international governance initiatives (such as the creation of voluntary carbon 
markets, carbon offsetting and clean development mechanisms), and modes of 
privatizing resource governance on a macro scale. Some geographers have taken this 
critique in the direction of highlighting detachment of climate change from political 
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economic responsibilities for emissions (Neumayer, 2000) while others concentrate on 
fairness and justice in the differentiated abilities to adapt (Adger et al., 2006; O'Brien et 
al., 2007; Moser, 2010). As O’Brien suggests, understanding climate change requires 
more than the physical science of biophysical processes and impacts, but 
“calls for recognition of multiple perspectives on human-environment 
relationships, alternative economic pathways, changing constellations of 
power, new modes of politics, and differing ways of approaching the 
future” (O’Brien, 2010: 3).  
 
At the heart of this PhD research is an interrogation of the role of scientific boundary 
work in shaping the types of discursive value framings that circulate in climate science–
policy debates, in order that they might be recognized as partial not total, politically 
contingent not necessary or natural and as a result open to challenge – as the opening 
quote of this chapter suggests. Taking a geographical approach firstly places emphasis on 
the situated processes through which meaning for climate knowledge is historically and 
spatially constructed (Liverman, 1999), which is important in a Laclau and Mouffe 
discourse theory approach (Howarth, 2000). Secondly, geography brings an empirical 
focus - attending to the specificities of process and questions of how constitutions in 
practice operate, with what effect. Thirdly, translation as a concept implies spatial 
movement, re-location and change yet it is perhaps surprising that theoretical 
engagements with translation as a concept have (with the exception of Sidaway, 2008) 
predominantly occurred outside geographical debates. Taking a geographic approach to 
translation focuses on designations of similarity and difference and implications of power 
in the how such boundaries are constructed. Finally, a geographic approach opens up 
critical questions around the politics of values with a concern for marginalization in the 
context of specific productions of hegemonic power.  
In taking a geographical approach the research contributes to deconstructing the 
workings of neoliberal hegemony at the small-scale of science–policy knowledge 
interaction, and seeks to explore potential for politically claiming spaces of difference in 
the micro-scales of science–policy practice. As Head and Gibson (2012) suggest, 
geography is particularly suited to combining deconstruction with generative and 
creative thinking beyond ‘modern’ categories (which I argue, extends to values), to 
explore practically the ramifications of thinking in relational and non-modern ways. This 
is a point of proposed resonance between a geographical approach and Chantal Mouffe’s 
emphasis on both de-articulation and re-articulation. With Mouffe’s emphasis on the 
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contingency and partiality of claims to meaning, and an implicit spatiality in her approach 
to legitimacy that is unexplored (Sziarto, 2008: 410), this PhD suggests there is a 
resonance between Mouffe’s work and geographical thought that merits further 
engagement.  
 
1.5 Contributions  
Through attending to the politics of discursive value framings as they are produced and 
reproduced through different boundary work practices, the following contributions are 
made to thinking about translation, values and legitimacy at the science–policy interface.  
1. Firstly, an argument is developed that CXC translation (as a particular form of 
boundary work) is a practice through which the hegemonic discursive value 
framings within policy are reproduced.  
 
2. Secondly, the thesis suggests that Mouffe’s approach to values is helpful in 
starting to scope out how values might be rethought post-structurally and 
suggests that destabilizing claims to neutrality and universality are helpful in 
hegemonic critique. 
 
3. Thirdly the thesis contributes to thinking about how legitimacy is constructed 
through boundary work. While legitimacy is found to be constructed in different 
ways through multiple and interacting forms of boundary working, in the case of 
CXC’s translation, legitimacy is constructed through the discursive value framings 
of policy. This demonstrates legitimacy being constructed through the 
translation as well as purification processes of boundary work. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is made up of eight chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 introduces 
the theoretical debates underpinning the thesis, and outlines moments of critique or 
intersection that have prompted and orientated this research. The chapter begins by 
reviewing two important science–policy literatures that provide a theoretical home for 
the research – argumentative policy analysis and STS boundary work – engaging with 
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their approach to values and to legitimacy and identifying strengths and challenges in 
each approach. The second half of the chapter introduces the political theory of Chantal 
Mouffe and opens up a theoretical framework for the thesis that draws attention to the 
concepts of translation, values and legitimacy in science–policy boundary work. Chapter 
3 discusses the methodological approach to the research including formulation of the 
research idea within a practitioner context, the theoretical influences on methodology 
and the challenges encountered in conducting research on values. 
Empirically this concern with values, legitimacy and boundary work is explored through 
examination of the processes of boundary working occurring at the science–policy 
interface in Scotland. Chapter 4 contextualizes and orientates the reader, both to the 
context of Scotland where the empirical research took place and also to the narratives 
and operations of science–policy boundary work upon which this research has been 
based. This chapter draws on empirical research as well as desk-based review, to open 
up some political questions around the model of science–policy interaction pursued in 
Scotland at a broad level, in preparation for the closer attention to boundary work in the 
three main empirical chapters. 
The main empirical chapters then focus on a detailed examination of one or more 
processes of boundary work in action. Chapters 5 and 6 focus primarily on workings of 
ClimateXChange – a mainstream organizational process for engaging with climate science 
initiated by the Scottish Government while Chapter 7 looks at several more ad-hoc 
boundary interactions. Chapter 5 first considers the discursive emphasis on translation 
by CXC and compares it to other forms of science–policy boundary work by other 
boundary actors such as knowledge brokerage, science communication and co-
production. It is argued that positioning boundary work as a process of translation is 
significant in the context of Scotland’s emphasis on policy responsive science, and that 
translation performs discursive work in shaping the practices of boundary work to 
privilege the audience’s discursive value frameworks of meaning. Using Laclau and 
Mouffe’s concept of the logics of equivalence, it is argued, helps to understand this 
emphasis on audience in ways not captures by STS translation narratives. Chapter 6 then 
focuses on the specific call-down function that is a signature of CXC’s translation work 
and considers how legitimacy for knowledge is constructed through the processes of the 
call-down itself. Building on Leigh Star’s emphasis that boundary objects such as the 
briefing reports produced through the call-down service need to generate meaning for 
both sides of the science–policy boundary, chapter six suggests that while this dual 
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accountability (1989) is necessary, the pull of each side need not be equal. It is suggested 
that ‘successful’ translation involves the generation of knowledge with meaning that 
resonate with the policy audience’s dominant discursive value framing. Chapter 7 then 
explores alternative forms of boundary interaction out with those being termed 
translation. Alternative collections of boundary practices driven by passionate boundary 
actors are establishing different types of science–policy relationship that construct claims 
to legitimacy differently and hold potential to open up different ‘discursive value 
framings’. The successes or failures of these approaches as alternatives are then 
discussed.   
Engaging with values through the ‘discursive value framings’ enabled or disabled in each 
case of boundary working, leads to a final discussion in chapter eight that offers 
reflections on whether a return to values is helpful in critically engaging with the politics 
of boundary work, and on the usefulness of Mouffe’s political theory in complementing 
existing science–policy approaches. Here, some limits to Mouffe’s work are identified, 
for which it is suggested the benefits of interaction between STS and Mouffe’s political 
theory might work both ways. In particular Jasanoff’s work on wider forms of reasoning 
could extend Mouffe’s theoretical applicability to science–policy interaction. A number 
of avenues for further research are also indicated, arising from the research, that open 
up productive research opportunities. 
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 Chapter 2.
Theorising Science–policy Interaction:  
Debates over Values and Legitimacy 
 
Values and legitimacy are the subject of much theoretical discussion in science–policy 
literatures, but rarely in combination. In seeking to develop greater attention to specific 
relations between values and legitimacy, this chapter situates the thesis within two 
important traditions of science policy theorization – those of the argumentative turn and 
STS boundary work. Argumentative studies within environmental governance debates 
focus on the way that science is drawn into processes and practices of governance, while 
STS boundary literatures focus on boundaries between science and policy as constructed 
by science and policy actors alike (Owens, 2012: 8). Within both literatures a diversity of 
questions are asked of the science–policy interface from different theoretical traditions. 
This thesis draws particularly from Foucauldian environmental governance approaches, 
such as work of Hajer and Litfin and STS approaches that respond to a Latourian 
tradition, such as those of Jasanoff and Miller. In doing so, an argument is made for the 
addition of Chantal Mouffe’s approach to values, legitimacy and hegemony in thinking 
about the politics of boundary work. Together these three literatures form the 
theoretical framework for the thesis. During these discussions, the concepts of values, 
legitimation and translation are drawn into particular focus. 
As specified in Chapter 1, this thesis reinterprets the concept of values through the 
device of ‘discursive value framing’ to separate the approach to values being taken from 
essentialist and structuralist notions of values. Discursive value framings are simply 
discourses in which the value commitments, and orientations towards particular 
outcomes have been foregrounded. Instead of starting from questions of what values 
are, or where they come from – which search for an essence – this thesis starts from the 
position that values are inseparable from discourse and have particular future-orientated 
effects (as outlined in section 1.3). Importantly, this inseparability does not assume that 
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connections between particular discourses and particular outcomes are necessary, pre-
established or singular in their possibilities, rather that discourses are made to work 
towards particular value outcomes through on-going performative claims over meaning, 
which could always be otherwise. In this process values are conceived as emergent 
through discourse and practice, in constant challenge and flux, but nevertheless sticky in 
their affectual relation1 (for further discussion on opening up the ‘affectual’ quality of 
legitimacy and values for future research see chapters 7 and 8). Discursive value 
framings, offer a way of talking about discourse that captures why discourses matter to 
people (Sayer, 2011), around and through which, gather the passions that Mouffe argues 
animate political collective forms of identification (Mouffe, 2000). This approach to 
thinking about values has been developed through engagement with the three main 
bodies of literature indicated above – STS boundary work, argumentative policy analysis 
and Mouffe’s political theory.  
Many recent science–policy approaches consider interaction in terms of policy needs 
(Cash et al., 2002) or supply and demand (Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). This research takes 
a contrasting stance, instead joining Hess, Jasanoff and others, it suggests we need to be 
critical of the way in which science–policy approaches might lose their critical stance. 
Arguing that values have been decentred but not eradicated from science–policy 
debates, this thesis suggests that even after the decentring of values in post-structural 
science–policy approaches, there is still need to attend to the value commitments of 
discourses, frames, storylines and narratives and to the boundary practices that enable 
particular discursive value framings to circulate. However in this task, further attention is 
required to theorise values post-structurally. The political theory of Chantal Mouffe 
offers one such approach to thinking about values post-structurally. As will be shown 
Mouffe offers attention to questions of legitimacy and power that in many ways 
complements existing approaches within science–policy studies. Mouffe’s foregrounding 
of the specific relation between rationality, legitimacy and hegemony in the context of 
her emphasis on value pluralism, is suggested to provide one possibility through which 
science–policy’s critical edge might be revitalized and enable questions around values to 
be thought politically rather than rationally or morally. Mouffe’s approach offers a 
                                                          
1
 Affect is understood here in terms of the emotional relational influences on the capacity to act and be acted upon that 
Gregg and Siegworth (2010) describe in their opening passage to their ‘Affect Theory Reader‘. Notions of affect in many 
ways haunt the chapters of this thesis but further engagement with these literatures is considered outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
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helpful avenue through which to explore values post-structurally, signalling that although 
values might be evoked as essentialist and naturalized concepts, their meaning is 
nevertheless always politically fixed through discursive processes. 
 
This chapter develops this argument by discussing firstly how values have been 
understood and/or problematized by environmental governance and STS boundary work 
literatures (sections 2.1 to 2.3), and then how legitimacy is conceived in both science–
policy approaches (section 2.4). Whilst the thesis seeks to build forward from these 
literatures in thinking about science policy interaction, it also seeks to problematise 
elements of both approaches.  These critiques are developed through the text but are 
summarised in section 2.5, where implications for de-politicisation through science is 
discussed. Section 2.6 introduces the work of Chantal Mouffe to complement and extend 
work by STS scholars such as Shiela Jasanoff who attend to the intricate relations 
between value plurality, processes of legitimation, and boundary work. Finally, section 
2.7 pulls these theoretical influences together to define the theoretical framework for 
the thesis. 
 
2.1 Values in environmental governance literatures: from 
explanatory tools to values in paradox 
Environmental governance literatures have in the last two decades been little interested 
in values as an analytical category, largely due to the rise of Foucauldian discourse-
centred approaches that criticised essentialist understandings of values as a source of 
explanation. A concept of values was prominent in the early work of Fischer (1980), 
Sabatier (1987) and Haas (1989). Sabatier and Hass in particular argued that groups of 
actors coalesce around shared values: scientific actors form epistemic communities 
around shared sets of principles (Haas, 1989: 385) and policy actors form  ‘advocacy 
coalitions’ with those who share similar values and causal problem framings (Sabatier, 
1987: 663). Both advocacy and epistemic community approaches share a structuralist 
understanding of values: pre-existing interactions, relatively static and resistant to 
change (Sabatier, 1987: 663). They offered explanation for policy change or patterns of 
behaviour that tended towards top down explanations implying coherence and 
permanence in values (whether held by individuals or within policy systems). These 
approaches are part of a wider realist approach to knowledge and power in which the 
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basic attributes of a problem are seen as stable characteristics. A linear model of science 
and policy is assumed, in which knowledge and science hold a neutral role and are 
thought only to be used politically by policy (Sabatier, 1987).  
With the ‘argumentative turn’ attention was increasingly focused on the role of 
language, argumentation and discourse in policy making (Majone, 1989; Fischer and 
Forester, 1993; Litfin, 1994; Hajer, 1995; Rein and Shon, 1993). Drawing from Bourdieu’s 
recognition that how we talk about things helps to bring them about (Healey, 1993: 244), 
these authors argued that language not just describes, but also creates the world (Hajer: 
44). Processes of argumentation establish narratives (Kaplan, 1993) or storylines (Hajer, 
1995) that “not only solve but formulate problems” (Fischer and Forester, 1993: 14). 
Utilising notions of framing, Hajer showed that much of the struggle around 
environmental conflicts was around how the problem becomes defined (1995: 22), and 
how other actors become positioned through discourse (1995: 53). Application of 
Foucauldian understanding of the co-production of knowledge and power (Litfin, 1994), 
foregrounded relationships between language, practice and meaning in ways that 
generated a paradigm change (Kuhn 1962) in understanding science–policy interaction. 
This demonstrated that meaning was discursively constituted, de-centred actors in 
favour of discourses, and put the neutrality and objectivity of science in question.  
In these literatures, however questions of values developed an increasingly uneasy place.  
On one hand, a Foucauldian emphasis on the intricacies of practice (Hajer, 1995: 47) 
often emphasized the value-laden nature of policymaking, of science, and of science–
policy interaction (Majone, 1989; Fischer and Forester, 1993; Rein and Shon, 1993). Yet 
at the same time, the increasingly Foucauldian post-structuralist aversion to causality 
(Hajer, 1995: 47) also meant that values, which were associated with a realist ontology, 
lost purchase as an analytical category. Within these discussions nevertheless lie 
foundations for thinking about a more relational view of values that will be briefly 
outlined. 
Majone emphasized values in policy making, refuting any notion of policy as objective 
and scientific, and instead emphasised argumentation in which “to say anything of 
importance in public policy requires value judgments” (1989: 222). Majone described the 
way that values are bound to problem definition (1989: 58) measurement standards 
(Majone, 1989: 59), decision making processes and policy-instruments which are seldom 
“ideologically or “distributionally” neutral (Majone, 1989: 116-117). In so doing, Majone 
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moved the notion of values some way towards a relational ontology, foregrounding the 
on-going processes of valuing, in which values become formed through “persuasive 
interchange” (1989: 8). He suggested that “these values are neither given nor constant, 
but are themselves a function of the policy making process that they are supposed to 
guide” (1989: 24). Following Majone, values were also emphasised in the formation of 
narratives and storylines (Kaplan, 1993: 172; Forester, 1993: 199) and discursive frames 
(Rein and Shon, 1993: 145). Rein and Shon in particular suggest that disputes 
“cannot be understood in terms of the familiar separation of questions of 
value from questions of fact, for the participants construct the problems… 
through frames in which facts, values, theories and interests are 
integrated” (1993: 145).   
 
This inability to distinguish fact from value in discursive practice means that forms of 
argumentation are described as “inescapably both normative and descriptive” as they 
“express or resist broader relations of power and belief” (Fischer and Forester, 1993: 14).  
As Forester emphasises stories “are not just idle talk; they do work. They do work by 
organizing attention, practically and politically” (Forester, 1993: 195).  
Drawing on Foucauldian approaches to knowledge and power and Rein and Shon’s 
concept of framing, Litfin examined the way in which particular scientific knowledges 
prefigured particular types of policy response. Litfin first emphasizes the falsity of 
separating science as fact and policy as values, emphasizing that scientists as much as 
policy makers act in relation to values (1994: 33).  Secondly, she emphasizes that science 
is drafted in on both sides of a dispute to harden existing political positions which tend to 
be around political values (1994: 186), arguing that “epistemic community approaches 
downplay – almost to the point of neglect – the ways in which scientific information 
simply rationalizes or reinforces existing political conflicts” (Litfin, 1994: 12). Thirdly, she 
argues that the way in which debates on values become rehearsed is through debates 
over facts, 
“no matter what values underlie a controversy, the debates generally 
focus on technical questions; questions of value become framed as 
questions of fact” (1994: 35). 
 
Central to her critique around the role of science in policy legitimation is the way in 
which political value debates come to be framed in scientific terms (1994: 4). In these 
three ways, Litfin highlights the inextricability of values from discursive practice. These 
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literatures all emphasise the inseparability of values from facts in discourse and indicate 
values as an orientation towards particular outcomes over others. 
Yet at the same time challenging the premise that values were shared was central to 
Hajer's (1995) critique of advocacy coalitions, and Litfin's (1994) critique of epistemic 
communities. For Hajer, both the development of actor coalitions and discourse 
development could not be explained through values. He demonstrated that coalitions of 
actors occurred around collective discursive storylines in which values were not 
necessarily shared (1995:13), emphasizing that such discourses are not coherent (1995: 
44), but fragmentary, contradictory and evolving with diverse problem definitions (1995: 
15). Through the example of ecological modernisation he argued that public discourses 
are not predefined, with clearly defined actors and storylines, but are instead a complex 
and continuous struggle over problem definition (1995:15) in which discourses emerge, 
and are not pre-envisaged (1995: 29). There were, he argued, no grand guiding 
narratives, no orchestrated attempts to put ecological modernization at the centre of 
discursive debates, but instead, inter-subjective discursive struggles resulting in 
incremental shifts in meaning, in which success of one discourse over another is a 
product of seemingly trivial micro-practices (Hajer 1995: 267-8). Similarly, Litfin criticised 
the vagueness around what is actually shared in epistemic communities, pointing to 
multiple instances of bonding within disciplines with little consensus (Litfin, 1994: 47).  
Hajer’s approach in particular was seminal in moving understanding of environmental 
politics away from realist notions, not only of values but also of meaning, emphasizing 
the way in which, although actors may share storylines, one discourse could offer many 
different meanings to different groups (1995: 13). With values understood within a 
psychology and economics intellectual heritage as individually held, prior to interaction 
and unchanging, the notion of values made little sense in examining discursive practices 
of meaning making. The terminology of values therefore became sidelined in favour of a 
new language of discourse, frames, storylines and narratives that better encapsulated 
the social construction of meaning.  
Hajer’s foregrounding of discourse, and his attention to the fragmentary, contradictory, 
and relational struggles over meaning, in which values are not pre-existent or shared, 
provides an important foundation for this thesis in understanding discursive struggle. 
However, his approach to values remains ambiguous. A close reading of Hajer’s text 
reveals that his main objection to Sabatier was not the presence of values per se, but 
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rather the individualist and realist ontology that suggests that values and beliefs are pre-
given and fixed in advance of discursive interactions. Hajer suggests instead that people 
have ‘value positions’: 
“People are not seen as holding stable values but as having vague 
contradictory and unstable ‘value positions’. New discourses may alter 
existing cognitive commitments and thus influence the values and beliefs 
of actors, for instance because new storylines create new cognitions that 
may give people a new idea about their potential role and the possibility 
for change (i.e. new subject and structure positions)” (1995: 71). 
 
Here values are not expunged altogether, but adapted into ‘value positions’ reflecting 
their relational qualities and enabling values to be thought non-essentially – as positions, 
temporarily held, that are always unstable and not necessarily coherent across 
interactions. Further, Hajer draws on a notion of ‘discourse affinity’ to describe the way 
in which particular discourses hold appeal for some actors over others (1995:66-67). 
Discourse affinity moves reasons for discourse selection away from individualist choice 
or logical deduction, and instead hints towards the way in which affiliation with a 
storyline is based on it “sounding right” (Hajer 1995:66- 67). In other places Hajer refers 
to actors who are “for various reasons (!) are attracted to a specific (set of) story lines.” 
(Hajer, 1995: 65). Here, the exclamation mark suggests at least some form of 
acknowledgement of the ambiguity in not accounting for why individuals are attracted to 
particular discourses over others. This void in what discursive affinity describes, warrants 
further attention. It is possible to read discourse attraction in terms of potential for 
serving interests, however this reduces people (both individually and collectively) to 
acting as rational, self-interested actors. Instead this opens up potential to further 
develop a relational notion of values, displaced but not eradicated in Hajer’s work, which 
Hajer does not develop.  
Difficulties concerning the attachment and affinity to some discourses over others have 
seen recent attempts to reference to values again within discourse coalition approaches 
(Di Gregorio, 2012) for as Di Gregorio suggests: “common discourse… requires at least 
some level of compatibility of value” (2012: 18)  as opposing values would exclude a 
discourse coalition from developing a successful master narrative (2012: 7). It is precisely 
these questions of attachment and affinity to some discourses over others that suggest 
all notions of values cannot be relinquished. As Howarth suggests a discourse “must offer 
points of attachment and identification that can grip subjects in particular 
ways”(Howarth, 2010: 321) . 
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This thesis shares Hajer’s important emphasis that coalitions often do not share values, 
however it is suggested that shared storylines promise a route to realize different value 
positions through equivalence built through shared opposition (c.f. Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 127). These value positions may still emerge differently, and unexpectedly, 
through their process of shared discursive interaction.  
The argumentative turn reflected broader post-structuralist movements across the social 
sciences that challenged essentialist framings of actors, politics, knowledges and cultures 
as discrete bounded entities, and understood these categories instead in terms of 
fragmentation, instability and outcomes of political struggle. Both Hajer and Litfin’s 
account demonstrate that meaning is “inter-subjectively constituted and constantly 
made and remade” (Paterson, 1996: 7). In doing so they addressed many of the 
limitations in earlier models of science policy interaction by focusing attention on 
knowledge and power to denaturalize the production of meaning. They shifted emphasis 
away from understanding values as the neat unveiling of a master narrative to the 
cumulative result of micro-practices, in many cases without individual actor driven 
intentionality as conventionally understood. However, this move left questions of values 
with an unresolved paradoxical status – as both strongly present but unable to be an 
object of attention in analytical argumentation.  
 
2.2 Boundary work: fact-value hybrids and the work of 
purification and translation 
In parallel to these debates within environmental governance, a specific body of 
literature within STS focuses on the constitution of science–policy boundaries and the 
on-going work in managing these divides. The term boundary work was first used in the 
sociology of science to describe the demarcation by science, of science from non-science 
(Gieryn, 1983). However, as interest in boundaries became increasingly characteristic of 
post-positivist approaches to science–policy (Backstrand, 2003: 27) ordering between 
science and policy soon became understood as mutually constructed by science and by 
policy (Owens, 2012: 8) and as occurring between different types of domains: science 
and public knowledge (Wynne, 1996) science and business (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008) 
or science and law (Jasanoff, 2006). During these accounts various dimensions of 
boundary work became highlighted: boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), 
35 
 
boundary ordering devices (Shackley and Wynne, 1996), boundary organisations (Moore, 
1996; Guston, 1999; 2001; Miller, 2001a), boundary people (Hoppe, 2010; Cash et al., 
2002: 17) and a broader array of collaborations - hybrid management (Miller, 2001a), 
boundary configurations (van Egmond and Bal, 2011) and boundary arrangements 
(Hoppe, 2010: 121). These theoretical contributions to the study of boundaries changed 
the way in which the boundary as an object of study was conceptualized. Rather than a 
dividing line between science and non-science as two pre-existing domains, Star and 
Griesemer (1989) understood the boundary as a zone of objects with multiple identities. 
The notion of a boundary zone was further elaborated by Gallison (1999) and later 
defined by Star as a ‘shared space’ not a demarcation line (2010: 603). STS literatures 
focused on the processes and work performed in boundary spaces themselves to 
construct domains that come to be understood as science, or as policy. 
Like the argumentative turn in policy studies, boundary literatures foreground practice. 
For Guston, it is not particular characteristics that demarcated science but rather 
contingent circumstances and strategic behaviours (1999: 87; 2001: 399). Focusing on 
boundaries as a shared space of active management removes the focus on exact sites 
where science and policy meet, or where science stops and policy begins, that 
characterise more linear ‘truth to power’ approaches. Instead a focus on boundaries 
allows us to understand the contingent drawing of boundaries in different ways, often at 
different times and for different purposes. This attends to the plurality and instability of 
boundaries and to the constructive practices of stabilising particular formations (Gieryn, 
1983; Jasanoff, 1987; Bijker et al., 2009; van Egmond and Bal, 2011).  
Like the argumentative turn, values are in many ways central to boundary narratives that 
criticise any naturalised separation of science and policy. Boundary scholars that draw 
from a Latourian tradition ontologically rebut any natural distinction between values and 
facts (alongside other binary oppositions - nature/culture, science/policy).  For example, 
Callon (1986) and Law (1991; Law, 1992) emphasise the messy middle ground of hybrid 
networks in constantly establishing, contesting and re-establishing fragile, multiple, 
contingent and transitory science–policy orderings. From this perspective facts and 
values, science and policy, are not separate wholes brought together, but rather domains 
created in part by their artificial separation (Latour, 1993). Studies of boundary work 
often draw attention to the way that science–policy “discourses, material artifacts, and 
institutions… are hybrids, complex mixtures of facts and value” (Miller, 2001a: 496). The 
work of purification - in making facts and values, science and policy appear separate 
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when in fact they are co-produced - is profiled by STS scholars who draw attention to the 
constant intermingling of facts and values (Jasanoff, 1990: vii; Backstrand, 2003: 38; 
Kleinman and Kinchy, 2003: 580; van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 123; Latour and Woolgar, 
1986: 70; Wynne, 1979) and emphasise that acts of boundary work themselves involve 
both “judgments of fact and value” (Miller, 2001a: 493; Jasanoff, 2003a: 160; van 
Egmond and Bal, 2011: 118). In contrast to the construction of science as value neutral 
(Moore, 1996: 1594), Miller proposes hybrid management as a suitable language that 
“explicitly confronts and emphasizes the value-laden character of policy-relevant 
scientific knowledge and expertise” (Miller, 2001a: 496). As Jasanoff argues, objectivity is 
“operationally constructed” by multiple actors at multiple sites (2012a: 2) for when 
starting in the messy middle ground “it takes work to detach judgment from fact” 
(2012a: 9). 
This work of separating science from policy, fact from value, is termed purification in 
Latour’s ‘modern constitution’ (1993) and refers to discursive demarcations between 
concepts which at the same time are being connected through Latour’s second process - 
translation. Translation for Latour describes the unofficial work of ‘mixing’ or ‘mediating’ 
between the two dichotomous poles of nature and society that enables the official 
narrative of separation to hold (1993: 10). Attention to the way in which translation and 
purification operate in tandem became foundational to STS understandings of boundary 
work, particularly Jasanoff’s emphasis on simultaneous separation and mediation 
(Jasanoff, 1990; see also Quick and Feldman, 2014; Star and Griesemer, 1989).   
Translation is an important concept in the empirical narratives of this thesis. However, 
although translation is a central concept in the theoretical foundations of STS (Latour, 
1993; Latour, 1983; Callon, 1986; Law, 1992), as Baiocchi et al. remark, “its definition is 
slippery and has received different accents by different authors and at different 
moments in ANT’s life course” (2013: 1). This slipperiness revolves around the tension 
between stability and change. On one hand, translation refers to establishing 
connections through equivalence (Callon and Law, 1982: 619), which is not stable but 
rather a constant work of shuttling back and forth (Latour, 1993: 3). On the other, 
translation within STS also refers to treason (Callon, 1986; Law, 2007), a sense of betrayal 
and dissonance (1986: 75). Law introduced the distinction between traduction (from 
Latin ‘to lead across’) and trahison or ‘betrayal’ to draw attention to the presence of 
dynamic change in that which is transferred (Law, 2007). In this attention to similarity 
and difference, attention is drawn to change in the information travelling as well as in 
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the target domain, as a result of the act of translation, leading Law to conclude that the 
notion of translation denies fidelity, that “all representation also betrays its object” (Law, 
2007: online). This emphasis on change focuses attention on translation as a process 
(Callon, 1986: 75). Translation as “the means of linking one thing with another” (Harman, 
2009: 15) is required precisely because the two domains are not the same, because “it is 
impossible to derive instantly one thing from another without the needed labour” 
(Harman, 2009: 18). As such, Law argues that translation “does the work of difference” 
(2007).  
Power struggles are ever present in these accounts of translation. For Latour, (Latour, 
1983) translation referred to a system of ‘making meaning’ through which actors tried 
“to dominate an association by making the others accept its translation” (Vernon, 1990: 
345). Similarly, Callon suggested actors were able to produce “scientific” knowledge 
through instituting and preserving various forms of privilege (Callon, 1986: 58), drawing 
attention to the way that claiming status as translator creates ‘obligatory passage points’ 
(1986: 59) through which legitimacy of voice is secured. To perform translation is to 
“express in one’s own language what others say and want…it is to establish oneself as a 
spokesperson” (1986: 75). Callon also draws attention to the way in which translation 
created hegemony in the voices represented: “if it is successful, only voices speaking in 
unison will be heard” (Callon, 1986: 75). In both Latour’s (1983) and Callon’s (1986) 
accounts, translation is a strategic approach though which actors mobilise power – 
creating acceptance of particular views of the world over others. This is important in 
attending to the politics of translation, for “the result is a situation in which certain 
entities control others” (Callon, 1986: 75).  
Translation is a struggle for meaning, which does not just describe the world but brings 
about relations in particular ways (Asdal et al., 2007: 29). Translation is not a one off 
process, but an on-going struggle of power in which, as Callon describes, actors 
continually challenge, deny and offer alternative relations of meaning (Callon, 1986: 75). 
However, when used to describe the communication of science to policy, the process of 
translation itself is often taken for granted and deployed uncritically (c.f.Jasanoff, 2003b: 
227; Hoppe, 2010: 109; Cash et al., 2003; Boykoff, 2007; Jasanoff, 1997). Cash et al in 
particular mobilise translation as one of three functions of boundary work that “facilitate 
mutual comprehension in the face of…differences” (Cash et al., 2003: 8088) yet do not 
interrogate what the actual process of translation entails or what the implications of 
viewing science policy interaction in this way might be. In his study of climate modelling 
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and the public acceptability of science, Wynne is critical of seeing communication failure 
as a “problem of ‘translation” arguing this is itself a key part of the problem (2010: 291). 
This calls for greater attention to the mobilisation of the term translation in boundary 
work and critical attention to the blurring of facts and values it performs.  
Science–policy boundary work interactions are the substance of empirical observation in 
this thesis. STS boundary literatures provide a useful theoretical starting point in seeking 
to understand the boundary making and boundary blurring practices through which 
hybrid knowledge forms circulate. They focus attention on the regulation and 
management of boundaries – asking what material and discursive processes are at work 
and how, where, and importantly, with what effect, are boundaries between science and 
policy produced? These questions help to open up the type of political questions around 
values that this thesis is interested in, and provide a good starting point for exploring the 
contingency of processes that fix particular relations of power.  
 
2.3 Bringing STS and Argumentative accounts together and 
the return of values 
Boundary and argumentative turn literatures connect through scholars such as Hajer and 
Jasanoff who found broad ontological compatibility between a Foucauldian inspired 
discursive approach to science–policy interaction and an STS understanding of the 
domains and distinctions between science and policy as relational constructed and 
contingent. Both boundary and argumentative science–policy approaches rejected 
previous realist understandings and instead sought to emphasise the messy, complex, 
fragmented, constructed, achieved, fluid and precarious nature of such categories and 
distributed understandings of the operation of power. The role of language as 
discursively constructing boundaries is emphasised in boundary literatures (Gieryn, 1983; 
Jasanoff, 1987) and the inseparability of fact and value are prominent in the 
argumentative approaches profiled in section 2.1.  
Recently there has been a revival of interest in values within geographical literatures. 
Although practice theory problematized the relationship between values and action 
(Shove, 2010), values are once again being positioned to explain differences in the 
acceptance of scientific knowledge and acceptance of policy or technology proposals 
(Demski et al., 2015), attitudes to risk (Leiserowitz, 2006), public engagement with 
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climate change and barriers to public action (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Corner et al., 2014) 
to predict the propensity to act (Howell, 2013) or as a necessary target for policy 
strategies (Wolf et al., 2013). Mobilization of values in such debates tends to draw from 
essentialist understandings of values in influencing behaviour, action and risk perception 
from psychology (Stern, 1992; Karp, 1996; Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Weber, 2006; 
Nilsson et al., 2004). These studies around public engagement with science in that 
mobilize values within geographical journals appear divorced from argumentative policy 
literatures.  
Mike Hulme has been at the forefront of this return to values focusing attention to the 
way in which conflicts and different understandings of climate change are underpinned 
by differences in values and beliefs (Hulme, 2009). In an interview in 2005 Hulme 
stressed the importance of moving the debate “onto what really is, I think, the legitimate 
debating point in climate change which is about values” (Hulme, 2013: 83-84). While 
agreeing with Hulme that a return to thinking about values is necessary, this thesis 
suggests that any revival of the language of values needs to build upon the contributions 
of the argumentative turn in refuting essentialist foundations - not only because of 
Hajer’s work on discourse coalitions which refute shared values as the cohesive factor 
(see section 2.1) but also to defend the possibility of plurality as outlined by Mouffe (see 
section 2.6.2). However, Hulme does not elucidate a post-structural understanding of 
values or address the tensions around referring to values within a post-structural 
approach despite also turning to the work of Chantal Mouffe through the work of 
Amanda Machin (2013). This is a gap to which this thesis seeks to contribute – beginning 
to scope out how an anti-essentialist notion of values from Mouffe’s work might be 
envisioned and take forward value debates in way that build on argumentative critiques.  
These moves within theoretical literatures have been mirrored by an interest in 
practitioner approaches that focus on values, including; the UK focus on segmentation in 
fostering pro-environmental behaviours (DEFRA, 2008) community-based social 
marketing (McKenzie-Mohr and Smith, 1999) and the common cause (Crompton, 2010). 
Engaging with this focus on values prompts attention to rearticulating a post-structural 
language of values with which to contribute to these debates. 
There is also an intricate connection between discursive framing and what becomes 
possible in both argumentative and boundary literatures (whether through collective 
storylines or boundary demarcations). In attending to the way that science–policy 
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boundary work enables or restricts particular discursive value framings over others, what 
is understood to be possible is of paramount importance in the way that the framing of 
boundary work takes place. Possibility can be considered in practical terms (e.g. 
feasibility in terms of cost, knowhow or time); through acceptability, implying agreement 
by existing actors; or in terms of legitimacy, implying in lay terms a sense of what is 
proper through conformity with regulations, frameworks or laws. All these dimensions 
are likely to be important in establishing what is possible. In STS literatures and in 
Mouffe’s political theory legitimacy is discussed, whilst in argumentative theory both 
legitimacy and acceptability are both referenced. Jasanoff described boundary work as 
producing legitimacy (1990) and so it is to discussion of legitimacy within science–policy 
literatures that the chapter now turns. 
 
2.4 Science policy studies and legitimacy  
Questions of legitimacy are central to boundary literatures (Miller, 2001a: 479). 
Discussions of legitimacy in STS are often focused on the way that boundaries between 
scientific and political domains establish and maintain legitimacy for expert scientific 
knowledge (Backstrand, 2003: 27). Jasanoff has perhaps done most to engage the STS 
community directly with questions of legitimacy, first highlighting that legitimacy is 
constructed through boundary work (as an outcome of purification). In her study of 
scientific advisory committees, Jasanoff concluded: 
“If negotiation is the engine that drives the construction of regulatory 
science, boundary work is the casing that gives the result legitimacy…by 
drawing seemingly sharp boundaries between science and policy, 
scientists in effect post ‘keep out’ signs to prevent non-scientists from 
challenging or reinterpreting claims labelled as ‘science’...When the 
boundary holds, both regulators and the public accept the experts’ 
designation as controlling and the recommendations of advisory 
committees, whatever their actual content, are invested with unshakable 
authority” (1990: 236, emphasis added). 
 
This extract emphasises legitimacy as a process and as an achievement of boundary work 
– contingent and requiring constant performance (Jasanoff, 2012a: 20). The de-facto 
legitimacy claimed for science through adhesion to scientific process and peer review is 
dependent on the on-going work of separating fact from values through boundary work 
to produce  “independent expert advice” (Jasanoff, 2003b: 229). As this quotation 
suggests, boundary work also produces legitimacy for policy as well as science, for the 
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separation of fact from values becomes important to the legitimation function of science 
within policy (Owens, 2012: 15). A specific contribution of this thesis is to assess the way 
in which legitimacy is constructed through the process of translation as well as 
purification. 
Jasanoff also drew attention to the spatially and culturally contingent nature of 
legitimacy through the notion of ‘civic epistemologies’ – differences in public knowledge 
ways observed between the USA, UK and Germany which value and legitimise differently 
(2005). Presenting legitimacy as both spatially and temporally contingent, serves to 
denaturalise it, opening up both the examination of processes and operations of power 
that stabilise particular forms of legitimacy. Jasanoff’s foundations in thinking about 
legitimacy as a context specific process of achievement, constructed in part though 
boundary work, is an important foundation for the empirical chapters in the thesis that 
explore different ways through which legitimation occurs and denaturalizes boundary 
demarcations over legitimacy (see chapters 6 and 7). 
At the micro-scale, when Star and Greisemer described boundary objects as “objects 
which both inhabit several intersecting social worlds and satisfy the informational 
requirements of each of them” (Star and Griesemer, 1989) they emphasised the 
necessary accountability of such objects to both worlds. This allows them to ‘speak to’ 
differing audiences simultaneously, “maintaining interests” of both communities (Star 
and Griesemer, 1989). A decade later, Guston emphasised a similar dual process for 
boundary organisations, whose success depends on “pleasing two sets of principles”, 
those of science and of policy, such that boundary actors have “direct lines of 
accountability to both” (Guston, 2001: 401; Guston, 1999). This dual accountability, he 
argues, is the main distinguishing factor of boundary organisations from intermediary 
agencies or boundary spanning organisations, both of which either retain independence 
from either party, or defer to one over another. In both Star and Greisemers’ and 
Guston’s accounts, accountability does not equate to legitimacy, for as Black describes, 
the two terms are conceptually distinct and it is entirely possible to have legitimacy in 
ways that do not require accountability (Black, 2008). However, the emphasis on dual 
relationships in terms of accountability, interests and knowledge requirements might 
suggest that similar requirements for dual legitimation are also required for boundary 
objects. Miller takes this to be the case when he highlights potential differences in the 
ways in which credibility, legitimacy, and authority are accorded on each side of the 
boundary (2001a: 482; see also Cash et al., 2002). Such processes of legitimation appear 
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to be required in a dual sense within both policy and science for legitimacy to hold. 
However little detail is provided within boundary literatures on what these specific 
processes of legitimation involve. 
Argumentative theorists emphasise the discursive constitution of what is considered 
legitimate. For Litfin, Foucauldian inspired attention to the intricate connections 
between knowledge and power provided insight into the processes through which 
science is called upon to legitimate policy (1994: 13). Argumentative approaches makes 
two important contributions to thinking about legitimacy from which this thesis builds. 
Firstly, employing Rein and Shon’s concept of framing, Litfin argues that scientific 
knowledge, being constructed discursively, already had “important political implications 
even before the international negotiations” got under way (1994: 10). Scientific 
discourses prefigure particular forms of response and “define the range of policy options, 
thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes”, highlighting the role of science in 
constructing legitimacy for policy responses – for designation of ‘legitimate’ knowledge, 
acts “as determinants of what can and cannot be thought” (Litfin, 1994: 13).  
Secondly, scientific knowledge is “incorporated into pre-existing stories to render it 
meaningful” (Litfin, 1994: 15). Hajer emphasised that legitimacy is constructed within 
discursive boundaries, suggesting 
“the politics of discourse is not about expressing power-resources in 
language but is about the actual creation of structures and fields of action 
by means of storylines” (Hajer, 1995: 275). 
 
In this quotation Hajer is pointing to the way in which discourses set the terms of 
possibility for action. This alignment with existing discourses is echoed by Lister for 
whom “organizational legitimacy can be considered to depend on conformity with 
dominant discourses” (Lister, 2003: 188) and Rein and Shon who suggest “the desire to 
do something[often leads to]’hitching on’ to a dominant frame and its conventional 
metaphors, hoping to purchase legitimacy for a course of action actually inspired by 
different intentions” (1993: 151). Hajer highlights that any particular framing “makes 
certain elements appear as fixed or appropriate while other elements appear 
problematic” (1995: 54). It is these designations as appropriate or problematic that set 
the framework for what is perceived to be legitimate and indicates the role of policy 
discourses in constructing legitimacy discourses of science.  
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Litfin and Hajer’s development of the discursive constitution of legitimate forms of 
science and policy is an important foundation for this thesis, drawing attention to the 
way that what is possible is judged within discursive frameworks. However while their 
connection between discourse and legitimacy is helpful, Hajer’s conceptualisation of the 
relationship between hegemony and legitimacy is considered problematic. Hajer 
distinguishes ‘discourse institutionalization’ (defined as the solidification of discursive 
meaning claims through institutions and moments when actors consent to the rhetorical 
power of one framing over another (Hajer, 1993: 66) from hegemony, defined as the 
sense that “no other discourses are to be found in the environmental domain” (1995: 
30). This account of hegemony appears to take the claim for totality at its word, as final – 
the eradication of alternatives and thereby the closure of power. This demonstrates 
what Goeminne has described as the “incapacity to think of ‘the excluded’” (2012: 162) 
and suggests the reproduction of dominant relations are inevitable. Hajer’s concept of 
hegemony might be contrasted with that of Laclau and Mouffe whose approach to 
denaturalizing and exposing hegemonic claims to totality and neutrality, draws attention 
to the always-present alternatives that are excluded by such claims. Further, in 
suggesting that although ecological modernisation “came to be the most legitimate way 
to speak about environmental problems” (1993: 50), whilst its bid for hegemony failed 
(Hajer, 1993: 67), Hajer separates legitimacy from hegemonic power. This division 
appears inconsistent with his emphasis on the construction of legitimacy within 
dominant discursive boundaries, prompting a need to explore further the specific 
relations between legitimacy and power in discursive approaches. In considering 
boundary work as constructing what is/is not claimed as considered legitimate, the 
always-present alternatives are the very substance that makes boundary practices 
contingent and therefore need not to be lost. 
2.4.1 Legitimacy in crisis 
Backstrand identified “a legitimacy crisis for modern science” (Backstrand, 2003: 29) in 
which previous reliance on the special status of scientific knowledge (Gieryn, 1983) and 
trust in and reliance on the authority of experts (Jasanoff, 2003a; Litfin, 1994: 35; Hajer, 
1995: 10-11; Irwin, 2006) is often undermined by political controversy. Bijker et al have 
further developed this as a paradox of scientific authority in which “the more urgently 
scientific advice is solicited, the more vigorously scientific authority is questioned by 
policy makers, stakeholders, and citizens” (Bijker et al., 2009).  In the presence of post-
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normal challenges, like climate change, in which stakes are high, knowledge uncertain 
and values in conflict (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a) the image of a disinterested 
valueless science has been difficult to uphold (Jasanoff, 2003b). Legitimacy of scientific 
knowledge is based on the separation of fact from value is under strain and science is 
turning to other processes of constructing legitimacy, notably increasing civic 
involvement in science, turning to consensus or to policy as a reference point for 
legitimacy.  
Response 1 – Civic participation  
Civic participation as a source of legitimacy draws from Locke’s shift towards “replacing 
the divine right of kings by the consent of the people” (Dogon, 1992: 116). The turn to 
increasing participation and transparency responds partly to the rise of post-normal 
scientific questions which demand extended peer review involving non-experts 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b) and also a wider post-positivist questioning of the role of 
expert knowledge (Backstrand, 2003: 27). Indicative of the tendency in STS to focus on 
input side or procedural legitimacy, many scholars adopt a normative stance to 
increasing civic participation in science (Irwin, 2006; see Girod et al., 2009: 3; Jasanoff, 
2011a: 621; Jasanoff, 1990: 234) generating a participatory turn (Jasanoff, 2003b) in both 
policy practice and academic debates. According to Backstrand, 
“A basic tenet in this model is to promote public use of reason, argument 
and free deliberation…to transform preferences, enable a new collective 
will and render public decisions more legitimate” (2003: 34). 
 
Whilst there may be many reasons for wanting broader engagement in science and 
greater public deliberation, there are a number of problems in this response. Firstly, 
Irwin sees this move as a further extension of the knowledge deficit model, which posits 
the problems in developing a policy response to science as a lack of knowledge (Irwin, 
2006). Whether the deficit is seen in understanding, representation, scientific democracy 
or trust – more knowledge in one way or another is being used to increase public 
understanding of scientific debates and rectify questions of public trust (Backstrand, 
2003: 31; Irwin, 2006). This ignores previous accounts that demonstrate that more 
knowledge is not the critical factor in policy response failure. Secondly, several theorists 
argue that “participatory procedures do not per se improve the democratic legitimacy 
and accountability of policy-making” (Abels, 2007: 104) but instead risk “encouraging 
public deference to the establishment’s experts” (Yearley, 2000: 107; see also Bora and 
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Hausendorf, 2006: 487). Indeed, Jasanoff highlights that in the case of climate change 
specifically “Participation in the absence of normative discussion can lead to intractable 
conflicts” (2003b: 243). 
Response 2 – Consensus  
A second response to the legitimation crisis has been to mobilise scientific consensus in 
pursuit of policy argumentation and media representations in both practitioner accounts 
and science–policy academic debates (Oreskes, 2004; Doran and Zimmerman, 2009; 
Boycoff, 2007; Miller, 2001b; Jasanoff, 2013: 439). Miller suggests that “the normative 
weight of collective agreement helps buttress the credibility of value-laden choices” 
(2001a: 495). Reliance on notions of consensus is strongly criticised by scholars who 
point to the lack of representation of dissent and exclusion (Hinchcliffe, 2001; van der 
Sluijs et al., 2010; Stirling, 2009). As Kelly remarks in her study of bioethics, deliberation 
did nothing to open up debate but rather 
“ways in which procedures for consultation and the determination and 
meaning of consensus are negotiated….operate to prefigure “legitimate” 
forms of participation and deliberation. Even though panel members 
openly debated…[and] narrowed possible avenues” (Kelly, 2003: 354-
355). 
 
Discomfort with the possibility of a rational resolution to value plurality has led Hulme to 
question the focus on consensus in climate politics (Hulme, 2009; Hulme and Mahony, 
2010; Hulme, 2015). Drawing on Machin (2013), Hulme argues instead that consensus 
misunderstands science and politics in equal measure suggesting, 
“it is politically necessary for us to disagree about climate change. The 
aspects of climate change that really matter for human and non-human 
life entail debates about values” (2015: 14). 
 
Both Hulme and Machin draw explicitly from Mouffe’s theory to contest pursuit of 
consensus in climate change, particularly her emphasis that not just procedurally but 
ontologically “every consensus is based on acts of exclusion” (2005b: 11). As Goeminne 
suggests, when the focus is on consensus, participation in effect means that “everybody 
is included as long as one plays to the consensual rules of the game” (2012: 162). 
Consensus itself is an ontological claim to hegemony that both obscures and naturalises - 
speaking for the totality as the only legitimate approach. Agreeing with Hulme (2015) 
and Machin (2013) that it is necessary to enable values-based disagreement in climate 
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change, this thesis is interested in the politics around exclusions rendered necessary in 
generating a claim to consensus. Appeals to consensus have largely been unsuccessful in 
ameliorating the legitimacy crisis, and are not just procedurally but ontologically 
restricting the possibility of plurality. Section 2.3 will continue discussion of Mouffe’s 
objection to consensus politics.  
Response 3 - Legitimacy according to policy  
Recent attention to legitimacy has been guided by Cash et al.’s credibility saliency 
legitimacy framework (2002; 2003). In considering the effectiveness of knowledge in 
policy, Cash et al. consider legitimacy in terms of process, and define it as 
“whether an actor perceives the process in a system as unbiased and 
meeting standards of political and procedural fairness. Legitimacy 
involves the belief that S&T systems are ‘fair’ and consider appropriate 
values, interests, concerns, and specific circumstances from multiple 
perspectives” (Cash et al., 2002: 5, emphasis added). 
 
Cash et al.’s approach is promising in its recognition of the importance of respecting 
diverse values and multiple perspectives. In doing so, it also recognises the way in which 
legitimacy is constructed differently by different groups (2002: 4), that there will be 
differential emphases on credibility salience or legitimacy at different times (2002: 6), 
and indeed differences in understanding over these terms on different sides of the 
boundary (2002: 8).  Their approach also places importance on the perception of a 
system being unbiased and fair without making any claim that such a system achieves 
these qualities. As a result very many considerations of legitimacy in science policy 
literatures are framed through, or at least cite, Cash et al.’s tripartite framework (White 
et al., 2010; Lemos and Morehouse, 2005; Vogel et al., 2007; McNie, 2007; Kunseler et 
al., 2015; Sarkki et al., 2013). 
However, there are several problems with their approach. Firstly by starting with what is 
salient, credible and legitimate for the decision maker, their framework naturalizes policy 
as a reference point for the judgment of legitimacy. Whilst this helps promote knowledge 
that is useful to policy, it does not enable a critical stance towards the politics involved, 
but naturalises the dominant policy approach. Secondly, Cash et al.’s procedural 
definition implies that if a ‘fair’ process that considers values and interests is undergone 
legitimacy is somehow automatic, not an achievement or outcome of struggles through 
power. If this were the case any values-based perspective would be legitimate as long as 
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the process had followed principles of procedural fairness and considered different 
perspectives. Reasons for why some values are able to predominate over others are left 
unaccounted for. Thirdly, reliance on procedural principles renders legitimacy a resource 
to be drawn from and what it means to be legitimate is consistent regardless of context. 
Yet as Jasanoff and other STS scholars have shown, legitimation is not consistent 
between cultures, disciplines or epistemic communities. Finally, their approach implies 
that consensual politics in which everyone agrees on the principles of political and 
procedural fairness is possible. Despite emphasis on the perception of fairness and lack 
of bias not its achievement, Cash et al.’s framework nevertheless draws the possibility of 
procedural fairness and idealised discursive participation (Habermas, 1992). As Mouffe 
would argue, this denies the possibility of plurality and multiplicity of value systems.  
Understanding legitimacy in terms of adherence to procedural rules is helpful in 
explaining how knowledge becomes useful to policy. However, in stopping at the level of 
procedural fairness Cash et al.’s approach to legitimacy takes an uncritical approach to 
the way in which the terms of legitimacy are themselves constructed by policy makers – 
how, why and in whose interests they come to matter (Backstrand, 2003: 27; Lister, 
2003: 178). Cash et al.’s account allows policy alone to set the terms by which legitimacy 
is assessed. It is precisely Hajer’s discursively constrained fields of action that Cash et al 
naturalize and take for granted (Hajer, 1995: 275). Several scholars have criticised Cash 
et al.’s approach practically (White et al., 2010), but most engagements have focused 
only on trade-offs between credibility, saliency and legitimacy (White et al., 2010: 231; 
Sarkki et al., 2013) and wider political questions about deferral to policy do not seem to 
have been raised. Chapter 6 will explore the extent to which concurrence with prevailing 
science and policy values plays a role in the conferring legitimacy on boundary 
knowledges. 
 
2.5 Summarizing the critique: science, boundary work and 
depoliticisation of values  
This discussion of values and legitimacy in science–policy literatures from the 
argumentative turn and STS boundary work has illustrated a two-part problem – firstly 
the difficulty of discussing values post-structurally, and secondly a weak 
conceptualization of the relationship between legitimacy and hegemonic power.  
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Values are recalcitrant in both science–policy literatures. Although necessarily and 
helpfully deposed from the status of an analytical category, values remain present 
throughout the argumentative turn and reasons why particular discourses hold 
‘discursive affinity’ over others fail to be accounted for (Hajer, 1995). Further, the 
language of values is once more being evoked in recent debates. Where argumentative 
scholars identified the inability to separate fact and value, boundary literatures 
emphasised their ontological inseparability. However, in practice (with the exception of 
Jasanoff), more attention has been directed at the production of claims to fact in STS 
accounts than to the functioning of values. It is suggested that while the language of 
discourse intended to capture a sense of values in the production of meaning in ways 
that do not imply an essentialist object, the ‘mattering’ of discourse has in many ways 
been lost. Sayer’s critique of social science for insufficiently recognizing that human 
relations to the world are relations of concern (2011), draws attention to the way in 
which Foucauldian inspired post-structural approaches struggle to address the notion of 
attachment and commitment to discourse, but his critical realist stance with emphasis on 
ethics (claims to right and wrong) is problematic for recognising value plurality. Further 
he pays little attention to questions of legitimation and hegemonic power.  
Similarly, although argumentative theories have developed an understanding of 
legitimacy as discursively constructed, and STS emphasize legitimacy as a contingent 
outcome of boundary work constructed differently in different spatial and temporal 
contexts, troubling questions over the relation between legitimacy and hegemonic 
power remain. Recent responses to problems of legitimation, through the separation of 
fact and value, are being addressed through prioritization of hegemonic policy discourses 
or emphasis on rational civic deliberation or consensus. It is argued that these 
approaches, both individually and collectively, provide an inadequately critical approach 
to the politics and struggles of power involved in processes of legitimation. All three 
approaches resolve plurality of value positions through exclusion. In considering how 
boundary work as a process of legitimation enables legitimation of some discursive value 
frameworks over others, a more critical approach to the relationship between 
legitimation and power, particularly in the face of dominant policy discourses, is 
required.  The role of science and boundary work in contributing to a politics of exclusion 
warrants greater attention and Jasanoff (Lanzarotta, 2009) Lovbrand et al. (2011) and 
Goeminne (2012) have all called for STS to think more about what models of legitimacy 
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are being employed. Understanding processes of legitimation vis á vis politics and power 
is necessary to a more politically critical understanding of both translation and values. 
2.5.1 De-politicisation and science–policy boundary work 
Both science–policy studies and evidence-based policy critiques highlight the way in 
which science often taking the form of ‘evidence’, embodying particular claims to fact, 
truth objectivity and neutrality that are established by the very boundary practices 
discussed in 2.2 and 2.3. Critiques of evidence-based policy (EBP) suggest that a focus on 
evidence promises “a new ‘post-ideological’ approach to government” (Sanderson, 2002: 
3; Solesbury, 2001; Parsons, 2002) and claims “an ideology/value free zone” (Sanderson, 
2002: 54) that transcends values debates. Parsons argued that rather than recognising 
“that ‘facts’ are embedded in the swampy world of values and politics and competing 
frames. EBP wishes to extricate them from the political/value quagmire” (Parsons, 2002: 
58). As Packwood highlights, this is itself ideological (2002). In assuming science can 
answer any policy question (Sanderson, 2011) EBP places enlightenment values at the 
heart of science–policy interaction and promotes a particular vision of rationality, 
modernity and progress that is “not so much a step forward as a step backwards: a 
return to the quest for a positivist yellow brick road leading to a policy dry ground” 
(Parsons, 2002: 45).  
Both Weiss and Head have pointed to the partisan use of evidence, more likely to be 
sourced when research findings are non-confrontational to the status quo (Weiss, 1998) 
and rarely sourced to say things can’t be done or that foundational frameworks are 
flawed (Head, 2008: 8). Evidence and expert advice thus becomes a way of fighting 
political opposition through technical means (Wesselink et al., 2013: 5; Jasanoff, 2003a: 
159). Extending the logic of naturalised conclusions and detached decision-making to 
policy seeks to “de-politicise and managerialise knowledge production and its utilisation” 
(Parsons, 2002: 56). This creates an official narrative of policy as the domain of value 
debate whilst in practice; values-based political debate is being denied2 and raises 
important questions around the role of science in shortcutting or erasing political 
deliberation over values (van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 124). As Jasanoff suggests, “there is 
                                                          
2 That official narratives of policy convey a values rich debate, whilst attention to practice reveals post-political 
technocratic decision making, offers an important counterpart to accounts within sociology of science and STS that reveal 
the official narratives of science as neutral to obscure a proliferation of values. 
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apparently little concern that policy issues will illegitimately be decided by scientists 
under the guise of technical decision making” (1987: 225).  
Swyngedouw has developed this argument further in relation to climate change – 
arguing that an emphasis on consensus, globalised threat, and socially homogenizing 
catastrophic consequences, exemplifies what he and other post political theorists term 
the post-political condition (Swyngedouw, 2010: 221). This post-political condition is 
defined as “a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are 
replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration” 
(Swyngedouw, 2010: 225; see also Goeminne, 2012: 160). In such circumstances, 
Goemminne suggests that the proliferation of climate denial can be read as “a 
symptomatic outburst of the political in a completely depoliticized landscape” 
(Goeminne, 2012: 164). Mouffe is part of this body of post political theorists who resist 
the condition of the post-political, striving to revive agonistic forms of politics.  
Boundary work is implicit in this work of de-politicisation. Firstly in continuously 
demarcating science as a value free sphere that provides a useful tool in de-politicising 
endless value disputes (van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 124). Secondly, through the role of 
boundary objects (and likewise organisations) in managing conflict (Star and Griesemer, 
1989) and internalising differences and tensions (Guston, 2001: 402). Guston describes 
such boundary work as “a strategy of neutrality” (2001: 403).  However, at the same time 
as being a tool for depoliticisation, White draws attention to the way in which boundary 
organisations use this strategy of neutrality to  “develop decision-making options” 
without being  “overtly political” (White et al., 2010: 221) and Edge and Eyles emphasise 
the power of boundary work in determining which participants become legitimate (Edge 
and Eyles, 2013: 294). This provokes important questions around the politics enabled and 
concealed within boundary work.  
Hess (2013) and Kleinman and Kinchy (2003) both criticise STS as a discipline for its 
inability to be critical of neoliberal hegemonies. Hess suggests STS is itself inflected with 
neoliberalist ways of thinking (2013: 178) and “lacks the capacity to develop a critical 
analysis of neoliberalism” (2013: 188). Kleinman and Kinchy further mount a structuralist 
critique of STS around two important points. Firstly they emphasises that non-science 
also secures legitimacy through scientific assessment, and this receives less focus within 
STS (Kleinman and Kinchy, 2003: 578).  Secondly, they argue that the discursive 
participation of actors is often implied to be strategic within STS accounts, while in their 
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own research, discursive compliance was often habitual (Kleinman and Kinchy, 2003: 
582). As Halffman suggests “Boundaries tend to become harder when they become 
routinized in such discursive, social, and material practices” (Halffman 2003 cited in van 
Egmond and Bal, 2011: 111) suggesting that patterns of practice develop habitual 
inclusions/exclusions of values that may be legitimating particular forms of knowledge 
and values in non-intentional ways. Where Kleinman and Kinchy’s critiques are helpful, 
their approach rests on structuralist understandings of discursive constraints. Whilst 
Jasanoff’s sustained critique of neoliberalism might stand in defence of Hess’s attack, 
increased attention to the way in which questions of power, value legitimacy and 
boundary work become intertwined in practice to generate and reproduce particular 
value systems would contribute towards avoiding grounds within STS literatures for 
Hess’s critique. It is proposed that turning to a Mouffian post-structuralist understanding 
of the production of legitimacy might offer an improved route for attending to both Hess 
and Kleinman and Kinchy’s important concerns.  
 
2.6 A Mouffian approach to legitimacy and values  
Chantal Mouffe’s political theory is premised on the plurality of values and offers specific 
attention to the relationship between legitimacy and power through the foregrounding 
of hegemony. This section introduces key tenets of Mouffe’s approach, summarises key 
criticisms of her approach and how it might be brought into dialogue with science–policy.  
2.6.1 An introduction to Mouffe  
Mouffe’s post-structural, anti-essentialist approach is part of a wider left Heideggarian 
post-foundational movement characterized by the impossibility of a final ground or 
closure (Marchart, 2007). As Tambakaki describes, incomplete closure allows the 
possibility for alternatives (2014: 3). For Mouffe it is the ability to contest, expose 
contingency and challenge relations of subordination that ensures “democratic politics 
remains dynamic and alert to instances of closure” (Tambakaki, 2014: 3). Mouffe’s 
political theory revolves around her specific concept of ‘the political’ which insists upon 
the irreducible presence of antagonism as “inherent in human relations” (Mouffe, 2000: 
15). Drawing from Schmidt’s notion of a friend-enemy distinction, political identities 
(always collective) involve “the creation of an ‘us’ that can only exist by its demarcation 
from a ‘them’” (Mouffe, 2009: 550). Antagonism is eradicable because the very 
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demarcation of us/them always creates exclusion and prevents formation of a 
homogeneous political sphere (Mouffe, 2009: 550). A state in which there are no 
alternatives to hegemonic power would be a state devoid of the possibility for political 
identity.  
For Mouffe, although difference and exclusion are always involved in political thinking, 
and hostile relations of antagonism are an ever present possibility (2009: 550), political 
relations are not necessarily antagonistic. Mouffe’s attention is on the form that this 
us/them relation takes (how the ‘them’ is envisaged) and in turning relations of 
antagonism into relations of agonism. This distinction between antagonism and agonism 
is crucial in Mouffe’s theory: “Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is 
struggle between adversaries” (2000: 16). The distinction rests on an understanding of 
the adversary as legitimate, a feature central to agonistic pluralism (Mouffe, 2005a: 14): 
“Agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although 
acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, 
nevertheless recognise the legitimacy of their opponents” (Mouffe, 
2005b: 20). 
 
An adversary is someone “whose ideas may be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to 
defend those ideas is not to be questioned” (Mouffe, 2005a: 7). Mouffe sees the task of 
democratic politics as turning antagonism into agonism and hence making space for 
plurality.  Although Mouffe’s focus is on the constitution of democratic politics and not 
on the relations with science, her thinking around legitimacy and value plurality is 
considered helpful in attending to the questions of the legitimizing role of boundary 
work in relation to the claims to hegemonic power of neoliberal policy. Without claiming 
to attend to all forms of power operating in boundary work, her approach to 
emphasizing the connection between legitimacy and hegemonic power is found to be a 
useful addition to the approaches to thinking about legitimacy outlined in section 2.3.  
2.6.2 Value politics  
Mouffe’s political theory is premised on plurality of values (Elliott, 2010: 152). As 
Crowder observes: “there is behind the notion of antagonism the still deeper idea of 
‘value pluralism’”(Crowder, 2006: 7). For Mouffe differences in values are what 
constitutes the forms of political identification necessary for ‘the political’ and what 
makes antagonism eradicable (Mouffe, 2014: 150) as some values “are exclusive of each 
other” and it is impossible to reconcile all points of view (Mouffe, 2000: 15). In premising 
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value plurality, Mouffe explicitly draws from Nietzche, Weber and Berlin (Mouffe cited in 
Bayard and Clark, 1996: 137). For Nietzsche values were never intrinsic, fixed or 
objective, but relational – both to other things and to the valuing subject (Mouffe cited in 
Bayard and Clark, 1996: 138). Values for Nietzche both expressed an attitude towards life 
and were also a way of ordering (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 36). Being context specific, “values 
always have to be affirmed; they do not ‘exist in themselves’” (Mihai, 2014: 219). Both 
Niezsche and Weber emphasised ways in which people create their own values rather 
than draw from naturalist categories. For Mouffe, this inability to get beyond the 
plurality of values demands agonism, which “nourishes and protects democratic 
pluralism” (Tambakaki, 2014: 5).  
For Mouffe any political system involves a hierarchy of values with inevitable tradeoffs. It 
is these differences in possible value combinations which mean that one hierarchy 
cannot claim any natural superiority over any other (Mouffe in Bayard and Clark, 1996: 
139), (Mouffe, 2005b: 126-129). However Mouffe’s commitment to plurality does not 
mean that anything goes, a charge often brought unfairly to her work (Karppinen et al., 
2008: 8), instead Mouffe emphasises: 
“Some limits need to be put to the kind of confrontation which is going to 
be seen as legitimate in the public sphere. But the political nature of the 
limits should be acknowledged instead of being presented as 
requirements of morality or rationality” (Mouffe, 2000: 19). 
 
Mouffe makes three important points in relation to values for this thesis: that values 
cannot be based on morality, that plural values cannot be resolved through rational 
consensus, and that values are only known through re-articulation. 
Values cannot be based on morality 
Mouffe’s specific understanding of values moves the concept away from morality and 
closer to politics. This is important in the defence of plurality for morals are based on 
essentialist identities and universal commands (Mouffe, 2005b: 122) and are thus non-
negotiable (Mouffe, 2002: 11; Elliott, 2010). Understanding political debates in terms of 
morality would replace “the opposition between Right and Left with the opposition 
between Good and Evil” (Mihai, 2014: 36) leaving no possibility of disagreement among 
legitimate alternatives. Yet Mouffe does not equate values with politics, but retains the 
term ‘values’ stating clearly: 
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“The conflict is between values: to recognize the pluralism of values 
means that, necessarily, there will be conflict” (Mouffe, cited in Bayard 
and Clark, 1996: 138). 
 
Mouffe’s retention of the term values, alongside passions (which she uses to describe 
collective affective states of attachment) and politics, (which she splits into the condition 
of the political and the formal apparatus of party administrations), suggests some form 
of goal, object or condition to be passionate about. Such values in Mouffe’s work form 
the grounds through which, and about which, the political condition is wrought. In this 
sense values describe a claim to meaning within particular discursive framings that 
matters, however contingently. 
Plural values cannot be resolved through rational consensus 
For Mouffe pluralism of values means there can be no rational resolution in politics 
(Mouffe, 2000: 15), for “relations of identity/difference… cannot be resolved through 
appeal to common reason” (Tambakaki, 2014: 3). Mouffe suggests that whilst not all 
conflicts are agonistic “properly political ones are, because they always involve decisions 
that require a choice between alternatives that are un-decidable from a strictly rational 
point of view” (Mouffe, 2014: 150). Mouffe finds fault with many contemporary 
approaches to democratic politics (aggregative, deliberative democracy and third way 
politics) because of their turn to consensual and rational resolution to political problems 
rather than recognizing value pluralism and conflict. Mouffe’s objection to each form of 
democratic model is in part specific, and in part collective, and is outlined in detail in 
Mouffe (2005b; 2005a).  
Her principal concern with the Habermasian deliberative democratic approach is their 
turn to deliberation and rational consensus (Mouffe, 2000: 4). Here Mouffe’s objection is 
both to rationality and to consensus. She insists that differences in value cannot be 
resolved rationally because this is a universal claim that brings closure to political 
questions in ways that prevent legitimate adversaries and plural contestation. Claims to 
rationality veil exclusion and hinder agonistic debate, by defining alternatives as 
irrational and illegitimate (Mouffe in Martin, 2013: 124). The inability to eradicate 
antagonism means an inability to bring rational closure (Mouffe, 2000: 5). For Mouffe, 
“The frontier that it establishes between what is and what is not 
legitimate is a political one, and for that reason it should remain 
contestable. To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to 
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present the frontier as dictated by rationality or morality, is to naturalize 
what should be perceived as a contingent and temporary hegemonic 
articulation of ‘the people’ through a particular regime of inclusion-
exclusion” (Mouffe, 2005a: 49).  
 
Habermas’s approach in particular emphasises securing of legitimacy through rational 
deliberation (discussed further in section 2.5.3).  
Likewise, consensus, Mouffe argues, is always partial; any claims to consensus always 
hide exclusion (Mouffe, 2000: 27). Drawing from Wittgestein’s emphasis on the limits of 
consensus she insists that 
“rational… consensus cannot exist. We have to accept that every 
consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a 
stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion.” 
(Mouffe, 2000: 17). 
 
Consensus for Mouffe is neither possible nor desirable, as it removes choice between 
legitimate alternatives, which for Mouffe is at the heart of what it means to be political 
(Mouffe, 2009: 551-552). Mouffe argues that despite their differences Rawls and 
Habermas both maintain the possibility of eradicating antagonism and both try but fail to 
“circumscribe a domain where consensus without exclusion is possible and not affected 
by the pluralism of value” (Mouffe, 2000: 8). Both negate the necessity of antagonism 
based on value pluralism, are blind to power and deny the un-decidability and lack of 
complete closure that recognises that any given order could always be different (Mouffe, 
2000: 17). Consensus she argues will always be the expression of hegemony and the 
crystallization of power relations (Mouffe, 2005a: 49) and suggests “bringing a 
deliberation to a close always results from a decision which excludes other possibilities 
and for which one should never refuse to bear responsibility” (Mouffe, 2000: 17). 
Values are only known through re-articulation 
Mouffe argues that it is only through processes of re-articulation that we gain a sense of 
who we are and what our values are (Janaway and Robertson, 2012: 47). Values are part 
of what it means to identify politically (Mouffe, 2002: 10). Such identities ‘can never be 
completely fixed’ (Mouffe, 2005b: 18) but instead “are necessarily precarious and 
unstable” (Willems, 2014: 10). In this sense values are emergent through practice not 
pre-existent. Although Mouffe (2000: 17) emphasises an agonistic pluralism which 
“forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive [and] make room for dissent”, 
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unlike other post-foundational theorists like Connolly who resist any form of closure she 
recognises the practical necessity of some form of closure and ordering – “un-
decidability cannot be the last word. Politics calls for a decision” (Elliott, 2010: 151). 
However, she encourages this form of closure to occur as a political decision that 
recognizes its own contingency and partiality of political claim, rather than presenting 
closure as the necessary or permanent resolution of tension. For Mouffe, social order 
always involves some form of hegemony as the institution of order in conditions of 
contingency (Mouffe, 2014: 151; Mouffe, 2009: 549) and, if challenged, one hegemony 
will be replaced by another counter-hegemonic claim (Tambakaki, 2014: 8). Mouffe 
therefore argues that agonistic struggle should not only attend to the de-articulation of 
existing hegemony but also a re-articulation as fundamental in politics (Mouffe, 2012; 
Mouffe, 2014: 152).  
Mouffe’s own work is split into an analytical approach of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (disrupting 
naturalized hegemonic articulations) and a political project of rearticulating ‘radical 
democracy’ for the left. Radical democracy is based on agonistic pluralism and Mouffe’s 
own political commitment not to relinquish democracy but to transform it (Mouffe, 
2000: 10). Re-articulation “captures the moment of politically constructing an alternative 
to the hegemonic order” (Tambakaki, 2014: 8). However, in line with her emphasis on 
contingency, Mouffe emphasises that the political project of radical democracy is only 
one such re-articulation among many, insisting that the two are not connected in any 
necessary relation for “different hegemonic projects can be envisaged and the outcome 
of the agonistic struggle is never pre-determined” (Mouffe, 2014: 155).   
Mouffe’s theory is a good place to start from in considering questions of values post-
structurally because she starts from a position that champions value pluralism and 
envisages values in ways that are neither individually nor pre-existently circumscribed. 
The aim of social enquiry is not to “unveil ‘true reality’ or ‘real interests’” but to 
demonstrate contingency and point to the possibility of alternatives (Mouffe, 2005a; 
Mouffe, 2005b). Mouffe’s approach starts to offer a post-structuralist understanding of 
values – as plural, collective, relational and discursive commitments that emerge through 
practice and form part of the construction of collective identity (Chilvers, 2008: 31) 
through which a range of meanings might be constructed, which cannot be known in 
advance.  
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2.6.3 Legitimacy and hegemonic power  
Legitimacy is a central concept in Mouffe’s work although often appearing as an outcome 
rather than a process. In thinking about legitimation of particular values, three 
contributions can be taken from her work. Firstly, her emphasis on the absence of an 
unabridged divide between legitimacy and power, secondly her emphasis on seeing 
alternatives and adversaries as legitimate, and thirdly her refusal to ground legitimacy in 
rationality. 
No unabridged divide between legitimacy and power 
“[T]here is no unbridgeable gap between power and legitimacy – not 
obviously in the sense that all power is automatically legitimate, but in 
the sense that: a) if any power has been able to impose itself, it is because 
it has been recognised as legitimate in some quarters; and b) if legitimacy 
is not based on a aprioristic ground, it is because it is based on some form 
of successful power. This link between legitimacy and power and the 
hegemonic order that this entails is precisely what the deliberative 
approach forecloses by positing the possibility of a type of rational 
argumentation where power has been eliminated and where legitimacy is 
grounded on pure rationality” (Mouffe, 2000: 14). 
 
When Mouffe speaks of legitimacy it is both an outcome (achievement) of successful 
power, and at the same time a claim (recognized at least among some groups) that 
enables power to succeed, she does not imply that securing legitimacy in some quarters 
is sufficient for hegemony to be achieved without political struggle. Rather she claims 
that any hegemony must have a claim to legitimacy that is recognised by some groups. 
Here, legitimacy is not a resource to be drawn from but an outcome of processes that 
both facilitates and signals the success of power. There are two interconnected 
implications of thinking about legitimacy in this way.   
Firstly it makes Mouffe’s concept of legitimacy relativistic and non-deterministic. In 
separating legitimacy from moral judgment, there is no independent adjudicator - no 
third party judge (Mouffe, 2009: 556). This lack of foundation through which to 
determine legitimacy makes several theorists uncomfortable: Elliot suggests that Mouffe 
offers “no explicit means for determining what ‘constitutes’ legitimacy” (2010: 62) and 
Crowder critiques her notion of legitimacy for not being grounded in moral terms 
suggesting “If fascism achieved ideological dominance, then presumably it would be 
fascist values that were legitimate” (Crowder, 2006: 11). Uncomfortable as this may be, 
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this is precisely Mouffe’s point. What is considered legitimate is no longer based on 
essential fixed characteristics, established in advance. Secondly it is the hegemonic 
discourse that sets the terms through which legitimacy is claimed (as argumentative 
scholars identified). As Crowder suggests “Since the current hegemony is liberal, it seems 
that liberal values are ‘legitimate’, for us now” (2006: 11). Legitimacy is achieved through 
the struggles of power that result both in claims to hegemony, and the claim to set the 
terms through which legitimation takes place without making these morally right. 
Without an “Archimedean point from which to adjudicate” (Kapoor, 2002: 474), any 
distinction between the legitimate and the illegitimate “can only be done from within a 
given tradition, with the help of standards that tradition provides” (Kapoor, 2002: 474-
475; see also Howarth, 2000). 
Legitimate adversaries 
A second way in which Mouffe utilises the concept of legitimacy can be seen in her 
validation of difference – through emphasis on the legitimation of dissent and conflict 
(Mouffe, 2005a: 119-120) and the right of the legitimate adversary to hold a position of 
difference (Mouffe, 2009: 551). In both cases, legitimacy appears to refer more to the 
recognition of validity or right to exist than a contingent achievement of power. This 
might confuse the first understanding of legitimacy, for the contestability and sense of 
outcome from a process of power is much less apparent, perhaps suggesting that 
difference in values should be granted the right to exist without political struggles. 
However, as Tambakaki argues, While antagonism is inherent, the transformation of 
antagonism into agonism requires constructive work and it is in this way that Mouffe’s 
theory triggers the work of politics anew (Tambakaki, 2014: 6). In this sense Mouffe’s use 
of legitimacy in both contexts refers to the on-going work of construction that 
legitimation involves.  
Legitimacy cannot be grounded in rationality 
Finally, for the same reasons that values cannot be resolved through rational debate 
(universal claims bring closure to political questions in ways that prevent plural 
contestation), Mouffe attests legitimacy cannot be grounded in rationality. For Mouffe 
“legitimacy is not based on a aprioristic ground” (Mouffe, 1999: 753) but is constructed 
through power, and as such should remain open to contestation  (2005b: 121). Argument 
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through rationality denies the possibility of plural positions and hence the possibility of 
contestation. Despite claims to neutrality, rationality will always involve exclusion and 
hence involve politics and power. 
“When a point of view is excluded ...required by the exercise of reason; 
therefore the frontiers between what is legitimate and what is not 
legitimate appear as independent of power relations” (Mouffe, 2005a: 
31).  
 
The implication of this for thinking about legitimacy, as for values, is that any claim to 
legitimacy should be seen as political and contingent, not rational and necessary – 
further supporting the intricate connection between legitimacy and power.  
The concept of hegemony is central to Mouffe’s demonstration that any existing social 
order (and process of legitimation) is not natural or neutral but a particular, historical, 
contingent claim to power that has been successful. Mouffe’s definition of hegemony, 
drawing from Laclau and Mouffe (1985), is “the collapse of objectivity and power” 
(Mouffe, 2000: 14). This extends Gramsci’s notion of presenting one set of interests as 
the expression of the collective will (Torphing, 2005: 163) and suggests that ‘speaking for 
all’ as opposed to ‘speaking for one’ is not only politically grounded, but is also 
epistemologically rooted in a claim to value neutrality. Neutrality and social objectivity 
are never given (Tambakaki, 2014: 7) but constituted through acts of power (Jones, 2014: 
19). Sedimentation of hegemonic practices conceal their contingent and political nature 
“so that they appear to proceed from a natural order” (Mouffe, 2014: 151). Such 
neutrality, Mouffe argues, “is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity that would 
be exterior to the practices that brought it into being”(Mouffe, 2009: 549).  
What is specific to Mouffe’s approach that sets it apart from Hajer or Foucault (who also 
emphasise the need to denaturalise sedimented practice) is twofold. Firstly Mouffe’s 
emphasis on the primacy of values and connection between hegemony and claim to 
neutrality opens up the contestation of hegemony through contestation of value 
neutrality. Secondly while Hajer and other argumentative theorists highlight the way in 
which legitimacy is established within discursive frames (Hajer, 1995), they stop short of 
specifying the connection between legitimacy and hegemony, which in Mouffe’s account 
are co-constitutive, and focus instead on other forms of power. It is Mouffe’s attention 
to the exclusion necessarily involved in hegemony that prevents us from accepting 
naturalisation of this claim to power. In doing so she reveals its contingent status as a 
political achievement and therefore the capability for boundaries between legitimacy 
60 
 
and illegitimacy always to be otherwise. To speak of hegemony is for Mouffe, unlike 
Hajer, to point to the absence of a final ground, and instead to the contingency of a 
partial fixing of social order - “nothing more than a particular and contingent ordering of 
power relations” (Jones, 2014: 20). Mouffe’s approach furthers Hajer’s attention to the 
political work being performed through hegemonic policy articulations of what is or is 
not legitimate by emphasising the contingency of such constructions of legitimacy in 
ways that allow for alternatives and contestation. Both Hajer and Mouffe’s approaches 
may be contrasted with those of Cash et al who un-critically allow dominant policy 
discourses to set the terms of engagement within which legitimacy is assessed. Through 
a focus on fair terms of engagement and remaining unbiased, there are distinct 
similarities between Cash et al.’s approach to legitimacy and that of Habermas, Rawls 
and deliberative democratic notions of legitimacy about which Mouffe is fiercely scathing 
(Mouffe, 2005a: 29-30).    
Whilst Mouffe’s relinquishing of essential reference points disconcerts those who feel 
her approach is “ill-suited to the adjudicative task of deciding between difference” 
(Kapoor, 2002: 473) and cannot safeguard particular values or principles by which we 
might want to organise our social life (Benhabib cited in Kapoor, 2002: 474), she 
emphasises the relinquishing of essential categories as necessary to the recognition and 
protection of value plurality – which is foundational to her post-structural project.  
“Only in the context of a political theory that takes account of the critique 
of essentialism… it is possible to formulate the axioms of a radical 
democratic politics in a way that makes room for the contemporary 
proliferation of political spaces and the multiplicity of democratic 
demands”(Mouffe, 2005a: 17).  
 
In disrupting the naturalised claim to legitimacy of particular discourses Mouffe opens up 
the possibility of challenge beyond that made possible by those who accept hegemony as 
securing closure. Mouffe’s conceptualisation of legitimacy, not as a resource from which 
natural, moral or rational claims can be made, but instead as a political process of 
construction through power, that both disguises its own contingent political status and 
sets the terms of its own definition, is a highly sophisticated contribution to 
understanding legitimacy from which the field of STS and science -policy would benefit. It 
is precisely the role of boundary work as a process of legitimation in reproducing claims 
to social objectivity that become the focus of this thesis. The work of reinforcing 
hegemony these processes perform need to be interrogated within science policy 
debates if the politics of boundary work are to be better understood.  
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2.6.4 Passions  
Mouffe’s concept of passions is a final concept that will be drawn upon in chapter 7. 
Throughout her work, Mouffe emphasised the centrality of passions to “the creation of 
collective political identities” as “the moving force in the field of politics” (Mouffe in 
Martin, 2013: 185). For Mouffe passions arise at the level of political identity formation 
and are neither personal nor expendable, but collective and necessary (Tambakaki, 2014: 
6). Passions are affects “mobilized in the political domain in the form of we/they 
identification” (Mouffe, 2014: 155). Passions are collective and distinguished from more 
individualist ‘emotions’ based on allowing greater emphasis on conflict and 
confrontation between collective political identities (Mouffe, 2014: 149). Like 
argumentative scholars Mouffe understands power not as “an external relation taking 
place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather as constituting the identities 
themselves” (Mouffe, 2000: 14; Jones, 2014: 20). Power is therefore “constitutive of 
social relations” (Mouffe, 2000: 13) and political identities come into being through 
power. Passions, Mouffe argues are not something to be suppressed but instead provide 
the very energy of politics that “keeps individuals motivated and enables political action” 
(Mihai, 2014: 32).  
One reading of Mouffe’s use of the term values is as discursive claims to meaning that 
become contingently fixed through relations of power, around which passions identify. 
This is not the same as saying that values are essential but rather that they are forms of 
stabilisation, and therefore political in nature. Mouffe is interested in passions as an 
important route to addressing questions about how collective forms of identification are 
created or sustained (Mouffe, 2014: 155). The ability to mobilise them is essential to the 
construction of new collectives needed for counter hegemonic projects (Tambakaki, 
2014: 7). Her foregrounding of passions provides another component of her critique of 
the rational focus of deliberative democratists, this time not on the impossibility of 
rational resolution but on the inadequate conception of the subject and how they act 
politically (Mouffe, 2014: 155). Mouffe’s notion of passion is used in Chapter 7 to explain 
both why things matter to people and the expression of agency through alternative 
political voices and forms of boundary work. 
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2.6.5 Integrating Mouffe with science–policy thinking on climate change  
Mouffe’s work has begun to be recognized as an important addition to thinking about 
climate change through the work of Amanda Machin (2013) Mike Hulme (2015) and Gert 
Goemminne (2012). Machin in particular provides an important connection between 
Mouffe’s political theory and possible models for climate change politics. Speaking from 
political theory, Machin focuses on why a radical democratic political approach in 
responding to climate change is preferable to techno-economic, ethical individual, green 
republican and green deliberative democratic approaches. In doing so she outlines what 
a radical democratic approach to valuing disagreement in climate change, rather than 
consensus, might look like. Rather than focusing on macro-political systems as Machin 
does, this thesis explores the applicability of Mouffe’s work to the micro-processes of 
boundary operation between science and policy and to the intricate practices through 
which alternatives to hegemonic discursive value framings become written out. In 
examining the way in which particular discursive value framings are constructed, 
reconstructed, legitimated, and thereby enabled to circulate over others, application of 
Mouffe’s thinking to boundary work develops a complementary way in which Mouffe’s 
theorizing might be relevant to the politics of climate change. 
The argumentative turn was in large part a challenge to the idea that policy could be 
value free technical process (Fischer and Gottweiss, 2012). However, the theoretical 
development of the argumentative turn has been strongly informed by Habermasian 
engagement (Fischer and Gottweiss, 2012) and shows some internal division between 
later Foucauldian inspired argumentative theorists (Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994) and those 
who draw more distinctly from Habermasian notions of rational deliberation (Fischer and 
Gottweiss, 2012: 9). Further, Rein and Shon and Healey all turn to rational deliberation to 
reconcile discourse conflicts (Schön and Rein, 1995: 48-49; Healey, 1993). STS responses 
to the legitimation crisis also turn to participatory deliberation and consensus. Mouffe is 
adamant that reliance on rational deliberation denies pluralism (Mouffe, 2005a: 6) and 
just as antagonism cannot be dissolved through rational debate, so too political 
questions cannot be adjudicated by standing outside of values. The tension between 
Habermas on one hand and Foucault/Mouffe on the other is described as “an essential 
tension in modernity… the tension between consensus and conflict” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 
211) with Habermas defending reason, legitimacy, justice, universality and Mouffe 
defending antagonism, pluralism and contingency (Kapoor, 2002: 465). There seems to 
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be an appetite within Latourian STS for more critical engagement with political 
questions, with Chilvers indicating that there is a need to open up participatory models 
to “diversity, difference, antagonism and uncertainties/indeterminacies” (Chilvers, 2008: 
155), and Blok using Mouffe’s notion of ‘agonistic cosmopolitics’ to explore “how STS can 
be fruitfully informed by political theory” (Blok, 2011: 74-75). This resonates with earlier 
STS attention to the way that  “representations, or inscriptions, contain at every stage 
the traces of multiple viewpoints, translations and incomplete battles” (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989).  
Mouffe’s potential resonance with STS is perhaps strongest in the work of Jasanoff who 
pays particular attention to politics in boundary work (Li Vigni, 2013: 2) and explicitly 
provokes need for greater criticality within STS (Willems, 2014). Both Jasanoff and 
Mouffe criticise hegemonic practice and embrace a plurality of values, forms of 
legitimation and operations of power. For both Jasanoff and Mouffe “political questions 
are not mere technical issues to be solved by experts” (Mouffe, 2005b: 10) but the 
opening up of new states of being (Jasanoff, 2012b: 276) and new spaces and 
subjectivities for hegemonic contestation (Mouffe, 2000: 10). For Jasanoff, expertise is 
bound up with questions of democracy (2003a) and consensus is always a product of 
demarcation (Jasanoff, 2003a). Like Mouffe, the point for Jasanoff is “revealing 
alternatives, and liberating the democratic imagination to soar above the constraints of 
the immediately possible” (Jasanoff, 2012b: 20). An area of greater tension in bringing 
Mouffe and Jasanoff’s work into dialogue is over the role of rationality and reason in 
legitimation. Where Mouffe adamantly problematizes rational deliberation, Jasanoff 
emphasizes increased participation, deliberation and a strong role for public reasoning. 
This is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
2.6.6 Critiques of Mouffe  
While Mouffe’s approach is considered helpful, it is not unproblematic and has 
generated a proliferation of critiques, some of which are easier to address than others. 
One area of confusion in Mouffe’s work is that she appears to hold some things, 
described as “ethico-political principles” (Mouffe, 2000: 15) as fixed in an essentialist 
sense. These include for example the permanent potentiality of antagonism (Crowder, 
2006: 15), conflict (Crowder, 2006: 20), democracy liberty, equality or pluralism (Jones, 
2014: 15). Further, while she is against rational consensus, she relies on “a certain 
amount of consensus” (Mouffe, 2000: 15) for example in agreeing the frameworks 
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through which legitimacy is assessed at any one time (Mouffe, 2008: 463; Mouffe in 
Bayard and Clark, 1996: 135; Mouffe, 2009: 551-552). Mouffe’s critics point to these as 
inconsistencies in her approach. 
These critiques can be addressed through foregrounding Mouffe’s emphasis on the 
acceptance of certain values and forms of partial closure as a political choice, not a 
necessity (Mouffe, 2000: 19). Accepting the pluralism of values is to envisage a plurality 
in possible systems - “different legitimate solutions to the problem of human 
coexistence” (Mouffe in Bayard and Clark, 1996: 139) – but to recognise that 
pragmatically these cannot all be realized at once.  Similarly, Mouffe suggests there 
cannot practically be pluralism in the frameworks for legitimacy, and so any social order 
will involve a hegemonic relationship that both establishes claims to the bounds of 
legitimacy and specifies which values are foregrounded. Crucially, however, these 
bounds should be recognized as political not essential, and therefore always open to 
contestation. Mouffe’s “ethico-political values” are therefore not essentialist categories, 
but rather political categories actively chosen. These limits to pluralism are inescapable 
for Mouffe (Mouffe, 2014: 151; Mouffe in Bayard and Clark, 1996: 136; Mouffe, 2000: 
15) and arise because political relations are always drawn through an ‘us-them’ relation. 
She suggests: 
“I do not believe it is possible to avoid excluding some points of view. No 
state or political order…can exist without some form of exclusion. My 
point is a different one. I want to argue that it is very important to 
recognize these forms of exclusion for what they are and the violence 
they signify, instead on concealing them under the veil of rationality” 
(Mouﬀe, 1993: 145). 
 
Her emphasis on the contingency of any hegemonic order as a political achievement 
leaves open possibility for contestation.  This applies as much to democracy as to any 
other political system, but in Mouffe’s view democracy should be our political choice. To 
suggest Mouffe considers such values in an essential sense is to misunderstand her 
political project for radical democracy which seeks not just to disarticulate but also to 
rearticulate in a way that leaves open the door of contingency and political agonism. It is 
in this emphasis on contingency that Mouffe argues for an understanding of values not 
based in morality or other essentialist identities (Mouffe, 2002: 11) that preclude the 
possibility of disagreement (Mouffe, 2005b: 122). 
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Mouffe’s approach has also attracted critiques that focus on practical objections to 
implementation. Jones suggests it is precisely in societies beset by disagreement and 
difference that the democratic agonistic framework might be difficult to adopt. He 
argues “it is not clear why the parties involved should accept the premise of an agonistic 
democratic framework….Mouffe does not provide us with a sufficiently robust 
explanation as to how this shift from enemy to adversary will come about.” (Jones, 2014: 
26) 2014:26). Deveaux further suggests that “agonistic democrats have so far little to say 
about citizens who may refuse to co-operate with other citizens, or about groups that 
have an entrenched interest in having a conflict continue unresolved” (1999: 5) and 
Rowan suggests it is the very democratic institutions over which hegemonic struggle 
allegedly takes place that must not be questioned ( 2011: 146). These raise questions 
around how basic agreement on the terms of engagement are set and a lack of 
specification in Mouffe’s work over practical application of her work. Further, Kapoor 
draws from Benhabib to question how “freedom and justice, respect for human rights of 
citizens as equal and free being” might be safeguarded (Kapoor, 2002: 474). Without 
essentialist ‘buck-stops’ to debate, agonistic theorists cannot protect these values in an 
absolutist way but rely on a vibrant political process that attends to processes of re-
articulation in ways that support democratic values. In this sense Mouffe’s approach 
could be fairly accused of placing too much trust in the political process.  
Crowder criticises Mouffe for a Foucauldian reduction of values to power (2006: 2) and 
suggests that “legitimacy on this view is simply ‘successful power” (2006: 9). Although 
this misrepresents Mouffe’s own distinction between the three terms which are not able 
to be read interchangeably in her work, it does point to a lack of clear definition over key 
terms which are often left to be interpreted through her usage rather than clear 
specification. While many of Crowder’s criticisms may be understood as disagreement 
with Mouffe’s anti-essentialist approach, one particular critique provides a powerful 
challenge. Crowder suggests: 
“If our values are no more than expressions of dominant power 
formations, then even the most radical normative alternatives we could 
imagine must be in some way complicit with existing structures. On this 
reading, the hegemonic approach, far from enabling a more radical 
questioning of the status quo, actually imprisons us within it” (Crowder, 
2006: 12). 
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According to Mouffe, spaces and subjectivities for challenge are not ready made, but 
need to be constructed against the sedimentation of a non-neutral playing field of 
discursive relations – hence the political struggle. However, further attention is needed 
to assess whether attempts to open up spaces and subjectivities beyond dominant 
power formations remain entrained in dominant ways of thinking. This is considered 
further in Chapter 7. 
Finally, several critics argue that Mouffe’s version of politics demands more rational 
deliberation (Karppinen et al., 2008) and participation (Kapoor, 2002) not less. 
Karpinnem suggests Mouffe’s reading of Habermas is oversimplified, citing Dryzek and 
Niemeyer (2006) as examples of later deliberative democrats who move away from a 
consensual model of the public sphere to argue for deliberation between people who 
accept each other’s colliding positions as legitimate (Karppinen et al., 2008: 10). Crowder 
also suggests “deliberation does not involve the ‘elimination’ of the passions, or of 
passionate attachments to collective identifications. It involves only the critical 
questioning of those attachments and the assumptions they generate” (Crowder, 2006: 
25). While, as discussed in section 2.6.5, Mouffe is not suggesting that politics should not 
be open to participation; in her attack on rationality she does overlook wider forms of 
reasoning and this is where dialogue with Jasanoff and with Sayer (2011) would benefit 
Mouffe’s approach.  
There are clearly some difficult questions that are not finally resolved in Mouffe’s work.  
However, in foregrounding post-structural approaches to values and legitimacy it is 
suggested that Mouffe’s thinking offers potential to further support and develop 
Jasanoff’s contribute to thinking about the crisis of legitimacy within science–policy 
studies and to further address suggestions that STS as a discipline is unable to critique 
hegemonic neo-liberal frameworks of science–policy interaction (Hess, 2013). 
 
2.7 Theoretical framework for the thesis  
The review of argumentative theorizing and boundary work presented in sections 2.1-2.5 
highlights a two-part difficulty for a study of values and legitimacy in science–policy 
boundary work. Firstly, the need to think about values non-essentially and, secondly, the 
need for greater attention to relations between legitimation and hegemonic power. This 
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thesis looks to the work of Chantal Mouffe to explore its potential to respond to these 
concerns. 
2.7.1 Working theory of values 
With values decentred but not eradicated either from science–policy debates or 
everyday interactions, there is a need to attend politically to the value commitments of 
discourses, frames, storylines and narratives and to the way in which boundary practices 
enable particular discursive value framings to circulate. In this task, further attention is 
required to theorising values post-structurally if they are not once more to be evoked as 
explanatory causal moments of closure to political debate. This is especially important 
given a revival of references to values within recent science–policy literatures. This thesis 
seeks to explore a critical politics of values that contests their naturalised status. 
Recognizing that while values are not essentialist, static, pre-existent or discretely held 
by autonomous individuals, the way in which certain values both fix, and become fixed, 
however contingently, requires critical attention. This brings into focus which claims are 
being positioned as values and which are naturalized as value-neutral.  
Discussing values more relationally and in connection with practices of boundary working 
and hegemonic power, as suggested in section 1.3, involves starting less from a clear 
notion of value as a bounded object but more from an intimation towards the way in 
which things come to matter, the effects of that mattering on the science–policy 
boundary interactions under study, and the politics around what is enabled and 
precluded from being valued. Proctor argues that geography as a discipline is well placed 
to contribute to theorising questions of value3 because of its embodiment of tension and 
paradox – avoiding simplistic resolutions (1998: 236). It is from the starting point of 
paradox that this thesis seeks to explore questions of value at the science–policy 
interface, recognizing both the importance and difficulty in their post-structural 
conceptualization. 
This thesis argues that it is possible to see values as achieved discursive categories in the 
same way that categories of race, gender, sex came to be understood post-structurally as 
discursive categories rather than essential qualities. Like these discursive categories, 
values are developed relationally, collectively, and emergently through everyday 
                                                          
3
 Whilst Proctor conflates values and ethics, this PhD thesis seeks to maintain a separation between these two terms on 
account of Mouffe’s movement of values away from morality towards politics. 
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interactions, are fractured and contradictory, not coherent. Drawing from Mouffe’s post-
structural approach, values are considered relationally and politically – and are emergent 
through discourse and practice, sedimented but not stable. Questions of values and their 
relation with legitimacy and hegemonic power are brought into focus, through attention 
to boundary strategies through which normative commitments become sedimented and 
reproduced. The notion of sedimentation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Sayer, 2011; Barad, 
2007) is useful in conceptualising how values both emerge relationally and become sticky 
– mattering between interactions. 
In rethinking values in this way, the thesis in many ways returns to Wynne’s distinction in 
1982 between two ways of thinking about values. In his view, there is an 
“alternative tradition, which I have accepted, [in which] people’s values 
and goals are held to be often vague, conflicting, unstable and open to 
persuasion. Political events and language, including technical analysis, can 
tacitly guide people into seeing the world in certain ways, influencing 
what is regarded as an acceptable value, and what is inevitable, possible, 
and desirable, or at least tolerable. Such processes are not merely 
instrumental, in the sense of conveying pre-existing ideas, but they create 
new cognitions and bring concrete values into public existence” (Wynne, 
1982: 160, emphasis added). 
 
Hajer suggests that Wynne’s account of the Windscale enquiry highlighted the way in 
which rationalism and objective science facilitated the formulation of some beliefs and 
values, while defining others as irrelevant (Wynne 1982, in Hajer, 1995: 72). While the 
argumentative turn responded to Wynne’s work by turning to discourse, in 
foregrounding discourse the emphasis moved away from these direct questions over 
value politics. In the revival of interest in the language of values it is important to 
develop this attention to values from Wynne’s second understanding of values – that is 
itself in many ways post-structural. The notion of ‘discursive value framing’ provides a 
temporary measure, to avoid any problematic confusion with traditional understandings, 
instead emphasising the value implications of discourse, whilst distancing the discussion 
of values from an essentialist lineage.  
2.7.2 Processes of legitimation 
STS accounts of legitimacy as an outcome of boundary work (Jasanoff, 1990) and 
spatially contingent (Jasanoff, 2005) are foundational for thinking about boundary work 
as a process of legitimation that politically enables or restricts circulation of particular 
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discursive value framings. Focussing on legitimation foregrounds the processes through 
which legitimacy is constructed. In this thesis, attention focuses on processes of 
knowledge legitimation.  
With increasing attention to legitimacy defined in policy terms (Cash et al., 2002) and 
demand driven science (Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007) Mouffe’s foregrounding of the 
relation between rationality, legitimacy and hegemony provides one possibility to take 
this thinking about processes of constructing legitimacy forward, and through which, 
science–policy’s critical edge might be renewed. Although there is emerging interest in 
Mouffe’s work in relation to climate change, little empirical work has tested its 
application and in this sense the conversation between the two disciplines offers 
productive possibilities on both sides. Responding to Jasanoff’s call to focus on questions 
of legitimacy further (Lanzarotta, 2009) and Lister’s suggestion that the ‘inherent 
vagueness’ of the term ‘legitimacy’ has been important in stabilising and securing 
particular value systems as natural and neutral (Lister, 2003: 176), this thesis attends to 
the specific processes through which legitimacy for knowledge becomes constructed at 
the science–policy interface in Scotland.  
2.7.3 Translation 
Translation is an important concept within the empirical narratives of the thesis, but it is 
being used with a specific political focus to prioritise policy meanings. Theoretically, the 
notion of translation is complex and contested, referring within STS to the establishing of 
connections between dichotomies of science/policy, culture/nature created through the 
work of purification. Translation is both essential to the maintenance of these narratives 
of separation and demanded through the work of purification itself to stabilise social 
order. STS narratives highlight both a tension between similarity and difference between 
these domains, and stability and change of meaning during the act of translation, such 
that the work of difference creates displacements, betrayals and treason, as well as 
gaining new meanings within new relational networks.  
STS accounts also point to politics of translation in doing this work of difference, 
emphasising that such processes are on-going struggles for legitimacy that do not just 
describe, but bring particular knowledges and values into existence. But what is this 
‘work of difference’ that is being performed at the climate science–policy interface? 
Exactly how are differences negotiated through the boundary processes, what ‘work’ is 
70 
 
undertaken, what is excluded, what is betrayed and what gained in translation? How do 
the processes of translation relate to questions of values and of legitimation? 
Both inside and outside geography, there appears to be interest in exploring the process 
of translation further. Gambier encourages more empirical studies of translation from 
any context (2010: 240), whilst Schaffner and Bassnett suggest that 
“we do not yet know that much about the actual translation practice in 
political institutions… What exactly happens in the complex processes of 
re-contextualisation” (2010: 1). 
 
Where Latour draws attention to the importance of features not names in translation – 
focusing on process and practises to find commonality rather than what something is 
nominally called (Latour, 2013a), Fazey et al (2014) suggest that naming has important 
discursive implications. Reflections from a close examination and shadowing of the 
processes of translation performed through ClimateXChange aims to contribute towards 
better understanding the contested nature and implications of translation as a concept 
and the discursive work it performs. This theoretical approach involves an emphasis on 
the relation between micro-practice and macro understandings of hegemonic power. To 
this end, the empirical chapters of the thesis examine processes of science–policy 
boundary work in more detail focusing specifically on processes of translation and 
legitimation to explore the way in which practices of boundary work enable or disable 
the circulation of particular discursive value framings. Here a distinction is introduced 
between the generic theoretical understanding translation within all boundary work and 
the particular usage of the concept as it is being deployed within the empirical context. 
To further introduce these empirical narratives the next chapter discusses how the 
theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter have influenced the methodological 
research undertaken. 
 
  
71 
 
 
 Chapter 3.
Researching Boundaries, Values and Legitimacy 
Methodologically 
 
“Just as politics and policy are about values, 
so too is research.  Research is always directed. 
Simply by the questions we choose to pursue 
and how we choose to work… the stories we 
believe need to be told, and what we consider to 
be a social injustice” 
 (Mayan and Daum, 2014: 74) 
 
 
 
If research is a journey (Brew, 2010: 279) this chapter charts several journeys: journeys 
that trace knowledge circulation at the science policy interface; through theoretical 
literatures, to Scotland to conduct fieldwork, the journey of producing the thesis and my 
own journey back to academia. This chapter presents a selection of narratives that bring 
the myriad of choices producing this thesis into view – conceptual, pragmatic and 
logistical. Taking a post-positivist approach to values, constructing legitimacy, and 
boundary work, involves acknowledging partial, multiple, contingent and relational 
interpretations of knowledge and recognising that certain forms of knowledge are able 
to be produced through specific relationships between the researcher and the 
researched. This demands reflexivity over the frames, assumptions, politics and tensions 
that have influenced the development of questions posed and possibilities for participant 
responses to ensure rigor (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 275 citing Finlay, 1998; Koch and 
Harrington, 1998; Rice and Ezzy, 1999). Empirical research comes from fieldwork 
conducted in Scotland between 2012 and 2013, however, research design began in 2010 
from within a professional context.  
3.1 A place from which to start: Origins of the research   
While working in climate change policy for local government in the north of England, my 
colleagues and I often became frustrated by an inability to generate significant policy 
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change despite clarity of scientific message, formal policy commitments and persistent 
efforts by individuals at many different levels to induce change. Practitioner 
conversations demonstrated recurrent frustration at endlessly coming up against the 
same barriers: around what was considered acceptable and what was not, what became 
valued, what re-framing was necessary and what discursive compromises had to be 
made to achieve the smallest policy ‘hook’. Lack of manoeuvrability around hegemonic 
discursive values generated a burning sense of injustice (Sayer, 2011: 21) that particular 
framings were not open to debate, driving the impetus for doctoral research. During 
spare moments I struggled with what exactly was the nature of these barriers; what was 
at stake and why was the relationship with science considered important? With science 
appearing as a tool in both arguments for, and resistance to, policy change, struggles 
over values were understood at this stage to be ‘played out’ through science–policy 
interactions.  
Boundary organisations and other forms of science–policy intermediaries were 
understood to be an important site of science–policy interaction for whom “the ability… 
to frame and interpret scientific knowledge is a substantial source of political power” 
(Litfin, 1994: 4). Where practitioner colleagues put resistance to change down to 
entrenched interests and ideology, both interests and ideology were considered to rest 
on differences in what is being valued, and both appearing to black box such questions, 
presenting them as end points of explanation that discourage further enquiry. This 
stimulated research into a more critical approach to values. At this stage, like Friedman 
who describes being troubled by the position of women but not knowing what to call it 
(1964), there was a problem of terminology. Although this thesis has been written from a 
clearly defined interest in values, difficulties in terminology have beset the research. 
Consideration journeyed between values, beliefs and worldviews with each perceived as 
problematic in some way, causing unrelenting challenges in framing the research.  
3.1.1 Why Scotland? 
Like much research, my proposal began with a hunch (Bennett, 2002: 141) and hope that 
academia would help me explore these questions further. In the early stages, my 
experiences in North-East England remained a reference point, and the research journey 
offered at least in part, a hope that as T.S Elliot captures:  
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“the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time” 
 
T.S. Eliot -- "Little Gidding" (the last of his Four Quartets) 
 
 
Yet, whilst offering ease of access and depth of existing knowledge, unlike Crang (1994), I 
felt strongly that the mire of sticky professional relations would compromise any ability 
to gain perspective and clarity, and so was adamant not to conduct the research in the 
context of my previous employment. On the one hand, I felt I knew too much outside of 
research relations, making it difficult to renegotiate an identity as a researcher. On the 
other, I felt I did not know enough – understood in too little analytical depth, and risked 
falling back on shared discourses and simplistic interpretations that would prevent 
making strange and interrogating the voices and concepts encountered. More than this, 
it would be difficult for me to come to know myself as a researcher not as a practitioner 
in this context. 
Discussions with Scottish academics and practitioners between Jan 2010 and March 2011 
stimulated interest in Scotland as a case study based on the Scottish Government’s 
globally ambitious carbon reduction targets and changes to the process for engaging 
with climate science. The Climate Change Scotland Act 2009 had enshrined in legislation 
the most ambitious Carbon Reduction Targets by 2020 globally, and the proposed 
Scottish Government restructuring of interaction with climate science made the science–
policy interface in Scotland an interesting research focus. Personal experiences and those 
of former colleagues affected the design of the research, the way that methods were 
used and combined, and the shape and direction of the narrative that emerged, yet 
these experiences have been constantly challenged at every stage of the research 
process and have been contradicted, as well as supported by accounts from Scotland. As 
Guillemin and Guillam emphasise, this relationship between researchers and research is 
bi-directional: 
“Our research interests and the research questions we pose, as well as 
the questions we discard, reveal something about who we are. Our choice 
of research design, the research methodology, and the theoretical 
framework that informs our research are governed by our values and 
reciprocally, help to shape these values” (2004: 274). 
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This reflexive narrative is important to the production of the thesis for as Cook and Crang 
describe, some stories just don’t always make the best sense told in an abstract detached 
way (1995: 170). Transitions in positionality, and reflexivity over the research process are 
further discussed in section 3.4.5.  
 
3.2 Theoretical frameworks for methodology  
Three areas of literature – STS boundary work, feminist methodologies and post-
structural discourse theory – were particularly influential methodologically as well as 
conceptually.  
3.2.1 STS boundary work 
Science–policy literatures emphasise the non-linear relationship between science and 
policy (Jasanoff, 1990; Sarewitz, 2004; Yearley, 2009; Owens, 2010; Pielke, 2007) and the 
way in which the categories of science and policy are themselves understood as 
outcomes of boundary work not pre-existent (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Guston, 2001; 
Jasanoff, 1987). This re-ignited my previous interest in Latour (undergraduate 
dissertation 2003) and meant methodologically starting in the middle with hybrid 
relationships (Latour, 1993: 2) rather than presuming any fixed view over what 
comprised science or policy. 
3.2.2 Feminist methodologies and sensitive research 
Inspiration was also drawn from feminist research methodologies which problematise 
the politics of knowledge, public-private divisions (Nelson and Seager, 2008: 1,4), stable 
categories (Nelson and Seager, 2008: 4), myths of value free enquiry (Cook and Fonow, 
1984; Reinharz and Davidman, 1992) and the possibility of objectivity (Edwards, 1993; 
Moss and Al-Hindi, 2008: 46). Feminist research instead emphasises performance, 
reflexivity, and multiplicity (Nelson and Seager, 2008: 4-7; McDowell, 1992) knowledge 
as situated and embodied (Haraway, 1991) and closer reflexive scrutiny of methods 
(Bergen, 1993). Feminist research has made important methodological contributions to 
researching ‘sensitive’ topics. In rejecting separation between researcher and researched 
feminist approaches emphasise “that we can know the world because we are connected 
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with it” (Hayles, 1995: 48, cited in Whatmore 2002: 1), openly acknowledge assumptions, 
beliefs, sympathies and biases (Renzetti and Lee, 1993: 177) explore specificity of power 
differences (Moss, 2007) and emphasise sharing of self during research to show solidarity 
(Oakley and Roberts, 1981). Research on values intersects with four areas that Renzetti 
and Lee suggest make research sensitive: 
“a) where research intrudes into the private sphere… b) where the study 
is concerned with deviance and social control c)where it impinges on the 
vested interests of powerful persons …and d) where it deals with  things 
sacred to those being studied that they do not wish profaned” (1993: 6).  
 
Sensitivity should not discourage research (Renzetti and Lee, 1993), for “shying away 
from controversial topics, simply because they are controversial, is also an avoidance of 
responsibility” (Sieber and Stanley, 1988: 55). However, identification of the sensitivity of 
research brings with it a heightened responsibility over reflexivity and ethical conduct 
discussed further in sections 3.3.3 and 3.5. 
3.2.3 Post-structural discourse theory 
The third important influence is post-structuralist discourse theory. As Chapter 2 
articulated, this thesis adopts a discursive approach to the study of values. Analysis of 
discourse has arisen within a number of traditions from structuralist, Marxist, 
hermeneutic and post-structural social science, each with different methodological 
implications (Howarth, 2000; Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 2). Whilst linguistic traditions 
focus on written and spoken forms of communication through exegesis of written texts 
(Fairclough, 2003), Foucault shifted attention in the production of meaning from 
language to discourse and onto the historically situated “rules and practices that 
produced meaningful statements” (Hall, 1997: 44). Although Laclau and Mouffe build on 
Foucault’s foundations, and broadly utilise a similar notion of power and agency4 
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 14) there are specific points of difference between the 
two. Laclau and Mouffe define discourse as “the structured totality resulting from the 
articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). Building on, but in many ways 
going further than Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that discourse is extended to “all 
social practices and relations”(Howarth, 2000: 101) and all meaning is constituted 
                                                          
4
 Jorgensen and Phillips position Laclau and Mouffe’s approach closer to that of Foucault than does Howarth (2000), who 
distinguishes a more significant point of departure, including greater emphasis on subjectivity and scope for resistance. 
76 
 
discursively (Howarth, 2000: 104). Taking a Mouffian approach to discourse implies that 
discursive meaning may be analysed through many forms of linguistic and non-linguistic 
activity, entailing analysis beyond spoken and written texts to also consider practices, 
behaviours and organisational arrangements.  
Previous boundary research both emphasises language in boundary definitions (Jasanoff, 
1987: 199) and diverse practices of boundary work that understand the signification of 
meaning beyond language (Jasanoff, 2003a; Jasanoff, 2006; Miller, 2001a). The three 
empirical chapters of this thesis draw from material that takes a linguistic form 
(speeches, interviews, reports, visual images, documents and electronic materials and 
observations from participation events) and non-linguistic forms (practices of boundary 
work, organisational and institutional arrangements, body languages and statistical or 
other tools of analysis such as MAC Curves) that were also considered important in “the 
process of analysing signifying practices as discursive forms” (Howarth, 2000: 10). 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, meaning is never permanently fixed, and 
discursive struggles focusing on exclusion are strong features (Jorgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 6). Howarth argues Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on hegemony provides an 
important connection between Foucault’s emphasis on the micropolitics of power and 
social structure (Howarth, 2010: 317)  and enables greater explanation of expressions of 
resistance and agency (Howarth, 2010: 314) . The purpose of their discourse theory is 
neither pure description nor to uncover deep causal logics but to analyse “the way in 
which political forces and social actors construct meaning within incomplete and un-
decidable social structures” (Howarth, 2000: 129). Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to 
discourse is suited to examining processes through which hegemonic claims to discourse 
are maintained or disrupted, how partial closure is claimed and the contingence and 
partiality of such claims overlooked. Consequentially, interviews were envisaged as 
situations through which to explore a plurality of discursive value framings.  
3.2.4 Joining practitioner and theoretical influences together  
Theoretical interest in exploring relations between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
discourses, and a practitioner approach to knowing the world through immersion 
(through professional experience of having to rapidly adapt to new policy roles, develop 
working knowledges and integrate into new practitioner communities) influenced 
research design in two important ways. Firstly, it led to an iterative and mixed methods 
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approach to research, which was responsive to openings and emerging emphases in the 
process of research. Analytical themes (such as notions of translation, evidence, expert 
opinion legitimacy and the distinction between the personal and professional domains) 
increasingly became the focus for research attention. Secondly, both theoretical interest 
in, and practitioner experience of, the multiple narratives involved in science–policy 
exchange led to attentiveness to differences between formal/informal narratives. 
Methods focussing on ethnographic and discursive analysis were selected and interview 
approaches experimented with the atmospheres and possibilities of relational 
interaction to try to explore these further. While different methods held their own 
strength, interaction between interviews, participation, discourse analysis, drawings and 
self-identification exercises enabled investigation to deepen beyond formal narratives 
and to explore discourses outside formal and official narrative accounts, as will be 
described in section 3.3. 
 
3.3 Designing and conducting research  
This section considers specific decisions in the planning and conduct of research – over 
organisational focus, research questions and methods – and discusses experiences of 
working with particular methods and managing positionality. 
3.3.1 Choice of organisations and processes  
Empirical research in Scotland centred on the work of ClimateXChange (CXC), understood 
as a boundary organisation (Guston, 1999), funded by The Scottish Government to 
facilitate engagement between climate policy makers and climate science. CXC’s work is 
set in a broader context of networks and forums through which science–policy  
interaction take place, including Parliamentary Committee hearings, policy stakeholder 
forums for policy preparation, Climate 2020 private sector forum, SEPA’s Environment 
Web, the Climsave Project, the Met Office and Sniffer (an independent charitable 
boundary organisation see section 4.4.2). The decision to focus on CXC came from its 
dedicated functionality and a future-looking mode of operation in Scotland. Nevertheless 
research took a situated view of CXC’s work within these wider networks and attendance 
at events and interviews extended beyond CXC. Science policy literatures emphasised 
that “interessement… cannot be understood from a single viewpoint” (Star and 
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Griesemer, 1989). To understand CXC it was necessary to understand CXC within a 
broader context. 
3.3.2 Choice of methods  
Participant observation, interviewing and documentary analysis were combined in the 
research. In reflecting on this choice of methods, this section discusses their offer or 
limitation to the research, and specific experiences of utilising and adapting approaches 
in the context of values research.  
Documentary analysis  
Research was to begin with a systematic documentary analysis of grey literature 
produced by CXC, The Scottish Government and CXC research providers. Assessing the 
value implications of formal written discourses aimed to understand the Scottish context 
and provide a springboard for more intensive interviewing and participant observation. 
However, initial plans for baseline documentary analysis were quickly overtaken by an 
invitation to be involved in CXC’s first Policy Awareness Workshop in May 2012. This 
provided an entry point to begin empirical research through participant observation from 
which the research subsequently snowballed. Instead a basic review of Scottish 
Government policy documents, CXC and Sniffer documentation and websites of major 
actors was undertaken alongside initial interviews, providing a knowledge platform to 
inform interview conversations. More detailed documentary analysis was undertaken 
later in the research of a smaller set of Scottish Government policy documents and CXC 
briefing notes, interview transcripts participation notes and email exchanges selected for 
their centrality and relevance to examples profiled (see Appendix A for a listing of 
documents used in the final writing process). 
Documentary analysis followed a broad understanding of ‘text’ that included written, 
visual (maps charts graphs graphics and pictures) and electronic based materials (Barnes 
and Duncan, 1992: 5; Shurmer-Smith, 2002: 123). I was initially interested in the power 
of visual climate change information – as characteristic of scientific activity (Lynch, 1985: 
37) saturating climate change understanding (Trumbo, 1999; Trumbo, 2000) – to do 
work, to make present and to naturalise (Wood and Fels, 1992). Growing theoretical 
interest in how images and graphics of science mix facts and value judgements and 
communicate a scientist’s objectivity (Robbins, 1992) makes it “more important than 
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ever to ask questions about what and how… images of science communicate” (Trumbo, 
2000: 380). However during empirical research there was more focus on textural and 
spoken communications within the particular channels of exchange being studied. The 
thesis focused more on written and spoken forms of exchange, although visual 
methodologies were still utilised creatively as part of interviewing.  
Analysis took the form of coding texts and performing basic discourse analysis, as 
described in section 3.5.2, and recognised that meaning is produced between texts and 
within the context of their circulation – through ‘intertextuality’ (Barnes and Duncan, 
1992: 2; Shurmer-Smith, 2002: 127; Eagleton, 1983). A text always has multiple meanings 
and  “escapes it author” (Barthes, cited in Barnes and Duncan, 1992: 6; see also Shurmer-
Smith, 2002: 124). ‘Intersubjectivity’ or the implied ‘we’ and ‘they’ of texts, was also 
considered important in circumscribing political agency and involvement (Barnes and 
Duncan, 1992). 
Participant observation  
Participant observation was important on two levels: in a broad sense attending climate 
science–policy events across Scotland and in a more focussed way through shadowing 
CXC. Although a feature of all research (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994), with degrees 
of participation in which distinctions between observation and participation are often 
ambiguous, participant observation offers possibilities to analyse interactions that are 
not staged by the researcher and fall outside what people might chose to emphasise 
during interview or written documentation (Herbert, 2000: 552). Far from an 
unmediated reality, participant observation knowledge is no less constructed than that 
of interviews (Crang and Cook, 2007: 30), but does allow research to “get beyond forcing 
answers to questions framed by a particular knowledge” (Bennett, 2002: 139). This was 
important given my eagerness to get beyond front stage narratives and explore everyday 
processes whose interest and significance might not be able to be explored through 
interviews alone. 
Broad scale participatory-observation involved attending 23 climate change related 
policy events in Scotland, largely between May 2012 and March 2013 (Appendix A). 
Selection of these events was largely opportunist and dependant on advance notification 
– through practitioner information networks (Holyrood e-magazine, CXC and Sniffer 
newsletters, Sustainable Scotland Network among others) online searching or word of 
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mouth. In some cases, I managed to negotiate attendance at events in exchange for 
voluntary administrative support – welcoming delegates and issuing name-badges was a 
good way to become familiar with faces with whom I could strike up discussions during 
networking breaks. These events enabled observation of discursive value framings in 
practice, and of informal conversations that were often revisited in later formal 
interviews. Participant observation also gleaned snippets of knowledge and insights into 
processes that were able to be further explored during interviews. Events provided a 
useful way of establishing who were the influential and recurrent voices in science–policy 
exchange and how others perceived such discourses. They were also an opportunity to 
observe less censored conversations and discussions that occur on the hoof, in corridors, 
between sessions and the arguments and tensions that break out during round table 
discussions. Finally deploying an immersive approach brought familiarity of the holistic 
picture of actors, organisations and science–policy interactions and gained me familiarity 
and acceptance within the context of study that became important both in accessing 
events and securing interviews but also in gaining trust with participants during 
interview.  
Guiding this early, extensive stage was a desire to become familiar with the 
organisational landscape and scope of science–policy interactions taking place. A 
database of key organisations/departments and named individuals was drafted from 
internet research that guided my focus, sharpening attention at events enabling scanning 
of attendance lists for key figures with whom to engage in conversation, and seek to 
arrange interviews. As expected, these events attracted particular policy actors over 
others, and more senior Scottish Government officers could not be approached in this 
way. Instead particular actors became incredibly generous gatekeepers (Dowler, 2001), 
providing recommended introductions and facilitating invitations to meetings. The mass 
of organisational information assimilated was organised and interpreted through 
construction of the following diagram, showing the organisations that constitute the 
climate science–policy landscape in Scotland and their interrelations (Figure 3.1). This 
was used in combination with the contacts database to target interviews and select 
particular processes of interaction to study in more depth.  
An early invitation to participate in the first ‘policy awareness’ workshop organised by 
ClimateXChange in May 2012 began a sustained relationship with the ClimateXChange 
secretariat. This event provided a rapid introduction to science–policy interaction in 
Scotland through presentations by CXC staff and anecdotal discussion by researchers and 
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also allowed introduction to CXC scientists. The opportunity enabled observation of one 
important strand of CXC’s work – the training of scientists in policy ‘needs’ as discussed 
in chapter five.  Participant observation was also possible during other CXC events, such 
as the CXC Woodlands Adaptation Workshop and the CXC Uncertainty Workshop that 
brought scientists and policy makers face-to-face. CXC granted me unrestricted access to 
many of their team meetings including ‘away-days’, annual general meetings and training 
events. The only exclusion was the Directorate meetings.  
More detailed participant observation with CXC in particular, enabled a strong rapport to 
be developed over time recognising that access is not an initial phase of entry but a 
continuing process of negotiation and renegotiation (Renzetti and Lee, 1993: 102). In 
studying CXC’s Call-Down work - the production of demand responsive briefings for the 
Scottish Government - participant observation of meetings between the Scottish 
Government and CXC secretariat were important in studying translation processes in 
greater depth. It was unfortunately not possible to follow call-downs from start to finish 
partially due to time and partly because many exchanges were done through email. In a 
few specific cases, I was generously provided access to email chains and draft iterations 
of the material produced in order to examine the negotiations over language and 
phrasing which goes some way to ensuring this continuity between communications was 
achieved. At the time of writing CXC has responded to 55 call-down briefing responses on 
an extensive range of topics (04/11/14 CXC website), although only 22 had been initiated 
during the initial fieldwork period between May 2012 and May 2013. Opportunities 
arose for six to be the subject of more detailed analysis either through shadowing, 
interviewing or access to email exchanges. The chance of shadowing and then analysing 
CXC call-down requests was a fantastic opportunity, and a strong sense of needing to 
study further the chosen examples, and more was strong, however advice over when to 
stop here was paramount (Kitchin and Tate, 2013: 271). 
The tension between being participant as observer or observer as participant (Burns, 
2000) varied depending on the situation and context of involvement. At times I was 
present as a silent observer (and under the Chatham House Rule), at others a full 
participant. During conversations at events I sought always to be clear about my status 
as a researcher, although the boundaries of consent were more difficult to ascertain than 
for those formally interviewed. Where specific conversations held at events were likely 
to be used in the research then a formal interview was requested to follow up the 
conversation in a more formalised setting of consent. Participant observation records 
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were captured through extensive note-taking, usually performed explicitly during 
conferences and or meetings, sometimes via notes taken immediately afterwards or 
voice recordings captured in private. Selection, interpretation and phrasing of events and 
descriptions in the research diaries were of course influenced by my own perspectives, 
but care was taken to distinguish directly captured quotes by participants and the more 
general paraphrasing and description in order to retain clarity over whose voice was 
being recorded. Although a longer period of participant observation was planned and 
agreed, this was unable to be undertaken for personal logistical reasons.  Although a 
shorter period of more targeted observation means that researcher presence is often 
more obvious and intrusive (Judd et al., 1991)a period of continuous immersion would 
have presented its own specific challenges. Incomplete transition in my own subjectivity 
– from understanding myself as a practitioner to as a researcher – could have meant it 
was too easy to slip back into a practitioner role, jeopardising the ability to develop a 
necessary tension between insider and outsider subjectivity (Crang and Cook, 2007: 37). 
Retaining distance through non-immersion may have helped keep a more analytical 
relationship with the research context. These questions of positionality are discussed in 
more depth in section 3.4.4.  
Interviews  
Interviews offered three advantages. Firstly they provided an opportunity to discuss 
multiple discursive value framings both formal and informal directly with actors. This 
built on Litfin’s experience that “interviews were crucial in determining the beliefs and 
discursive orientations of the participants, information that is not readily accessible 
through publications and documents” (1994: 9). Secondly, interviews provided an 
opportunity to explore observations from participation or documentary sources in 
greater detail – such as the use of a presentation style that focussed on personalisation 
(Chapter 7) or the reasons why particular discursive framings are chosen (Chapter 6). 
Thirdly, interviews provided a chance to explore differences, contradictions and 
complexities in experiences (Bennett, 2002), particularly how those active in science–
policy interaction “experience and make sense” of their interactions (Longhurst, 2010: 
108).This function was important for understanding tacit experiences over acceptability 
of discursive value framings – in different settings and through different organisations – 
that provided clues to how legitimacy comes to be discursively and relationally 
constructed. 
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Atkinson and Silverman highlight the risk of normalising interviews as a qualitative 
method without critical attention to their particular epistemological commitments 
(1997). This serves as a reminder that interviews are not neutral (Ratcliffe, 2002: 20) and 
that interviews focus attention on atomised individual responses, for which “we must 
think of ourselves as discrete individuals with personal experiences and goals” 
(Silverman, 2013: 51). Quoting selectively from interview transcripts may further 
underplay the discursive and sequential constitution of speech acts in relation to the 
interviewer, the question, and the context (Silverman, 2013: 54). These assumptions 
pose difficulties for post-structural research where subjectivity is understood in less 
bounded ways. Transcribing interviews in full, interpreting interviews responses within a 
broader participation context and probing reflexive elaboration on specific claims and 
remaining alert to multiple narratives, were a few ways in which these concerns around 
interviewing were methodologically addressed. While the demands of writing imposed 
strict editing and selection of quotations, analysis focused more holistically on the wider 
passages of text and the way in which such quotations were always constructed through 
relational dialogue. In using interviews to explore wider discourses and situated 
subjectivities it was particularly helpful to attend to Cook and Crang’s emphasis that 
“the stories they are telling are often not simply made up on the spur of 
the moment. Many will have been told, retold and refined on a number of 
occasions, in a number of places and with a number of different 
audiences. Therefore, instead of taking them at face value, it is important 
to ask questions that encourage their elaboration” (2007: 70). 
 
 
Many of the interviews planned were elite interviews with professional actors in 
positions of power. However, traditional elite actor interview approaches tend to reify 
elite actors as powerful and holders of specialist knowledge (Dexter, 1970). Elite actors 
also operate through everyday and personal knowledges and in many cases are also 
disempowered in their discursive participation, having to work through constructing 
legitimacy, like any other actor. This knowledge and these barriers are also worthy of 
research. Inspiration for interviewing was therefore drawn from a number of approaches 
including Ratcliffe’s distinction between active interview, strategic interview and creative 
interview approaches (2002: 21-24) and Kezar’s theoretical review of elite interviewing, 
feminist interviewing and narrative enquiry (2003), which was particularly influential. 
Instead of seeing the researcher as separate from the researched Kezar seeks to bring 
feminist and narrative enquiry approaches into elite actor interviews to explore more 
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relational, committed, mutual, reflexive and egalitarian interaction (2003: 400-401). This 
provided inspiration in designing the interviews in this research with an emphasis on 
establishing two way relationships and trust, reflexive questions, developing mutual 
reflexivity, employing self-disclosure, empathetic listening and allowing the focus of the 
interview to be set by the interviewee as well as the interviewer (Kezar, 2003: 406-407).  
In total, forty-one interviews were conducted with actors from climate science, climate 
policy and boundary organisations in Scotland. A full list by professional title is included 
in Appendix B, but can be summarised as follows: 
Category Number of Participants 
 
Scottish Government 6 
Scottish Government Agency 4 
CXC Directorate and Secretariat 5 
CXC Researchers 12 
Sniffer (2 counted as CXC secretariat) 4  
Other (non-CXC scientists, NGO, Private Sector)  10 
 
Interview participants were selected partly from desk-based identification as key actors 
associated with CXC and partly through prominence of particular figures during the 
empirical encounter. I tried to first meet participants at events or work through personal 
referrals. This style of approach was considered important, as the type of interview 
discussion sought was one that relied on a degree of trust and openness between 
interviewer and participant, more likely to be achieved on a second or third meeting. 
Ensuring the interview was not the first face-to-face engagement went some way to 
enabling more familiar professional interaction. Snowballing was used at the end of 
many interviews in which participants were asked for recommendations of people with 
whom to speak. Interviews were conducted either at participants’ workplaces or in 
coffee shops, as chosen by participants. Given the sensitive nature of some of the 
discussions, I was keen that participants felt as comfortable as possible, and there are 
advantages and disadvantages to being on/off site. Interviews were recorded and later 
transcribed. Participants were not offered confidentiality although it was suggested that 
the aim of the research was not to name people personally, participants were made 
aware that their organisation would likely be identifiable and sometimes their role 
specified.  
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Semi-structured approaches were chosen offering a balance between strategic direction 
and flexibility to respond to participant narratives (Burns, 2000; Longhurst, 2010: 107). 
Rather than a list of questions, a one-page mind-map was preferred as an interview 
prompt, which was designed personally for each participant in advance of the interview. 
Although there were common themes, no two interviews were identical, but were 
conceived more as a strategic conversation than a predefined set of questions to be 
explored systematically (as demonstrated by the two example interview schedule mind 
maps provided in Appendix C). 
Generating this mind map involved desk-based participant research in advance of the 
interview. This drew from ‘strategic conversation’ interviewing methods, which 
emphasise the importance of substantial research prior to interviews (Ratcliffe, 2002). 
Prior research was not ‘substantial’, but basic desk based research of professional and 
personal, policy or scientific involvements did provide a number of advantages, 
encouraging participants to provide more sustained and detailed answers, in ways 
moving at least part way towards peer conversations. While skimming over such basics 
may have risked missing participant’s own accounts of basic roles or leave either their or 
the researcher’s assumptions unpacked, this risk was ameliorated by referring to such 
knowledge during the interview in ways that opened up the possibility for elaboration or 
correction by the participant. Similarly concepts that participants used habitually and 
often recurrently – such as notions of ‘translation’ and ‘evidence’ – were also noted 
during the interview and returned to for further questioning later in the interview 
process.  
Background research also created snippets of information that were useful in stimulating 
more engaged discussions during the interviews. In one instance discussion of a personal 
interest in systems thinking from one participant’s LinkedIn page opened up a 
conversation about policy officer bias that other interviewing strategies had not engaged 
(Interview SG4). In another instance decisions over the style of presentation approach 
developed an exceedingly valuable conversation about personalisation that is detailed in 
Chapter 7. As Schoenberger notes familiarity with the context of operation also allowed 
contradictions or differences in the interviewee narrative to be spotted and further 
explored (1991). Interviews can only “scratch the surface of an interviewee’s life” (Crang 
and Cook, 2007: 73), so Kitchin and Tate recommend that interviews are situated within 
a longer period of engagement (2013: 234). Timing interviews with central actors 
towards the end of a period of participation made atmospheres more familiar and 
86 
 
allowed discussion of events from the longer period of participant observation. Follow up 
informal interviews (not recorded) with key staff also helped to situate the interview 
within a broader frame and longer sequences of interaction.  
3.3.3 Exploring values and legitimacy construction – problems and 
strategies 
Direct discussions of values was expected to be difficult because of the sensitive nature 
of the questions being asked, the departure from everyday modes of thinking and 
perceived importance of neutrality to scientific, policy and boundary actors. Fischer and 
Forester suggest the importance of storytelling and narrative description from which 
values can be later interpreted (1993) and so participant narratives were encouraged 
through asking about life histories, frustrations, challenges and using familiar tropes such 
as “what keeps you awake at night” (Ratcliffe, 2002: 25). Participants were also asked to 
talk through examples in their work and give accounts and descriptions of processes that 
might appear mundane. This approach was useful in exploring questions of value for as 
Forester suggests:  
“If we listen closely, not to the portrayals of fact in these stories but to 
their claims of value and significance, we discover an infrastructure of 
ethics, an ethical substructure of practice, a finely woven tapestry of 
value being woven sentence by sentence” (Forester, 1993: 199-200). 
 
Kaplan argues that such “stories remind us of what mattes and what is at stake” (Fischer 
and Forester, 1993: 12). Discursive values that were excluded from mainstream 
narratives also often became manifest in personal narratives. This is not to suggest that 
such values are personally or discretely held but rather that, in their exclusion from 
public discourse, the personal domain was one place in which alternative values became 
apparent. Exploring personal dimensions therefore often helped to get at instances of 
exclusion or differences from the mainstream discursive values that could then lead to 
further delicate questioning.  
One challenge of using life histories and stories is that people tend to make sense of their 
lives through specific events (Davies, 1999: 64) and do not easily vocalise the effects of 
discourse (Antonesa et al., 2006). However, such narratives can also “show how people 
actively (and sometimes knowingly) take up positions in certain discourses, and how they 
are (interactively) positioned by other people, and by social structures and discursive 
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practices” (Antonesa et al., 2006: 24). Forester describes the way in which attention to 
such narratives is helpful in exploring values, but moreover questions of constraint and 
possibility:  
“The challenge we face… is to do more: to listen carefully to practice 
stories and to understand who is attempting what, why and how, in what 
situation, and what really matters in all that. That challenge is not just 
about words but about our cares and constraints, our real opportunities 
and our actions, our own practice, what we really can, and should, do 
now” (Forester, 1993: 202). 
 
 
However, this delicate questioning demanded from the interview a relatively high level 
of openness by the interviewee, around issues such as where the boundaries of 
acceptability lay, the type of legitimacy at play and the role of values in science and in 
policy – at moments where neutrality was often publically foregrounded. In some ways, 
the relative anonymity of the researcher from outside the Scottish context may have 
provided an easier context to discuss these issues than someone closely involved, but on 
the other, a level of familiarity is often required for interpersonal trust to develop. Early 
interviews remained quite stilted and formal and it was difficult to get participants to 
relax and speak more informally in conversations beyond the official organisational 
narratives. Direct questioning in some cases was difficult due to exhibited discomfort of 
participants. Such discomfort may have been due to a number of reasons: unfamiliarity 
with talking about values, lack of reflexive awareness over discursive values, lack of clear 
or strong values or difficulty identifying them, perceived concerns over acceptability of 
expressing values in a professional or personal capacity, or doubt in their own authority 
to comment on professional positions.  
Despite attention to fostering trust, a few early failures to open up conversations 
prompted inclusion of a number of techniques during interviews to try to create an 
atmosphere more conducive to frank and informal discussion. This drew from what 
Ratcliffe refers to as creative interviewing to move past formal accounts (2002: 22) and 
relied on understanding interaction with participants through notions of front stage and 
back stage narratives (Goffman, 1959). Recognising front and back stage narratives takes 
seriously the plurality of discursive constructions with which we operate in our day-to-
day lives. Rather than any sense of a ‘real story’, neither is more ‘true’ than the other, 
but each operates in different spaces of conversation. The challenge was to open up 
spaces during interview that were able to bring backstage narratives centre-stage. 
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Recognising plurality of narratives is important for opening up questions of discursive 
participation and framing and understanding how certain discourses are made visible 
and others remain hidden. Three techniques were incorporated into interviews with the 
intention of allowing conversations around values to be staged.  
Using drawing as an interview methodology 
Introducing a drawing exercise was one way to change the atmosphere of the 
engagement. During interviews participants were asked to visually represent ‘what 
climate change means to you’ and to talk through their drawing as part of the interview. 
This drew from a number of studies that have explored questions of value and views of 
the world through drawings both with adults (Bendelow, 1993: 215; Longhurst, 2010: 
107; Tolia-Kelly, 2007) and often with children (Matthews, 1992; Barraza, 1999; Owens, 
2000). Drawing offered a way of exploring more spontaneous forms of association with 
climate change, and in many interviews succeeded in opening up conversations around 
discursive values in a relaxed non-threatening manner. Stanczak drew attention to the 
methodological contribution of visual methods “deepening rapport can unlock what 
otherwise might be closed off”(2007: 13). Although sometimes brief, participants were 
usually willing to elaborate on their drawing and such discussions highlighted discursive 
understandings of climate change, which had not otherwise been engaged in 
conversation. Understood as no more real than front stage accounts, these other 
discursive understandings of climate change were also understood as no less real in their 
effects on science policy interaction. 
The use of drawing took inspiration from Pink’s use of images within broader 
ethnographic practice (Pink, 2001: 11) which is part of a post-positivist revival in visual 
methodologies during the 2000s (Pink, 2001; Rose, 2001; Stanczak, 2007) and contrasts 
with previous uses within education and psychology research, where drawings are 
produced for the purposes of psychological interpretation using Jungian visual 
methodologies (Prosser, 1996). Drawing during interview practice was used for its 
influence on the atmosphere of interview discussion rather than as a product from which 
interpretation could be drawn. Drawing offered a way of opening up discursive space for 
engaging with dimensions of discursive understanding not otherwise being profiled 
(Stanczak, 2007). This developed “a richer relationship with views, politics and 
experiences beyond the restraint of written and oral practices” (Tolia-Kelly, 2007: 132). 
At first the exercise was introduced at the end of the interview, however I noticed that 
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participants became more talkative, engaged and open after the exercise, so began to 
experiment with increasingly introducing the exercise sooner in the interview process. 
The effect of drawing on the interview relationship is noticeable within the interview 
transcripts with participants talking much more intensely, much more personally 
afterwards and in one case the experience of drawing had quite an emotional effect on 
one participant (see section 3.6 on ethics).  
Self-identification statements 
A second exercise introduced into interviews was a self-identification exercise in which 
participants were asked to select up to ten from thirty discursive statements on climate 
change most significant for them. I had been subjected to this method in Shaw and 
Maythorne’s research on resilience (2012) and found it an effective, interesting and non-
threatening method for prompting reflection on terms. Thirty statements taking 
particular discursive framings of climate change were generated from academic, grey 
and activist literatures with a wide range of intentionally value rich connotations. Very 
quickly, a scientist asked ‘do you want me to do this in a personal or professional 
capacity’ which alerted me to the division in subjectivity between a personal and 
professional. That this scientist was uncomfortable about not having had this clearly 
defined, alerted me to the significance of this division among the scientific community as 
discussed in Chapter 7. In a wavering moment of indecision, immediately understanding 
their dilemma, I asked them to do it for both and hastily amended the form to include 
two boxes. This began a more detailed examination of the perceived importance of a 
personal and professional division and the differences in discursive framings of each that 
had not been possible through the method of drawing. The exercise was, like drawing, 
designed as a qualitative aid to discussion, not a questionnaire for quantitative analysis. 
However, there are distinct patterns in the selection of discourses that are expressed 
personally and those expressed professionally. Whilst any form of quantitative 
interpretation of these patterns would not be statistically robust and so has not been 
included in the thesis, this indicates an interesting avenue for future research around 
how and why differences between personal and professional discursive framing occurs. 
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Pushing boundaries 
In order to prompt conversations over acceptability and legitimacy, which are often tacit 
or semi-conscious, it was necessary to scope out where the boundaries to acceptability 
lay. One way to do this was to play devil’s advocate or to find moments of discomfort in 
narratives. As well as strategies to put people at ease and open up I therefore also found 
myself trying to find these moments of discomfort that indicated the boundaries of 
discursive acceptability. Body language was useful in identifying where boundaries of 
comfort/discomfort lay and note-taking during interviews or recording verbal reflections 
afterwards helped to note when changes were observed.   
This strategy arose spontaneously from an experience early in the research, which 
resulted in an interview termination. It was the first interview of the research, and 
bravely I had requested to interview a scientist who had not been afraid to sustain a 
pronounced objection at the first CXC Policy Awareness Workshop about the extent to 
which the session ignored the role of ‘evidence’. I was interested in his antagonistic 
stance and forthright position against the direction that CXC were advocating.  Half an 
hour into the interview I happened to ask innocuously whether his decision not to do 
communication of science was mere pragmatics or whether he felt uncomfortable in 
adopting this role. Unfortunately, the interview broke down at this point and was 
terminated as his request as he suggested he was “not prepared to discuss feelings” and 
had actually become “quite uncomfortable by the whole conversation” (Interview CXC-
R1). After endlessly replaying the recording and agonising over my error, I concluded the 
discomfort told me more about his boundaries of comfort than any fault in my 
questioning. This event taught me about perceived legitimacy and boundaries for as 
Nairn et al have highlighted, failures in interviews help us to find out more about who we 
are in relation to the people we research (Nairn et al., 2005: 4). His apparently quite 
extreme sensitivity about notions of detached and neutral science created a very 
different boundary from mine, and it was my lack of sensitivity to where his boundary lay 
that had been at fault. Whilst he gave little warning, I carelessly walked into the disaster 
quite unaware. The experience taught me sensitivity to differences in boundary drawing 
practices and these became incorporated into research. Gradually as my interest in 
boundaries and constructions of legitimacy developed, and confidence had been 
recovered from this first interview experience, I began to gently experiment with the 
boundaries of comfort to explore where the boundaries over acceptability lay.  
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This builds from a number of similar approaches in which researchers deliberately do the 
wrong thing to understand intricacies of situations (Crang and Cook, 2007: 73, citing 
Fusco, 1994, Garfinkel, 1984 and Giddens, 1984, 1991), and highlight that blurting out 
accidental and misphrased questions might not be a disaster but lead to interesting 
responses (Crang and Cook, 2007: 72). Rein and Shon’s encourage that “phenomena that 
hamper an empirical epistemology of policy discourse must become objects of study in 
themselves” (Rein and Shon, 1993: 153).The original feeling that had indicated where my 
own learnt boundaries lay remained important, not in naturalising the boundary location 
(as previously), but in allowing a gentle probing without trampling unknowingly into 
unacceptable terrain.  Increasingly questions were carefully woven into the second half 
of the interview that became playful in pushing these boundaries of discursive space to 
test for where limits to legitimacy lay, whilst still maintaining a dialogue not an 
interrogation (Valantine, 1997: 111). A delicate balance was needed in exploring both an 
opening up through trust and a testing of boundaries within the same interview, as each 
strategy potentially works against the other. In practice however they often worked 
together in an amicable way, allowing greater scope for boundary testing where there 
was greater ease in the relationship (although this of course affected the interpretation 
of where boundaries lay).  
Experimenting with these three strategies provided reflective learning about the 
flexibility of discursive space that an interview can explore and the importance of 
interpersonal delicacy in affecting the possibility of some types of conversation over 
others. In practice experimentation sometimes worked better than others and if the 
research was conducted again, repeat interviews would enable a greater level of trust to 
be built up over time that may reduce the pressure and risk of such attempts during a 
first encounter. These experiences of interviewing and the necessary adaptions to the 
methods employed generated reflexive learning around the use of interviews to explore 
sensitive subjects.  
3.3.4 Positionality  
Questions of positionality are always important (Skelton, 2001), however my 
positionality as a researcher was particularly foregrounded by immersion in a research 
context when transition from a professional to an academic subjectivity was still 
incomplete. Transitioning identity from practitioner to researcher illustrates Cook and 
Crang’s observations that: “research is an embodied activity that draws in our whole 
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physical person, along with all its inescapable identities. What we bring to the research 
affects what we get” (Crang and Cook, 2007: 9). My background as a professional 
practitioner in climate change policy has shaped the process of doctoral enquiry in both 
positive and negative ways. During early stages of research I still understood myself as a 
practitioner. With experiences of policy interaction fresh in my mind, research 
encounters felt starkly superficial. Whilst it was recognised that a fully insider position 
would never be possible (Dowler, 2001: 153) these feelings drove a focus on becoming 
integrated in the Scottish policy events circuit, to try and establish trust and overcome 
perceptions of being a ‘student’ outsider just doing a ‘project’, which were perceived to 
stand in the way of serious professional conversations. Yet, at the same time, I was trying 
to develop and embody a critical approach, denaturalising past assumptions and 
challenging experienced connections that enabled different forms of knowing not 
possible as an entrenched insider. This required distancing and an outsider perspective. 
Balancing these two demands generated tensions in subjectivity that played out in often-
conflicting ways in the research. 
Positionality also involves the research participant’s view of the researcher (Edwards, 
1993: 184). Striving to be accepted within the Scottish science–policy community in fact 
worked very well. I became recognised and greeted from meeting to meeting, and within 
CXC was even given access to parts of their project management systems via the 
TeamworkPM software. At meetings CXC staff were keen to play down my status as a 
researcher often presenting me as a member of CXC staff (presumably to minimise my 
intrusive involvement at sessions). This presented distinct research challenges as I 
struggled to avoid covert research and be clear about where boundaries of permissions 
lay, without jeopardising the relationship with CXC. CXC were also keen to draw on my 
outsider perspective – asking me to help facilitate, as well as to observe, the first policy 
awareness workshop and to get my professional response by way of feedback 
afterwards.  
Feminist researchers have challenged Merton’s insider vs. outsider distinction (1972), by 
emphasising instead a plethora of relationships with participants which often dissolve 
clear boundaries between researcher and researched (Chase, 1996: 49). Just as 
membership of groups does not complete similarity so difference does not apply in all 
respects (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 60) and so some ‘lines of identification’ will come in 
and out of focus for some participants over others (Crang and Cook, 2007). Mies (1999) 
advocates for ‘conscious partiality’ of identification with participants. Where, initially 
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trust was perceived to be secured through becoming as much of an insider as possible 
(Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 58), in hindsight, these assumptions were problematic and it 
was recognised that trust can be earned in many ways during research, including through 
the role of an impartial outsider. Trust is also not a one-off agreement but is continually 
negotiated (Brewer, 1993). From seeking to be a pseudo-insider, I travelled a journey 
that challenged my assuredness that being an insider was either possible or desirable, 
and came to value my position between insider and outside perspectives (Dwyer and 
Buckle, 2009). 
During interviews, subjectivity and disclosure were managed dynamically and 
relationally, playing up or down different facets of experience (Bennett, 2002). 
Sometimes experiences were shared to foster connection and other times downplaying 
to prompt participant explanation. During one interview with a policy official who made 
reference to mainstreaming, I used my previous work experience and new research role 
in combination to caveat what might otherwise seem too basic a question – asking “okay 
so this idea of mainstreaming then, I mean that’s something I’ve come across in the work 
that I used to do but can you, can you elaborate a bit on what that means here” 
(Interview SG1). Silverman raises concerns that an interview “demands subjects who are 
happy to confess their innermost thoughts and emotions” (2013: 51). I was acutely 
aware of the demands I was making and this led to the decision to sometimes 
reciprocate and share my own experiences during appropriate moments to make 
participants feel more comfortable. For example, toward the end of an interview in 
which the participant began talking about why she was passionate about climate change 
and the difficulty of pinpointing where such attachments came from, I shared a story 
about my own childhood and early ambitions that offered a parallel example. The 
interview continued offering a relaxed discussion of values in the interpretation of 
evidence, and the role of experts in drawing conclusions, that was arguably facilitated by 
establishing this common ground (Interview CXC-S1). This recognised that interviews are 
staged products of personal interaction between two people and set a tone of sharing 
rather than extraction. However, I was careful not to let my own experiences be the 
starting point for conversations, but rather to play only a supporting role for the 
discussion of participant contexts. 
Kezar suggests that although self-disclosure is often understood as a strategy to lower 
the status of the researcher to find common ground with their participant, it may also be 
used to raise the status of the researcher to be seen as a professional equal (Kezar, 2003: 
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406). Interviews as “strategic conversations”(Ratcliffe, 2002: 19; see also Van der 
Heijden, 1996) employ mutual respect and understanding to generate conversation 
among peers (Ratcliffe, 2002: 24). Without trying to overstep my limited experiences 
(and certainly peer status was not possible with more senior figures), some interviews 
demonstrated evidence of peer exchange. For example, one policy officer included 
references to my previous work – “well you’ve worked in policy…” and “you'll know this 
from your previous job” (Interview SG1). Whilst reciprocation may have enabled a 
particular type of conversation to take place, explicit attention was given to making sure 
the participant’s position was fully elaborated and not automatically equated. In the 
delicate balance of establishing shared ground, in order to foster trust, it was also 
important not to assume false shared ground where no such common experience 
existed. Although I tried to be vigilant, participants did at times challenge assumptions. 
Luckily because of the inverse power dynamics, participants felt comfortable in quickly 
correcting me where my assumptions were misplaced.   
While post-positivist approaches value the researcher’s “life experiences, values and 
ways of viewing the world” (Antonesa et al., 2006: 37) these need to find a conscious 
balance in the research to prevent these perspectives overpowering the research. Too 
much reliance on previous experience can mean researchers have “difficulty separating it 
from that of the participants” or worse, enthusiasm can prevent consideration of certain 
aspects (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 58; see also Kanuha, 2000 ). Throughout the research, 
it has been important to find a balance between utilising the advantages of prior 
experience to negotiate access, in interpersonal interaction and interpretation of events 
without assumptions being misplaced. This has required constant attentiveness to 
difference, drawing from Skelton’s suggestion that 
“to acknowledge, respect and work with difference means that you first 
have to recognise the many differences that exist between yourself as 
researcher and those you want to work with, reflect upon what they 
might mean, and then think through how you… make them part of the 
research” (2001: 90).  
 
Dwyer and Buckle conclude that “the core ingredient is not insider or outsider status but 
an ability to be open, authentic, honest, deeply interested in the experience of one’s 
research participants, and committed to accurately and adequately representing their 
experience” (2009: 59). Strong personal investment in the research required constant 
attentiveness that research was not merely used to voice my position through the voices 
of others and the implications of omitting personal disclosure were kept in balance with 
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their inclusion. Given the difficulty involved in exploring perspectives that were 
traditionally off limits, there was a need to construct what Stoudt has referred to as ‘safe 
spaces’ (2007). To demand disclosure without mutual reciprocation in these instances 
felt unethical. Although personal experiences were shared, it was considered important 
to keep any expression of personal values out of interview conversations to avoid setting 
a particular framework for what might be perceived as legitimate within the interview 
conversation, or artificially encouraging participants to express or withhold particular 
positions. By being reflexive and challenging tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958), these 
experiences have sought to be employed to enable stories from Scotland to be given 
greater not less chance of being heard. 
3.3.5 Disclosure and transparency  
During introductions and formal interview requests partial disclosure was adopted, 
balancing an ethical commitment to transparency with a desire to explore if, where and 
how values were important without pre-informing participant responses. Research was 
therefore framed in terms of the science policy interface, rather than the role of values, 
unless questions of values had already arisen in previous conversations. If and when 
questions of values were raised I made clear that these were areas that interested me in 
order to further enable informed and focussed discussion. In contrast I offered full 
disclosure about myself and my own previous experience, partly in compensation for 
only partial transparency in the research and partly in an attempt to approach the status 
of peer conversations. 
 
3.4 Analysis and producing the thesis  
Often described as an art the journey between ‘data’ and ‘narrative’ was attempted 
through processes of description, classification and making connections (Kitchin and 
Tate, 2013: 229, 231). Interviews were transcribed and coded with NVivo – twenty two 
were selected for full transcription using full annotation (Poland and Pederson, 1998 ), 
the remainder selectively transcribed. Nine of twenty participation events were also 
selected for close analysis and manually coded in paper format. Finally discourse analysis 
was performed on selected documentary sources, transcripts and email records as 
described in section 3.5.2 below. The self-identification and drawing exercises 
underwent specific coding and analysis though this data was little used in the write up.  
96 
 
The intention of coding is to “make analysis more systematic”, minimise cherry-picking 
and “build up interpretation through a series of stages” (Jackson, 2002 202). A mixed 
approach to coding was used in which both emic and etic nodes were ascribed. This 
created a diverse and dense set of nodes, reflecting both a strong sense of concepts 
important to research participants and concepts already decided to be important by the 
researcher (Kitchin and Tate, 2013: 239). A bottom-up emic approach to coding was 
useful in assessing the relative importance of concepts within the research setting. 
However, this was both time consuming and created an overly complex node-hierarchy 
that became quite overwhelming. Several revisions of coding in which codes were 
condensed and node hierarchies strengthened to aid clarity took place, but future coding 
would take a more emic approach to speed up and create greater focus and 
manageability. NVivo codes “break up the data into constituent parts and then place 
them into similar categories or classes” (Kitchin and Tate, 2013). This encouraged 
attentiveness to the different ways in which terms were being used, but there was a 
growing dissatisfaction with the way that such categories “fractured the field of 
experience” (Crang and Cook, 2007: 148). In most cases the quotes had to be retraced to 
their original transcription context for analysis. NVivo served more as a useful data 
management tool. Connections between codes, interpretation of meanings and 
exploration of contradictions and fractures in the narrative emerged more through the 
process of writing with corroboration between the emerging narrative and data (Kitchin 
and Tate, 2013: 253) which is always dialogic (Crang and Cook, 2007: 152). 
3.4.1 Analysing discourse  
Laclau and Mouffe discourse theory offers few specific methodological tools for analysis 
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 24; Richardson, 1996: 224; Howarth, 2000: 112, 316). 
Howarth goes some way to interpreting what a Laclau-Mouffe discourse theoretic 
methodology might involve suggesting their approach to discourse is based on a notion 
of articulatory practice (Howarth, 2000: 102) in which meaning is always only partially 
fixed through ‘nodal points’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 113). With fixation only ever 
partial, and a surplus of meaning that enables articulations to be always contingent 
within systems of meaning that are never closed, Howarth emphasises the need to 
“delineate the historically specific rules and conventions that structure the production of 
meanings in particular historical contexts” (Howarth, 2000: 128) and examine how 
fixations of meaning “endeavour to impose order” (2000: 102-103).The purpose of 
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discourse analysis is then to examine “how, under what conditions, and for what 
reasons, discourses are constructed, contested and change” (Howarth, 2000: 131) and 
requires attention to what is left out but “might have a claim for inclusion” (Shurmer-
Smith, 2002: 134). In showing that all social meaning is contingent, contextual and 
relational (Howarth, 2000: 113) Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory opens up the 
possibilities for denaturalising meanings and disrupting claims to objectivity. Howarth 
suggests that two specific cases call for special attention in discourse theory – “formation 
and dissolution of political identities and the analysis of hegemonic practices” (Howarth, 
2000: 136). 
Analysis of the texts and practices from empirical research broadly followed this 
discourse theoretic approach. Although awareness of Howarth’s interpretations of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s method came only during the writing stage, many of the intentions for 
analysis and specific modes of analysis Howarth suggests resonated with the analysis 
undertaken. Textual documents such as grey literature, project reports, briefing notes, 
email exchanges and transcripts as well as non-linguistic practices such as practices of 
boundary work were examined for points of antagonism that might “reveal the 
boundaries or political frontiers of a social formation” (Howarth, 2000: 106) and pinpoint 
struggles over meaning (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 29). Analysis focused on different 
ways in which climate change was problematized, different articulations of proposed 
solutions, questioning which discourses were reproduced or challenged and what value 
commitments were privileged. Moments in which misunderstandings or changes in 
meaning occurred became a focus for analysis to explore shifts in meaning and instances 
of contention or reframing. Recognition of the non-natural connection between signs 
and signifiers (Barnes and Duncan, 1992: 8) enabled attention to ways in which claims for 
meaning were established, maintained or disrupted (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 113). 
Although the language of “nodal points”, “chains of equivalence” and “logics of 
equivalence and difference” were not the terms used in coding, the objectives of analysis 
are consistent. 
It was only through writing that certain forms of analysis came together. As 
interpretations came to fit or jar, the narrative was forged, revised or abandoned 
accordingly. In framing a narrative, this writing process is no less subject to norms 
governing acceptability among its audience than the science–policy processes being 
researched. The theoretical concepts that informed the research have informed ordering 
and sense-making of the material as much as the empirical enquiry itself. This has 
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provided tools for disrupting certain narratives, but has also meant conforming to 
particular ontological and epistemological framings and approved ways of producing 
accounts.  
 
3.5 Ethics and representation  
In seeking to make questions of values visible that are often intentionally concealed, 
there are potential consequences for participants in their professional role – both from 
personal and professional disclosures. Guillemin and Guillam suggest that reflexivity is 
key to understanding and developing ethical practice and ensuring the researcher 
remains actively responsible for ethical questions during the whole process of research 
(2004: 273). Consent for interviews was agreed formally through a form which specified 
secure and confidential storage of recordings, transcripts, drawings and questionnaires 
and participant’s right to withdraw consent at any stage (Longhurst, 2010: 111). No 
promise for confidentiality was given, although participants were assured that the 
research did not seek to name individuals it was suggested that identity might be 
deduced through organisational position, especially for senior figures. Personal beliefs 
and values are formally categorised as sensitive data, which means that procedural 
measures over storage and limiting access to data in compliance with the Data 
Protection Act are required to restrict circulation of this information in a personally 
identifiable form. Although the research focus was collective values, personal and public 
values were difficult to separate and so these measures were followed as a 
precautionary measure. During participant observation, my presence as researcher was 
made known. As no formal consent was obtained, any reference made to participants 
who were not later interviewed (and therefore covered by consent) were discussed 
anonymously. 
Participants might have felt uncomfortable during questioning around personal and or 
perceived taboo subjects like values in science. With exactly where, when and how 
individuals drew their boundary of comfort in acute attention during interviews 
questioning sought to find an ethical balance between making contact with this 
boundary and not unduly stressing participants or making them feel uncomfortable. In 
this process I tried to be sensitive over when to back off and not push too hard, 
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becoming alert to expression of concern about research intent often expressed through 
jokes and humour (Brewer, 1993: 135). 
How the researcher responds in ‘ethically important moments’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 
2004: 264) was a key learning point in the interview experience. When lines of 
questioning or the drawing exercise actually succeeded in opening up tender and 
vulnerable moments of disclosure by participants, I was not always prepared for the new 
interpersonal terrain that opened up. During one drawing exercise a participant’s voice 
became shaky and he discussed an existential crisis he’d had that reframed his career 
choices, in another line of interview questioning, a scientist showed signs of anxiety as he 
discussed his passion and frustration that ‘the government’ was not doing enough to 
protect people and countries more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than 
Scotland. In such instances I felt emotionally unprepared and transcripts revealed that 
my own sense of awkwardness led to changing the subject onto a more comfortable 
topic with easier more factual responses, rather than having the confidence to pursue 
such lines of enquiry further. As well as a missed research opening, this disrupted 
traditional ideas of elite actors not usually understood as ‘vulnerable adults’ in research, 
and shied away from the responsibility that my questioning demanded in failing to 
provide the necessary safe and comfortable space for participants to discuss their 
positions. Ethical consideration needs to be given to opening up such spaces through the 
exercises presented in 3.4.3 without being sufficiently prepared to support participants 
through their subsequent experiences or the confidence to stick with the atmospheres 
that opened up. As Adamson and Holloway have highlighted sometimes the role of the 
researcher is to provide support “often in silence, just by being present” (2012: 7394). 
Greater foresight and engagement with the challenges that ethical practice might entail 
at the procedural stage would have helped situations to be dealt with less reactively. 
Suitable responses are often difficult to make without forethought and consideration 
(Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 277) but mighty have enabled these sensitive conversations 
to become part of the research.  
There are always politics to the stories of research. Voices that come to be profiled, 
particularly in Chapter 7 became salient in the research because of resonance with the 
type of questions the research was keen to explore. Fielding emphasises that it is easier 
to show empathy and to interpret the actions of those with whom we share sympathies, 
than those with whom we disagree (Fielding, 1993: 148). Attention was paid to ensuring 
fair representation of the range of voices encountered and no active downplaying of 
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contrary positions occurred. Effort was made to explore diverse views with equal 
enthusiasm and curiosity regardless of personal sympathies and to remain impartial to 
the types of alternative openings of politics that might be encountered. Often the 
narratives profiled generated unexpected conclusions and changed the direction of the 
research narrative and the thesis narrative sought to remain open and flexible to such 
retelling.  
During the research process I felt a huge gratitude and debt to my hosts at CXC and was 
eager to offer them something back for their time and openness to my research. 
Although no exchange of favours was demanded, the need for “immediate 
reciprocation” (Gillan and Pickerill, 2012) was felt – demonstrating the impossibility of a 
detached researcher (Bennett, 2002: 160) and a protracted sense of researcher guilt 
(Bennett, 2002: 147) based on the inability to rapidly produce consultancy-type reports 
on findings to share. Bennett recognised “inevitably, though, participant observation 
does not end when ‘the field’ is left and ‘lives’ with the researcher as s/he stays in touch 
with her informants, sometimes returning” (2002: 140).  
Productive and encouraging discussions remain on going with CXC (see section 8.4). 
Whilst the research creates a particular politics of knowledge, with which not everyone 
in the research context might agree, Cook and Crang emphasise that research is 
inherently political, and this should be tackled head on (2007: 17). Rather than hope that 
my narrative would be hidden in the archives, I developed an on-going dialogue with the 
closest participants for whom I provided minutes of meetings, reports, a reflections 
paper based on their selection from a shortlist of emerging research themes and also 
presented the research in full at the CXC Annual General Meeting 2015. Kezar 
emphasises that research transforms both parties as a result of the encounter (2003: 
402). Although deeply transformed myself by the process of research, at no point in the 
research did I attempt, or even aspire, to transform anything about CXC’s practice. Given 
agreements to disagree, I was surprised to find that CXC had become reflexive over the 
political implications of their own practice as a result of these discussions. This 
demonstrates the effects of interaction which Rose describes remain ever uncertain and 
incomplete (1997: 316). 
In writing up the research I increasingly wished to be critical of the way in which 
neoliberal modes of policy making were reinforced in science–policy exchange and the 
way in which changing science–policy configurations in Scotland were being geared 
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towards compliance with policy, yet I did not wish to be personally critical of the 
individuals with whom I had engaged, and held professional empathy. This was relatively 
easy, as the thesis does not place individual agency at stake. Yet, with the luxury of a 
detached academic narrative told from outside the practitioner context, it is 
acknowledged that the narrative is not necessarily a desirable one for all involved, and 
wider circulation within Scotland could adversely affect the organisations studied. The 
narrative is necessarily partial, and one of a number of narratives that could have been 
drawn from the research. Discussing sources of difference with CXC has strengthened my 
account and given a depth of understanding to the research that a more isolated 
narrative would not have captured.   
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 Chapter 4.
Mapping the Climate Science–policy  
Landscape in Scotland 
 
During the period 2009-2015, climate science–policy interaction became the subject of 
focussed attention in Scotland, through the establishment of the Climate Change 
Scotland Act (2009) and a Centre for Expertise on Climate Change - ClimateXChange. 
Focusing on these science–policy boundary configurations, the aims of this chapter are 
both contextual and empirical. Firstly, the chapter explains the research context, 
situating Scottish climate policy in relation to UK and European policy whilst also 
discussing wider discursive influences on the development of Scottish public policy more 
broadly. This draws attention to particular discursive value framings that become 
established in rhetorical circulation into which public policy and climate knowledge is 
required to speak. This opens an argument, developed throughout the thesis, that these 
framings are significant in the processes of constructing and legitimating knowledge. The 
chapter also describes how and why science is brought into climate policy-making, 
discussing changes in science–policy interaction initiated by the Scottish Government, 
introducing the specific organisational actors studied and situating the work of 
ClimateXChange within a wider science–policy landscape.  
Secondly, the chapter provides an initial analytical engagement with the constitution of 
the science–policy boundary. Empirical practitioner narratives suggest the science–policy 
interface is a singular gap to be bridged and boundary work is a neutral activity. These 
accounts are problematised through drawing on empirical observations of a plurality of 
micro-level distinctions at the science–policy interface. The science–policy boundary is 
instead conceptualised as multiple and cumulative, and the value-free nature of 
boundary work is contested. This empirical analysis provides a foundation for more 
detailed analysis of the processes of boundary work that make up the following three 
empirical chapters, and which consider the politics of science–policy interaction in more 
detail.   
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4.1 History and development of climate change policy in 
Scotland 
Scotland was chosen as a research focus because of the Scottish Government’s globally 
ambitious carbon reduction targets and changes to the process for engaging with climate 
science. In both senses Scotland might be seen to be taking a bold stance in its approach 
to climate change. This section explores the climate change policy context in Scotland in 
relation to that of the UK (and internationally), beginning with an outline of key UK and 
Scottish Climate Policy Developments (Table 4.1). 
4.1.1 Scottish climate change policy in the context of UK and 
international policy frameworks     
International agreement on tackling climate change, first established through the 
UNFCCC in 1992, encouraged industrialised countries to reduce their emissions. In 1997, 
this framework was strengthened through the Kyoto Protocol to legally bind signatory 
developed countries to emission reduction targets of 5% (based on 1990 levels) by 2012 
(UNFCC). The UK established a leading role in these negotiations, committing to 12.5% 
reduction and achieving 27% (Climate Change Commission, 2015). The UK Energy White 
Paper (2003) established an intended policy commitment prior to legislation of 60% 
reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 with “significant progress” by 2020. The 60% 
target was based on advice by the UK Royal Commission of Environmental Pollution that 
global adoption of a 60% reduction would maintain global CO2 at 550ppm – the figure 
thought to limit global temperature rise to 2°C established through the IPCC Second 
Assessment Report (RCEP, 2000). The Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act (2006) 
introduced targets for renewable energy micro-generation and encouraged a culture of 
reporting, but it wasn’t until the UK Climate Change Act (2008) that legally binding 
emissions reductions targets for the UK were established. At this stage, scientific, NGO 
and media attention focussed on suggestions that the 550ppm figure would be 
exceeded, implying that a 60% reduction was insufficient. In the final stages of hearing 
the Act in late 2008, the figure of 60% was increased to 80% based on formal 
recommendation from the Climate Change Commission, an independent scientific 
advisory body for the UK Government and its devolved administrations (Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland), which was simultaneously initiated through the 2008 Act. This 
made the UK the first country with a long-term legally binding target for reducing 
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greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 (1990 baseline) and included an interim target 
of 36% by 2020. The Climate Change Act 2008 also established the UK Climate Change 
Adaptation Programme.  
In June 2009 the Scottish Parliament passed the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 – 
matching the 80% by 2050 reduction target in Scotland, but setting a higher interim 
target.  Up until 2007 Scotland had followed the UK’s leadership in climate policy, 
mirroring the UK policy moves (Table 4.1) with ‘Changing our ways: Scotland’s Climate 
Change Programme’ (2006) quantifying a ‘Scottish share’ towards UK climate change 
commitments. However, in 2007 Scotland’s position diverged by pushing for higher 
targets. This can be understood in relation to SNP’s weak political victory in 2007. SNP 
had won only one seat over Labour to form a minority Government, and initial coalition 
talks with Liberal Democrats failed (over Independence). However, SNP formed a ‘co-
operation agreement’ (not full coalition) with the Scottish Green Party, in return for 
“early legislation to reduce climate-change pollution” as well as opposition to nuclear 
power and appointment of a Green Party MSP as a subject Committee Chair (Lester and 
Gay, 2007: 3). SNP delivered this promise by matching the UK’s 80% target and setting an 
interim 42% by 2020 target with annual reporting – compared to the UK’s 36% interim 
target with 5 year reporting. Like the UK, the Climate Change Scotland Act (2009) also 
developed an Adaptation Framework, building on the ‘Climate Change Commission - UK 
Climate Change Risk Assessment’. 
The circumstances of setting a 42% target were narrated by several actors during 
interviews as the result of a coalition between Stop Climate Chaos and the Chief 
Executive of Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), who jointly wrote a letter to the Scottish 
Government pushing them to achieve the higher target. The Scottish Government policy 
teams were preparing a number of options for the interim target to be put before the 
Parliamentary Committees – 34%, 36% 38% and 42% (Interview CXC-D1): 
“… right near the end the NGOs got together, and they’re very effective – 
the Stop Climate Chaos Coalition [they]… wrote a letter with [X the Chief 
Executive of SSE]… the biggest listed company in Scotland… the week 
before the third reading…which would turn it into an Act from a Bill… 
saying ‘go for the biggest target and we will try and deliver it’ and that 
gave the politicians a huge amount of cover because it wasn’t about a 
bunch of weirdy lefty NGOs… it was actually somebody signing it from the 
biggest most successful company in Scotland saying, ‘go for it’… that 
really helped in political terms” (Interview CXC-D1) 
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Whilst the preferred target was always greater than 34% because “SNP, were passionate 
about doing a bit more than Westminster” (Interview CXC-D1) the commitment from SSE 
built confidence and legitimacy for a higher early target. SSE, governed by UK OFGEM’s 
decarbonisation strategy were seeking a stable policy framework for their strategy for 
investment in renewable energy over nuclear (Interview C2020-3). Their support enabled 
the SNP Government to demonstrate greater ambition than the UK, mobilising a 
discourse around the “reindustrialisation of Scotland through renewables” (Scottish 
Government 2011f) and fulfilling their obligations with the Green Party. However, the 
42% target was made contrary to current advice over deliverability unless the EU set a 
30% instead of 20% target (Interview CXC-D1). 
Having set the target, the Scottish Government initiated the first Report on Policies and 
Proposals (2011e) – RPP1 in which policies for achieving emissions reduction were 
outlined. This document was being refreshed during the empirical research period 
through development of the ‘Second Report on Policies and Proposals’ (2013) – 
hereafter RPP2. While the target of 46% reduction in carbon dioxide by 2020 is one of 
the highest commitments in Europe (most other European countries working towards 
20% by 2020 and 40% by 2030 (European Commission, 2015)), at the time of writing 
Scotland had missed all four annual targets. As Patrick Harvie, MSP for Glasgow reminds 
Parliament: “It is not at all challenging to set a target; it is challenging to meet that 
target” (Scottish Government 2012: online). 
4.1.2 Climate change governance in Scotland 
At Parliamentary level, climate change is managed by a ‘Junior Minister for Environment 
and Climate Change’ who reports to the ‘Cabinet Secretary for Rural Affairs and 
Environment’, who represents the portfolio within the Scottish Government Cabinet and 
the ‘Rural Affairs Climate Change and the Environment Parliamentary Committee’ 
(RACCE). In the devolved Scottish Parliament, Parliamentary Committees hold a more 
powerful role than in UK Government by being able to initiate as well as scrutinise policy 
(Maclean, 2012: 228).  
The Scottish Government operates through a cross-sectoral governance approach to 
climate policy with two small climate strategy co-ordination teams responsible for 
designing and co-ordinating delivery plans for mitigation (RPP2) and adaptation (the 
Scotland Adaptation Programme). These teams work with thematic policy sector lead 
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officers in areas such as transport, housing, land use planning etc. to encourage them to 
develop proposals for either reducing emissions or adapting to projected climatic 
changes. Both teams work within the Energy and Climate Change Directorate and report 
to the Minister for Environment and Climate Change5. There is a subtle balance in this 
role between encouraging and challenging sector leads to increase performance against 
climate goals, while respecting delegated authority and expertise of sector Directors and 
Heads of Service, all of whom report to their own respective Ministers and are ultimately 
responsible for delivery. This form of cross-sectoral governance ensures an integrated 
approach to policymaking and ensures climate policies also serve respective Ministerial 
portfolio priorities. As a result it often involves compromises and framing of actions that 
deliver against broader objectives beyond those typically driving climate change policy 
goals (such as economic growth, health, fuel poverty, or infrastructure resilience).  
Many literatures have pointed towards climate governance being as much a private as a 
public sector affair (Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012) and increasingly critiques have 
alluded to the increasing difficulty in distinguishing between public and private sector 
either in policy development or in service delivery (Raco, 2013; Raco, 2014). In Scotland, 
climate policy making is a distributed activity, and an endless circular chain of re(de)feral 
was evident during interviews in which policy was always made ‘elsewhere’ – “it sort of 
like comes out of the walls almost” (Interview SG6). Ministerial priorities, existing 
Government policy, Parliamentary Committee enquiries, Government Agencies informal 
drafting, formal and informal consultation with private sector industry groups, forums, 
business leadership groups, representations from NGOs, interest and campaigning 
groups, industrial lobbies, public sector partnerships, crafting by policy officials, public 
consultations and constant media commentary all play a role in policy development 
(Interviews: SG1, SG3, SG4). Public-private blurring was strongly evident particularly 
though relations with the C2020 Group – a private sector partnership of business leaders 
who hold an important influence in climate change policy development, and industry 
stakeholder leadership forums played a central role, for 
                                                          
5 In addition to the main mitigation and adaptation programmes, there were also a number of other policy teams 
responsible for ‘transition to a low carbon economy’, ‘low carbon behaviours research programme’, administering the 
‘climate challenge fund’, work on international climate change and climate justice, and the ‘Public Bodies Duties Team’ 
who support and facilitate delivery by Scottish local authorities and other public bodies and partnerships. Since 2014, 
there has been some consolidation of policy responsibility into a new Climate Change Unit.  
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“increasingly it’s recognised that if you don't take industry with you 
you're not actually going to get your policy implemented anyway so, you 
might as well cut to the quick and get them involved… where you end up 
is going to be a compromise, I mean it’s got to be because Government is 
responsible for the economies” (Interview SG6). 
 
With such broad engagement, there is a perceived risk that particular interests can and 
do dominate policy making. As a result, policy makers emphasise that no single view 
predominates but rather policy emerges from an amalgam of views. In the case of the 
involvement of C2020 in target setting it was suggested: 
“I don't think you can say that anybody is key because Government can't 
say that one group is key over another … there was a lot of discussion 
with stakeholders …but Government has to take the responsibility. It 
can't, sort of say, this policy was developed with these stakeholders. So, I 
mean they had an input, but…” (Interview SG6). 
 
Such plurality of perspectives establishes a claim to neutrality in which interest-laden 
bias is seen to be cancelled out, establishing a neutral middle ground for policy. Plurality 
of influences in climate policy making in Scotland also exemplifies public private sector 
boundary working, which is further discussed in section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Scottish policy discursive value framings   
Within Scottish policy there are four particularly strong influences on public policy 
discourse: Scottish independence, outcomes orientated policy, sustainable economic 
growth, and a tradition of left-leaning politics. These influences, which are not unique to 
Scotland nor always coherent, can be seen as discursive value framings that influence the 
making of climate policy in Scotland. This section considers each of these influences in 
turn, particularly their shaping of climate science–policy debates. 
4.2.1 Scotland the brave? The politics of a sub-nation and trajectories 
towards independence 
 Scotland is a sub-nation within the United Kingdom which, until the Union of the 
Parliaments in 1707 had sovereignty (Young, 1970: 6). This has created long-standing 
tension over independence in Scottish Politics with strong feeling on both sides. 
Demands for re-establishing a Scottish Parliament were resurgent during the early 20thC 
leading to formation of the Scottish National Party in 1934 (Young, 1970: 16). Election of 
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the UK Labour Party in 1997 initiated a referendum over devolution of powers to 
Scotland (delivering a Labour manifesto commitment) and a Scottish Parliament and 
Executive was established in 1999 (Ross, 1998). Passions for Scottish Independence were 
mobilised with election of the Scottish National Party to minority Government in 2007 
and majority Government in 2011, leading to a narrowly defeated referendum in 2014.   
The target setting and political commitment on climate change in Scotland are 
recurrently described by Scottish Ministers and Government Officials as world leading 
(McGregor et al., 2011; McEwen, 2010: 18) and discourses of leadership were recurrently 
rehearsed in both science and policy narratives during the period of research. The higher 
targets have been considered a ‘race for the top’ (Pataki et al., 2011: 5:17 ) in relation to 
the UK’s leadership within Europe. As one boundary actor described: 
“Scotland wants to be better than England and Wales, which is partly tied 
up with the sort of growing, belief of itself as a country that happened 
after the devolution of ’98” (Interview CXC-D1). 
 
Wendt argues that practices and processes of international negotiation produce and 
reproduce state identities (1999: 28) and are a way of “states producing and reproducing 
their identities” (Paterson, 1996: 133). In the context of The Scottish SNP Government’s 
striving for independence, Scotland may be seen to be reflexively constructing its 
identity, folding climate policy into a larger project of nation building both internationally 
and domestically.  
Internationally, Scotland has attended Conference of Parties meetings both in 
Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011) and the World Future Energy Summit 2012 in Abu 
Dhabi was one among many examples of Alex Salmond (then First Minister) presenting 
Scotland as an international actor: 
“We are also world leaders in the transition to a low carbon economy and 
in particular the renewables revolution. It is only fitting that we should be 
part of the foremost annual meeting committed to finding solutions to 
the energy needs of the future" (2012). 
 
The ambitious carbon targets give Scotland informal recognition in the international 
arena supporting its claims for sovereignty by setting its own course separate to the UK. 
The targets also contribute to constructing a national persona as a Government with 
ambition and commitment to deliver change that offers an opportunity for Scottish 
nationalism to be retold. This is exemplified in the RPP2: 
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“It would have been far easier to set targets that ignored climate science 
or showed little ambition, so that they would be straightforward to meet. 
Scotland does not lack ambition and as a nation we can take pride in that” 
(RRP2 2013: iii Ministerial Forward). 
 
Demonstrating leadership in important policy arenas is therefore one way in which a 
sub-nation can establish an imaginary of itself as independent. The circumstances of the 
SGP- SNP collaboration agreement provide insight into why climate change became one 
such policy area in 2009. However, division between ‘devolved’ and ‘reserved’ powers in 
the current Scottish Devolution Settlement is also important in making this both possible 
and desirable. The UK Government reserves power over areas of strategic interest: 
energy infrastructure, immigration, international affairs and foreign policy, defence, 
employment, trade and industry and fiscal arrangements such as benefits and social 
security. The main areas of devolved power are health and social services, education and 
training, housing, law, local government (including land use planning), tourism and 
economic development, transport, sport, arts and environment, agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries. Historically Health and Education are key policy areas in which Scotland has 
been able to express policy difference from the UK, contributing to their high profile 
status in Scotland.  
In comparison to health and education, climate change policy is less high profile as 
reflected in its significantly smaller budget allocation (Interview SG2) – sitting within the 
Environment and Rural Affairs Directorate budget of £559.2 million compared to a 
budget of £12.2 billion for Health, £3 Billion for Education and £3 billion for Finance, 
Employment and Sustainable Growth (Scottish Government, 2014). Climate policy has 
been able to develop a higher profile than might have otherwise have been achieved 
through simultaneously delivering against policy objectives on economic growth, 
particularly through development of the renewable energy industry and ‘Low Carbon 
Economy’ (Scottish Government, 2011f). With strong renewable energy generation 
potential and transferable skills from the oil and gas sectors, renewable energy is 
considered an opportunity for the reindustrialisation of Scotland (Scottish Government, 
2011f). As one boundary actor commented, Scotland’s interest in renewable energy goes 
far beyond climate change: 
“It wasn’t actually just about being nice to the environment; it was also 
because it was tied up with global markets, job opportunities talent at the 
universities and you actually had that coalition all coming together” 
(Interview CXC-D1). 
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Renewable energy is positioned as an economic opportunity for Scotland. In fact, the 
lead policy officer for the Mitigation Policy – RPP2 stated that because of the way that 
energy generation is counted within the ETS, “the investment in renewables is 
fundamental for the growth strategy and for the long-term [carbon] targets but does 
nothing for the short term [carbon] targets” (Interview SG4). This indicates the extent of 
the opportunistic framing climate policy offers for pursuing economic growth. 
The ambitious carbon mitigation targets within the Climate Change Scotland Act (2009) 
also provide a strong foothold to exercise bargaining muscle with the UK Government 
over devolved powers vis-a-vis energy infrastructure. Renewable energy policy is a 
contentious policy area in the relationship with the UK Government, as energy 
infrastructure remains a reserved power, but both local planning and environmental 
decisions are devolved, making the boundaries of decision making for energy generation 
unclear. Over nuclear power in particular, Scotland has expressed a clear negative stance 
- counter to UK policy - which affects the securing of planning consent (Swenden et al., 
2009). Further, the UK is reliant on Scottish renewable generation capacity in hydro, 
wind, biomass and tidal resources to meet the UK commitments on renewable energy 
provision as Scotland holds an estimated 25% of Europe's tidal and offshore wind 
potential (Scottish Government).  
Discursive embedding within other policy ambitions is central to the foothold of climate 
policy in Scotland, and the lead policy officer for the Mitigation Policy described how 
“most of the climate change policies and proposal don't stand alone so they have other 
benefits” (Interview SG4). Like elsewhere, climate change policy is therefore pursued 
through discourses of co-benefits and multiple drivers. Climate change policy with 
explicit emphasis on renewable energy, is one arena in which the Scottish Government 
can define itself internationally, secure greater powers within sub-national negotiations 
and strengthen Scottish economic performance - particularly important given the 
enduring sense of economic dependency on England (Simpson, 1970: 121). The push by 
the Scottish Green Party, Stop Climate Chaos and Scottish and Southern Energy 
presented an opportunity for climate policy to become another area in which leadership 
could be established. Understanding this moment of decision-making in these terms goes 
beyond Swenden et al.’s (2009: 8) assessment that setting a more rather than less 
ambitious carbon reduction target was Scotland’s only acceptable option for asserting 
autonomy. 
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4.2.2 Evidenced based – outcomes orientated politics 
Since the UK Government White Paper ‘Modernisation in Government’ (1999) and 
subsequent Cabinet Office publication ‘Better Policy Making’ (2001) the discourse of 
‘evidence-based-policy’ (EBP) has become naturalised in UK policy across scales, with its 
benefits often considered self-evident (Trinder, 2003). Although Solesbury suggests that 
the UK particularly has seen a turn toward evidence based policy (Solesbury, 2001) 
similar movements in both the USA and Europe as part of new public management 
(Owens et al., 2006: 635) suggest that “the evidence movement is an international affair” 
(Hansen, 2010: 87). In Scotland EBP takes the form of ‘outcome orientated policy’ 
(Sanderson, 2011: 62-64; also Interview SG1). This focus on outcomes, Sanderson argues, 
seeks to “redefine the problem of Government from one of micro-managing delivery… to 
one of improving performance in terms of outcomes… [and] implies the strengthening of 
an evidence based learning approach to the tasks of Government” (2011: 64-65). In 2007 
this outcomes approach was structured through the National Performance Framework 
(NPF) that replaced a suite of very specific performance targets with a single overarching 
goal or purpose of government underpinned by five strategic objectives, seven purpose 
targets, sixteen national outcomes and fifty national indicators (Interview SG2) (Figure 
4.1). 
This National Performance Framework established Scottish Government’s priorities and 
the measures through which performance is assessed (Sanderson, 2011). All policy 
formed through the Scottish Parliament and Government has to demonstrate delivery in 
accordance with this performance framework, both formally, and, as one policy official 
suggests within Scottish Government organisational culture: 
“Scottish Government… communicated what matters to them, what they 
value… these are things which do I think drive our Ministers and because 
of that drive the way that we need to go about our work” (Interview SG1). 
 
This supports identification of institutions as expressions of shared ideas and norms 
(Litfin, 1994: 3) and whilst most policy seeks to deliver on several outcomes, there are 
various practical senses of priority felt within the Scottish Government particularly on 
health and economic growth (Interviews: SG1, SG2, SG4).  
Scholars have drawn attention to the popularisation and increased emphasis on evidence 
during the period of UK New Labour policy (Sanderson, 2002; Nutley et al., 2002; 
Parsons, 2002). However, despite changes in both UK and Scottish Governments since 
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the New Labour era, there appears to be no decline in interest in evidence in Scotland, 
suggesting that EBP is surviving the political cycle. Continued emphasis on evidence may 
in part be related to the governing of the SNP in minority (2007-2011), which places 
additional focus on strength of evidenced argumentation to gain policy support from 
other political parties. In his acceptance speech Salmond suggested that “the nature and 
composition of this Parliament makes it imperative that this government will rely on its 
strength of argumentation in parliament, and not the argument of parliamentary 
strength” (Salmond, 2007). However, upon being elected in majority in 2011, Salmond 
further famously suggested that although SNP had a majority of seats it did not have a 
‘monopoly on wisdom’ (Maclean, 2012: 241) further increasing the focus on outward 
sourcing of knowledge and evidence in policy making. Outcomes orientated policy 
provides an emphasis on evidence in terms of what works, and in producing strong 
argumentation under what is a very consensual model of politics (Interview SG1). 
Although evidence within policy relates not just to science but also to political know how 
and practical and professional practitioner experiences (Sanderson, 2011; Head, 2008), 
this focus on outward sourcing of knowledge and evidence in policy making may help to 
explain and situate the research investment in the three centres for expertise detailed in 
section 4.3 of which ClimateXChange is one.  
In constructing new climate policy, approval by stakeholders (usually business leaders, 
professional bodies and NGO representatives) is an important part of the policy process. 
Increasingly with the participatory turn in policy-making, suggestions and consultation 
responses from sectorial thematic forums, stakeholder consultations and expert panels 
all contribute knowledge as ‘evidence’ into the mix (Interview SG4). A triangle of 
legitimacy was described in which policy needed to be seen as legitimate by three 
communities simultaneously: government policy, business and civil society (RN: CXC-
PAW3)6. Scottish Government requires support for proposed policy from the business 
community as well as civic support from the electorate (Interview Met Office). The 
private sector holds strong discursive power in the way that legitimate actions are 
framed. The C2020 is one particularly important forum through business and 
Government interact over climate change. During one group meeting, legitimation of 
community actors was made through references that they are no longer hugging trees 
but being ‘entrepreneurial’ (RN: C2020-M) and during the same meeting a Chief 
                                                          
6
 RN refers to ‘Research Notes’ associated to policy events attended, as listed in Appendix A. 
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Executive of one local authority strove to legitimate public sector organisations through 
championing the uphill struggle to combat public sector culture in Scotland (RN: C2020-
M). These examples demonstrate the way that public and private sectors alike are 
framing legitimate actors and forms of approach in business terms. Many policy makers 
referred to the use of such stakeholder forums for providing evidence for policy 
development – as one climate policy officer remarked: 
“We thought it was better to run some stakeholder workshops… targeted 
at particular stakeholders and within particular themes… testing the 
things being identified as policies and proposals… it just generally will 
allow us to take the temperature of how stakeholders feel about this, so 
we'll know whether the things that could go forward in the programme 
are likely to be well received in a public consultation” (Interview SG3, 
original emphasis). 
 
This evidence appeared to consist of evidence over deliverability assessed through 
acceptability of proposed actions to the private sector as well as their knowledge of 
practical constraints. 
4.2.3 Sustainable economic growth  
The ‘single purpose of government’ that provides the overarching single outcome for the 
Scottish Government, and all policy developed, is a commitment to sustainable economic 
growth:  
“… to focus Government and public services on creating a more successful 
country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through 
increasing sustainable economic growth” (Scottish Government, 2007b: 
online) 
 
Two policy documents are important in taking forwards this headline goal (to which all 
policy is required to align): the National Performance Framework (mentioned in the 
previous pages) and Scotland’s Economic Strategy.  The latter forms the strategic plan for 
all future Scottish Government policy (2015: 11). The 2007 Economic Strategy 
emphasised “accelerating sustainable economic growth” and deployed a narrative of a 
Scotland lagging behind a naturalised state of growth; the Ministerial Forward 
emphasized: 
“Scotland has suffered because our economy has been locked into a low 
growth cycle. Successive economic strategies… failed to lift Scotland’s 
economic performance to where it should be… Scotland has lagged 
behind” (Scottish Government, 2007a: v). 
115 
 
 
To many practitioners, the mention of ‘sustainable’ alongside economic growth has little 
effect on the conception of economic growth, and equates to business as usual. The way 
that climate change is presented becomes an opportunity for further economic growth 
and private sector innovation (Interviews: NGO 1, CXC Directorate 1). Aspirations for 
transitioning to a ‘low carbon economy’ are an important strand of the Economic 
strategy (2007a) and described as an integral way to secure sustainable economic growth 
that is pursued through a ‘Low Carbon Economic Strategy’ (2010: 7). The key purpose of 
the Low Carbon Economic Strategy is to “strengthen business confidence in exploiting 
low carbon opportunities” by focussing attention on global economic opportunities, 
barriers and the role of government and wider public sector in supporting business to 
overcome these barriers (2010: 7). This positioning of a low carbon economy offering 
opportunities for growth, far from unique to Scotland, was emphasised by one policy 
officer responding to the question of whether short-term economic growth was ever 
compromised for long term social or environmental benefit: 
“There's been no compromise and I can't imagine under the current 
administration that that would happen” (Interview SG4; original 
emphasis). 
 
Another responded: 
“that compromises growth, No! Not to my knowledge… the main reason 
is because of the renewables agenda… reindustrialisation of Scotland and 
that's through renewables… so the First Minister would say, we would 
say, that the effort on renewables is also driving growth” (Interview SG1). 
 
Public policy discourses on climate change are not only being required to align with 
broader discourses of economic growth but are also being positioned as key to delivering 
such growth. During participant observations of CXC practice, there were constant 
reminders of this discursive economic growth context. For example, it was emphasised 
that any focus on adaptation had to produce a strong business case, as illustrated by the 
words of a prominent UK science–policy advisor speaking at the 2013 CXC Annual 
General Meeting: “if it’s not associated with economic growth and jobs, there’s no 
money for it” (RN: CXC-AGM 2013).   
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4.2.4 A Socialist tradition 
In the updated Economic Strategy (2015: 22), continued economic growth is still 
paramount, but is nuanced by an emphasis on inclusive growth, strengthening questions 
of equity and making direct reference to Stiglitz’s critique of rapid growth (2012). This 
emphasis was part of a (highly successful) strategic positioning of the SNP in opposition 
to austerity politics in the run up to the 2015 UK General Election in which the SNP 
sought to contrast the austerity politics of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition in 
Westminster with Scotland’s focus on “ensuring that growth is shared and 
sustainable”(2015: 5). The new Economic Strategy suggested that “increasing growth and 
tackling inequality are mutually supportive”(2015: 8) and that “ensuring that the benefits 
of economic growth are shared more equally across society is just as important as 
boosting overall growth” (2015: 21). This strategic refresh of the 2007 Economic Strategy 
however drew on a longer heritage of left leaning politics within Scotland, from Keir 
Hardy’s formation of the Labour party in Scotland in 1888 (Young, 1970: 9) to a long 
standing anti-tory majority (Ross, 1998: 18; Maclean, 2012: 225). Scottish policy has 
historically seen strong public investment in health and education, drawing on a tradition 
of widely accessible education dating from the sixteenth century (Ross, 1998) and the 
strength of resistance to hegemonic rule seen in the rumblings of “strong radical strain in 
Scottish thought” (Ross, 1998: 268). In the National Performance Framework (2007) 
there was clear emphasis on cohesion and social solidarity – through “opportunities for 
all of Scotland to flourish” (Scottish Government, 2007b). There is some evidence that 
this leftist orientation in Scotland tempers neoliberal policy trajectories: 
“… while the British Prime Minister Tony Blair was driving through 
reforms of English hospitals and schools, introducing more competition 
and private enterprise, Scotland continued to keep faith with state 
ownership and management of health and education… tuition fees were 
abolished for Scottish students… free care for the elderly” (Maclean, 
2012: 235). 
 
Although strong in other areas of public policy, left leaning influences are less apparent 
in climate policy in Scotland. However, they can be seen to a limited degree in 
opportunities for debating questions of climate justice, social equity and distributional 
impacts of climate policies - within Scotland as well as internationally, in the 
distributional equity proofing of the mitigation policies (Interviews: CXC-R6, CXC-S3), and 
questioning of the model of growth being pursued throughout the UK as “an economic 
model that has exacerbated inequalities” (Scottish Government 2015: 21). 
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This social democratic angle is not just the result of a historical legacy, but also 
influenced by active campaigning by third sector organisations and coalitions of NGO 
actors. An example of this is the partnership coalition Environment Link who, among 
others, challenges the continued measurement of economic performance through 
traditional measures of GDP, GVA and their unproblematic indirect inference of 
wellbeing (Interview NGO1). Environment Link is stimulating wider debate through a 
commissioned report about the notion of flourishing, which although central to the 
Scottish Government’s single purpose is, in their view, overshadowed by attention to 
economic growth (Interview NGO1). The focus of campaigning is not the present 
Government but manifesto writers for the next election with whom strategic discursive 
alignment – finding common ground between different discursive positions – relies on 
the hope of shifting core aims long-term. Such opening offers encouragement to 
alternative forms of thinking about economic prosperity. However, it is important not to 
overstate their purchase and the package of indicators that the UK Sustainable 
Development Commission (SDC) and Carnegie Trust had proposed to measure success 
differently were lost with abolishing of the SDC (Interview NGO1).  
4.2.5 Summarising discursive value frameworks and the scope for 
opening up political debate 
Bridging these four discursive influences together indicates the discursive framework 
within which policy making in Scotland operates.  These discourses can be seen as 
discursive value framings that influence the framing of climate knowledge. The lateral 
resonance required between policy documentation for cohesive and ‘joined up’ public 
policy, means that policy documentation cross-references other strategies and identified 
actions are echoed between documents. This sets a discursive policy culture into which 
new policy is required to ‘fit’, and through which, particular discourses are reproduced. 
Climate policy commitments can be seen to both align with and re-produce these 
discourses. Where at times evidence is argued to be essential, at other times grounding 
in evidence is less important - as the adoption of the 42% mitigation target suggests. 
When and where science is drafted in, to provide evidence and the work of legitimation 
this performs, requires further attention.  
In some senses Scotland’s political passion for independence is creating a ‘can do 
attitude’ at the science–policy interface. Many scientists, boundary actors and policy 
makers alike commented that Scotland’s small size and shorter vertical networks to 
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Ministers, give opportunities to meet and communicate directly with senior decision 
makers, making it easier to have influence or make things happen (Interviews: CXC- D1, 
CXC-R4, RN: CXC-AGM 2013) and Scotland’s rich natural energy resources encourage the 
possibility of ambitious action. This comes across in the words of one boundary actor, 
when comparing working in climate policy in Scotland to England: 
“… there’s no doubt that… coming back up to Scotland having worked 
down in southern England has been really refreshing in the sense that 
that you do have a coalition of business groups… saying ‘let’s go for it!’. 
Local authorities, a lot of them, not all… are saying ‘let’s go for it’...we 
may not hit the targets, we may fail spectacularly at certain times, but 
actually there is a genuine belief that we can do something good here, 
whereas I had no sense of that whatsoever in southern England – it was 
just absolutely no, it wasn’t even on the agenda it was just irrelevant… 
And that is so, so, refreshing” (Interview CXC-D1). 
 
While historical and contemporary socialist influences allow Scottish policy to provide 
potential openings in which alternatives to traditional economic growth might become 
considered, the example of Environment Link shows this is strongly reliant on achieving 
discursive synergy with existing policy commitments. Where Scottish politics are perhaps 
slightly more favourable to weaker forms of neoliberal governance through emphasis on 
social concerns, this is constantly held in tension with a focus on economic growth, 
particularly as the strength of the Scottish economy is a key stake in Independence. 
Overall, there is a strong normative meta-narrative about an acceptable role for policy 
(and state involvement). Key actors spoke of the need not to tell people what to do, and 
of taking both the private sector and civic Scotland along with them in their policy 
decisions (Interview Met Office). This can be read in the context of Harvey’s definition of 
neoliberal policy: 
“… a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets and free trade…” (2005: 2). 
 
Under a neoliberal approach, Harvey argues, only specific functions of the state are seen 
as legitimate – to guarantee “the quality and integrity of money”, “secure private 
property rights” and “the proper functioning of markets” including creating new markets 
as a form of governance “but beyond these tasks the state should not venture” (Harvey, 
2005: 2).  Many contemporary climate politics scholars point to the way in which policy 
responses to climate change are adopting strongly neoliberal forms (Bailey, 2007; Bailey 
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et al., 2011; Oels, 2005; Parr, 2014) often through the discourse of ecological 
modernization (Beck, 2010; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000; Jänicke, 2008). However, much of 
what has been discussed for Scotland is not unique but part of a wider neoliberal policy 
discourse in which the UK as a whole participates. Harvey suggests that “neoliberalism 
has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse” (Harvey, 2005: 3) although 
others have pointed to the diversity within neoliberalist approaches (Larner, 2003; Peck, 
2004). Following argumentative theorizing against the unfolding of grand narratives, a 
plurality of neo-liberalisms are recognized here, in which local manifestations develop 
common themes and commonalities among difference are present (Peck, 2004: 403). 
Scotland’s policy context (including its socialist tradition) helps shape one such specific 
manifestation of neoliberalism and creates a specific  ‘civic epistemology’ through which 
legitimacy for scientific knowledge is conferred (Jasanoff, 2005).  
 
4.3 Bringing science into climate policy making in Scotland  
Having drawn attention to the demand for science in evidenced based approaches to 
policy, this section outlines the multitude of processes and points of engagement 
through which Scottish policy interacts with climate science and describes the recent 
changes implemented by the Scottish Government to rationalise, streamline and re-
orientate processes of engagement through ClimateXChange as a single point of 
reference for Government. Climate science–policy networks may be understood as a 
shared space or boundary zone (Star, 2010; Galison, 1999) in which many actors hold 
multiple roles. Many natural scientists perform policy engagement and some policy 
officials are scientifically trained making any clear categorisation as ‘science’ or as ‘policy’ 
(and any clear science–policy boundary) difficult to maintain. Up until 2011 the Scottish 
Government and its Government Agencies had many potential sources of advice on 
climate change including research undertaken within the fifteen Scottish universities; six 
Research Institutes funded through the Scottish Government ‘Strategic Research 
Programme’ as ‘Main Research Providers’ (MRPs) for agricultural, biological and 
environmental research; and several smaller centres of research. These are all highly 
networked academic institutions with research networks throughout the UK and globally. 
Mapping of main science–policy actors in early stages of the research (Figure 3.1) 
provided a wide, though non-exhaustive picture of science–policy actors, in relation to 
which CXC activity may be understood. In balancing a strong culture of evidence-based 
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policy with delegated policy responsibility, and recognition that science is only ever one 
among many elements of decision-making (Interview SG1), the type of information 
sourced is left to sector leads (Interview SG4). This promotes many points of science–
policy interaction. Although some topics (such as nuclear energy) are designated off 
limits by Ministers, greater flexibility and freedom in policy-making without interference 
was alluded to than in UK Government Departments (Interview SG6). As well as evidence 
based policy advice from civil servants; Ministers also encounter scientific information 
from a variety of sources – from popular science, campaigning organisations, private 
sector businesses commissioning their own research and the Met Office (who regularly 
submit written and verbal scientific knowledge directly to Parliamentary Committees).  
4.3.1 A changing framework for climate science–policy interaction in 
Scotland 
In 2011, RESAS (the Scottish Government department for Rural Environmental Science 
and Analytical Services responsible for publically funded environmental research) 
established a new process for engaging with climate related research. The new 
arrangement involved top slicing funding from the Strategic Research Programme with 
the MRPs and establishing ClimateXChange as one of three centres for expertise in 
“areas of high policy importance” (Scottish Government, 2011c: online). The intention 
was that ClimateXChange became a single point for knowledge exchange around climate 
change in Scotland providing policy teams with tailored scientific knowledge drawn from 
across the specialist teams within Scottish universities and research institutes as well as 
wider sources UK and worldwide. Nevertheless, given the broader science–policy 
landscape outlined in Figure 3.1, multiple sources of science–policy engagement 
continue. CXC as a single simplified point of engagement remains an on-going ambition, 
requiring constant attempts to stimulate and co-ordinate knowledge requests by policy 
teams to CXC and making policy teams aware of what CXC could provide (Interview SG2). 
These changes in how policy engages scientific knowledge responded partly to the need 
to develop evidence based policy implementation of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 
2009 but also drew from wider science–policy concerns beyond climate policy. In 2009, 
the Scottish Government had established a Coordinated Agenda for Marine, 
Environment and Rural Affairs Science initiative (CAMERAS) as a mechanism to simplify 
portals of information for civil servants and Ministers. Establishment of ClimateXChange 
sat within this wider move to simplify sources of expertise for Ministers and Civil 
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Servants. There was also some discomfort that research institutes were receiving public 
funding through their Strategic Research allocation but were not necessarily 
demonstrating value for money in terms of policy goals (Interview SG6). This reflects an 
outcomes-orientated approach to evaluation, which is at least partially behind the push 
for ClimateXChange to be driven by policy needs. Finally, there was a desire to establish 
better communication channels with, and make better use of, ‘Scottish’ science’ 
(Interview SG6). On the one hand, this exhibited nationalist feeling, establishing a 
Scottish centred source of scientific advice on climate change above and beyond that 
provided through the UK Climate Change Commission – which was established to provide 
scientific advice to the UK Government and devolved administrations. On the other 
hand, it also reflected broader dissatisfaction with a distanced relationship of science 
from policy in Scotland and demonstrated interest in the need to “translate policy 
context into scientific questions” (Walker, 2010). Research institutes were seen to have 
become complacent about their on-going funding from the Scottish Government 
(Interview SG6). Tensions can be seen in accounts of an early, science led, Centre for 
Expertise created in 2006 for research on animal disease (EPIC) whose research had 
achieved serendipitous policy relevance during the 2007 Foot and Mouth Outbreak, but 
after the crisis passed, scientists “went off and did their own thing and they became 
much more sort of strategic” (Interview SG6). Scottish universities (funded separately) 
were also not seen to connect with Scottish policy needs and, other than a few key 
people, were generally not considered good at bridging the science and policy divide 
(Interview SG6). To address this situation, the Scottish Government created a new 
position of Chief Scientific Advisor for RESAS that combined budget responsibility for the 
research institutes, a scientific advisory function to government, and redesigning the 
process of science–policy engagement (Interview SG6). 
In line with wider UK science–policy culture, the new framework explicitly foregrounded 
policy relevance and usefulness of scientific research and sought to establish greater 
steer towards policy requirements. The drive to assert the demands of policy had two 
faces. Instead of the centres for expertise being a flagship of expanding investment in 
Scottish scientific research, the new policy led model of interaction emerged in a context 
of questions over whether the Scottish Government should continue funding the 
Research Institutes (Interview SG6). The Chief Scientific Advisor for Rural Affairs and the 
Environment appointed in 2006 was a former director of one of the research institutes 
who both sought to retain funding for the research institutes but also understood the 
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Government interest in demonstrating value for money (Interview SG6). There was an 
urge to protect the research institutes from losing their funding or being forced into 
privatisation as had occurred in England (Interview SG6). Higher education research 
councils cannot fund research institutes so any redirection of funding, would mean 
survival of research institutes would rely on either merging with universities or 
privatisation (Interview SG6). Science had to be seen to deliver on the policy agenda or 
there was a risk that research institutes would lose direct Scottish Government funding: 
“What I really wanted to achieve was a closer relationship between the 
policy and the science, partly because I believe that policy was going to 
benefit, but also because I thought we wouldn't keep the science budget 
unless we, showed that we were a bit more willing to listen… it was to 
decrease the distance, the gap, between the science community and the 
[policy] community” (Interview SG6, original emphasis). 
 
As ‘”poacher turned gamekeeper”, the RESAS Chief Scientific Advisor stated “I hadn't 
understood a lot of things when I was outside” (Interview SG6), emphasising the 
arrogance of scientists in the research institutes and perceived complacency in expecting 
to continue to be given funding to do what they wanted: “they needed to learn how to 
operate in the real world and be more competitive” (Interview SG6). This need to be 
accountable was justified on the grounds of ‘public money’: 
“… they wanted to be the ones to say how they changed… the scientists 
just went and put up their own agendas regardless of what policy said, so 
you know, they had a chance… they’re not listening so pheh… they blew 
it!... to them it’s still their money, well it’s not their money it’s the 
taxpayers’ money and they need to be much more responsible” 
(Interview SG6). 
 
Narrowing the gap between science and policy became about decreasing the 
independence of science from policy goals in the face of wider neoliberal financial 
pressures on the funding of science. It was argued that science “should be driven by the 
needs of policy colleagues and not scientists given a free hand to decide what they 
wanted to do” (Interview SG6). Here the need of policy teams to demonstrate their own 
value for money is being pushed outwards to scientists to define their worth, in policy 
terms. Assertion of policy as the agenda setter and in the driving seat was recurrent 
through conversations with the former Chief Scientific Advisor of RESAS and in this sense 
establishment of CXC responds to a widespread perception that the scientific community 
as a whole is insufficiently sensitive to policy needs (Owens et al., 2006). The ambition 
for scientists to focus on policy led demands for knowledge also extended to learning to 
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work better with the grain of government. As well as being more responsive to policy 
needs, scientists were called to accept Government’s ways of working and not objecting 
to government staff changes or short timeframes (Interview SG6). Responses among 
scientists have been mixed with some who want their research to influence policy 
eagerly, accepting these demands as necessary. Others (often older scientists) resisted 
these changes in the science–policy relationship (Interview CXC-S3). The next two 
sections introduce the key organisations on which the research focussed, starting with 
CXC. 
4.3.2 ClimateXChange 
Of the three centres for expertise, CXC was established with the highest level of resource 
investment – £4.1m out of the total £6.6m originally invested between 2011 and 2014. 
With this greater investment, ClimateXChange also appeared to carry greater 
expectation to demonstrate international significance with expectations “To create a 
world-renowned centre of expertise to deliver objective, independent, integrated and 
authoritative evidence” (Scottish Government, 2011b: online, emphasis added) standing 
in contrast to the other two centres, for both of which the aim is “to provide the best 
available scientific advice to inform government policy” (Scottish Government, 2011d: 
online, emphasis added; see also Scottish Government, 2011a: online). Such 
international expectation supports suggestions that climate change is being used in 
Scotland to establish recognition on the global stage (Swenden et al., 2009: 16 ). There is 
also a striking difference in the type of evidence required. Climate change evidence will 
not simply be “the best available”; rather, it will be produced by a world renowned 
scientific authority and characterised by being “objective, independent, integrated and 
authoritative” (Scottish Government 2011b: online). Such higher stakes place high 
demands on climate science, both reflecting the controversial status of climate science 
post-climate-gate in the UK and also presenting particular challenges to an area of 
science already beset with post-normal challenges of high stakes, high uncertainty, 
urgency and public value based controversy (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b). 
ClimateXChange as a ‘virtual centre’ (Scottish Government, 2011c) comprises a 
directorate, a secretariat, and around 80 affiliated research scientists drawn from 
Scottish universities and research institutes, employing around six specifically appointed 
post-doctoral researchers hosted within the aforementioned institutions. Leadership of 
the organisation is shared between Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Innovation (who host 
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the CXC offices and whose Managing Director is the Policy Director for CXC), Aberdeen 
University (who provide the science director), the research brokers Sniffer (who host two 
members of the secretariat) and JHI (who provide the third director of CXC responsible 
for the relationship with the research institutes). These blurry and overlapping 
boundaries point to the relevance of not considering CXC as an organisation in isolation. 
Significant sharing of staff membership between organisations in the case of Sniffer and 
CXC brought benefits to both organisations alongside access to different funding, assets 
and datasets which can be used to the advantage of both parties (RN: CXC Away-Day 
2013). However, this also generated tension over the distinctiveness of roles especially 
between CXC and Adaptation Scotland (a programme of Sniffer) requiring discussion of 
how to manage the division, avoid duplication and ensure unique audiences in the eyes 
of their common joint funder (RN: CXC Away-Day 2013; Interview Climsave 1). 
Formation of CXC 
The initial concept for a Centre for Expertise on Climate Change emerged in 
conversations between the Head of Scottish Government's Research and Science division 
and the Chief Scientific Advisor for Rural and Environmental Affairs. A ‘sandpit’ event was 
then organised by RESAS (the Scottish Government Rural Environmental Science and 
Analytical Services Division), to which representatives from the six research institutes, 
fifteen universities and (after some appealing) several other smaller research centres 
were invited. The purpose of the event was to generate a bottom up approach (led by 
research scientists) to organisational design, membership, structure and work-planning, 
to encourage greater buy-in to the process of change by the various research 
organisations involved (Interview SG6). Originally research scientists proposed four work 
streams, on ‘Mitigation’, ‘Adaptation’, ‘Significance Risk and Uncertainty’ and a forth 
work social science workstream dedicated to ‘Knowledge Transfer and Communication’. 
However RESAS rejected this model, requesting that Knowledge Transfer and 
Communication be integrated across the other three workstreams (Interview CXC-R9). 
This reflected emphasis on all research being policy relevant. Widening research partners 
to include universities and smaller research centres was an attempt to expand the types 
of expertise being engaged to social as well as natural science (Interview SG6), however 
this was at first met by strong resistance from some research institutes: 
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“[x research institute] pilloried me in the press when I suggested that 
perhaps they needed to work with social scientists. I was destroying 
science” (Interview SG6). 
 
From RESAS’s perspective, desirable social scientists appeared to be those from an 
economic or behaviourist background that were responsive to policy. An example was 
given of one responsive scientist who was “much more of an applied person… and 
therefore he was closer to policy where economists got involved... the sort of guy that 
would listen to what policy people were asking for! And make the effort, to deliver what 
they wanted” (Interview SG6). Broadening of expertise has continued to be a challenge 
for CXC as further discussed below.  
Reformulation 
During its first three years of operation, CXC has undergone several rounds of 
organisational structural change. Like other Government departments, RESAS had to 
show financial savings, which for CXC, offered opportunities for organisational reform 
and self-definition. However, some scientists expressed a desire for a period of stability 
“to see through achievements on what we’ve been planning so far” (Interview CXC-R9); 
this stability at the interface with rapidly changing world of policy appears unlikely. 
Observations of the everyday interactions of CXC demonstrated a constant focus on 
demonstrating value for money (Interview SG2; RN: CXC-AGM 2013) added value, and 
return on investment (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). In 2013 the SRU work-stream was folded into 
Adaptation and Mitigation, leaving only two work-streams, and funding was reduced for 
long-term projects (which would have to be negotiated under the respective Institutes 
Strategic Research Programme funding) (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). Initial membership of 120 
research scientists with time allocations of as little as 5-10% was also reduced to around 
80 with 50% or more time costed to CXC (RN: CXC-AGM 2013, RN: CXC Away-Day 2013). 
Everyday Practice 
CXC defines itself as a translation organisation with a clear focus on serving policy: “it’s 
very explicit, it’s not to improve the science; it’s to improve the policy making” (Interview 
CXC-D1). Provision of knowledge drawn from the broader Scottish Government Strategic 
Research Programme and CXC’s wider contacts involves provision of knowledge to policy 
teams and Government Agencies (who are themselves often scientists within policy 
roles). At the 2013 CXC AGM a diverse list of policy areas with whom CXC had worked 
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were presented (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). In responding, CXC activity comprises three main 
areas: call-down service, co-developed planned projects and proactive support and 
facilitated conversations (Figure 4.2). 
The call-down service is a responsive service provided to policy teams within the Scottish 
Government, and is perhaps the defining characteristic of CXC’s knowledge exchange. 
The service is premised around the expectation that policy makers will face difficulties in 
making climate policy that require scientific knowledge. In such instances, policy teams 
are invited to get in contact with the CXC secretariat and request scientific knowledge to 
help address this challenge. The secretariat will meet with the policy practitioners, often 
face-to-face, to refine the definition of the problem into one which can be addressed by 
science, and will source a team of CXC researchers (or external consultants in the 
absence of relevant CXC expertise) to produce a short policy briefing for the policy team. 
As the policy director describes, 
“a policy maker can pick up the phone and say ‘help’… can you help… we 
sit down with the… policy team and work out what evidence they could 
do with and how we can help. And then we go and negotiate with the 
Figure 4.2: Main areas of CXC activity; Source: CXC Director presentation at the 2013 AGM of 
CXC (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). 
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researchers and essentially create an ad-hoc project that we can take 
forward to support that” (Interview CXC-D1). 
 
Advice is provided in the form of a briefing report – usually no more than 2 to 3 pages – 
that undergoes iterative rewriting, until the scientists are happy that the scientific 
message is accurate and the secretariat is happy that the response answers the policy 
need. Each briefing report is signed off by the CXC science and policy directors before 
being released to the policy team and placed on the CXC Public website. This establishes 
a ‘pull model’, drawing science into policy in ways determined by policy teams and 
contrasts with ‘push models’ where the emphasis is on pushing scientifically defined 
relevant knowledge out to policy teams. ClimateXChange is “the hub that pulls the 
information across from policy or from research” (Interview CXC-D1). The intricacies of 
the call-down process are subject to closer attention in Chapter 6.  
The lack of social science within CXC has been a continuing struggle for the organisation 
in responding to call-down requests, with much less call for physical and natural 
environmental science knowledge and more demand for social research (Interview CXC-
D1). The Policy Director described the way in which climate change had turned “from a 
scientific problem into a management problem, which is exactly what it should do, which 
is the point we’re trying to get to, where it becomes something that people manage on a 
day to day basis” (Interview CXC-D1). In terms of the effect on the demand for science he 
suggested: 
“We are starting to see a very different framing for the science now, 
people are quite frankly not interested in another statement about what 
the world might be like in a hundred years’ time… Scotland’s got it’s 
legally binding target, its working its backside off to try and deliver on it... 
the policy teams are not interested in more physical science… the 
problem is how do you get behaviour change or perceptions to change or 
how do you shape the way that communities operate… that’s not about 
the physical science” (Interview CXC-D1). 
 
Scottish Government continually emphasised the need to broaden the basis of expertise 
within CXC in order to reduce the need to commission externally (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). In 
practice it is also “not just Scottish expertise but UK expertise that’s being brought to 
bear” (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). There was a need to work strategically, both with the UK 
Living with Environmental Change Program and international linkages to demonstrate 
that the science was ‘world renown’ (RN: CXC Away-Day). 
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The other two areas of CXC’s work - facilitated conversations and co-planned projects 
focus on early and continual policy engagement such that the types of questions posed 
to CXC should be shaped and planned together and any planned work should be aligned 
to policy needs (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). These interactions rely heavily on face-to-face and 
telephone interaction building trust and rapport (Interviews: CXC-D1, CXC-S3). CXC’s 
performance in close working with policy was reported to be broadly successful at the 
2013 CXC AGM, although RESAS expressed difficulty in getting policy teams across the 
Scottish government to turn to CXC for advice (Interview SG2). Hence, the push 
continues from the RESAS that CXC should be more about responding to stakeholder 
needs, developing closer interpersonal engagement and awareness of policy deadlines 
and pressures (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). In many senses RESAS is less of a client for CXC than 
a marketing agency in which happy policy customers are the best marketing you have 
(RN: CXC Away-Day).  
 
4.3.3 Other organisations studied 
The analysis of CXC’s boundary work in the thesis is complemented by comparison with 
other forms of science–policy interaction – by Sniffer, the Met Office and more ad hoc 
forms of boundary work performed by research scientists in policy facing roles. This 
section provides specific organisational context to these organisations as parallel forms 
of science–policy interaction.  
Sniffer  
Sniffer, who host part of the CXC secretariat, is a charitable organisation with a recurrent 
presence in networks of climate science–policy interaction in Scotland. Sniffer often 
appears as a connecting chain and glue within these networks. Originally the name 
‘Sniffer’ represented an Acronym: ‘Scotland and Northern Ireland Forum For 
Environmental Research’. However, in 2011 the organisation refocused to concentrate 
only in Scotland, keeping the name but dropping the acronym. Sniffer is the vision of the 
founding, and still current, managing director who described it as “a change maker for a 
more climate resilient Scotland. So our focus is on climate resilience and making change” 
(Interview Sniffer 1). She described the original idea for Sniffer developing from informal 
conversations in 1989 while working for an environmental consultancy and then for SEPA 
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over how to make the most of pooling the many small funding sources available for 
environmental and water related research (Interview Sniffer 1). From being a part time 
project, Sniffer became a company in 1994. This created a strategic and agile 
organisation able to navigate and utilise many sources of funding for environmental 
based activity. In refocusing on Scotland only, no overt connection was made with 
potential Scottish Independence; however this could be considered a strategic move 
positioning Sniffer in a funding climate that could have increasingly emphasised Scottish 
activity.  
Sniffer describes itself as a knowledge broker who simplifies and better communicates 
science to a wide range of public sector, business and community audiences: “we are 
very much working with decision makers, to help them be better informed” (Interview 
Sniffer 1). Central to this function is application of science in a risk-based approach to 
thinking through adaptation in terms of resilience. The organisation focuses less on 
mitigation or energy and more on adaptation and triple bottom line sustainability (a 
focus that has evolved from early framing through water land and soil) (Interview Sniffer 
1). For the Managing Director, Sniffer’s role is about empowering people “about feeling 
that you can do something about it, whatever the ‘it’ is… what we can do [is] be a 
catalyst” (Interview Sniffer 1, original emphasis). Partnership working has been an 
important focus for Sniffer historically: 
“Sniffer was a mechanism to actually deliver things in partnership… that's 
been at the heart of what we do, and still is… we don't do consultancy 
work… we work in partnership” (Interview Sniffer 1, original emphasis). 
 
Sniffer was repeatedly constructed as ‘just a mechanism’ to define collective priorities 
and deliver projects. Sniffer hosts several projects and programmes under their umbrella 
including the work of Adaptation Scotland which works with local authorities, businesses 
and communities on climate adaptation (equivalent to the regional climate change 
partnerships across England, now formally part of ClimateUK) and two members of the 
secretariat of CXC.  
Met Office 
The Met Office is the UK’s principal Government funded scientific meteorological 
research and public information institute. First established in 1854 as an experimental 
government department, the organization today comprises a Public Weather Service, 
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National Severe Weather Warning Service, a series of specialist environmental 
monitoring services funded through UK Government (MET Office, 2015), a commercial 
forecasting service for aviation, energy sector defence etc., and a research programme 
into long term climate change modelling through the Hadley Centre. The Hadley Centre, 
based in Exeter has a remit for monitoring climate variability and change, understanding 
processes of change and developing computer modelling such as HadCU4 to model 
projected future climate (Interview Met Office). In Scotland, the Met Office have a chief 
scientific advisor who specifically serves the Scotland and Northern Ireland devolved 
administrations, provide commercial forecasting services from Aberdeen and an archive 
of historic weather data in Edinburgh as well as a specific public weather forecasting 
service and extreme weather support service to the Scottish Government Resilience 
Group comprising Ministers, junior executives and emergency response teams from all, 
from the required agencies that are scrambled during an event (Interview Met Office). 
The Met Office holds an authoritative voice on climate science in Scotland and regularly 
provides advice to the Scottish Parliament and Government. 
Ad hoc science–policy exchange 
As indicated in section 4.2, there are also plethora of other routes for science–policy 
exchange including through Government Agencies who all commission and produce 
scientific knowledge and whose staff are often scientifically trained, perform boundary 
work and become the voice of science within policy debates. Specific instances will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4 Problematising models of science–policy interaction in 
Scotland  
Before examining the specific differences in the processes and politics of boundary work 
between CXC, Sniffer, the Met Office, this short empirical section attends to the way in 
which the science–policy interface is being envisaged and narrated by practitioners. The 
section begins with a discussion of when and why science–policy actors look to science 
and then discusses the type of science–policy interface conjured through such reasoning. 
Most practitioner narratives imply a singular boundary between science and policy and 
describe boundary work as a value neutral. Drawing from boundary literatures 
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introduced in Chapter 2 and empirical findings, this section problematizes these 
characteristics to suggest that the science–policy boundary in Scotland is made up of 
multiple micro-sites of boundary work that cumulatively construct the idea of a macro 
science–policy interface. Further, while narratives may emphasise the neutrality of 
boundary work, observations suggest that value neutrality was carefully constructed in 
the process of boundary work itself.  
4.4.1 Roles for science and associated science–policy models 
Climate policy-making processes engage with science at a number of different stages, 
from preparation of the draft Climate Change Bill, Parliamentary Committee ‘Calls for 
Evidence’ or action planning for implementation (Interviews: Met Office, SG 1, SG4, SG3).  
The types of knowledge also varies from natural scientific evidence of the need for a 
policy response (in the early stages of a bill) to a greater emphasis on socioeconomic 
evidence of what works in terms of policy response in later stages of implementation 
(Interview CXC-D1). It is important to recognise the diverse ways in which science enters 
the policy making process and the limited role that it plays in policy development for as 
Irwin et al have demonstrated whilst influential – in many cases science itself effectively 
disappears (Irwin et al., 1996).  
In exploring why science is looked to by policy makers, research interviews revealed a 
vast number of roles for science. From the search for information to a desire to reduce 
debate, policy makers and CXC staff expressed multiple viewpoints in their explanations 
for turning to science in generating a policy response to climate change (Table 4.2). 
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These reasons for turning to science influence the way that science–policy interaction is 
envisaged. Information provision, for example, assumes a very different model of 
science–policy interaction than does providing policy options or suggesting what should 
be done. Where Pielke’s models of honest broker, issue advocate, arbitrator and pure 
scientist (2007) are perceptible, the role of science as a problem solver, to justify policy 
and to close down debate, are familiar functions that escape Pielke’s classification. As 
well as complicating Pielke’s model, this set of reasons for turning to science offers 
conflicting demands, in which science is asked to perform a variety of different roles - 
some of which imply a clear demarcation of science and policy and others that contradict 
such demarcation. This generates many perspectives on what the science–policy 
boundary should look like and the kind of responsibility held by each party – creating a 
highly contested space of interaction. 
Table 4.2: Reasons suggested for turning to science. 
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Despite these complex and conflicting perspectives on the science–policy boundary, and 
explicit engagement with academic literatures on boundary organisations (Interview 
SG6) a rather singular narrative of science and policy as “two different worlds” that 
“speak a different language” and “have a different culture” (Interview SG6) is often told. 
Those seeking to change modes of science–policy interaction in particular, describe a gap 
between science and policy that needs to be overcome (Interviews: SG6, SG2, CXC-D1). 
The former Chief Scientific Advisor of RESAS described: 
“What was obvious was the big gap between, science and policy and I had 
done… reading up about that… I have what’s called Maggie’s pipeline 
diagram which was basically, trying to show that you’ve got a huge bulk of 
academia and you’ve got a community of policymakers, and actually… the 
institutes were sort of moving knowledge along that pipeline in 2 
directions… so that you needed a broker. There’s a lot of stuff in the 
literature about boundary organisations… what we were basically saying 
was that the Institutes were almost like boundary organisations” 
(Interview SG6). 
 
Here, science and policy are seen as separate bodies, with a gap between them requiring 
bridging. Exchange is conceptualised in a linear, if bidirectional, way with research 
institutes and later ClimateXChange as boundary organisations – understood with 
functionality to better move knowledge from A to B. Owens et al. (2006) suggest that 
problems of communicating research findings are a familiar explanation for a science 
policy gap and this positioning of science and policy as pre-existent and separate 
domains provides justification for boundary organisations, like CXC, through the belief 
that these “two groups [science and policy] don’t go naturally together” (RN: CXC Away-
Day). Yet differences between science and policy are however not just constructed but 
‘felt’ through experiential difference. One fascinating but lengthy account by a Scottish 
Government policy official (provided in Appendix D) details an instance in which 
scientists presented a model to policy for predicting the needs of migrating species under 
a changing climate. The policy actor described with frustration and incredulity the 
scientist’s interest in the micro-scale intricacies of better predicting the behaviour of a 
hypothetical animal in a virtual model without any attention to what that tells us about 
what needs to be done, the wider scale of implications or financial considerations around 
investment options as a result of what they were exploring (Interview SG2). Frustration 
was particularly expressed around the limited scale of conclusions that could be drawn: 
“what does it tell us on a larger scale?… So you know something about this moth. Is there 
something bigger we can say?… not even another insect… if this is only applicable to that 
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moth and nothing else. Actually pffff it it’s irrelevant for me!” (Interview SG2). This 
difference in scale is one among many differences in focus which create the experience 
of difference between science and policy. Hearing accounts of one world through the 
lens of another enables what Knorr Certina has termed comparative optics (1999) to 
highlighting differences. Where Miller (2001a) describes very real differences in social 
practice and organization that exist between the two settings, these are understood not 
as ontologically different but produced through boundary work (Latour, 1993; Jasanoff, 
1990; Miller, 2001a). 
4.4.2 Problematising a single macro science–policy boundary 
This proliferation of sites of boundary work suggests it is important not to overemphasise 
two simple homogeneous worlds of science and policy with a singular gap between 
them. During interviews, actors demonstrated an almost countless number of ‘worlds’ 
configured through demarcation of similarity and difference in which different norms, 
ways of knowing, languages (Interview CXC-R4), epistemic commitments (Interviews: 
Climsave 1, CXC R-4), focuses of interest, scales and networks of operation (Interview 
CXC-R3) and writing styles (Interview CXC-R4) were described as frontiers through which 
similarity and difference were demarcated within disciplines, policy areas, scientific 
teams, organisations, epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) and civic epistemologies 
(Jasanoff, 2005). This suggests that differences within the heterogeneous communities of 
science and policy may be almost as significant as those between science and policy. 
Actors often held multiple roles which facilitated boundary working – for example one 
scientist described the way he uses his split affiliation between two scientific 
organisations to share knowledge to the benefit of both – acting as “a kind of bridge 
between the two” (Interview CXC-R4). Actors also often changed roles over the duration 
of their working life and rather than being fixed, boundaries appear to be hardened 
through monitoring practices that emphasise clear demarcations of responsibility and 
accountability (Interview SGA4). As a result boundary work was also configured not only 
between science and policy but for example also between public and private sectors, 
with frequent blurring and simultaneous reassertion of a public-private boundary in 
policy making to defend against any one group holding too strong a sway over public 
decision making (Interview SG4). This can be understood in terms of a construction of 
legitimacy (see Chapter 7).  
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It is perhaps more helpful to consider the perceived macro differences between science 
and policy instead as constructed cumulatively through specific micro-scale boundaries 
of similarity and difference. In extensive coding of interview transcripts, science and 
policy are often distinguished form one another through small scale conceptual 
distinctions: through being neutral vs. political (Interviews: CXC-R3, CXC-R4; RN: CXC-
UW), impartial vs. with vested interest (Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-D1, CXC-S1, Climsave 1) 
through simply providing information vs. advocating/actively campaigning (Interviews: 
CXC-S3, CXC-S1, CXC-D1, CXC-R1, Climsave 1) through being specific rather than general 
(Interviews: CXC-D1, CXC-S1, CXC-S3, CXC-R11, SGA4, SG2, SG3, SG6, Sniffer 1, Climsave 
1, Met Office), through being technical rather than applied (Interviews: CXC-S1, CXC-S3). 
They are also distinguished by being or not being a decision maker – or even a decision 
support tool (Interviews: Climsave 1, Climsave 2), being an expert vs. lay, (Interviews: 
CXC-R10, Climsave 1) and dealing with evidence vs. dealing with values or opinions 
(Interviews: CXC-S2, CXC-R3, CXC- R4). In some cases science and policy are also 
distinguished through scales of interest, in others over processes of constructing 
legitimacy, customary norms in writing, or the importance of financial considerations. 
None of these are themselves chasms but small differences that become cumulative and 
mutually reinforcing when mobilised collectively. Multiple boundaries found in the small-
scale everyday conceptual distinctions discursively employed, create difference that is 
felt at a larger scale, without any clear divide or linear continuum being locatable. 
As well as being fragmented and multiple, such boundaries are often contradictory. 
Boundaries do not neatly align to make a seamless locatable boundary, but rather make 
simultaneous claims and counterclaims that render any single boundary difficult to 
locate. In many cases, both scientists and policy makers were simultaneously aware of 
contradictions in their narratives. As early as 1983 Gieryn drew attention to a collection 
of science characteristics variously drawn to demarcate scientific endeavour and noted 
that these characteristics are often contradictory and not mutually compatible (Gieryn, 
1983). Boundary literatures since have drawn attention to boundary objects holding 
different meaning for different actors simultaneously that were intentionally ambiguous 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989) and to the role of boundary work in concealing such 
contradictions (Miller, 2001a). Gieryn’s account drew attention to the different 
characteristics that were foregrounded in different combinations at different times and 
in different situations – in effect there are many boundaries of science advocated, which 
whilst related, do not form a coherent whole that could be located as a singular 
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boundary of science. Empirical findings in Scotland suggest multiple boundaries between 
science and policy, consisting of micro distinctions that cumulatively contribute to a 
macro level distinction through which a large-scale science–policy interface comes to be 
known, but none of which can claim to represent the science policy boundary as a whole. 
These fragmented multiple boundaries are however networked, such that small scale 
distinctions interrelate and reinforce each other in complex ways to allow diversity and 
accommodating contradictory claims. This argument is further developed in Chapter 7. 
It is precisely the everyday trivial activities of boundary workers, their small scale 
decisions, conceptual distinctions, mundane actions and enlisting of actors that make up 
these multiple, distributed, fragmented yet networked boundary practices. Taking this 
position therefore disagrees with Guston’s need to focus on the “crucial (rather than 
trivial) activities of boundary workers” (1999: 88) and instead, following STS approaches, 
argues that tracing micro-scale processes of simultaneous processes of translation and 
separation (Latour, 1993) and attending to the infinite number of passing points (Star 
and Griesemer, 1989) are important in exploring the micro-scale boundary work that 
effects a broader science–policy boundary. As Jasanoff argues, 
“making sense of public reason as a social and cultural achievement 
dissolves the boundaries between micro and macro, by showing that the 
grand abstractions of reason, such as expertise and objectivity, are 
constructed and reconstructed through small mundane actions and 
inactions” (2012a: 20). 
 
4.4.3 Problematising value-free boundary work  
While science may be used to open up or to close down political debate, the claims of 
science themselves are often positioned as value neutral. In the reasons for turning to 
science (Table 4.2) science is in many cases being valued through a claim to being values 
free – as information, as an arbitrator, to scope out possible policy responses or 
implications, or to solve problems. Science’s value free claim is also utilised when science 
is used in justification of policy, to prompt debate by others, or to reduce debate albeit 
with greater reflexive acknowledgement of the problematic nature of this claim. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 problematise such claims to value neutrality, by drawing on the 
hybridity of boundary work and empirically analysing the value circulations at stake in 
science–policy boundary work. 
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Accepting STS attention to the hybrid nature of knowledge (as mixtures of fact-value 
claims) means attending to the value as well as the fact dimension of knowledge. 
Critiques to EBP introduced in Chapter 2 are a central thread in this thesis in 
demonstrating that the role of boundary work is not neutral. Recurrently research 
scientists and policy practitioners corrected any references to evidence-based-policy 
suggesting instead ‘evidence-informed-policy’ in acknowledgement of the limited role 
science plays in policy decisions (Interview SG1). In many cases the policy goal “often 
comes before scientific and research evidence rather than the other way round” (Owens 
et al., 2006: 637) and “scientific findings do not fall on blank minds that get made up as a 
result. Science engages with busy minds that have strong views about how things are and 
ought to be” (2004). One policy maker passionately emphasised: 
“The way we tend to do things in Government is just think we just give 
people the evidence ((laughing)) and of course they'll believe it but… no 
they won't if they don't like it, it’s like telling me to read a newspaper that 
I don't believe in, I just won't, I won't do it! And I don't think we take that 
into account in Government and we should, we really, really should…this 
stuff is sub-conscious in the end…and it’s not a bad thing it’s just… hhh 
yeah. I'm very aware of it” (Interview SG4, original emphasis) 
 
This ‘evidence-proofing’ allows “only certain kinds of ‘evidence’ to be noted” (Head, 
2008: 5). Another Government Agency official suggested “if they don't want to hear it, 
[they] just exclude it from their thinking” (Interview SGA2). While narratives may 
emphasise neutrality of boundary work, value neutrality was observed to be carefully 
constructed in the process of boundary work itself as will be outlined in chapters 5 to 7 
enabling contestation of these claims to neutrality and rational foundations to policy 
making.  
The circulation of fact-value hybrids as ‘evidence’ within political debates establishes a 
black box in which the circumstances and conditions of knowledge generation become 
masked and knowledge is rendered fixed, independently produced, un-questionable and 
apolitical. Referral to ‘evidence’ tends to cleave out a value neutral claim for decisions in 
which authority and therefore responsibility is relocated from the political sphere to 
science (or other sources of knowledge). Evidence thus has potential to serve as a 
channel through which responsibility for decision-making is deferred to the impersonal 
processes of science, removing the responsibility for decision making from policy and 
thus rendering decision making non-contestable. It is this that prompts one boundary 
actor to reject the use of evidence: 
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“I deliberately don’t use it, I don’t like the word evidence because… for 
me it is not truth and if it is not truth, what is it?… knowledge is more, 
always more impartial. You know what is truth for one person is not true 
for another… So evidence isn't fixed and therefore I think it can be 
misleading… I think knowledge is important” (Interview Sniffer 1). 
 
With the Scottish Government establishing a model of science–policy interaction through 
the three centres for expertise in which the objective for ClimateXChange to deliver  
“objective, independent, integrated and authoritative evidence” (Scottish Government, 
2011b), it is both timely and important to be attentive to both these earlier and newer 
critiques of EBP and to examine how value debates and knowledge interact at the 
science–policy interface.  
 
4.5 A summary and looking forward 
This chapter has considered the history and development of climate change policy in 
Scotland, and the complex landscape of organisations and networks of interaction 
through which science is drawn into policy making. The chapter has aimed to map a 
number of important influences on public policy discourse that reflect wider UK science–
policy culture and/or shape science–policy boundary practices, including: Scottish 
Independence, outcomes-orientated policy, sustainable economic growth and a 
historical tendency towards socialist politics. It suggests that these discursive frameworks 
involve clear value orientations, which have important effects on the way in which 
science is drawn into policy making and on the processes of science–policy interaction 
discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. However, the influence of these discursive value 
frameworks is not straightforward and struggles over balance of power between science 
and policy in agenda setting and discursive framing of climate change do not reach 
closure but remain on-going in processes through which organisational actors find 
different degrees of scope for resistance (see Chapter 7). 
By sketching out the organisational background, history and context of ClimateXChange 
and other key organisations, this chapter has established the context of science-policy 
boundary working in Scotland within which the detailed analysis undertaken in the 
following chapters takes place. The model of a singular science policy boundary and the 
understanding of science and of boundary work as value neutral have both been 
problematized, suggesting instead the hybrid nature of boundary work around multiple 
micro-sites that mutually construct a macro understanding of science and policy as two 
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separate worlds. Understanding the science policy boundary as involving multiple 
distributed sites of boundary work which mutually interact, also helps to open up a more 
realistic understanding for the role of agency within boundary work and to understand 
the robustness of any science–policy boundary to critique. 
The period of research was a time of intensified attention to questions of Scottish 
Independence in the run up to the 2014 Referendum. Although not the focus of 
research, the possibility for independence has provided an inevitable context within 
which the research took place. This has probably over-emphasised the rhetoric of the 
significance of Scotland’s activity and the importance of nationalism in policy-making. 
However, the possibility of independence has also provided an atmosphere of ambition 
and possibility that facilitated ambitious climate change policy to develop, and 
configured climate change as an avenue to construct a progressive national identity.  
Beyond the hype of the ambitious targets, Scotland is implementing a new model of 
science–policy interaction that is attracting attention beyond its borders (RN: CXC-AGM 
2013; Interview SG6) and sits within a wider move towards demand rather than supply 
driven science–policy interaction (Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). This thesis suggests that 
this ‘pull’ model of science–policy, which reconfigures the science–policy relationship by 
establishing policy in the driving seat and science in the service of policy, merits greater 
attention than the globally reaching mitigation targets. Amidst a language of translation 
and of co-production, each itself evoking particular interpretations of meaning, CXC are 
seeking to establish a more useful supply of science to Scottish Government policy teams 
to facilitate stronger delivery against climate policy goals, and the CXC secretariat are 
navigating and negotiating a new discursive ordering of science–policy interaction. Yet in 
the success of responding to these demands, the politics involved in the changing model 
of interaction are receiving insufficient attention. With abolition of SDC, which acted as 
an (often vocal) critical friend to the Scottish Government (Interview CXC-S1), and the 
establishment of CXC as a translation organisation, the Scottish Government has 
institutionalised a very different relation with policy in which there is little scope for 
policy critique.  
The theme of the changing science–policy relationship being initiated through CXC is 
explored in each of the following chapters through closer attention to the practices and 
processes of boundary work. Through this more detailed attention it is argued that there 
are political questions in the configuration of the relationship between science and 
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policy, which should be the subject of reflexive debate. Questions that climate change 
provokes for policy are not just scientific questions, and cannot be resolved through 
application of science in ways that deny value pluralism. Concerns over the way in which 
science is being enrolled within climate politics frames this need for greater 
attentiveness to the politics of boundary work. In the next chapter I examine the 
significance of practitioners terming the work of CXC ‘translation’ in terms of what 
associations are evoked by considering interaction in this way and make the argument 
that this terming performs discursive work that serves the objectives of putting policy in 
the driving seat of establishing the meaning of climate change. 
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 Chapter 5.
Struggles for Meaning at the Science Policy Interface: 
CXC as a Translation Organisation 
 
ClimateXChange (CXC) defines itself as a translation organisation, or as one director 
described “a knowledge translation business” (Interview CXC-D2). The term ‘translation’ 
was used repeatedly throughout interviews to describe the work CXC undertakes, and 
this repetition stood out in contrast to the work of other science–policy actors who 
prefer ‘brokerage’ (Sniffer) or ‘science communication’ (Met Office). Wider science–
policy literatures, often use the concept of translation to describe science and policy 
exchange, but frequently deploy it uncritically, as Chapter 2 outlined. This chapter draws 
from Fazey et al.’s (2014) suggestion that the way a process is described has implications 
for the way it is conducted. Through examining what the process of translation involves 
and how it differs from other forms of boundary work, this chapter argues that terming 
boundary work ‘translation’ is significant given the Scottish Government’s intent to make 
science more responsive to policy. The chapter finds that an important tenet of 
translation, as it is employed within CXC, is the act of making knowledge meaningful for a 
specific audience. Describing boundary interaction as translation performs discursive 
work, offering a useful way of shaping boundary work to prioritise policy audience needs. 
This specific emphasis on the audience is not differentiated by STS accounts of 
translation discussed in section 2.2, which could equally apply to other instances of 
boundary work discussed in this chapter. Instead, an argument is made for thinking 
translation through Laclau and Mouffe’s logics of equivalence and logics of difference 
(1985) to better capture the specific relations of power involved in CXC translation 
process. 
The chapter is structured to first introduce and develop an understanding of translation 
through the logics of equivalence-logics of difference. Reading translation through Laclau 
and Mouffe is a theoretical move that builds on the more general introduction to Mouffe 
outlined in Chapter 2. The chapter then turns to the empirical accounts of translation in 
CXC to discuss who is using the term and what the envisaged work of translation entails 
for different actors. Here the notion of ‘audience’ is an important feature within 
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practitioner narratives. The way in which CXC foregrounds the discursive value framings 
of its policy audience through its working practices is the subject of section 5.3. 
Description of boundary work as translation is then compared to co-production, 
knowledge brokerage and science communication in section 5.4 to consider what is 
significant about the process of translation. The inability of STS approaches to distinguish 
the specific influence of hegemonic power in the shape of the privileging of audience 
grounds the turn to Laclau and Mouffe’s work to help further thinking about the notion 
of translation.  
 
5.1 Translation as boundary work between similarity and 
difference  
Theoretical discussion of the concept of translation in Chapter 2 focused on debates 
within STS. A key feature in these discussions was the tension between stability and 
change in meaning involved in translation, in which similarity comes to be established 
across conditions of difference. This tension is also typical of other disciplinary accounts 
of translation such as those within linguistics and communication studies which have 
long struggled with tensions between faithfulness to the author’s intention and 
‘dynamic’ (Nida, 1977) or ‘functional’ (Nord, 1997) equivalence that increasingly 
emphasise meaning for the perceived audience (Nord, 1997). The way that CXC 
practitioners refer to translation appears to draw on lay understandings that originate 
within these linguistic understandings – of establishing equivalence in meaning across 
different languages or communities. The impossibility of achieving perfect translation is 
recognized within both traditions. For Venuti, the impossibility of ‘double fidelity’ to the 
source and target domains simultaneously creates an inevitable violence in the work of 
translation (Venuti, 2008: 267); as in the appearance of equivalence, difference is 
obscured (Venuti, 2008: 267). Venuti’s account draws attention to the politics of 
overlooking difference in the act of establishing equivalence, the priority often given to 
the frameworks of the new community and the possibility for other meanings to be 
gained in translation (Venuti, 2008: 14), however, his language of violence privileges an 
original. Where for Callon processes of translation have no normative sense of 
faithfulness, only continuous practices of displacement, Venuti valorises an original 
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which is not helpful within a science–policy context that does not wish to advocate for 
interaction as simple ‘science communication’.  
 
5.1.1 Laclau and Mouffe on similarity and difference 
Mouffe does not use the concept of translation directly, however, the concept of 
similarity and difference and the process of claiming equivalence that are recurrent 
within translation, are central to Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of the logics of equivalence 
and the logics of difference that are foundational to their work on identity constitution 
and the formation of hegemony.  Reading translation through the theoretical lens of 
logics of equivalence and logics of difference is helpful in attending to the politics of 
translation that are manifest in the case of CXC. Making this bridge requires bringing 
several of Mouffe’s ideas together, including further explanation of the logics of 
equivalence and difference. 
First, to understand logics of equivalence and logics of difference it is necessary to 
understand Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of identity formation. Laclau and Mouffe start 
from the impossibility of a fully positive identity – complete or freestanding – for this 
would constitute an essence. Instead, identity is always formed relationally, through two 
processes. Firstly, drawing from Derrida, they argue identity comes to be defined by 
what it is not (Mouffe, 2005b: 15), forged in relation to a constituent outside (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 127). This constitution of identity in relation to what is not involves the 
designation of ‘same’ through “constituting a chain of equivalences which construct what 
it is beyond the limits as that which it is not” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 143-144). 
Secondly, they claim identity is also prevented from realising itself as a complete whole 
(i.e. as a purely positive characteristic) from within itself – through subversion of the 
positive characteristic to a negative, within the very boundaries drawn around identity 
itself. This makes positivity without any trace of negativity impossible (Mouﬀe, 1993: 
114) and creates contingency and ambivalence within identities that can never be 
stabilized as pure essences for “the contingent subverts the necessary by preventing it 
from fully constituting itself” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 128). The effect of these two 
processes is that “neither the conditions of total equivalence nor those of total 
differential objectivity are ever fully achieved” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 129). In 
discussing equivalence and difference, Laclau and Mouffe argue that as identity cannot 
144 
 
be grounded in purely positive characteristics (essences), identities are formed instead 
through opposition to shared difference  
“by their common reference to something external… It is because a negative 
identity cannot be represented in a direct manner – i.e. positively – that it can 
only be represented indirectly, through an equivalence between its differential 
moments. Hence the ambiguity penetrating every relation of equivalence: two 
terms, to be equivalent, must be different – otherwise, there would be simple 
identity” (1985: 128). 
Equivalence is therefore constructed through commonality in difference for otherwise 
the claim would be to being identical, not being equivalent.  
Based on this groundwork on construction of identity, and Mouffe’s emphasis on the 
collective we and collective they in ‘the political’, Mouffe argues that building chains of 
equivalence is a tool of hegemony that seeks to establish the terms through which the 
collective ‘we’ comes to be defined. She suggests that: 
“The building of a new hegemony implies the creation of a ‘chain of 
equivalence’ among the diversity of democratic struggles, old and new, in order 
to form a collective will” (Mouffe, 2005b: 53). 
Constructing chains of equivalence Mouffe maintains is not an innocent act but a claim 
for setting meaning in particular ways that always requires “the demarcation of a they” 
(Mouffe, 2005b: 53) who are the constitutive outside, defined through difference. This 
expansion of a chain of equivalence – the claiming of ‘same’ in the face of a shared 
opposition, is a claim to universality (Rear, 2013) that is central to the construction of a 
hegemonic claim. 
5.1.2 Reading translation through logics of equivalence and difference  
Reading the process of translation through the logics of equivalence and difference 
builds from an understanding of translation as the construction of equivalence across 
situations of difference. Understanding translation as an expansion of a chain of 
equivalence reflects that equivalence is always partial and is based not on positive 
(essential) characteristics, but on shared difference (Figure 5.1). 
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The shared outside needs to be a state of meaning that prevents the realization of each 
party’s identity/goals. An example from the previous chapter that helps to illustrate this 
claim is the discursive alignment of climate change with the reindustrialization of 
Scotland through renewables. In this case equivalence is created between climate 
change and economic policy, not through shared values or identical interests, but 
through seaming together these concerns through a shared adversary – in this case a 
weak carbon neutral electricity generation capability that would prevent the goals of 
each policy from being realized. This chapter considers the specificity of the way the 
concept of translation is being employed within CXC and how it might be seen as an 
expansion of a claim of equivalence with regard to the discursive value framings of 
policy.  
 
5.2 Translation as a process in CXC   
At a broad level, the way in which the term translation is being employed within CXC was 
notable in three ways. First, active usage of the term was encountered primarily among 
policy and boundary actors and not among scientists. Second, the narratives of 
translation encountered foregrounded the importance of the ‘audience’ and of making 
knowledge meaningful for a defined audience. Thirdly, scientists and boundary/policy 
Figure 5.1: Identification through positive characteristics (A) and Identification 
through shared difference (B). 
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actors held very different understandings of what the process of translation entails. 
These findings are discussed below. 
5.2.1 Active use of the term ‘translation’  
Only certain actors spontaneously used the term translation. The term arose prolifically 
and spontaneously in the narratives of the ClimateXChange Secretariat and 
ClimateXChange Directorate and of Scottish Government policy-makers during 
interviews and participation at events (Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-D1, CXC-D2, SG-6, CXC-
S1, SG-2) but was rarely spontaneously employed by CXC researchers (Interviews: CXC-
R1, CXC-R3, CXC-R4, CXC-R8, CXC-R9, CXC-R10, CXC-R12). This specific usage of the term 
‘translation’ by those in a policy-facing role suggests that description of boundary work 
as translation is part of a Scottish policy discourse, rather than driven by the scientific 
community.  
Further, as Chapter 4 outlined, the science–policy interface is a complex, messy and 
overlapping space of heterogeneous scientific and policy communities, with boundary 
work taking place as much within and between these communities as across any clear 
demarcation of science and policy domains per se. For example, the nature of call-down 
requests usually requires cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary conversations that require 
the input of multiple authors (Interview CXC-D1). Yet, despite this multiple boundary 
working and interfacing different knowledges across disciplinary boundaries, the 
emphasis on translation and foregrounding the meaning of the audience both occur only 
in the case of science- policy boundary work. In STS terms – all these acts of boundary 
work might be termed translation, yet the term translation tended only to be used for 
science–policy boundary work.   
5.2.2 Making knowledge meaningful to the audience 
An important reference point for those who are actively using the term translation within 
CXC was the notion of ‘audience’. The audience for CXC is quite clearly the policy 
community – the Scottish Government and Government Agencies: 
“The point of the centre is… to do (.3) policy responsive work which means that 
… they’re there to have their brains picked... really, the understanding has to be 
that it’s all about policy” (Interview SG2). 
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Translation was understood as “making knowledge understandable and relevant to the 
audience” (Interview CXC-R5). Foregrounding the needs of the policy audience is the 
raison d’etre of CXC, and demanded through their funding agreement with the Scottish 
Government (Interview SG6, SG2). The secretariat describe: “That’s what we are paid to 
do is to serve the needs of policy” (Interview CXC-S3). Making knowledge meaningful for 
CXC’s audience was central in descriptions of the translation work that CXC undertakes. 
For example, the CXC knowledge officer described her role as 
“translating the intelligence, or the information, the feeling, that I have from 
direct engagement into something that is then meaningful to the other 
audience” (Interview CXC-S3). 
This prioritisation of the needs of the policy audience works towards establishing 
knowledge’s salience for policy (Cash et al., 2002: 4). Concern for understanding and 
connecting with the audience was recurrent in narratives of all CXC directorate and 
secretariat staff. In this process of establishing meaning, the interests, problem framings, 
discourses, objectives and values of the audience hold primary importance. As the 
communication manager describes, 
“to me the number one is always to find what is it that motivates your 
audience…what is it that is their objective, their goal so what have I got that I 
can package up, it’s a marketing task” (Interview CXC-S1, original emphasis). 
Instrumental to this foregrounding of audience meanings is getting the right translators 
who will seek to prioritise policy meanings. The policy director in particular was both 
cited (RN: CXC-WAW) and observed (RN: Climsave, RN: C2020-M) to excel in his ability to 
look at and frame problems or information through the eyes of his audience. His ability 
to shift conversations to reflect the needs of his audience was experienced first-hand. 
When asked about these skills directly, he recounted previous experiences of working in 
the private sector, as an entrepreneur, trying to engage new markets (Interview CXC-D1): 
"The first thing you had to do was go and find out what people wanted or 
thought they wanted and so the first conversation was not the same as a typical 
academic… hey look this is what I’ve done, you know, here’s my papers here’s 
my presentation, what do you think? Instead you actually have to go in and say 
‘What’s your problem’, you know what is the thing that’s facing you?… So I think 
it’s probably driven from my private sector experience of trying to deliver a 
service that will deliver a product that met people’s needs" (Interview CXC-D1). 
With a long working relationship with the Scottish Government the Policy Director 
recounted some previous disastrous examples of bringing policy teams and scientists 
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together in which scientists had launched into presentations entirely focused on their 
own world. He described his own reaction as “whoa, whoa, whoa. No, stop right there, 
ask them what the problem is, really tailor it to their approach” (Interview CXC-D1). The 
importance of starting with what is valued by policy could not be clearer.  
These former private sector experiences are informing the design of the CXC approach to 
science policy interaction in the following ways. Firstly, ClimateXChange’s approach is 
framed in terms of delivering a product to meet a demand. The provision of policy 
awareness workshops focuses on helping scientists to better understand policy needs in 
order to tailor their product. Secondly, offering secondments for scientists into policy 
roles is seen to develop greater understanding of policy and the establishment of 
“rapport” (Interview SG6). This is entirely focused on scientists better understanding the 
world of policy (as audience) not vice versa. Thirdly, the practical editing and rewriting of 
scientific briefing notes by secretariat staff to ensure they respond and deliver against 
the policy need helps to better serve policymakers as clients or customers – both terms 
were used prolifically within CXC’s discourse (RN: CXC-AGM 2013, RN: CXC-AGM 2015, 
RN: CXC-PAW 1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3).  
The original combined bid to deliver CXC by the directorate7 was successful because of its 
promise to deliver a service that was responsive to policy. The secretariat subsequently 
appointed consists of highly experienced boundary actors with long previous policy 
experience and strong understanding of a policy perspective (Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-
S1). They then encourage scientists to become translators by understanding the goals, 
motivations and objectives of the other party and to stand in the shoes of the other 
(Interview CXC-S3; RN: CXC-PAW2). This is an outward looking skill at which CXC staff 
excelled (Interview CXC-S3) but scientists were very bad at (Interviews: SG2, CXC-D1) and 
constituted an important reason for CXC’s establishment. While STS narratives of 
translation capture the status of translator and the change in knowledge they do not 
capture this orientation towards policy framings which is carefully being built into CXC’s 
practice.  
                                                          
7
 Originally several bids went in to establish the centre for expertise. The successful bid was a combination of two bids, 
each led by one of the current directors, which were asked to merge (Interview CXC-D1). 
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5.2.3 Differences in epistemic understanding of the process of 
translation 
Whilst the need to make knowledge meaningful for an audience was generally 
understood and accepted by scientists, there were significant differences in the 
expectations of what the process of translation involved between CXC scientists and 
CXC’s Directorate and Secretariat. During interviews it was found that scientists tended 
to envisage translation as a continuous process of filtering of a discrete set of knowledge 
from a wider whole: 
“There's a lot of information out there and certain key people were like 
information filters… extract the useful from the noise... I think that role of 
translating something that is quite general into, something that is particular for 
their particular peers… is still fundamental… these particular key people know 
what the issues are for their sector so they can extract that… I think it’s partly 
what ClimateXChange was meant to do, to be a filter like that” (Interview CXC-
R11). 
In such cases, translation involves selection of a subset of information based on 
relevance to a specific domain from a larger whole, with no fundamental change in 
character. As another researcher described “making that distinction about what needs to 
be there and what doesn't need to be there and getting rid of anything that really 
doesn't need to be there is what the translation process entails” (Interview CXC-R4). One 
domain is simply a subset of the other, and meaning in one context flows smoothly to 
the other, with no disjunctures. In natural science literatures such as physics, biology, 
mathematics and computer science, translation is often used to connote stability 
through change. This contrasts with social science where attention is drawn to the 
dimension of ‘change’ – whether betrayal (Bassnett, 2014) treason (Callon, 1986) or 
violence (Venuti, 2008). For example, in mathematics and physics translation is 
understood as uniform movement without rotation (Morris, 1992), in computer science 
and artificial intelligence as stable conversion through coding and decoding, and in 
biology and virology as transmission. This creates a difference in understanding of what 
the process of translation entails and therefore, very different expectations over the 
work that translation performs - leading scientists to view the process of getting scientific 
knowledge to policy without political distortion – as one scientist suggested “we can 
deliver messages but messages get muddied” (RN: CXC-UW). While the concerns of 
policy become the selection criteria around which filtration of scientific knowledge takes 
place, the meaning of knowledge in filtration appears to remain unchanged. This is 
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characteristic of models of science communication (see further discussion in section 
5.4.2). 
Understanding translation as filtration contrasted with understanding by policy and CXC 
staff of translation as conversion. Policy and boundary actors emphasised the 
disconnection and required jump that translation involves, during the application of 
knowledge to a different problem that is not the same – "the policy problem is the real 
one that’s on the ground just there, which won’t be the same, it might be similar, but it’s 
not the same as the paper that’s written over here” (Interview CXC-D1). Instead the 
emphasis in translation-as-conversion asks scientists to interpret their knowledge in a 
different context: 
“It’s trying to get them… to think more in terms of… being professional, they 
have more expertise in that field than the policy team do so we're asking them 
to impart that professional excellence knowledge into that space… what we're 
interested in is your professional opinion and how it applies to this particular 
problem” (Interview CXC-D1). 
As the secretariat described “its that ‘turning into’ that’s important” (RN: CXC-PAW2, 
original emphasis). Some natural scientists within CXC are less comfortable with 
demands to convert meaning in this way, than others, however it was emphasized that 
the real difference CXC brings compared to the MRPs (Main Research Providers8) is 
providing expert opinion/expert judgement9 rather than research itself (Interview SG2). 
Part of the Scottish Government move towards centres for expertise was policy 
recognition that scientists were understandably reluctant to share reflections in writing 
prior to peer review “but you can tap into the brain and the knowledge, that’s in a 
scientist, an expert working in the right area” (Interview SG6). In the face of need for 
rapid information in policy, verbal conversations with experts for their ‘expert opinion’ 
are presented as a way of circumventing this difficulty: 
“It’s that kind of kind of translation… the hunch aspect right? So you’ve got the 
scientist that says, no no… it’s just this species that I can tell you anything about. 
Ok that’s fair enough scientifically ok. Yeah but! Tell me! What is your expert 
judgement!" (Interview SG-2 see Appendix D). 
                                                          
8
 Research Institutes with a long standing renewed research contract for Scottish Government 
9
 Expert opinion and expert judgment both used in interviews. 
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Demands for expert opinion are stimulated partly by the complexity and 
interdisciplinarity of modelling information that requires specialist interpretation 
(Interview SG6) and partly because climate change, as an area of post-normal science, 
asks scientists to contribute knowledge in areas of urgency, uncertainty, high stakes and 
values disputes (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). These calls for expert opinion over 
evidence can be seen to involve precisely this emphasis on conversion. Providing 
evidence can be seen to refer to the distillation of conclusions from data, whilst expert 
opinion refers to the conversion of expert knowledge in one area to application in 
another area, which is not the same. While in practice, CXC both filters robust and 
relevant knowledge from a wider body of scientific knowledge and converts meaning in 
one area into meaning for another; the emphasis on translation by policy and CXC actors 
is a push for the conversion of meaning. 
This tapping into a scientist’s brain and shift in emphasis on ‘evidence’ to interpretation 
of implications and emphasis on ‘expert opinion’ can be seen as one way in which the 
discontinuous leap between science and policy is being navigated, but asks scientists to 
take a more flexible approach to their habitual boundaries around the role of science.  
The move from written peer reviewed evidence to consultation with scientific experts 
further asks scientists to occupy different subjectivities – as experts with opinions, rather 
than as the collective voice of science (discussed further in Chapter 7). For policy and 
boundary actors, conversion of knowledge from one domain to another through 
extending equivalence is epistemically unproblematic, and part of how they understand 
the process of translation. This is illustrated by the words of a CXC Director at the 2013 
AGM, who refers to scientists’ reluctance as reticence and stubbornness: 
“Policy want your judgment, even if you’re not sure, and just have an inkling… 
its about overcoming resistance to wanting everything just so, and… making a 
judgement call on it in the absence of certainty” (RN: CXC-AGM 2013).  
For many natural scientists, the request for expert opinion requires a discontinuous leap 
across difference; extrapolating or interpreting implications of findings in one area to 
that in another runs counter to many of the methodological principles upheld by 
scientists trained in natural science, as one scientist described: 
"My role is to… make sure that the way that people make use of data is robust… 
that the relationship between the data they've collected and the questions they 
want to answer and the conclusions they draw using that data are reliable and 
defensible… that those statements are actually backed up by the evidence 
behind it... I wouldn't say my role was to go any further than that in terms of 
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advocating particular outcomes, or even communicating those outcomes more 
generally” (Interview CXC-R3). 
These demands for expert opinion require the passage of judgment outside the 
boundaries of experimental evidence. The very different meanings of the term 
‘translation’ for different communities within CXC is likely to create very different 
expectations among scientists for the work required and different understandings of 
where boundaries of equivalence and difference might be drawn means that such 
equations are felt as problematic. Scientific researchers who have clear boundaries over 
what constitutes ‘the same’ and what constitutes ‘different’ – find translation, when 
understood as conversion, troubling whilst those who understand these boundaries in 
more flexible ways are able to interpret likely implications more provisionally in ways 
amenable to policy needs thus generating two communities of researchers (Interviews: 
CXC-S3, SG2). 
Further, researchers are often caught in a tension between epistemic pressure to 
separate scientific practice from judgment and pressure through CXC for “less research 
and more judgment and expertise” (CXC’s Science Director, at RN: CXC-AGM 2013). At 
the 2013 AGM, the Science Director suggested to his audience of scientific researchers 
that although there was a tendency in the science community to say that unless you’ve 
got absolute evidence then you’re not going to say anything at all, he emphasised “we’re 
a centre for expertise not a centre for certainty” and called on scientists to “be prepared 
to provide judgement/expertise” (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). As STS describes, this pressure 
for scientists to convert knowledge into policy meaning is simultaneously accompanied 
by a parallel discourse that demands separation of science from policy. One policy official 
described this by saying, 
“I wouldn't expect policy colleagues to design science, I wouldn't expect 
scientists to design policy but they'll often come up at the end of the 
consultancy and say 'and the policy should be this' and policy colleagues would 
go berserk, you know, you've got to accept where your area of expertise stops 
and just because you know the evidence doesn't mean you can design the 
policy” (Interview SG6).  
This enforces a very definite boundary over where the responsibility and involvement of 
scientists should stop and suggests that scientists in the past have been guilty of 
overstepping this boundary. These competing pressures are contentious for many CXC 
scientists who feel that they are being asked to draw conclusions beyond their evidence 
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or expertise (Interviews: CXC-R1, CXC-R3, CXC-D2) at the same time as upholding strict 
boundaries between science and policy. On the one hand, it is recognized that science 
and policy are not the same and are governed by different responsibilities, areas of 
interest and epistemic processes of meaning making. On the other, they are asked to be 
made functionally equivalent, in order to make scientific knowledge on climate change 
meaningful to policy problems – such as making buildings, reducing transport journeys 
and waste or conserving peat and forestry (Interview SG4) and policy framings of what is 
being valued. STS literatures help us to understand the parallel narratives at play here 
but not the politics of the demand from policy. Unpacking understanding of translation-
as conversion enables the discursive emphasis on translation to be understood as a 
significant epistemic challenge to the scientific community over the way that knowledge 
is being constructed and is circulating at the science policy interface. 
5.2.4 Designating similarity and difference 
If active use of the term translation constitutes a discursive challenge to the way 
boundary work is taking place at the science–policy interface, it is important to enquire 
deeper into the politics of this work. Laclau and Mouffe’s framework, introduced in 
section 5.1, enables translation as conversion to be understood as the expansion of a 
claim to equivalence across difference. Translation understood as filtration, justifies the 
ability to interpret from one case to another through shared characteristics of a problem 
(see example A in Figure 5.1). This creates essentialist notions of identity in which when 
characteristics are not shared scientific findings do not hold. Translation understood 
through conversion by contrast, recognizes that the two domains do not share identical 
characteristics, but suggests they can overlook their differences in the face of a common 
opponent. Science and Policy are not the same (identical), but these differences are 
seamed over in the shared opposition to a common opponent. In this case, this 
opponent is the joint problem of rising carbon emissions and the lack of policy response. 
Both scientists and policy actors are seeking to address this problem (often with passion). 
Commonality is found in the shared problem as adversary that prevents each party 
achieving their own goal (of addressing climate change). Differences between different 
types of policy response are strategically overlooked in the pursuit of some form (any 
form) of policy response. Recognition of these differences were occasionally indicated: 
“The transition to the low carbon economy is kind of the Pandora’s Box. 
because what does that mean and to me… that means doing sustainability… but 
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it doesn’t to everyone else… I mean there’s lots of low carbon economy that is 
not particularly sustainable… to me… you can’t think about this whole agenda 
without thinking about it as sustainability… but of course specific questions 
posed to CXC won’t have that dimension” (Interview CXC-S1, original emphasis). 
In the urgency and difficulty of delivering a policy response, some policy response is 
perhaps considered better than no policy response. The gratification of seeing a policy 
response was celebrated by the secretariat at CXC’s AGM 2013 through quantified 
guestimates over peat in the RRP2 (RN: CXC-AGM 2013); it was emphasised that policy 
teams like “people who get on with it and produce work they can use” (RN: CXC-AGM 
2013). The common enemy for CXC researchers was also constructed in practical ways by 
emphasizing the relevance of “making it clear to the academics that if we don't provide 
that information to time then they'll go elsewhere for it” (Interview CXC-D1), referring to 
Scottish Government and to a potential threat of discontinued support for Scottish 
research institute funding. The boundary working that draws some boundaries into sight 
as significant and important and establishes connection across other lines of difference is 
political work in which the seaming together of differences under the promise of some 
policy response as opposed to no policy response, is a practice of hegemony into which 
passionate actors are being enrolled. Section 5.2 explores these politics further through 
examining CXC’s Policy Awareness Workshops through which scientists are prepared for 
performing the translation work of the call-down service (discussed in Chapter 6). The 
strength of thinking about translation as an expansion of a chain of equivalence, is that in 
constructing equivalence in meaning across difference, the politics involved in emphasis 
on the policy audience in CXC’s use of ‘translation’ may be understood as a practice of 
hegemony – expanding claims to equivalence in the face of a shared constitutive outside. 
 
5.3 Preparing scientists for translation: CXC’s Policy 
Awareness Workshops 
Within CXC, the language of translation is used to refer to the call-down service in 
particular, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. CXC secretariat prepare research 
scientists to respond to call-down requests through running ‘Policy Awareness 
Workshops’ for CXC researchers to help scientists understand the needs of the policy 
community as their audience. These sessions aimed to raise awareness of the policy 
making process, the demands and pressures involved, and the discourses important in 
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making Scottish policy (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3). Workshops 
involved a number of presentations and participative exercises, for which a sample copy 
of the agenda is included in Appendix E. Policy Awareness Workshops are an important 
process through which orientation to policy needs and understanding of what is 
considered meaningful for policy is constructed for scientific researchers in order that 
they might better perform the call-down service function. These expectations shape 
knowledge translation processes and encourage the development of particular types of 
knowledge that ‘fit’ over others. 
5.3.1 Emphasising the fit with existing policy discourses 
Presentations provided information on the way that policy is made, both in theory and in 
practice, drawing from recent examples of climate policy from the UK Government to 
convey the messiness and non-linearity of the policy process and outline differences in 
perceptions of risk and markers of success. During all three Workshops presentations 
emphasized the need for all policy to deliver against sustainable economic growth as well 
as the context for Scottish Independence (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-
PAW3). Policy needs, problem framings and motivations for acting were recurrently 
emphasized. AtCXC-PAW2 the problem policy are seeking to address in climate change 
involved the following slide representing climate change as carbon dioxide, user energy 
consumption monitoring, the stock market, commerce and health, while emphasizing the 
green growth and jobs imperative (RN: CXC-PAW2) (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Slide shown at the second CXC Policy Awareness Workshop illustrating their 
problematisation of climate change (RN: CXC-PAW2). 
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In addition to an emphasis on economic growth, the relationship between science and 
policy was recurrently described in business terms, for example referring, to the Scottish 
Government as customers (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3), to the shop 
window of CXC services (RN: CXC-PAW3) and to meeting the policy ‘demand’ (RN: CXC-
PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW 2, RN: CXC-PAW3). The effect was to frame the relationship 
between science and policy both in market terms and with a sense that ‘the customer is 
always right’. Discursively framing the relationship with policy and the focus of policy 
interest in this way foregrounds particular expectations for knowledge to meet 
neoliberal values of economic growth, private sector models of operation, and thinking 
of knowledge provision in terms of a demand led service. Repeatedly emphasizing these 
discursive value frameworks encouraged science to work within these framings when 
shaping knowledge communications. While public science and market logics have 
arguably long been entwined, particularly through historical reliance on patron funding 
and co-evolution of science and neoliberalism via key figures central to the development 
of the philosophy of science and to the Mont Pelerin Society - the intensity of this 
relationship is increasing (Lave et al., 2010: 664). These examples of actively framing 
both scientific knowledge and science−policy relations in market terms observed within 
CXC sessions demonstrate an important way in which this intensification is taking place. 
5.3.2 Internalising and rehearsing framings 
Sessions also included a participatory role-play exercise that encouraged scientists to 
step into the shoes of a policy maker and share the visceral experience and pressures of 
policy making. The ninety-minute exercise involved working in groups to review 
competing sources of information on flooding and designing a flood management policy 
in five bullet points that addressed the following questions: 
– Scale of the plan 
– Whether revision of the Scottish Rural Development Programme is required 
– How stakeholder views should be incorporated 
– Resource implications for Scottish Government and local communities  
 
The proposed policies developed in the participatory exercise offered significant 
diversity of approach (helping to illustrate that many solutions can be forged out of the 
same evidence) but all apart from one fitted well within the existing, broadly neoliberal, 
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policy ethos (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3). Most schemes 
emphasized cost neutrality to the Government (fiscal austerity) and required no 
mandatory action (de-regulation/state withdrawal). Instead approaches favoured 
financially incentivised action (envisaging an individual economic actor), cross 
partnership delivery with a national approach but flexibility at the local level, public 
consultation (rather then community devolved design), voluntary action and 
redistribution of funds. This participatory exercise demonstrated a rehearsal of and 
internalization of expectations of what policy audiences would consider not just 
meaningful but also acceptable responses. The strong role for the private sector and 
market mechanisms as necessary solutions to problems indicating the neoliberal 
character of solutions being framed. The need to fit solutions into these requirements 
seemed well understood by many scientists.  
In the second workshop, one flood policy proposal stood out from the others, advocating 
a highly regulatory approach that relied on governing through force – a national scale 
plan of centrally planned flood defences, compulsory purchase orders of land, active 
flood diversions, and funded by a premium insurance tax and levy on irresponsible 
developers building on floodplains that serves as a redistribution fund (RN: CXC-PAW2). 
Other participants met this with humour and there was a clear sense that this would not 
be considered acceptable for policy, with one person suggesting it sounds like a 
dictatorship (RN: CXC-PAW2). Both CXC secretariat and other scientists responded by 
emphasising more typical approaches within policy – including stakeholder consultation, 
utilizing existing delivery partners and local authority led approach based on their ability 
to pay (RN: CXC-PAW2). In this case acceptability of policy approaches is constructed 
through aligning proposed solutions to current policy frameworks, and the types of 
policy instruments that are habitually used to influence citizen behaviour. This particular 
policy proposal that strayed outside this familiar territory was policed through humour 
and subsequent discursive realignment.  
5.3.3 ‘Speaking their language’  
Workshops 2 and 3 also discussed practical writing strategies for communicating to 
policy audiences in response to scientist requests at CXC-PAW1 (RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-
PAW3). Accessibility of language and requirements for text to be short, clear and to the 
point were emphasized during workshops, reflecting comments made by policy makers 
during interviews on what is required of briefing notes (Interview SG4). Workshop 
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sessions illustrated differences in writing styles, and presented use of active voice and 
policy preferences for the format, layout, length, sentence structure, writing style and 
tone of written documents as an important feature of translating knowledge for a policy 
audience.  However, translation is about more than just writing style.  
The notion of ‘speaking their language’ was often used during interviews to describe the 
process of connecting with things considered important by the policy audience 
(Interviews: SG6, CXC-D1, CXC-S1). For example, “recognising that you speak a different 
language” (Interview SG6), describing the practice of translation as “turning it into the 
language that your listener is speaking” (Interview CXC-S1) and emphasizing to scientists 
the need to ‘speak the same language as your listener’ (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, 
RN: CXC-PAW3). The capability of speaking different languages was often attributed to 
previous experience and exposure to different communities. It was suggested by the 
secretariat that, 
“engagement has often been pushed by a very small number of either 
charismatic researchers… who have a relationship already, who are um well 
engaged in the kind of broader stuff around Scottish Government objectives and 
understand what Ministers are trying to achieve in Scotland and are able to 
speak a language that policy people are able to understand” (Interview CXC-S3). 
This quotation demonstrates, that for the CXC secretariat speaking the language of policy 
is about more than writing styles, short formats and plain English, but about having an 
eye to the bigger picture – the ‘broader stuff’ the ‘Scottish Government objectives’ and 
‘what Ministers are trying to achieve’. Speaking someone else’s language can be thought 
as making knowledge connect with discourses and concepts that are recognized and 
valued within the audience’s context. In the view of one CXC scientific researcher, 
translation is the slotting into frameworks that policy use: 
“We don’t do basic research… but its still too far away to be slotted into the 
type of policy questions that RESAS or any other part of government have got, 
which are fundamentally about policy costs and benefits… impact assessment… 
as an economist I find that relatively easy, you know I’ve worked in Government 
before and so I’m quite familiar with the kind of general frameworks they’re 
working with you know… that’s not research, it’s just translation” (Interview 
CXC-R12). 
At one point debate erupted at the second Policy Awareness Workshop in the context of 
how to make land use and agricultural research useful if it is not already being seen as 
useful.  The question centred on “what’s the policy hook?” (RN: CXC-PAW2). The CXC 
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secretariat response came in the form of framing the research in terms of crop efficiency 
(RN: CXC-PAW2). Here meaning for policy is constructed through connection with the 
characteristic of efficiency as a valued characteristic within prevailing policy discourses. 
The policy ‘hook’ becomes a way in which the interest of policy makers might be 
captured by speaking to, and connecting with, what is valued within their discursive 
practice. According to the CXC secretariat, the “way to influence is to provide the 
information they can grab as their own, can run with” (RN: CXC-PAW2) – making sure 
research speaks to such discursive value framings enables information to be successfully 
absorbed within the policy making process. The communications manager described this 
process of making meaning as a question of ‘making sense’ within the wider framework 
of your audience: 
“Any message that we get we put, we hook onto what we already know. We put 
it into the framework that we use to make sense of the world and you know 
that that’s part of my job… to make some of that make sense” (Interview CXC-
S1). 
It is the language of Scottish Policy discursive value framings presented in section 4.2 
that scientists are being asked to speak. 
5.3.4 Affectual strategies  
As well as verbal and written discursive frameworks, the CXC secretariat emphasized in 
both presentations and the participatory exercise, the importance of simulating a visceral 
experience of policy making:  
“The founding kind of thought is, is understanding the policy team's 
requirements, their needs, and the way in which that the way in 
which they work, so not just the policy problem that they're 
grappling with, but also how they work, what pressures they're 
under in terms of their external stakeholders, or relations with 
Westminster, or whatever it might be… to try and step into their 
shoes” (Interview CXC-S3). 
 
Presentations further gave a humanised account of policy makers, from Ministers to 
stakeholders and lobbyists to delivery agents, who all have feelings, whose jobs are often 
on the line and who were subject to intense pressures (RN: CXC-PAW1). The secretariat 
stressed both - “policy starts and ends with people” and the importance of starting ‘from 
where people are’ (RN: CXC-PAW1). Connecting with the audience in a visceral and 
interpersonal sense both brings the audience into view in a sympathetic way, building 
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interpersonal identification, and encouraged acceptance of the frameworks within which 
policymakers work. The emphasis on visceral experience is a strategy employed to bring 
home and internalize the view of the world that the policy maker faces.    
The CXC secretariat expressed a strong feeling that it is scientists who need more 
awareness of the demands of policy and need to reach out to policy, not vice-versa 
(Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-D1). Secondments of scientists into policy placements within 
the Scottish Government are being encouraged to raise understanding and empathy of 
policy needs – “once they see that, they better understand what it is that they need to 
produce” (Interview CXC-D1). Emphasis on secondments probably reflects the personal 
experiences of the former RESAS chief scientific advisor and the CXC policy director who, 
having both trained as scientists and moved into policy roles, experienced differences 
through immersion. Such encounters between scientists and policy makers directly were 
nevertheless managed with some caution in order to protect/construct CXC’s 
organisational reputation with policy (Interview CXC-S3) and avoid repeating previous 
bad experiences had by policy officials during interacting with scientists (Interviews: SG2, 
CXC-D1). This careful management acknowledges that understanding between two 
communities is built gradually over time as one scientist with extensive policy experience 
suggested – prolonged interaction is needed to allow “the common language, common 
objectives common goals” (Interview CXC-R11) to develop.  
This interpersonal approach was also presented as central to building a strong 
relationship of trust between the CXC secretariat and the policy teams to help stimulate 
call-down requests, by helping policy teams become aware of what CXC can provide 
(Interview CXC-S3), ensuring policy problems are well understood (Interviews: CXC-D1, 
S3) and build trust through good working relationships (Interview CXC-D1). It was 
suggested this establishment of trust is central to CXC’s success and reputation (both in 
terms of being turned to and listened to). This emphasises on visceral experience, 
emotional connection and trust understands discursive practices beyond written and 
spoken text and instead as more widely embodied in practice.  
Policy Awareness Workshops and policy secondments were one among several ways of 
building discursive familiarity among those performing translation of science for policy, 
and naturalizing the framework through which meaning is constructed.  This can be 
understood as the interactional expertise – the “tacit components of a strange language” 
(Collins, 2007: 12) – which when  internalised complement the development of boundary 
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objects. These workshops serve as processes through which concerns of non-scientists 
become integrated as concerns of scientists (Star and Griesemer, 1989). Through 
understanding the visceral pressures and demands on policy makers as well as their 
systems of meaning, discursive value framings and motivations, the discursive value 
framings of policy becomes a lens through which translation takes place. Translation as a 
process draws on lay understandings of the term with their emphasis on audience to 
prioritise discursive value frameworks of policy in knowledge circulation. In these 
processes of translation the audience is always that of policy.  
5.3.5 Summarising the Policy Awareness Workshops: the scope for 
encouraging/discouraging policy challenge? 
Each of the CXC Policy Awareness Workshops opened with the quotation from Bismark 
“politics is the art of the possible” (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3). 
However, it was only slowly during the period of research that what was first interpreted 
as an open expansive horizon of possibility, dawned on me to be a narrowing of 
understanding of the possible – to considerations within existing policy frameworks. 
While interpreting the implications of scientific information for policy, and making 
suggestions for action were often encouraged (Interview SG2; RN: CXC-PAW 1, RN: CXC-
PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3), suggestions for action within existing policy framings were 
favoured. In response to CXC emphasis on developing the ‘best possible option’ within 
policy frameworks (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2, RN: CXC-PAW3) debate erupted at 
two Policy Awareness workshops in particular over whether scientists should focus on 
the ‘best option possible’ or the ‘best possible option’ (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2). 
The ‘best option possible’ was understood as the best option for addressing climate 
change in an ideal constraint free world and the ‘best possible option’ was understood as 
the option that addressed climate change best within the limitations of the policy 
framework in which the Government Officials were operating. Some scientists, who felt 
that it was the role of science to suggest the best actions possible and for policy to be 
responsible for compromising and restricting these to the best possible actions, based on 
a justification that science was not equipped to comment on the influences outside 
science which needed to be taken into account (Interview CXC-R4). CXC staff argued that 
scientists should be providing the best option possible (RN: CXC-PAW1, RN: CXC-PAW2) 
within the framework of policy and it was suggested, “there’s not a huge amount CXC 
can do to change the structure” (RN: CXC-PAW2).  
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In response to a question about what to do if scientists think policy is wrong, the 
secretariat suggested scientists should say so, as critical friends, but with awareness that 
“if you’re already in the process, radical solutions mean going back to the beginning and 
starting again” (RN: CXC-PAW2). Instead the type of response encouraged were those 
that were not challenging to policy framings. In relation to an example of agricultural 
research and policy, the secretariat suggested: 
“They're interested in the areas where you can achieve emissions reductions 
rapidly and cheaply… there's a limited range of things that you might be able to 
tinker with, without upsetting the entire apple cart or looking at the CAP… you 
are constrained completely by what the CAP lets you do” (Interview CXC-S3). 
Further, the original CXC proposals for adaptation indicators to examine success of 
existing policies was described to have been rejected by Scottish Government as “too 
close to the knuckle, too critical of ineffectiveness of current policy teams” (RN: CXC-
AGM 2013). When another scientist asked “how do you move society to a better place 
then?” the answer given was through political voting (RN: CXC-PAW2). In this sense 
emphasis on translation involves resonating with, and being constrained by, possibilities 
for action within current policy frameworks. The need to work within policy suggests the 
circulation of particular types of climate knowledge and policy solutions. This will be 
explored in further detail in Chapter 6 through closer examination of three call-down 
examples.  
This section demonstrates the extent to which, in preparing scientists for translation, CXC 
is internalising the framings valued within policy within its practice, to help create 
‘meaning’ for a policy audience. The understanding of the logic of equivalence developed 
in sections 5.1 and 5.2, suggest these discursive value framings may be understood as 
nodal points through which the fixation of meaning occurs, generating particular forms 
of discursive articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 109,115). Nodal points work to frame 
climate change as a problem in terms of GHG, energy consumption, economic growth, 
jobs and health (Figure 5.2), advancing what suitable policy responses look like – through 
constructing chains of equivalence in policy terms, linking climate change to fiscal 
austerity, deregulation, the development of individual economic actors and cross 
partnership delivery (section 5.3.2). The strategies of the Policy Awareness workshop 
that seek to internalise these nodes of meaning of the policy audience within scientific 
researchers consciousness practice, expand claims to equivalence between the meaning 
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of scientific findings and the meaning in policy terms. Translation (understood as 
conversion) might therefore be understood as a form of hegemonic practice.  
 
5.4 Distinctiveness of Translation  
The CXC science director described translation as the latest stage in a historical transition 
between knowledge transfer, knowledge exchange and knowledge translation: 
“It’s back to KT again but the T stands for Translation ((laughing))... it’s to do 
with getting the information translated into a form that's, that's relevant for the 
policy maker…and that's different from knowledge exchange… where you… get 
the stakeholders together in a room and… the farmers say one thing and the 
foresters say another and the scientists say another and then you find the 
common ground. What we do within CXC is more translation, our customer is 
the Scottish Government, they need to know answers to specific questions and 
our job is to translate that science.... into some headline messages that can be 
acted upon” (Interview CXC-D2).  
In this description, translation is characterised as a directional process in which the policy 
audience is framed as the customer needing to be supplied with what they need. 
Translation is described as a discursive shift in Scotland, contrasted firstly to knowledge 
transfer which was seen as transferring science to policy in an ‘un-mediated form’ and 
secondly with knowledge exchange in which, in this example, common knowledge 
ground is sought between different parties. The way translation is described places policy 
very much in the driving seat and frames a private sector model of science–policy 
exchange through the reference to TSG as a customer. This section compares the 
practices termed translation within CXC with other boundary practices to explore 
whether the distinction in practices goes beyond naming. The section continues to ask 
why might a discursive shift from knowledge exchange to translation be occurring in 
narratives of policy and boundary actors through CXC. The section examines how the 
process of translation differs from other forms of boundary work by comparing it to 
firstly to the brokerage of Sniffer and the science communication of the Met Office and 
then to processes termed co-production within CXC to explore the specificity of 
translation. 
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5.4.1 Sniffer and knowledge brokering  
Sniffer describes its boundary work as ‘brokerage’: 
“We call ourselves a knowledge broker… Sniffer is saying right so, this is what 
we know from organisations like climate change or other academics, what do 
we do… who needs to know this, who needs to do something, you know, what 
can we do, how do we do it.” (Interview CXC-S1). 
Emphasis in brokerage is more than just distilling or converting knowledge but is also on 
bringing people and knowledges together to facilitate action:  
“It’s about conveying messages between different sources of information. The 
brokering role is actually sort of almost translating it, so the bringing of 
knowledge from one source, where we know that knowledge exists, and we're 
taking it to others, but we might be translating it in the process, or we may be 
bringing different parties together… different organisations, different people, or 
even different people within the same organisations… introducing and 
facilitating of the conversations and trying to clarify what's important, what isn't 
important, what needs to be acted upon” (Interview Sniffer 1, original 
emphasis). 
In this case brokering may involve translation (understood here as a change in the 
knowledge itself) but is more about making connections to facilitate conversations as 
Meyer’s definition of brokerage suggests (2010). Where translation is focused on 
knowledge, brokerage is about bringing knowledges and people together. Sniffer also has 
a strong emphasis on the action that results from brokerage. The Managing Director 
describes Sniffer as a change maker (Interview Sniffer 1) and a “catalyst” (Interview 
Sniffer 1). Sniffer’s raison d’etre as an organisation is as a mechanism to deliver greater 
sustainability through partnership working (Interview Sniffer 1) and Sniffer’s identity has 
been built around a commitment to generating action on sustainability (increasingly 
community resilience) that is increasing not decreasing over time –  “a move along the 
continuum from what we used to do, which is commission research to what we want to 
be, which is sort of making change happen” (Interview Sniffer 1). This is unlike literature 
definitions of brokerage which, at most point to strengthening the use of science (Bielak 
et al., 2008: 203). Bracken and Oughton suggest political involvement in action is not the 
typical role of the broker, but more the knowledge intermediary (2013), suggesting 
Sniffer occupies a dual role. 
Sniffer constructs an official narrative of neutrality through its independence from both 
science and policy. Rather than being a member of both communities (like a translator), 
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Sniffer is a member of neither community – again embodying the model of a knowledge 
intermediary, suspended between two communities (Guston, 2001). Sniffer balances 
commitment to taking action on the basis of scientific findings by not specifying what 
those actions should be. Instead, such actions are defined by the communities 
themselves through working in partnership (Interview Sniffer 1). In this way Sniffer is not 
challenging or converting but supporting, facilitating and enabling those who are already 
committed to action: 
“We are not really doing something terribly controversial, so we are not trying 
to get them to change their opinion… we are not telling them that they have to 
do something that they wouldn't have done otherwise” (Interview Sniffer 1). 
It was suggested that “Sniffer is a very um friendly organisation… we build alliances of 
the willing… who’s inside the tent… how can we um support, enable, facilitate” 
(Interview Sniffer 2). The practitioner audience is important for Sniffer, but the relation 
with that audience is of exploring together rather than meeting a customer demand.  
Nevertheless, Sniffer holds an active role in competing to establish discursive meaning – 
through suggesting what sustainability or the low carbon economy mean and knitting 
these two discourses together (Interview Sniffer 2) or populating the First Minister’s 
vision of what a better Scotland looks like (Interview Sniffer 1). Sniffer organized a 
conference on Climate Justice (with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation) hosted by the 
Scottish Government in November 2012. This profiled the need for climate adaptation to 
be socially just adaptation (RN: Sniffer-CJ). While this claim for meaning can also be seen 
to utilize an expansion of a logic of equivalence, it is Sniffer’s discursive value framings of 
meaning that are claiming dominance. Through staking claim to discursive meaning 
Sniffer performs brokerage in ways that lubricate channels for science, policy business 
and civic interaction that further the discursive value framings to which Sniffer has 
expressed commitment. Through encouraging and supporting those practitioners who 
also identify with these framings, Sniffer enables the development of political collectives 
and enables particular counter hegemonic debates to be staged. This occurs whilst their 
third party independence enables Sniffer to construct claims to be passive, neutral and 
simply responsive to their partners’ requests. Through enabling voices of practitioners, 
who self-identify with Sniffer’s sustainability objectives – Sniffer facilitate these 
practitioners to better use science to challenge policy practice, without ever becoming a 
challenging organisation itself. 
In maintaining a clear boundary with science – speaking forwards from a received 
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platform of science, without being science – Sniffer is also able to focus on what is done 
with science without challenging scientific practice. This enables a greater focus on 
action and greater latitude in the languages chosen, which would not necessarily be 
considered legitimate within the scientific community, such as framing climate change in 
terms of weather (Interview Sniffer 1). It also means that, for Sniffer, the emphasis for 
change has historically been focussed on changing policy not changing science: 
“We probably do more to take the techie language into plain English. Whereas 
there are probably things that could be geared the other way. I don't think we 
do much that way, of trying to convince scientists of why there are other ways 
of framing it… I think we tend to take, the words almost as gospel from 
scientists, and put them into a language we think would be suitable for other 
audiences” (Interview Sniffer 1). 
In contrast to CXC, there has been little incentive for Sniffer to push the challenge back 
towards these scientists. In this respect the boundary of science is safe in Sniffer’s hands.  
In summary Sniffer provides a very different role to CXC. Sniffer constructs the boundary 
between science and policy in ways that allow a degree of what Pielke has described as 
stealth advocacy (2007) or what might be considered expansion of claims to equivalence 
in meaning to form counter hegemonic claims. The focus for challenge is on policy 
practice not scientific practice and the anchor for meaning is the discursive value 
framings of the broker, which the self-selecting audience share. 
5.4.2 Met Office and communicating science 
A second model of science–policy interaction with which translation might be compared 
is the science communication of the Met Office. Here boundary work is described as 
‘communicating science’: 
“… its about keeping the level of science right… so that people don't get false 
messages… there are an awful lot of problems… when you put a message out it 
can be misread and misinterpreted quite easily, so it’s about keeping that in 
balance all the time so part of my task is with civic Scotland with the broader 
Scottish electorate and organisations effectively is to keep them on the right 
track” (Interview Met Office, original emphasis). 
This model of science communication echoes the process that some natural scientists 
within CXC understand by translation. There is a sense of science acting as a check and a 
balance against misinformation or runaway politics. The scope of engagement here is 
broader than that of CXC, with invitations to speak at a broad range of civic events as 
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well as more formal interaction with Ministers through the Scottish Parliamentary 
Committees and Civil Servants and Government Agency staff (Interview Met Office). 
Communicating science is seen to be the provision of information upon which politicians 
and civic Scotland can and should, base their thinking (Interview Met Office). Getting 
people to think for themselves was a recurrent phrase during the interview: 
“I don’t try and brow beat people at all but saying these are the kinds of 
information available…ensuring that the kind of information is there for them to 
let them do their own kind of thinking” (Interview Met Office). 
Science, in this model becomes a baseline for politics. There is a clear boundary around 
science that stops short of decision-making – “we don't make policy decisions” (Interview 
Met Office). Yet, through the provision of science, particular forms of response are 
staged. One example emphasises individual action (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
7), another is the way in which certain political responses become naturalised in 
responses to the science presented: 
“I'm just a meteorologist I'm not a politician in that sense. But if people think 
about it for themselves some of the answers that actually fall out are quite 
obvious, I mean you need to reduce the amount of energy that you use, um, you 
need to use more local stuff you need to travel less in your own motor car” 
(Interview Met Office). 
In this task, like Sniffer and CXC, the importance of tailoring messages to the interests of 
the audience is of paramount importance (Met Office) and focus is on the salience of 
science to the audience. For example, differences in the information provided to the Eco 
Churches of All Ireland compared to the Scottish Parliamentary Committees were 
described: 
“What they were looking for was generalities, they were looking for reasons to 
change, moral reasons… so we were looking at global impacts of climate 
change, but when you go talk to committees they’re much more interested in 
the local impacts” (Interview Met Office). 
This tailoring involves ‘filtering’ and ‘zooming in’ on relevant portions of interest, but in 
science communication, the science does not, at least formally, have to convert meaning 
to align with dominant policy positions.  
Whilst the opportunity to influence policy development is constrained by the prevailing 
political appetite, the established authority of the Met Office as a scientific institution 
allows communication of ‘the scientific message’ to continue regardless of prevailing 
political values. A comparison of Scotland and Northern Ireland illustrates this: 
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“Scotland's been fairly straightforward in the sense that the previous 
administration was committed… The decision had been made… Northern 
Ireland is very different… the previous two …environment Ministers were 
sceptical to say the least… Nevertheless we are there to provide them with the 
science, we have briefed cross party groups… the new Minister is keener… and… 
minded to introduce a climate change act in 2014… to that end um myself and 
the head of Hadley Centre will be over in Northern Ireland the week after next… 
talking to the committee and then we'll be talking to the Ministers at the 
beginning of December” (Interview Met Office, emphasis added). 
Separation of science from policy enables the on-going communication of science 
regardless of prevailing political values, but for that voice to influence policy 
development science is dependent on awaiting resonance with policy discursive value 
framings. The Met Office is (apparently neutrally) simply continuing to provide the 
science until a window of opportunity opens up. However, when such a window of 
opportunity arrives, the Met Office and the Hadley Centre ensure they are in the right 
place at the right time to influence emerging policy. In science communication, like 
brokerage, there is a clear boundary constructed around science. This enables science 
communication, unlike translation, to not directly depend on policy discourses. This is set 
within the caveat that science is never independent of, or disconnected from such policy 
discourses and science is indirectly and directly made responsive to policy goals through 
funding (Braun, 1998) or regulation (Jasanoff, 1987; Burawoy, 2011). Science 
communication, like brokerage is speaking on from science without challenging or trying 
to change scientific practice. Translation pushes back on science whilst science 
communication protects the scientific community from involvement in political debates. 
5.4.3 Co-production through facilitated conversations: CXC’s Woodlands 
Adaptation Workshop 
As well as translation, CXC uses the language of co-production. Co-production tends to 
be used in relation to medium term planned work in relation to a policy goal, for 
example, the publication of the Scottish Climate Change Adaptation Programme or 
facilitating thematic conversations around particular issues. Two facilitated 
conversations were staged during the time of research in the form of CXC hosted 
workshops – one on Communicating Uncertainty and another on Woodland Adaptation. 
These were hosted by CXC and offered the opportunity for scientists and policy officials 
to meet together to discuss and debate a thematic issue (Interview CXC-S3). The desire 
for face-to-face exchange between scientists and policy makers was frequently 
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expressed by CXC researchers (Interviews: CXC-R5, CXC-R4; RN: CXC-PAW2). The 
Woodlands Adaptation and Uncertainty Workshops may have been an attempt to 
develop a safe space for such face-to-face interaction to take place in a carefully 
managed way that minimised risk to organisational reputation. Whilst CXC secretariat 
took a backseat role during the workshops, the workshop format itself served as a 
mediator and was a carefully engineered space for interaction. With its back seat role, 
CXC as an organization were able to retain their own value-neutral status through simply 
staging the voices of others (a strategy that is discussed more in Chapter 7). 
These co-productive forums enabled policy makers and scientists to enquire and respond 
to each other directly. The Woodland Adaptation workshop enabled a vigorous debate 
around different ways of valuing trees.  This was made possible by bringing together a 
diverse set of voices to facilitate debate and interaction. The process was underpinned 
by understanding of a fair process of engagement and exchange, and a respect for 
diversity of values (Cash et al., 2002). The session, described by the CXC secretariat as 
generating really interesting dialogue between science and policy (Interview CXC-S3), 
allowed what might be described as agonistic debate over different value positions 
(Mouffe, 2005b). Central to the debate was recognition of the legitimacy of these 
different actors to hold differing value positions, such that whilst consensus around how 
management of trees should respond to climate change was never reached, and areas of 
conflict were unresolved, the validity of different valuations of trees were recognised. In 
the Woodland Adaptation workshop there were many translators all marshalling the 
right to speak on behalf of particular entities (Callon, 1986). Amongst this collection of 
voices, exchange was based on sharing discursive renditions, response and dialogue 
(Beals, 2014). Differences were retained and different perspectives valued even where 
participants did not agree. In many ways this contrasted with the Policy Awareness 
Workshops described in section 5.3.2 where differences in values were not open for 
debate. While the WAW demonstrated the legitimation of a plurality of values, it is 
important not to be blind to the inequalities of discursive participation and to recognise 
the unequal operation of power in a workshop space like this. Further, CXC’s usage of the 
concept of co-production appears to relate to that proposed by Ostrom within 
organisational literatures (Ostrom, 1996: 1073), which refers to the involvement of users 
in the provision of services rather than Jasanoff’s ontological notion of the co-production 
of science and social order (Jasanoff, 2004). 
When the workshop report was produced (by the CXC secretariat together with two 
170 
 
policy actors from the session), it streamlined these diverse and varied positions into a 
coherent narrative that spoke to current policy framings around ecosystems services. 
Differences in values discussed were acknowledged only through reference to trade-offs 
between different ecosystems services. For Callon “to translate is also to express in one’s 
own language what others say and want” (1986: 18). The agonistic debate of the 
discussion became ‘translated’ into an account that aligned it with the dominant policy 
discourses. This closure, to allow progression of the ideas discussed involved little debate 
in how such closure was achieved, rather ‘ecosystems services’ as the prevailing policy 
framework and nodal point, was naturalised as the necessary discursive framing. In this 
sense, in the translation of agonistic discussion into a report format, discursive alignment 
to policy goals was a form of hegemonic practice that traded usability by policy for the 
flattening value plurality. The translation process re-established an obligatory passing 
point for knowledge and a claim for dominance in meaning in which only those who are 
speaking in unison are heard (Callon, 1986: 18). This performance of agonistic debate 
followed by translation into a neoliberal framing of ‘ecosystems services’ could be seen 
as a neoliberal device of pacification, however this implies intentionality around the 
politics of this act, which is much less clear. Alternatively, the exclusion of difference can 
be seen with less intentionality as the overwriting of differences retained during debate 
through practices of translation that narrow meaning into dominant policy terms and 
excluding differences in meaning claims. In characterising plurality and the inability to 
represent difference in any such instances of summing up, Law describes: 
“if unassimilability is characteristic of the world that is described there can be 
no question of drawing things together in the description, of summing them up. 
Instead there will be lots of stories, different stories, stories that are orthogonal 
to one another, that cannot be told together. In which case...? In which case... I 
do not know” (Law, 2007: online). 
Mouffe suggests that any drawing together into a consensus position involves exclusion 
(Mouffe, 2000: 17). Law’s expression of the inability to account for this exclusion both 
signals the difficulties CXC face in making knowledge useful to policy without generating 
some form of exclusion, and the difficulty of STS approaches in capturing the politics 
involved when meanings are claimed through nodal points that enable hegemonic 
meanings to extend their claim to power.  
5.4.4 What does translation do differently? 
CXC, Sniffer and the Met Office all perform boundary work between science and non-
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science in different ways. Translation, brokerage, science communication and co-
production, are all processes through which meaning for scientific knowledge in non-
scientific domains is sought. However, there are a number of important differences 
involved in understanding the process of exchange as translation, over brokerage, 
science communication or co-production (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Key differences between the processes of translation, knowledge brokerage, 
science communication and co-production from the empirical examples studied. 
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All the modes of exchange discussed differ from each other in a variety of ways – 
translation does not stand alone in contrast to the other three. Instead each model of 
interaction enables and restricts different types of relationships with knowledge. All 
modes maintain some boundary between science and policy for legitimation of scientific 
knowledge and constructing neutrality for boundary work (although in each case this is 
claimed differently; see Table 5.1). In this chapter translation is the focus of attention, 
however, co-production and translation (both used by CXC) share a weaker boundary 
between science and policy, foregrounding importance of knowledge user concerns and 
discursive value framings, pushing a challenge back on science to work differently, 
reducing / dissolving a boundary between science and policy practices and re-allocating 
some responsibility to scientists for knowledge communication success and decision 
making. Both contrast with science communication where responsibility for using 
scientific knowledge is distanced from the act of communicating. Together forming CXC’s 
practice, translation and co-production demonstrates changes in the science–policy 
relationship, but translation and co-production also have marked differences between 
them in the process they facilitate.  
Firstly, translation asks scientists to frame knowledge in policy audience terms for 
communication to be successful. As Hoppe suggests the kind of statements deemed 
tenable depend on the standards and values of the targeted audience (Hoppe, 2010: 
110). Translation explicitly constructs meaning for knowledge through alignment with 
the discursive value framings of policy. This contrasts with science communication where 
meaning for knowledge is constructed in scientific terms, and to brokerage where, at 
least in the case of Sniffer, the brokers own discursive value framings remain an anchor 
for meaning around which practitioner collectives are invited to gather. In co-production, 
knowledge is a product of both science and policy communities involved, and the 
predominance of one or the other is, at least officially, not known in advance. With 
translation, science is on tap not on top, as Laski famously suggested (cited in Richter, 
2009: 13). Although the funding and structuring of science beyond translation mode 
means that science has never been insulated from the value framings of policy, 
translation explicitly demands construction of meaning in policy terms, and builds this 
into the condition for future funding. 
Secondly, translation and science communication focus on mobilising knowledge only, 
whereas co-production and brokerage focus on bringing people as well as knowledges 
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together. As the co-production example of the Woodland Adaptation Workshop 
demonstrates, this bringing together of people holds potential for agonistic debates to 
occur. Whilst such co-productive and brokerage encounters by no means achieve 
Habermasian ideal discourses, they at least provide forums through which alternative 
voices have the potential to enter into discursive struggles. Translation then established 
an obligatory passage point for knowledge in which differences are collapsed and written 
out in the process of constructing meaning within a dominant discursive framework. 
However, co-production is no simple solution with Lövbrand (2011) highlighting similar 
concerns over balancing policy responsiveness and policy critique in co-production. 
In this comparison, the question is whether Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of extending the 
logic of equivalence applies equally to knowledge brokerage, science communication or 
co-production, or only to translation? In the case of science communication, meaning for 
knowledge is set according to the frameworks of science – whilst this is a political claim 
to meaning there is no extension claimed. In co-production, meaning is officially not set 
in advance of the co-productive practice. Whilst the dynamics of practice and power may 
render an extension of claims to equivalence in meaning, these remain at least 
theoretically open to collaborative contestation. In the case of knowledge brokerage 
there is a complex claim to meaning that does seek to establish a claim to equivalence of 
meaning, in the brokers’ terms. This parallels the claims for meaning in translation, in the 
audience’s terms. Whilst both processes could be seen as a claim to the extension of a 
logic of equivalence, the relations of power in this specific case suggest that knowledge 
brokerage is part of a counter-hegemonic claim, whereas translation is part of a 
hegemonic claim. This suggests Laclau and Mouffe’s approach does capture the 
specificity of translation as a form of hegemonic practice. 
 
5.5 Understanding boundary work as translation 
This chapter has explored the use and discursive power of the term ‘translation’ within 
CXC. The centrality of the concept of translation to CXC’s practice was discussed in 
section 5.2, including for whom the description of translation is important and what the 
envisaged process involves. CXC draw upon the concept of translation, and its colloquial 
emphasis on producing meaning for a new audience, to encourage its research scientists 
to tailor research findings to the policy goals and frameworks of meaning of the Scottish 
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Government. Emphasis on translation within CXC creates a model of science–policy 
interaction that posits policy in the driving seat by encouraging knowledge generation to 
speak to policy concerns, placing greater responsibility on science to make science work 
within policy settings, and constructing meaning for knowledge through the discursive 
frameworks of policy. While different understandings of translation as a process by 
natural scientists (as filtration not conversion) potentially reduce the effectiveness of the 
term as a discursive strategy, overall, the need to serve policy as CXC’s ‘customer’ is 
clear. Understanding translation as expanding a logic of equivalence between the 
discursive value framings of scientific knowledge and the discursive value framings of 
policy, as a way of asserting what responding to climate change means, helps to 
understand the dynamics of power involved in the way that claims to meaning are 
constructed through boundary work. In section 5.3, the Policy Awareness Workshops 
were presented as one way in which the discursive value framings of policy are made 
central to CXC’s practice, and through which claims to meaning in policy terms are 
encouraged in preparation for translation work. Comparison of translation practices to 
knowledge brokering by Sniffer, science communication by the Met office and co-
production by CXC in Section 5.4 enabled translation to be understood as a particular 
form of boundary work that embodies a particular knowledge politics. While STS theories 
of translation take us so far in understanding the processes and politics of boundary 
working in general, they do not account for the specificity of the way in which translation 
is being deployed within CXC. In this concluding section the advantages that STS and 
Mouffe’s approach each bring are presented. 
STS accounts of translation firstly draw attention to translation as an on-going process 
(Callon, 1986: 19), the shuttling back and forth (Latour, 1993) that does the work of 
difference (Law, 2007). This highlights the role of boundary work in bringing science and 
policy as domains into being (Guston, 2001) – as Callon describes: “Translation is the 
mechanism by which the social and natural worlds progressively take form” (1986: 19). 
This is important not only in understanding the contingent constitution of the science–
policy boundary (as discussed in Chapter 4) but also in emphasising outcomes of 
translation as the result of particular achievements, struggles and politics. Secondly, Law 
describes the way in which knowledge itself, as much as the target domain is changed in 
the process of translation (Law, 2007). For Callon “the notion of translation emphasises 
the continuity of the displacements and transformations which occur” (1986: 18). The 
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emphasis on partial unstable connections of meaning (Law, 2007) dissonance (Callon, 
1986) and trahision (Law, 2007) allow recognition of both the way in which boundary 
work involves contingent changes in meaning, and also conceals and manages conflict in 
meaning (Star and Griesemer, 1989) – exemplified by the description of the low carbon 
economy as a Pandora’s Box holding different meanings for different people (Interview 
CXC-S1; see also Hajer, 1995). Thirdly, STS narratives of translation explicitly draw 
attention to the politics involved in claiming the voice of translator – securing an 
obligatory passage point to dominate meaning, establish oneself as a spokesman and 
collapse difference so that “only voices speaking in unison will be heard” (Callon, 1986: 
18). In this sense STS accounts signpost translation as a practice through which 
provisional closure is rendered. In these accounts, translation is neither a neutral act 
(Callon, 1986; Law, 2007) nor a simple linear model, but rather a complex process 
through which claims to power are established that bring the world into being in 
particular ways.  
However, in the Scottish empirical case, STS notions of translation might as easily be 
applied interpretively to account for all four forms of boundary work studied – 
translation, co-production, science communication and brokerage. STS accounts do not 
account for whose meanings predominate, implying only that the translator decides. 
Callon’s emphasis on particular figures as obligatory passage points could equally apply 
to the broker or the science communicator. All three organisations claim positions as 
spokesperson for science, for their own organisational longevity and authority. STS 
accounts of translation take us so far in understanding the boundary work of CXC but do 
not account for the distinctiveness and politics of the boundary work being undertaken 
by CXC in prioritizing the policy audience. Instead, understanding translation in terms of 
the expansion of logics of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and as a discursive tool 
of hegemonic practice that reproduces policy discursive value framings, better helps to 
understand the privileging of policy framings without relying on notions of violence 
against an essential original meaning (Venuti, 2008). Laclau and Mouffe’s account offers 
both an anti-essentialised account of similarity and difference, and one that attends to 
the operations of hegemonic power missing in STS accounts. This brings two 
contributions to a study of CXC translation. 
First, in making knowledge meaningful for the audience translation can be understood as 
a process of building equivalence between scientific knowledge and policy goals– a 
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staking of claim to meaning that expands and reproduces hegemonic meanings, and can 
therefore be understood as a practice of hegemony. Claims to equivalence in meaning 
are constructed through nodal points which temporarily fix meaning (Mouﬀe, 1993: 
114). In the example of the CXC Woodland Adaptation Workshop it is possible to 
understand the discourse of ecosystems services as a nodal point in the rendering of 
juxtaposed difference and agonistic debate (during co-production) into a narrative that 
collapses these differences into alignment with policy goals (through translation). 
Translation collapses differences, generates exclusions and implicates CXC in the closing 
down of political questions around possible policy responses. Mouffe suggests that 
different discursive actors constantly attempt to dominate the discursive field through 
the use of nodal points that stake claim to meaning in particular ways (Mouﬀe, 1993: 
114). Claims to meaning staked through nodal points can be seen in Sniffer’s often more 
subtle attempts for discursive influence as well as through translation. However in the 
case of CXC translation, a combination of the relations of power and location of an 
anchor for meaning within policy, enable CXC translation to be understood as part of a 
hegemonic claim and Sniffer’s work to be part of a counter hegemonic claim. For Mouffe 
such (hegemonic) “power is constructed in a pragmatic way… through the opposed logics 
of equivalence and difference; power is never foundational” (1985: 142).  
Secondly, claims for equivalence are constructed, not through identification of 
essentialist characteristics, but through a collective adversary that becomes a 
‘constituent outside’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 127) and prevents both from realising 
their goals (as in example B in Figure 5.1). In CXC’s practice this can be seen through the 
overlooking of differences between different actors in the type of policy approach 
envisioned in the interest of developing any policy response to climate change. 
Specifically, the widely accepted need for a climate policy response among the scientific 
community is being equated with a specifically neo-liberal discursive value framing in the 
Scottish policy response in joint opposition to no policy action. Likewise, scientific claims 
to robust impartial knowledge are being equated with specific neoliberal policy proposals 
to claim robustness and impartiality for these approaches too in joint opposition to bias 
and interests, which is framed as a common opponent.  Translation is used to construct a 
claim for scientific knowledge to be understood through the dominant value framings of 
policy through opposition to a shared threat that prevents both parties from realizing 
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their goal10. It is important to stress that at this stage, the argument is not that these 
goals are being envisaged in terms of values, understood as positive identifiers, but that 
the outcome of this expansion of logics of equivalence reproduces and strengthens the 
hegemonic claim of policy discursive value framings.  
Howarth suggests that the greater the claim to equivalence, the greater the 
concentration around two antagonistic poles (Howarth, 2000: 107) and the reduction of 
possible legitimate differences in meaning. Recognizing the plurality of difference, 
legitimation of alternatives and focusing on turning relations of antagonism into 
agonism, draws in contrast from a logic of difference that expands discursive space 
(Howarth, 2000: 107). Although Mouffe’s own focus is on the specificity of democratic 
relations, developing relations of agonism may also broaden the discursive space for 
debate and therefore widen possible climate change policy responses (rather than 
presenting a few narrowly defined responses as natural and necessary). 
Examining the politics of boundary workings through logics of equivalence/logics of 
difference helps to draw attention to the politics of such boundary practices in 
constructing hegemony and counter hegemonic claims and to the way in which the 
expansion of equivalence as a hegemonic practice allows particular discursive value 
framings of knowledge to circulate over others. Discursive alignment through nodal 
points is strategic; as Hajer and Versteeg suggest, rather than reject or “resist 
environmental values… a more effective strategy for recalcitrant actors will be to cloak 
themselves in the language of environmentalism” (2005: 180). This cloaking not only 
stakes a claim for one particular interpretation of meaning but also, through Laclau and 
Mouffe’s framework, masks and excludes differences between the two discourses. 
Marginalising differences in meaning further extends the pragmatic difficulty for science 
to be critical of policy discussed in section 5.3.1. One effect of the revised relationship 
between science and policy being implemented through CXC could be a reduction of the 
scope for science to be critical of policy. In the context of the abolition of the Sustainable 
Development Commission, known to be an outspoken critical friend to both the Scottish 
Government and UK Governments (Interview CXC-S1), the CXC model of science–policy 
                                                          
10 For Mouffe it is important that equivalence is constructed through a common threat to the realisation of each party’s 
goal, rather than any shared positive identification. This is important for the goal not to be rendered in essentialist terms. 
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offers a more convenient and compliant science–policy relationship partner. Extending 
logics of equivalence play a strong role in this compliance. 
There is a perception within CXC that translation does not affect the way the science is 
done, only how it is communicated, thereby establishing a boundary between science 
and science communication (Interview CXC-S3). While there may be no intention among 
CXC secretariat that translation changes the way science is done, and certainly the focus 
of CXC is to synthesize existing research rather than generate new research, this thesis 
argues that the processes of translation shapes knowledge in terms of policy audience 
frameworks of meaning – and in doing so seeks to embed the discursive value framings 
of policy into the CXC scientific community. This occurs through the Policy Awareness 
Workshops, secondments, repeated emphasis of what is considered relevant, important 
and useful (in policy terms) and through the nodal points and claims for equivalence that 
fix meaning in terms of hegemonic policy framings. Further, increased engagement with 
policy through co-production of research knowledge may well increase the 
internalization of policy framings within future research practice, particularly as funding 
is increasingly ring-fenced for knowledge that demonstrates policy relevance and impact. 
Reflections on translation and co-production presented in this chapter suggest that these 
processes seek to lessen the boundary between science and policy, making this 
distinction between how science is done, its communication, difficult to maintain. 
Discourses of translation are useful in encouraging a science–policy relationship that is 
policy responsive.  In return for policy responsive knowledge, CXC secures a valued 
position as an obligatory passing point, and climate science secures a route through 
which scientific knowledge might influence policy. The double reading of what was 
‘possible’ at the Policy Awareness Workshops illustrated the extent to which dominant 
neoliberal policy instruments “foreclose possibilities of thinking and acting differently” 
(Tambakaki, 2014: 8). This highlights the limited ability of CXC to exert policy challenge 
through boundary work as translation. Given prolific uncritical usage of the notion of 
translation within science–policy literature (Cash et al., 2002) this chapter argues that we 
need to be attentive to Wynne’s concern about characterising science–policy exchange 
as translation (2010: 290) and to the way in which the language of translation establishes 
particular processes and expectations of science policy boundary work, less for its 
evocation of a knowledge deficit model and more for the value politics of boundary work 
that translation involves. 
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 Chapter 6.
Translation as a Process of Legitimation 
 
This chapter focuses on the call-down service as an example of CXC’s translation. Moving 
from a broad scale analysis of translation as a form of boundary work (Chapter 5), this 
chapter looks at the specific processes involved in the work of the call-down service and 
specifically at how legitimacy is constructed – for knowledge, for policy action and for 
CXC as an organization itself. In this chapter there is potential for confusion between the 
general process of translation described in STS boundary work literatures, and the 
specific form of boundary work that CXC describe as translation. Careful attempts have 
been made to differentiate these through references to ‘CXC translation’ where the 
specific process under study is being discussed. The chapter develops overall concern 
with the politics of boundary work by focusing on how legitimacy for knowledge is 
constructed through responding to call-down requests. Interest in legitimation comes 
from an interest in which knowledges are enabled to circulate through CXC’s translation 
as a boundary process. Thinking about what types of knowledge, and in turn, what types 
of policy responses are becoming legitimated through the process of translation, is 
particularly relevant given the theoretical connections between legitimation and 
hegemonic power (Chapter 2) and the empirical emphasis on policy meanings during 
CXC’s translation work (Chapter 5). 
The chapter is concerned less with what legitimacy is, and more with the processes 
through which legitimacy is constructed. To this end the chapter starts from the 
observation that at the CXC AGM 2013 successful translation was being defined explicitly 
in terms of Cash et al.’s tripartite framework (2002: 1) of credibility, salience and 
legitimacy (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). Yet, of Cash et al.’s three attributes, legitimation 
appeared least obviously understood. The credibility of CXC research findings appeared 
to be largely accepted by policy teams (RN: CXC-AGM 2013) and during an interview with 
the knowledge manager it was suggested “to a certain extent the policy team is really 
only interested in the output… provided that they are given comfort that the researchers 
are approaching the problem in a robust, and scientifically… an independent and neutral 
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way and using scientific methods… they implicitly assume that peer review and all that 
kind of thing goes on in the background” (Interview CXC-S3). Similarly, although 
questions of salience were of utmost importance in everyday operations, and central to 
the establishment of CXC, the design of the call-down service itself as a responsive 
service supports the generation of salient knowledge. While salience is still not 
guaranteed – and much work was going into “a massive cultural shift” (Interview CXC-D1) 
within CXC to ensure responses to call-downs are both timely and relevant – the way in 
which knowledge achieves legitimacy is much less immediately clear. Discussions of 
legitimation at CXC’s AGM 2013 provoked some debate about what legitimacy entailed, 
with suggestions that legitimacy had its reference point not just with the source of 
information (science) but also in policymaking terms (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). This raises 
questions about how CXC knowledge constructs legitimacy for knowledge through its 
work. 
The empirical analysis is structured around three call-down examples that were profiled 
by CXC and the Scottish Government as either successes or failures of CXC’s translation. 
Detailed examination of the processes of each occurred through textual analysis of the 
Scottish Government request, the final and draft call-down responses, Scottish 
Government feedback on the process, and CXC’s own presentation and evaluation of the 
cases at their AGM 2013, as well as interviews with key actors involved. These have been 
used to identify factors important to perceived success and to explore how legitimacy for 
knowledge is constructed. An argument is made that both aligning knowledge with/ 
reproducing dominant discursive value framings was a clear factor in the legitimation of 
knowledge, and was important in both instances of successful CXC translation. As a 
result, CXC translation can be seen to lubricate and facilitate the flow of particular forms 
of knowledge. Attention is drawn to the type and contingency of knowledge enabled to 
circulate, and in doing so to the political functioning of boundary work. The chapter 
begins with further theoretical clarification over the concept of legitimacy. 
  
6.1 Multiple forms of legitimacy  
Legitimacy is a highly diverse concept that is “rarely defined” (Lister, 2003: 176; Kronsell 
and Bäckstrand, 2010), with multiple meanings and “surprisingly fragile conceptual 
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moorings” (Suchman, 1995). In political theory, theories of legitimacy are often 
organised into descriptive vs. normative approaches. Weber’s descriptive approach 
bases legitimacy in the belief of something as legitimate. He suggests that people 
construct ideas of legitimacy in relation to characteristics influencing the acceptance of 
domination – traditional, charismatic and legal-rational (Weber 1956, cited in Lister, 
2003). In this approach Lister, who provides a helpful review, suggests legitimacy is based 
on conformity with regulatory institutions, rules and laws, cognitive structures and 
normative values (Scott 1995, cited in Lister, 2003: 179), legal compliance (Edwards, 
1999), accountability (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Saxby, 1996, cited in Lister, 2003) or 
even acknowledgement by others as legitimate (Friedrich, 1974, cited in Stillman, 1974). 
Other political theorists have adopted a more normative approach, which involve clear 
designations of right and wrong. Normative groundings can be distinguished according to 
both the input and output sides (Scharpf, 1998). Input side legitimacy is concerned with 
factors such as the degree of participation, notions of justice and democratic values 
(Rawls, 1995), representativeness (Eade, 1997; Hudson, 2000, cited in Lister, 2003) and 
consistency between “professed mission (values) and actual behaviour” (Lister, 2003: 
177-178). Output side legitimacy focuses on the effectiveness of outcomes in relation to 
audience interests (Suchman, 1995). Many approaches mix descriptive and normative 
approaches (Fabienne, 2014) and Beetham suggests this diversity demonstrates that 
legitimacy is multidimensional (Beetham, 2013).  
Approaches to legitimacy within science policy studies also show this divide between 
normative and descriptive approaches (though often contesting Weber’s narrow focus 
on domination). STS often appeals to normative ideas of input legitimacy both of 
knowledge and processes through emphasis on civic participation and consensus (section 
2.4), while argumentative theories instead tend towards descriptive understandings, not 
grounded in right and wrong but in conformity to contingent discourses. Chantal 
Mouffe’s approach to legitimacy shares the descriptive approach – making legitimacy 
contingent in relation to hegemony. Recent attention to knowledge legitimacy within 
science–policy often follows Cash et al.’s credibility saliency legitimacy framework (2002; 
2003) that defines knowledge legitimacy through the input conditions of an unbiased 
process, procedural fairness and consideration of “values, interests, concerns, and 
specific circumstances from multiple perspectives” (Cash et al., 2002: 5). Section 2.4 
developed a critique of Cash et al.’s naturalization of policy as a reference point for the 
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judgment of legitimacy, and their implication that if a ‘fair’ process that considers values 
and interests is undergone, legitimacy is somehow automatically secured and not 
therefore an achievement or outcome of struggles through power. This leaves reasons 
why some values are able to predominate over others unaccounted for, and takes an 
uncritical approach to the setting of terms of how, why and in whose interests they come 
to matter (Backstrand, 2003: 27; Lister, 2003: 178). Respecting value differences in the 
absence of attention to workings of hegemonic power appears oxymoronic. It is precisely 
Hajer’s discursively constrained fields of action that Cash et al. naturalize and take for 
granted (Hajer, 1995: 275).    
Jordan et al. (2015: 83) call for science–policy scholars to “move beyond broad brush 
explanations of selection and adoption couched in Cash et al.’s (2002) terms of 
‘credibility saliency and legitimacy’”. Similarly, Jasanoff (2009), Lovbrand et al. (2011) and 
Goeminne (2012) have all called for STS to think further about the models of legitimacy 
being employed. This chapter seeks to respond to such calls by favouring descriptive 
approaches to thinking about how legitimacy is constructed with a critical approach to 
the relationship between legitimacy and power. Argumentative policy analysis 
approaches foreground the discursive constitution of legitimacy (Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 
1994) and signal the fitting of knowledge into existing framings to render it meaningful 
(Litfin, 1994: 15; Rein and Shon, 1993; Lister, 2003: 188; Hajer, 1993; Hajer, 1995). 
However, in attending to other forms of discursive power Hajer gives little attention to 
the relations between legitimacy and hegemonic power and takes the hegemonic claim 
for totality at its word (section 2.4).  
If reproduction of dominant relations is not to be inevitable, then greater attention to 
thinking about the relations between hegemony and processes of legitimation is 
required to highlight its contingency, to denaturalise it, and to examine processes of 
legitimation through which particular claims to legitimacy become stabilised. Mouffe’s 
thinking about legitimacy specifically builds on argumentative policy approaches to 
discursive construction of legitimacy, but with clearer conceptualization of the 
relationship between legitimation and hegemonic power. Emphasising no unbridgeable 
divide between legitimacy and power (2000: 14) means that legitimacy is always thought 
through a relationship with hegemonic power (section 2.6.3). Further, her refusal to 
ground legitimacy through any reference point outside of discourse draws attention to 
why normative references for legitimacy are unsatisfactory. Grounding legitimacy in 
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rationality or in any particular input/output normative goals generates legitimation 
through essentialist appeals to right and wrong. These are non-negotiable, and therefore 
boundaries of legitimacy cannot be considered political, or contestable. Mouffe argues 
that designations of legitimacy are always political decisions and therefore should remain 
open to contestation (Mouffe, 2005b). This approach to legitimacy complements that 
within argumentative theories, but with greater attention to hegemonic power and to 
why these grounds for legitimation cannot be essential. It also responds directly to 
critiques of normative approaches to legitimacy within STS.  
Before leaving STS approaches, there are two further ways of thinking about legitimacy 
within STS that draw more from descriptive approaches and form a central point of 
discussion in this chapter. Firstly, Star and Greisemer’s emphasis that accountability for 
boundary objects is required on both sides of the boundary prompts questions over the 
equality of influence being exerted by each domain over the construction of legitimate 
knowledge (Star and Griesemer, 1989; see also Guston, 2001; Miller, 2001a). Secondly, 
Jasanoff’s emphasis on legitimacy as a context – specific process of construction though 
boundary work (1990; 2005) is an important foundation that this chapter builds upon to 
examine how boundary work as a process of legitimation operates through the three 
empirical cases. However, boundary literatures have drawn attention to the production 
of legitimacy through separation of fact and value (Jasanoff, 2003b: 229; Owens, 2012: 
15; Jasanoff, 2003a; Litfin, 1994: 35; Irwin, 2006). As Chapter 2 suggests, understanding 
legitimacy through this separation is in crisis (Backstrand, 2003). This chapter argues that 
knowledge is becoming legitimated within CXC through the translation component of 
boundary work as much as through that of purification. In the case of CXC translation 
(with its emphasis on the policy audience) discursive value framings of policy naturalise 
particular values through connections of equivalence (Chapter 5). While separation of 
fact from value remains important in constructing legitimacy, it is suggested that both 
translation and purification are active components of legitimation at the science–policy 
boundary. This argument is made by tracing the processes of legitimation involved in the 
CXC call-down service that CXC term translation. It is suggested that descriptive 
approaches to legitimacy bring a more critical engagement with how legitimacy is being 
claimed and naturalized than Cash et al.‘s understanding of legitimacy, and therefore 
better help understand what is being legitimated when the success of translation is 
heralded. 
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6.2 The call-down Service  
The short and clear format of call-down briefings belies the complex and multifaceted 
work behind their production. The call-down service was introduced in Chapter 4 as a 
responsive service to policy and a signature of CXC’s translation work. Every stage of the 
process of producing a briefing note involves moments of re-interpretation, shaping, 
framing and sense-making – from the secretariat’s framing of the policy question in ways 
answerable by science, to the selection and construction of knowledge by the scientific 
researchers, to the subsequent reshaping and rewriting of the content and format of the 
briefing response between the CXC secretariat and the scientific researchers involved. 
Key figures within CXC secretariat and the directorate, who have tacit understanding of 
policy requirements and sufficient overview of the science, are vital to the stages of 
interactive rewriting. The policy director specifically describes the role of the secretariat 
in re-writing briefing notes in the language of translation as: 
“… pure translation; that is actually rewriting… as a briefing note that is 
meaningful so a lot of the ones you can see on the website, a lot of those 
will have been rewritten by us… so it is a process of translation" 
(Interview CXC-D1). 
 
This funnelling of exchanges through the CXC secretariat establishes the secretariat as an 
obligatory passing point (Callon, 1986), at least temporarily, in the aspiration for a more 
policy responsive science.  
The function of the briefing note varies depending on the information request, but 
usually includes some distillation of relevant scientific knowledge and some conversion 
of knowledge to the particular policy problem in question, as discussed in Chapter 5. This 
section describes three call-down requests – two of them profiled at the CXC-AGM 2013 
as successful examples by CXC staff and policy makers alike. In contrast, the third was 
presented by the CXC secretariat as a less successful example of CXC translation. Analysis 
of each case helps to understand what was considered successful or unsuccessful about 
these examples and how legitimation occurred in each case.  
6.2.1 Call-down 1: Peatlands  
The Peatlands call-down was highlighted as a success by RESAS who suggested the 
knowledge had been well received by the Scottish Government’s Natural Assets and 
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Flooding Division, and well used in the RPP2 (Interview SG2). It was also profiled by 
scientists at the CXC Uncertainty Workshop as a successful example of providing an 
answer that commented on uncertainty without weakening ‘the message’ (RN: CXC-UW). 
The work was championed at the Rural Affairs, Climate Change and Environment 
Committee on 6th Feb 2013 (The Scottish Parliament, 2013) by one of the scientists 
involved, and the CXC secretariat also profiled the example as an example of best 
practice at the 2013 AGM of CXC.  
In preparing the second Report on Policies and Proposals for carbon mitigation, the 
Scottish Government was interested in quantifying abatement potential of peat. The 
specific wording of the call-down to CXC asked for ‘expert opinion’, as described in the 
following text taken from the original call-down request (D: CXC-Peatland-CDR)11: 
1. An expert opinion on provisional ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ 
emissions factors (tCO2e ha-1) which could be used to indicate 
the GHG abatement potential of peatland restoration measures in 
Scotland, pending forthcoming reporting guidelines from the 
IPCC; together with an indication of the uncertainty involved. 
 
2. An expert opinion on the approximate area of peatland in 
Scotland, which has the potential to undergo restoration and 
achieve abatement within this range. 
 
3. An expert opinion on the nature of the profile of the abatement 
potential from restoration measures over time.  
 
In response, CXC provided a series of staged briefing notes (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). The 
scientists’ vision of success of this work drew from the credibility of the knowledge 
provided, which appeared important for scientists although was never put at stake by 
the policy team. In presenting the work, CXC used provisional language describing 
“a range of values relevant to Scottish conditions to use as indicative 
emissions factors; an initial indication of the size of the land area where 
peatland restoration measures would achieve these reductions in 
emissions; and the timeframes likely to be involved” (CXC, 2015: online, 
emphasis added) 
 
                                                          
11
 D refers to ‘Additional Documentary Sources’ consulted, as listed in Appendix A. 
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This provisionality balanced the precision required for the question to be framed in 
scientifically answerable terms, with tentativeness over quantitative values, such that 
scientists could still respond in a way that was considered robust given the limited data 
availability. Estimates of realistic restoration abatement figures were described by 
researchers as rough figures with “significant data gaps and uncertainties” in which 
researchers “had to make a number of assumptions in modelling emissions savings” (CXC 
website 2015). This preparedness of science to provide a provisional but informed 
response, gave policy rough numbers to work with (Interview SG2). Large caveats 
included in the briefing report, such as ‘indicate abatement potential’ and emphasis on 
‘expert opinion’, allows these figures to remain provisional, helping to create information 
that met policy requirements yet easing scientific fears over validity (RN: CXC-AGM 
2013). The policy team were not concerned, however, that knowledge was uncertain and 
provisional, and this was made clear to the scientists: 
“We are aware of the very wide range of results reported in published 
literature, as well as the difficulty of applying these to Scottish conditions, 
and are therefore looking for the views of ClimateXChange researchers as 
experts in GHG emissions and in peatlands” (D: CXC-Peatland-CDR). 
 
As the knowledge officer suggested policy makers are often less concerned by 
uncertainty than scientists think – “it’s not a novel thing… they are used to poor data 
sets… it’s kind of decision making under uncertainty all the time in a policy team… so 
they are fairly understanding” (Interview CXC-S3). In this specific case, the policy team 
were awaiting the IPCC supplementary guidance on a methodological approach to 
assessing abatement potential (IPCC, 2014) but due to the timing of the RPP2 Scottish 
Policy makers were looking for “indicative values… in advance of the IPCC guidance” (D: 
CXC-Peatland-CDR). In their view seeking “an expert opinion from ClimateXChange” (D: 
CXC-Peatland-CD) was one way of overcoming these temporal and spatial gaps. 
Credibility of knowledge was important for scientists but policy did not put the credibility 
of knowledge at stake, they simple wanted narrower estimates (Interview CXC-S3). Part 
of the success of the call-down was the ability to provide quantifiable figures in ways that 
accommodated the concerns of science about robustness and credibility, yet still 
provided policy with useful knowledge (RN: CXC-UW).  
But to what does useful knowledge refer? Salience of peatland knowledge was in many 
senses already configured, through the recent Durban Summit ruling in 2011 on the use 
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of carbon sinks (UNFCC, 2011) that allowed peat management to be included in national 
greenhouse gas emissions  (CXC, 2015). The fact that knowledge was being requested 
through a call-down in many senses also prefigured its salience for the Scottish 
Government. However, preparedness for scientists to respond with “guestimates and gut 
feelings” and to acclimatizing to iterative processes of refinement (RN: CXC-AGM 2013) 
was important in continuing to provide salient knowledge.  
In considering knowledge legitimacy, engagement occurred between two well-informed 
communities who already shared common expertise and a common framing for the type 
of quantitative and costing information required. It is suggested that fostering 
equivalence in these framings of reference helped to legitimate knowledge. The policy 
team requesting the call-down were government analysts (Interview CXC-S3) who 
already had strong knowledge, interest and background in peat research (Interview CXC-
D2) and simply needed more specific and measurable information (Interview CXC-S3). 
This made the type of knowledge sought a good fit for scientific response. These analyst 
were familiar with the epistemic needs of science and so respected scientists’ needs for 
framing the question in specific and measurable ways and for greater time to deliver a 
more robust answer (Interview CXC-S3). Likewise, peat is a strong existing research area 
for CXC and part of these particular researchers’ core funded research from the Scottish 
Government, meaning they were working on familiar territory with a strong empirical 
basis (Interview IUCN; RN: CXC AGM 2015).  
However, behind the immediate interaction of the call-down was a longer history of 
boundary work to align the scientific community with the content-based discursive value 
frameworks of policy (not vice-versa). As an area of strategically funded research 
(commissioned by Scottish Government with the Main Research Institutes outside of 
CXC) research on peat was also already focused around a clear policy-orientated 
management approach “to better understand the potential for peatland restoration to 
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions reduction in Scotland” (CXC, 2015: online). This 
encouraged a strong degree of similarity and synchronicity in what was being valued 
within both science and policy communities involved in the call-down, both 
epistemologically and in terms of outcomes. Further, the particular researchers involved 
were experienced in working with policy having had a long-term working relationship 
with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and providing evidence 
for the UK Biodiversity Action Plan target (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). An interview with the 
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IUCN Research Manager suggested a great deal of work had gone into developing 
alignment between this particular scientific research community and policy goals at a 
higher strategic and UK-wide level (Interview IUCN), which constructed this apparently 
naturalized compatibility. He described the way in which the IUCN, acting as a boundary 
organisation, generated a hard won pragmatic consensus within the scientific community 
through negotiation, in order that it might engage with policy more productively 
(Interview IUCN). Alignment occurred between peatland conservation aims and carbon 
abatement aims that enabled science–policy conversations to productively prioritise 
peatland restoration (Interview IUCN). This appears to be a clear and proactive case of 
establishing a discourse coalition (Hajer, 1995) through which different soil and biological 
scientific communities and policy could participate in a shared message. This work 
behind the scenes performed preparatory discursive framing that then enabled the call-
down requests to CXC to benefit and build on this existing alignment (Interview IUCN). As 
the CXC Science Director commented – both sides were framing the problem in a similar 
way (Interview CXC-D2). This involved valuing the same methodological approach of 
quantification, which provided a concrete figure for policy in terms of carbon saved, and 
enabled the question posed to science to be specific, narrowly constrained and 
measurable and so well served by ‘normal’ science despite the uncertainty involved. The 
temporary nature of the answer pending the IPCC approach may have helped alleviate 
concerns about the accuracy of these figures. 
The usefulness of knowledge to policy was therefore not incidental, but the result of long 
term boundary work and funding arrangements, and meant that information being 
provided was aligned with and not controversial or challenging to policy discursive value 
frameworks. Whilst values of (peat) conservation and quantified carbon mitigation were 
not necessarily shared across the discourse coalition (Interview IUCN)(c.f. Hajer, 1995), 
they were at least not threatened by, or threatening to, policy. As Di-Gregorio suggests, 
in order for coalitions to develop there must be some “compatibility of values” (2012: 
18). Discursive alignment meant that peatland conservation aims within the scientific 
community and the valuing of carbon sequestration by policy were able to find common 
ground in which they could both be pursued. In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms through a 
common threat to their realization (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 127), which in this case 
could be thought of as policy approaches that lead to the declining health of peat bogs. 
Whilst the content-based values of the soil and biological scientists – peat conservation 
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aims – were not lost (Star and Griesemer, 1989), they were made equivalent with this 
policy framings of meaning in ways that enabled the holding together of the discourse 
coalition as described in Chapter 5. 
Perceived legitimacy of the knowledge generated can be interpreted from the 
championing of this example as a case of good practice by all three communities, 
suggesting that legitimacy was achieved on both sides (Star and Griesemer, 1989). It is 
unlikely that science, policy and boundary communities would hold up knowledge they 
considered non-legitimate, as best practice. Within the specific CXC process, respect for 
the epistemic values of science and the pragmatic needs of policy were important 
procedural factors in the establishment of legitimate knowledge. However, in the longer 
history of boundary work, legitimacy for knowledge was produced through content-
based discursive value framings of policy, by placing a volume and cost on carbon that 
makes it governable through management (in this case peatland management to yield 
quantifiable figures of carbon savings). It is argued that it is through these boundary 
struggles that these discursive value framings of policy came to be accepted as the 
frameworks through which legitimacy for knowledge was claimed. This goes beyond 
mutual respect of value differences. Aligning knowledge with these frameworks through 
relations of power becomes one way in which scientific knowledge came to be 
legitimated. The discursive value frameworks involved were reproduced through the 
immediate interactions of the call-down process itself, not as a one off achievements by 
CXC, but through longer-term discursive alignment both through the Scottish 
Government Strategic Research Programme and IUCN.  
6.2.2 Call-down 2: MAC Curves 
A second example of a successful call-down, profiled at the CXC AGM 2013 and at the 
Uncertainty Workshop 2013 by RESAS (RN: CXC-UW), was the work on Marginal 
Abatement Cost Curves (MACCs). Like in the previous example, this call-down also relied 
heavily on a history of boundary work that aligned the scientific team with the discursive 
value framings of policy. Once again, these discursive value framings include the 
quantifying of volumes and costs of carbon to make carbon governable through 
management. In this example, aligning scientific knowledge with policy meanings 
occurred through MACC graphs – as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) – 
which then became the focus for call-down requests. Three call-down requests were 
192 
 
placed: firstly for a Scottish MACC update and policy cost effectiveness tool for the RPP2, 
secondly for a review of potential measures for RPP2 and thirdly, for a specific precision 
farming review for RPP2 (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). 
MACCs are defined as “a graph that indicates the marginal cost (the cost of the last unit) 
of emission abatement for varying amounts of emission reduction” (Ekins et al., 2011: 7). 
In simple terms, they outline a cost per volume of emissions savings for any given 
mitigation policy option. Despite strong critiques by Elkins et al. and others of the MAC 
Curve approach to decision making – based on its oversimplification, limited assessment 
of interactions and lack of transparency over uncertainty and assumptions (Ekins et al., 
2011) MAC Curves are a common approach within mitigation policy. They have a long 
history in European environmental economic modelling (see Nordhaus, 1991), and since 
the Ellerman and Decaux report (1998) have been used to assess the impacts of 
responding to the Kyoto Protocol (Klepper and Peterson, 2003). MACCs have been used 
prolifically at UK level by DEFRA and the UK Climate Change Commission (CCC), and in 
Scotland form a key part of the RPP1 and RPP2 emission reduction strategies (Interview 
CXC-R12). One of the Scottish Research Institutes had led the agricultural work on MACCs 
for CCC and DEFRA at a UK level (Interview CXC-R12). The Scottish Government had been 
made aware of this work by the CCC and wanted to make the most of this knowledge for 
Scotland given Scotland’s ‘policy gap’ between forecast emissions reductions identified 
within current policy measures and the increase in measures required to meet the 42% 
emissions reduction goal by 2020 (Interview CXC-R12). MACCs offered the Scottish 
Government a tool to prioritise cost effective emissions reductions and identify where 
further emissions reductions might be “squeezed out of sectors”, at what cost (Interview 
SG2).  
Once again, the specific CXC call-down response was able to draw on a longer history of 
boundary work that demonstrated strong prioritization of discursive value frameworks of 
policy. Like with peat, the success of the specific MACC call-down responses relied in part 
on previous alignment of science and policy approaches at UK level. As a result of the 
CCC referral, CXC researcher’s MACC work already had a degree of established 
reputational authority within Scottish policy and, like peat, interactions did not have to 
struggle for credibility, salience or legitimacy during the immediate call-down. This 
history also meant that CXC scientists were speaking from relatively confident and 
familiar territory, despite the uncertainties in estimations.  
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Credibility once again did not seem at stake for policy but was a concern for science. 
Referring to the longer history of interaction over MACCs at UK level, one CXC researcher 
involved throughout indicated that there had been difficulty in establishing legitimacy for 
the MACC approach within the agricultural science community (Interview CXC-R12). 
Although he used the term ‘legitimacy’ in his narrative, what comes across is that these 
concerns are about the robustness and validity of the knowledge produced, concerns 
more usually associated with credibility. During early stages of developing a MACC 
approach it was suggested that agricultural scientists were not keen on the MACC 
process and MAC Curves were seen to hold little benefit for science. Like much economic 
modelling, MACC calculations are highly uncertain and rely on a large number of 
assumptions and educated guesses (Interview SG2). In the early stages of designing 
MACCs, CCC were described in an interview as “woefully ((laughing)) brilliantly… crazily 
optimistic about what the science was” (Interview CXC-R12). The respondent went onto 
explain that 
“… scientific methodolog[ies] to do this, are very contested… there’s a 
legitimacy issue… I think the scientists were slightly nonplussed that they were 
being put on the line… but then as the thing firmed up I think they got more 
galvanised and more confident… that process still could be contested, but it 
wasn’t” (Interview CXC-R12). 
Residual unease about the MACC approach can be seen in the concern around early 
versions not taking into account all the cost benefits, having lots of associated 
uncertainty, and having only estimations of cost and policy risks included (RN: CXC-UW). 
Caveats were used for the approach in the final CXC call-down briefing stating that: 
“ClimateXChange produced this brief early in the preparation of the 
second Report on Proposals and Policies. Its purpose was to help frame 
questions and lines of enquiry and as a result, did not fully take account of 
real-world constraints (economic, political, social, institutional) that mean 
that these theoretical abatement levels are unlikely to be achievable in 
practice” (D: CXC MACC-CD1)  
 
Salience of knowledge was again in part prefigured by the call-down request in the 
context of the development of RPP2. Although salience did not appear to struggle, the 
post call-down evaluation suggested, "in general, when working under CXC, it is 
important that researchers understand the specific policy context of the area they are 
working in and around the question they are being asked. This is different from their day 
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to day work which might be for Government in a less direct sense” (D: CXC MACC-CDF), 
indicating that salience still required active attention and was not entirely prefigured.   
Legitimation of MACC knowledge among scientists was achieved precariously through 
the pragmatic benefits offered by the MACC tool to scientists in expert elicitation and 
interdisciplinary working (Interview CXC-R12). Descriptions of the process demonstrated 
an over-ruling of initial scientific value framings, rather than respect: 
“This framework actually allowed us to get a lot of people in the room and 
essentially bully them into hearing what we’re trying to do …if we did your 
measure in lots of farms… how much carbon would it save…we know you don’t 
know, but give us your best answer, it basically brigaded, well I say brigaded, we 
bullied them basically… just give us an answer, and then we hung them on that  
diagram and said well how does that work? And then it was either ‘mmm well 
that doesn’t look too bad’ or, ‘oh no that’s really wrong because…’ then… 
there’s a construct there to be refined and improved… they start to say, ‘I’m not 
sure, x has published a paper over there to say that’s not true and somebody 
else has published a paper and so on’ and so you can actually build up a 
database” (Interview CXC-R12, original emphasis). 
The approach is implicitly justified by the rationale that as soon as scientists understand 
the process, they will see the benefits of working this way. Here, credibility and 
legitimacy of the method are in question for agricultural scientists, but are tentatively 
produced through the ancillary benefits of offering a pragmatic tool with which to 
approach the difficult tasks that scientists increasingly face (through policy demands), 
but for which they are poorly equipped – i.e. connecting with non-scientific or 
interdisciplinary concerns. Procedural markers of legitimacy are used to construct 
credibility and legitimacy, including using initial statements as hypotheses, reviewing 
evidence, and revising estimates. This slowly constructed legitimacy for the scientists 
involved, through recognised procedures of science. However, it was suggested that the 
MACC approach would not have a life of its own within the scientific community, 
“because why would anybody ask the question?” (Interview CXC-R12). This indicates that 
legitimation not only remained tentative, but also was constructed within the discursive 
value framings that structure policy questions not science questions. 
For policy and boundary actors, knowledge was legitimated through alignment with the 
discursive value framings of policy. It was suggested that resistance arose because 
agricultural scientists were not used to having to operate within these policy 
frameworks: 
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“Natural scientist… are not used to being shoved into the frameworks that that 
the government uses to try and frame their questions and answer their 
problems… they boil down to well you know what are the costs and benefits of 
doing this… certain disciplines like economics, well that’s what we do… 
fundamentally you try your best to work within those frameworks... that’s the 
crux of the policy CXC space” (Interview CXC-R12). 
Here there are tensions between different scientific disciplines, as described by a policy 
officer in another interview with the Scottish Government: 
“What you find is that the economists are probably the most valued 
analysts… because the approach that the economists take is very 
pragmatic … statisticians will give you the data and will tell you about how 
it was all collected and how it is robust or not… different ways you are not 
supposed to use the data ((laughing))… and the economists will ride 
roughshod over this and will say, ok that’s the data it’s the best 
information we’ve got, let’s use it. It might not be entirely appropriate… 
but we’ve got nothing else… what else should we do!… I think it’s this 
pragmatism… that is really valued… economists… through their training, 
have a certain philosophy or approach … which is an approach that is 
generally used in government, which is about costs and benefits… These 
kinds of things are actually the types of questions that people are 
interested in… economics is not very much evidence based ((laughing)) as 
a science, so therefore it is perhaps easier for economists to… just make 
pronouncements… they are more willing to do that… the view as a whole 
is perhaps… less rigorous than the natural sciences… this lack of rigour 
((laughing)) allows them to do things that a natural scientist would not be 
comfortable to do” (Interview SG2). 
 
In this excerpt, the particular ways of thinking that arise from economics are seen to be 
favoured by policy because they generate knowledge that provides information suited to 
the types of decisions policy has to make, that embodies looser ways of working with 
knowledge, and that are practical in conditions of incomplete, conflicting and uncertain 
knowledge. Economists hold important policy and scientific advisory roles (both in CCC 
and through the way CXC is managed), which normalise (and naturalise) economic ways 
of thinking. At a UK level the CCC had been instrumental in requesting use of the MACC 
approach – commissioning the original research, providing guidance on how the task 
should be done and even setting up a spread sheet that “short cut our job a bit” 
(Interview CXC-R12). CCC were described as being made up of former Government 
economists (Interview CXC-R12). Their involvement in the design of the approach in the 
earliest stages helped align the scientific approach to policy discursive value framings. As 
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a result, the MACC approach was already well aligned with economic ways of thinking 
about managing carbon within the Scottish Government. 
The CXC call-down response is being used directly in the preparation of RPP2 to identify 
policy actions (RN: CXC-UW). The call-down response outlined “20 further measures that 
could offer additional abatement potential over and above that identified in RPP1” (D: 
CXC MACC-CD). MACCs as a knowledge tool are therefore also directly legitimating 
particular courses of policy action: 
“MACCs are just relatively clear stories… they tell you exactly what you can get 
in terms of the mitigation story… they’re the clearest way of representing… 
within given constructs all the things that are out there to do, which ones of 
them are low cost, or negative cost… which ones are more progressively more 
expensive, which ones you should forget about… you can draw this so called cost 
of carbon line through the diagram and cut off the ones that are more 
expensive… so that story is very useful, it tells you… here’s the ones you should 
be concentrating on” (Interview CXC-R12, emphasis added). 
Presenting MACCs as ‘clear stories’ that ‘tell you exactly what you can get’ naturalises 
decisions based on least cost, and demarcating a line specifying ‘here’s the ones you 
should be concentrating on’ vs. ‘ones you should forget about’ prefigures particular 
options as natural rational choices. MAC Curves become “a useful representation of the 
whole economy [and]… policy makers love it because they can see what they’ve got to 
do” (Interview CXC-R12). Such naturalisation removes opportunities for political debate 
about the effectiveness of measures with regard to climate change or the social 
implications or distributions of costs of these measures, vis-a-vis others that fall outside 
the demarcated scope of possibility. MACCs therefore enable knowledge which quantify 
and prices carbon to achieve legitimacy and to circulate, reproducing the constraining of 
possibility through cost, and encouraging market led responses to carbon ‘management’: 
“We aim, where reasonable and practical, to encourage a portfolio of 
technologies and create competitive market conditions in which the most 
sustainable and cost effective succeed over time” (Scottish Government, 
2013: 32). 
 
At the CXC Uncertainty Workshop, the Scottish Government confirmed, “the MACC story 
is the way that policy is conceptualising policy targets” (RN: CXC-UW) and emphasised 
cost curves encourage priority of low cost measures that pass under the required cost 
threshold (RN: at CXC-UW). “We can now design policy by positioning MACCs to see if 
policy contains most cost effective measures” (RN: CXC-UW). MACCs therefore become a 
197 
 
process through which policy approaches minimising high cost structural change and 
encouraging minimal cost and minimal structural disruption become legitimated and 
prioritised. These knowledge forms are contingent in that, under different 
circumstances, the relative balance between questions of cost and questions of 
methodological robustness may create processes through which other forms of 
knowledge become legitimate. 
Policy options were on one hand constrained through the questions asked by Scottish 
Government. As Rein and Shon suggest “the questions we ask shape the answers [i.e., 
policy solutions] we get” (1977: 236). The scientist responsible suggested, 
“For reasons I couldn’t fathom at the time they were obsessed with peat… 
it’s really weird what they asked us to focus on… some of the more robust 
science was on things like adapting livestock housing and transport… 
temperature and thermal heat… they weren’t quite so interested in that... 
It’s almost like in some ways they had what they wanted to say already” 
(Interview CXC-R12). 
 
On the other, the MACC approach constrained understanding of possible policy 
responses. In the report produced for the UK CCC UK MACC for Agriculture and Land Use 
and Forestry Sectors (Moran et al., 2008), it was suggested that shortlisting of measures 
was made not only based on abatement potential, but also perceived industry 
acceptability (Table 6.1). This is also apparent in the detailed presentation of reasons 
given for omission of certain options (Figure 6.2), where the traces of omissions based on 
perceived acceptability among industry indicate the construction of legitimacy for 
options in private sector terms. 
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Title of table in original publication:  
“Annex A4: Full list of measures and reasons for omission from interim list” 
 
ID Category Sub-category Measure 
Included 
in interim 
list? 
Reasons for 
omission 
86 Management of organic soils Avoid drainage of 
wetlands 
 y  
87 Management of organic soils Avoiding row crops and 
tubers 
 n 
Unlikely due to 
high value of land 
88 Management of organic soils Avoiding deep 
ploughing 
 n 
Small abatement 
potential 
89 Management of organic soils Maintaining a shallower 
table 
Peat y  
90 Management of organic soils Maintaining a shallower 
table 
Arable n Unlikely 
91 
Management of organic soils Erosion control  n 
Small amount of 
degraded land so 
small potential 
 
 
The call-down responses provided by CXC researchers to the Scottish Government in 
relation to MACCs both drew from and reproduced these particular framings. Their 
heralded success, as examples of best practice CXC translation, might in some ways come 
Figure 6.1: Methodology for shortlisting measures in UK MACC for Agriculture and 
Land Use and Forestry Sectors (source: Moran et al., 2008: 35). 
Table 6.1: Reasons for omission of options in UK MACC for Agriculture and Land Use and 
Forestry Sectors (excerpt) (source: Moran et al., 2008). 
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as no surprise given this historic narrative, for once again the difference between the 
two communities which requires translation is already small. As the CXC researcher 
interviewed suggested, the example is actually not a good example of translation 
“because it is just so clear, you know” (Interview CXC-R12). Yet the apparent obviousness 
of the match conceals precisely the collapse of objectivity and power that Mouffe so 
adamantly maintains requires attention. It is through their very use, as science, and the 
claims to authority that this gives knowledge within the policy making process, that 
MACCs naturalise particular courses of mitigation action. Such boundary devices have 
implications not just on the type of policy that comes to be developed but also on the 
type of science: 
“People might go back to their everyday research but somewhere in the backs 
of their minds is some, some policy device that they can still kind of relate to, 
not to say that they have to, but if it’s still there and it’s still relevant it’s still 
asking, it’s begging us questions” (Interview CXC-R12). 
Frameworks with which to order and prioritise decision-making were emphasised as 
being very important. “The world would be a lot easier if we had more of these 
frameworks… its so much the better if you can put up a nice diagram so we can all 
coalesce, and that’s effectively what MACCs have done” (Interview CXC-R12). In doing so, 
the MACC approach becomes a framework for consensus: 
“I mean the policy question is very clear, you know, everybody’s on board… 
everybody’s now attuned to the fairly fundamental principle that we need to do 
the cheaper things first, and there is nothing to argue there…its like clinical 
effectiveness you know NICE, its effectively the same thing” (Interview CXC-
R12). 
The homogenising potential of MACCs immediately alerts us to the absence of attention 
to power and exclusion of alternative ways of approaching the policy challenge. The 
claim to consensus apparent in this narrative is indicative of the closing down of 
possibility and difference about which Mouffe is so suspicious. It was suggested by the 
CXC researcher interviewed that MAC Curves can, under particular conditions, encourage 
debate and become the focus for critical engagement, 
“This is what we think is the story, if its wrong tell us why its wrong… you’ve got 
to start somewhere… they’re good devices because they spawn this debate… 
they give you a direction of travel in terms of things you can get better” 
(Interview CXC-R12). 
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However this debate is limited to options already within the framing and constrained 
ranges of MACC representation. He also suggested that a MACC curve  “makes space for 
new technologies that are over there on the right hand side and cost a fortune… should 
we be investing in those you know, and why are the ones that really work, all off the 
political agenda – you know biotechnology, GM genetic modification?” (Interview CXC-
R12). Whether or not these are options that are politically or ethically desirable, the way 
in which this space is made for expensive options is already within a low priority zone for 
interpretation, and so the likelihood of these types of options being chosen is already 
prefigured by the logic through which they are presented.  
Mouffe’s attention to exclusion is important here in drawing attention to the way in 
which framing a view of the world according to particular established discursive values 
generates a perspective from which no alternatives can be envisaged. The CXC 
researcher whose narratives have been so important in exploring these processes of 
constructing legitimacy neatly describes the success of this hegemonic practice when he 
concludes “you organise your information by something like that, and it could be 
something else, I just can’t think what it could be” (Interview CXC-R12). Mouffe’s 
approach encourages us not loose sight of how this might be otherwise. It was 
recognised that in the end, the MACC graph is “just a construct right?” (Interview CXC-
R12). A MACC is a construct that enables the legitimation of particular forms of 
knowledge and particular forms of action to the exclusion of others. 
6.2.3 Call-down 3: Extreme weather variability  
The call-down on extreme weather variability is considered by the CXC secretariat as a 
less successful example of CXC translation. The purpose of the call down was to establish 
the extent to which climate change is likely to involve an increase in extreme weather 
events which will be challenging to predict. Although the outcome is considered a very 
robust briefing note (RN: CXC-AGM 2013), the Scottish Government Adaptation team 
remained little further forward in what they needed to write in the Adaptation 
Programme as a result (Interview CXC-S3). In this case, the prior background boundary 
work with the wider scientific community was not present. In fact, the specific call-down 
request relates to a wider long-standing dispute between meteorological physicists and 
wider policy and public communication of climate change over attribution; the ability to 
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connect extreme weather events and climate change is a wider debate within climate 
science. The IPCC suggest that: 
“… unequivocal attribution would require controlled experimentation 
with the climate system. Since that is not possible, in practice attribution 
of anthropogenic climate change is understood to mean demonstration 
that a detected change is ‘consistent with the estimated responses to the 
given combination of anthropogenic and natural forcing’ and ‘not 
consistent with alternative, physically plausible explanations’… This is an 
area of research with considerable challenges because different forcing 
factors may lead to similar large-scale spatial patterns of response” (IPCC, 
2007: online). 
 
Attribution was a point of contestation in science–policy conversations in Scotland at the 
time of research because extreme weather events constitute an important way in which 
policy and boundary actors are establishing meaning for a lay public in relation to 
adaptation (Interviews: SG3, CXC-R3, Sniffer 1; RN: Sniffer-CJ). Insistence on the inability 
to make a statistical connection equates to inability to use a discursive connection 
between climate change and extreme weather events. This poses difficulty for policy and 
boundary actors in communicating the risks of climate change to the general public. The 
head of the Adaptation Programme suggested “people could relate to that… [it] is a 
message people can understand” (Interview SG3). Some prominent climate scientists in 
CXC felt that an overall connection between climate change and extreme weather could 
be drawn, suggesting “I think you can say it’s more likely… you can say it’s more likely 
with strong confidence is what we'd often say… what we can't do is to be definitive 
often” (Interview CXC-R11). However, the Met Office was vociferous in objecting to a 
connection between the two. Emphasising the difficulty in statistically connecting 
instances of extreme weather with climate change (RN: C2020-PEWG) the Met Office 
cited a paper published in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society (Peterson 
et al., 2012) involving Met Office staff which considered global attribution 
probabilistically, concluding that only some events were attributable to human induced 
climate change (Interview Met Office). It was into this controversy over the legitimacy of 
a connection between extreme weather and climate change that CXC was asked to 
speak. 
The call-down was relatively unusual as the request was actually prompted by the CXC 
knowledge officer whilst on secondment within the Scottish Government Adaptation 
team. In the midst of the controversy outlined above, the Scottish Government 
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Adaptation team was facing a specific difficulty of ‘selling the message’ of adaptation to 
both policy colleagues as well as civil society in Scotland: 
“To the general person on the street and even you know to the general policy 
area that's not that engaged in it, that’s a really difficult message for them to 
understand and to take on in terms of priorities” (Interview SG3). 
The secretariat described how they 
“thought it would be really nice if we could come up with a couple of 
paragraphs… that would allow us to say something in… the Adaptation 
Programme that said… actually, we're going to have more variability and we're 
going to be less able to predict from one summer to the next…” (Interview CXC-
S3). 
The Adaptation Policy team needs a clear message of why adaptation action is required. 
In order to communicate the risks and urgency of climate change the Adaptation team 
was relying on precautionary principle discourses, with the Ministerial forward to the 
Adaptation Programme stating, “uncertainty is not an excuse for inaction” (2013: 1). 
Although interpretations of precautionary action are diverse (Jordan and O’Riordan, 
1999), under such discursive framing unknown risks become the basis for preventative 
action. Tannert et al. suggest that “the precautionary principle is applied as a strategy to 
prevent incalculable possible dangers” (2007: 894). O’Riordan and Jordon suggest that 
“the point about the precautionary principle is that it swims against the economic, 
scientific and democratic tides” (1995: 19). It is therefore suggested that political 
legitimacy needs to be constructed for deployment of a precautionary approach. 
Interviews with policy actors suggest that the unpredictability of extreme weather was 
being used to legitimate precautionary action. O’Riordan and Jordan suggest “precaution 
requires being honest and open about uncertainty, rather than dismissing, ignoring or 
downplaying it. It means exploring the worst case scenario” (1999: 19). In practice, such 
honesty about uncertainty serves to legitimate a precautionary approach. 
Although the briefing report was robust/credible and timely, it was not salient to the 
policy need and struggled to legitimate either one or other narrative over attribution or 
policy precautionary action. The extensive and lengthy process of iterative struggles over 
meaning were analysed through access to the email exchanges and reviewing edited 
track changes of the briefing note during production, which provide insight into the 
process through which salient meaning and legitimation were not secured. Due to 
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agreed confidentiality there is a limit to the specific detail of the textual struggles that 
can be reproduced here but a number of points will be distilled from the exchanges. This 
example demonstrates problems in translation in part due to failing to align with 
discursive value framings of policy. In this case, it is suggested these are a valuing of 
uncertainty that would help legitimate precautionary action.  
A subtle yet important discursive shift occurred during the process of translation, which 
saw an interest in unpredictability turn into an emphasis on predictability. This first 
manifested itself in the wording of the formal call-down request to CXC, from the 
Adaptation team (written by the CXC knowledge exchange officer): 
“To produce a short brief on current and future climate variability and 
unpredictability in Scotland. The brief should summarise current understanding 
of how climate variability – particularly inter-annual – and unpredictability will 
change with climate change… and, as far as possible, highlight any gaps and 
uncertainties… The brief should flag whether and where evidence on the future 
predictability of extreme events has a bearing on broader climate 
variability/predictability… We intend to use the brief to help with drafting the 
Scottish Adaptation Programme… to say something about variability and 
unpredictability to help present a more nuanced interpretation of the 'hotter, 
drier summers; warmer, wetter winters' headline, in terms that are more 
meaningful to the layperson” (D: CXC-Extreme weather-CDR, emphasis added).  
Although the words variability and unpredictability are recurrent, there is also a 
reference to predictability. In the research scientist’s response it was the predictability 
rather than unpredictability of climate variability that was emphasised (D: CXC-Extreme 
weather-CD). 
The wording of the call-down references the problematic connection between extreme 
weather and climate change, acknowledging the difficulty of the link and pushes 
specification on where and when this link could be drawn. The call explicitly asked for 
consultation with the Met Office given the wider controversy, as an authoritative source 
of scientific information on climate change for the Scottish Government (Interview SG3). 
The tension had created an impasse at the Scottish science–policy interface, over which 
there is great frustration, as described by the CXC secretariat who posed the call-down: 
“It's very frustrating not to be able to communicate something to the public, to 
make them aware of what we all think is going to happen… if it’s as simple as 
hotter drier summers and warmer wetter winters, then adaptation doesn't 
seem to be that difficult …just, I don't know, put more drains in… I don't think 
we've got the messaging around it right and I don't really understand why 
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((sighs))… I don't understand why we can't say something more categorical than 
we are able to say… or find a form of words that lets us say something, and if we 
genuinely can't say anything then why don't we actually say - do you know 
what, this is so uncertain, that anything could happen so let’s be prepared for 
that - but we're kind of unable, we're just totally mute, you know?” (Interview 
CXC-S3). 
The intention of requesting consultation/collaboration with the Met Office through the 
call-down may have been in part to try to resolve this longstanding tension; as well as to 
prevent future challenge to the Scottish Government Adaptation Programme, the work 
of Sniffer, CXC and other stakeholders in Scotland; and establish CXC as an authoritative 
voice on this thorny issue.  
The experience of the secretariat in understanding how to frame the request for 
scientific engagement is evident in the way that a rather vague policy ‘need’ becomes a 
well-structured and delineated problem, that can be responded to in scientific terms. 
Like the example of Peatlands (call-down 2), it was important to consider the scientific 
community’s framings of knowledge. The brief provides a clear indication of what is 
required: ‘summarise current understanding’, ‘review the evidence’ and ‘highlight any 
gaps and uncertainties’. These can be seen as all legitimate tasks within the remit of a 
scientific epistemological approach, and the full brief further specified a clear scale, 
dataset, format and indication of what the briefing will be used for to try to ensure the 
needs of the audience are clear. However, in recognition that the subtext of the policy 
interest in on-going uncertainty and the difficulties of being able to predict might not be 
clear, further email clarification was sent directly to the CXC scientist in question, 
clarifying what the policy team were looking for: 
“A form of words for the Scottish Adaptation Programme that explains to 
Joe Public that climate change… is going to mean more unpredictability 
from year to year and so make our lives a bit more complicated (as 
opposed to more pleasant, which is the message people take from 
'hotter, drier')” (D: Email 1). 
Whether the subtlety of purpose in the original wording of the call-down was intentional 
or accidental is unclear. Clarification may have been a mere correction of ambiguity 
based on later reflection. Perhaps it was recognised that the interest in unpredictability 
rather than predictability would only be perceptible with tacit knowledge on how the 
information was to be used. Or perhaps, in the boundary work of constructing the 
neutrality of science so that science was not seen to be drafted in to provide a 
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predetermined message, the conclusion or outcome of what policy was trying to show 
was officially left open. As the person framing the call-down is also the person 
responsible for it being delivered successfully, perhaps desire to demonstrate the worth 
of CXC’s services contributed to interest in ensuring the scientific researcher knows 
exactly what is required so that the briefing is useful. However, despite this extra 
clarification, the valuing of unpredictability in policy appears to have been missed, 
overlooked, or ignored by the CXC researcher. This was apparent in the wording of the 
first draft that concentrated on how well science might be able to predict climate 
variability in the future. Draft versions of the briefing note emphasised variability of 
climate and the difficulties of prediction, but the focus was on hopefulness about being 
more definite about what could be said in the future – a key premise within the climate 
science community (D: CXC-Extreme weather-CD draft Dec 2012). In emphasising 
potential for improved prediction, there is loss of touch with what is being valued by 
policy (unpredictability). This resulted in a failure of CXC translation as the briefing 
provided was not relevant to the policy maker’s need, and failure to provide legitimation 
for the types of policy response that the policy team looked to the call-down to provide.  
The language and structure of the briefing underwent extensive changes during the six 
months of iterations between the CXC researcher and the CXC secretariat and 
directorate – orientating it more towards policy language and a more direct writing style. 
The scientist easily accepted changes to the format or presentation, but some of the 
more significant changes to meaning were not considered acceptable and the scientist 
appeared to retain the right of veto to revoke wording changes where it was felt the 
meaning of the text was being lost (D: Email 2). Part way through the CXC scientist was 
keen to consult a range of colleagues to check the on-going accuracy and validity of the 
briefing note. This appears to have been based on concern over accurately representing 
the science, rather than in relation to the needs of the audience. During this process, one 
senior scientist (who had significant previous policy experience) immediately picked up 
on the mismatch with what the policy team were interested in. He appeared to 
understand the valuing of unpredictability rather than increasing predictability and 
suggested inclusion of the following statement: 
“UKCP09 may well be right that 'wetter winters, drier summers' is a robust 
projection for the 2080s (medium confidence) but the closer we get to the 
present for future planning, then the less reliable that is for guidance...All this 
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means we should be preparing more for the unusual rather than waiting for a 
better 'answer' from the models” (D: Email 3). 
Despite this suggestion, this piece of advice was never incorporated. It is not possible to 
ascertain whether this repeated omission of delivering a message on unpredictability 
was a result of insensitivity to these repeated requests or an aversion to a policy-led 
message. The final text says much about the difficulties of climate modelling prediction 
but little about the relation with everyday weather, or the impacts of unpredictability on 
everyday life. The particular researcher responding to the call-down had shown great 
capability, eagerness and astuteness in anticipating and discussing science in terms of 
what the policy makers need during the Policy Awareness Workshops (RN: CXC-PAW1). 
Perhaps in his enthusiasm to anticipate, he had jumped to assumptions over what policy 
wanted (the narrative that policy want to be able to better predict climate is a common 
narrative, and one especially amenable for scientists who have faith that predictability 
will improve through scientific and technological development). Or, perhaps he felt 
uncomfortable being asked to make science perform obligingly in this way. During 
interview he expressed strong scientific epistemic value in neutrality suggesting: “being 
politically neutral is kind of top (billing) so… anything I write has to be completely 
independent of whoever is actually running the show… it has to be just the best science 
we have” (Interview CXC-R4). Perhaps he resisted science being used to back up a pre-
existent policy decision. Regardless of the reason, prioritising the discursive value 
framings of science and demonstrating more concern over accurately representing the 
science than aligning knowledge with what was being valued by policy. This 
corresponded with failure in CXC translation. 
Although it was not possible to obtain specific reflections on this call-down from the 
Adaptation team because the interview took place before analysis of this example was 
undertaken, their comment on how useful the responses to call-down questions in 
general was lukewarm: “…er it is. I mean it was useful; I mean it is still early days in terms 
of what we do with the information but it gives us just an additional source of 
information to weigh in” (Interview SG3). For the CXC knowledge officer who had 
requested the call-down in relation to the needs of these wider policy and boundary 
actors however, the call-down however did little to resolve the problem: 
“I still don't know what The Scottish Government can write in the Adaptation 
Programme, that tells people anything other than hotter drier summers, 
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warmer wetter winters… if we can't say anything more meaningful than that 
then you know, it’s a real shame; it’s a real missed opportunity and between all 
the brains that are involved in climate science if somebody can't come up with a 
form of words… I just don't, I cannot understand it” (Interview CXC-S3). 
This feeling of dissatisfaction with the ability of scientific knowledge to be translated into 
a form usable by policy, reflects the presentation of this example as a poor instance of 
CXC translation, despite the credibility of scientific knowledge presented. The briefing 
note was delivered to the policy team and provided them with some robust information 
on current scientific predictability of climatic changes, however, the final briefing note 
did little to speak directly to the controversy over linking extreme weather events and 
climate change, or emphasizing the unpredictability of future climate.  Although it 
slipped on timeliness (taking 6 months, not 6 weeks, to be delivered) it nevertheless still 
fell within the time window of the Adaptation Programme development and information 
was credible and robust (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). The call-down response failed on salience 
and legitimacy – not providing the information needed by policy and failing to legitimate 
precautionary action.  
 
6.3 Translation, legitimation and hegemony: Analysing the 
three cases  
Analysis of the three cases together enables some provisional reflections on what makes 
CXC translation successful in the eyes of practitioners, how legitimacy is constructed and 
the role of knowledge legitimation in translation success.  
6.3.1 What makes successful translation? 
Cash et al.’s (2002) emphasis on credibility, salience, and legitimacy is a good starting 
point for thinking about translation success, as all three elements recur in the three call-
down examples profiled as contributing to successful CXC translation. However, while 
some aspects of their understanding of the process for constructing legitimacy can be 
identified, knowledge legitimation did not only entail fair unbiased process and respect 
for values, as Cash et al suggest (2002). At times credibility of knowledge was at stake. 
However, often concern with robustness tended to be a concern of scientists, not of the 
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policy teams. Salience was important in all three cases, and while the nature of the call-
down function itself enabled knowledge to be provided at the right time, and with 
relevance to a policy problem, salience was only partly preconfigured by the process. 
Salience also relied on wider policy context and relevancy to the policy problem still 
required construction through the knowledge process production (as call-down 1 
suggested), with varying success (as call down 3 demonstrated). Further, one challenge in 
applying their model was the difficulty of distinguishing between credibility, salience and 
legitimacy, which Cash et al. have themselves suggested are often intertwined (Cash et 
al., 2002; Cash et al., 2003).  
Procedural concerns and respect for values did not fully account for the way in which 
knowledge achieved legitimacy; instead knowledge legitimation was achieved through 
discursive alignment with the discursive value framings of policy. Procedural factors, 
including scientific research and synthesising peer-reviewed material, did play a function 
in the construction of legitimacy of knowledge for scientists, however, these procedural 
aspects were largely taken for granted by policy teams (Interview CXC-S3). Examples 1 
and 3 did demonstrate a certain level of respect for values during the call-down process 
itself, based largely on the epistemic values of science and the pragmatic values of policy, 
however, in call-down 2, the process of constructing scientific legitimacy for MACCs as a 
tool, demonstrated little respect of the values of the scientific community. Indeed, when 
the scientific community expressed resistance, their objections were over-ruled. Yet 
MACCs were still legitimated by boundary and policy actors. In the longer histories of 
boundary working around peat, scientific values around peat conservation appeared to 
be respected only to the extent they were made equivalent through a discourse coalition 
that established equivalence in the face of joint opposition. In the two successful 
examples profiled, differences in values were not merely respected, but connected as 
equivalent through a discourse coalition with particular dynamics of power. As Star has 
highlighted such boundary object allow co-operation in the absence of consensus (Star 
and Griesemer, 1989; Star, 2010). 
In both successful cases, alignment with the dominant discursive value framings of policy 
through long histories of boundary work seemed vital to knowledge legitimation and call-
down success, and its absence may have played a part in the failure of the third case. 
Discursive values framings may be understood as the frameworks through which 
descriptive approaches to legitimacy argue that legitimacy is claimed. Rather than taking 
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these frameworks as naturalised, normative markers of legitimacy (as Cash et al. do), 
descriptive approaches critique their naturalisation and highlight the relations of power 
through which legitimation occurs. In this sense call-down briefings themselves were 
successful only as the tip of a boundary work iceberg, and their perceived legitimacy in 
many cases is a product of this wider boundary work.  
Cash et al.’s three categories well capture the ways in which success of CXC’s translation 
might be assessed, and they are right to extend attention beyond credibility alone; 
however their framework does not capture the value politics involved in the way that 
legitimation takes place. Framing knowledge through the discursive value framings of 
policy is one way in which legitimacy for knowledge is being constructed through CXC’s 
translation process. Successful call-downs legitimate knowledge through alignment with 
policy discursive value framings – in the two successful cases, this occurred through 
quantifying and pricing carbon. As Hajer and Versteeg describe “meanings do not emerge 
‘out of the blue’, but come into politics channelled through a particular set of operational 
routines and mutually accepted rules and norms” (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 177). The 
prominence of alignment with particular policy value framings signals questions around 
who, and what, become legitimated in the processes of CXC translation, and what is 
excluded, which descriptive approaches to legitimacy are better placed to address. As 
Van Egmond and Bal demonstrate, boundary configurations “shape[d] the incorporation 
of specific types of knowledge and associated norms and values while leaving others out” 
(2011: 110). 
6.3.2 Legitimation and hegemonic practice 
In the two successful call-downs profiled, significant discursive alignment occurred 
through longer histories of boundary work that constructed discourse coalitions which 
enabled different parties to share a storyline (Hajer, 1995) and form strategic alignment 
(1993: 47). Argumentative policy theories help to draw attention to the way that these 
functional coalitions rely on precisely the misunderstanding of and/or overlooking of 
difference (Hajer, 1995) to create a shorthand in which it is assumed everyone shares the 
same understanding (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 177). For many practitioners, such 
differences are considered inconsequential, as just different ways of talking about the 
same issue (Interview CXC-S1). However, the politics during such struggles over 
discursive meaning are not incidental or inconsequential. Behind these “visible changes, 
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there is the creation, thickening or discarding of meanings” (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 
176). This ‘seaming’ together of different discursive value framings through an extension 
of the logics of equivalence occurs through discursive struggles within particular relations 
of hegemonic power that benefit from analysis through a Mouffian discourse approach. 
This argument is developed through interpretation of Mouffe through Howarth, an Essex 
School discourse theorist, who further interprets and develops this area of Mouffe’s 
work.  
With no reference outside discourse, no third person judge (Mouffe, 2009: 556), 
Howarth argues that the reference point for legitimacy is the framework for meaning 
within any given hegemony (Howarth, 2000: 115). The development of a joint storyline 
involves the articulation of nodal points (discussed in Chapter 5) that “organise social 
orders” (Howarth, 2000: 110) – seaming discourses together and “covering over 
disjuncture” (Howarth, 2000: 111) in order to dominate the field of meaning. Drawing 
from Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 142), Howarth argues that the construction of such 
discursive formations are a practice of hegemony. The processes of discursive alignment 
referred to in the case of MACCs and by the IUCN in the Peatland case may be 
interpreted as examples of this seaming together and extension of claims to equivalence 
in meaning, and therefore as a form of hegemonic practice. For Peatlands, finding a 
storyline that accommodated the content-based values around peat conservation as well 
as those of carbon abatement was important, for as Vernon recounts “No actors, Latour 
suggests, will be recruited until the cause presented is more or less in line with their 
previous orientations” (Vernon, 1990: 345). Such identities must not be lost during 
interaction (Star and Griesemer, 1989). However, these content-based values need not 
be shared (Hajer, 1995), especially if they are seen through a logic of equivalence that is 
constructed through shared difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
Mouffe’s approach to legitimacy enables the discursive value framings through which 
CXC’s translation promotes alignment during legitimation, to be understood as an 
outcome of the achievement of power, not as fixed, necessary, or natural. These 
dominant framings for Scotland were set out in Chapter 4 (economic growth and a 
neoliberal state, Scottish Independence, socialist traditions in policy and an evidence 
based outcomes orientated policy approach) and in Chapter 5 (in more specifically 
neoliberal terms). These discursive value framings can be seen in both the two successful 
call-down examples. In both MACC and Peatland examples, the types of knowledge 
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provided are quantifiable volumes and prices of carbon that are helpful for management 
approaches which, in turn, prioritise minimizing government spending and market led 
approaches to carbon management and trading. These are not naturalized policy 
responses to climate change, but discursive value framings that help to reproduce 
neoliberal policy approaches. Mouffe’s attention to the naturalization of such claims 
helps to understand how particular forms of knowledge appear to have natural fit with 
policy that disguises the political struggles and exclusions in their formation. The act of 
translation in CXC creates a moment of closure through which narratives of practical 
usefulness both naturalise and rationalise (through their scientific claim) particular forms 
of knowledge. The MACC case, in particular provides an exemplar of the way in which 
this naturalisation and rationalisation of particular framings of knowledge collapses 
distinctions between objectivity and power, obscuring the contingency of claims and the 
possibilities for alternative forms of knowledge. As Lövbrand suggests “‘the bureaucratic 
intellectual’ has to refrain from the full opportunity of choice’” but rather in working 
within what is deemed to be acceptable, one is already committed to certain frames that 
favour technical and instrumental implementation of those commitments (2011: 226). 
Analysis of a greater number of call-down examples would be needed to ascertain 
whether claims for meaning that differed from existing policy framings would be 
considered non-legitimate. While unlikely to be so clear-cut, being framed as less useful 
to policy, might conceivably affect the legitimacy of knowledge indirectly. One scientist 
raised an example of knowledge that was provided outwith CXC that supports such 
suspicions. The SDC report on Sustainability Without Growth was described as 
“a very complicated piece of sociological research… changing how society 
as a whole globally works… but it was such a radical change and radical 
way of looking at things… a Labour administration [UK] threw their hands 
up in horror basically when they saw it” (Interview Met Office). 
 
The lack of take-up of recommendations from this report, despite its professed credibility 
and salience, suggests legitimacy in relation to existing policy frameworks may have been 
at stake.  
In thinking about legitimacy during CXC’s translation, discursive value framings are 
understood not as fixed, necessary or natural in their arbitration of legitimate 
knowledge, but instead as a product and achievement of power secured through a 
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hegemonic claim. Alignment with these policy framings need not be thought simply as a 
one-way engagement in which new knowledge deforms to fit with static and pre-existent 
policy discourse, but rather an on-going process through which that dominant policy 
discourse is itself being constantly legitimated through the provision of scientific 
knowledge that reinforces its claim to power. As such these acts of boundary work 
reproduce, and constantly create, the legitimacy from which hegemony legitimates its 
claims. While Jasanoff drew attention to legitimacy being constructed through boundary 
work (Jasanoff, 1990) her emphasis was on the production of legitimacy through 
separation of fact from values. In these processes of establishing equivalence and 
connection during CXC’s call-down processes, legitimacy is being produced through the 
translation function of boundary work as well as through purification. The connecting 
and mediating of knowledge to align with discursive value framings of policy is an 
important way in which legitimation of knowledge occurs.  
Mouffe argues that political relations always involve exclusion. During both the Peatlands 
and MACC narratives, moments of closure can be identified during which scientists come 
to accept (with varying degrees of willingness) the necessity of fixing meanings in the 
ways specified by policy. Closure is the point at which a claim to hegemony of meaning is 
made – “collapsing objectivity and power” (Mouffe, 2000: 14). These moments of closure 
obscure the partiality of claims to meaning, and the exclusions that could render 
meaning otherwise. Whilst the Peatlands and MACC responses appear to naturally fit 
with policy needs, this alignment was carefully constructed in both cases through long 
histories of boundary work, which reveal in each case significant discursive conflict and 
tensions through which hegemony of meaning was fixed temporarily, through political 
boundary struggles (Iverson, 2012). The apparent natural character of politically achieved 
social ordering is central to Mouffe’s definition of hegemonic practices, which “conceal 
the originary acts of their contingent political institution and that appear to proceed 
from a natural order” (Mouffe, 2014: 151). Further participant observation or draft 
accounts of such struggles would be necessary to be able to be specific about such 
exclusions, which tend not to be recorded in final products or narratives. However these 
exclusions remain as traces in the first hand accounts of conflict (Interviews: IUCN, CXC-
R12), or in the way policy options were written out in documents such as the UK MACC 
for Agriculture and Land Use and Forestry Sectors (Figure 6.1). For Mouffe, the boundary 
between legitimacy and illegitimacy is political one “and for that reason it should remain 
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contestable” (2005a: 49), yet in the case of the MACCs and Peatlands there is little 
possibility for alternative meanings to be treated as legitimate alternatives to discursive 
framings that value the quantification and pricing of carbon. 
In many ways the scientific community is tied in this process. Formal suspension of all 
but epistemic values in the professional cultures and narratives of science restrict the 
extent to which alternative values might be directly mobilised by scientists. That 
scientists do suspend all content-based values in practice has long been disputed (Latour 
and Woolgar, 1986; Mouffe, 2000; Longino, 1990; Lacey, 2005; Douglas, 2009). 
Establishment of a discourse coalition among scientists through which competing values 
could be aligned in the Peatland case is also testament to the role that content-based 
values play in science. However, formal suspension of content (rather than epistemic) 
values in scientific discourses enables discursive values of policy to take precedence in 
boundary interactions. Whilst scientists can resist policy framings, where this occurred 
during call-down 3 (extreme weather), CXC translation was deemed unsuccessful. Where 
resistance occurred in the longer histories of boundary work (call-down 1), compliance of 
the scientific community was wrought through stabilization of a discourse coalition. 
When scientific values obstructed the approaches of policy (call-down 2), a more forceful 
approach with science was taken. Alignment with even the epistemic values of science 
therefore seemed to occur only when it was in the interests of policy.  While there are 
similarities between Cash et al.’s emphasis on respect for participant’s values and 
Mouffe’s concern for differences in value to be held in a relation of agonism (as 
legitimate adversaries) rather than antagonism (enemies), Mouffe’s approach recognizes 
the conflicting and political nature of such relations. 
Boundary literatures emphasise the positive role of boundary objects in enabling 
differences to coexist without either conflict or consensus (Star, 2010: 602; Star and 
Griesemer, 1989; Galison, 1999), and discourse coalition approaches emphasise the 
possibility of co-operation without values being shared (Hajer, 1995). However, Mouffe 
highlights the way in which concealment of conflict occurs through relations of power 
and exclusion that do not respect conditions of value pluralism. CXC translation through 
call-down briefing boundary objects constitutes a hegemonic practice that constructs 
equivalence at the expense of difference. Rather than these differences in priorities 
being subject to debate, these inconsistencies are being equated in claims to meaning. 
For example, addressing climate change becomes about economic growth, and 
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quantifying and pricing carbon. In contrast to being open about such partiality and 
contingency, hegemonic practices through which dominant power and social order are 
constructed (Howarth, 2006) establish their claim to power precisely through obscuring 
their partiality and exclusion of difference, through claims to totality and neutrality 
(Mouffe, 2005a: 53). It is the partiality of hegemonic claims (underpinned by recognition 
of legitimacy only among some groups) that generates competing and non-cohesive 
policy ambitions. One policy official described competing governmental priorities are 
often left unresolved and the Scottish Government remains unclear in their priorities 
(Interview SG2) which supports Mouffe’s claim that hegemony is unable to be finalised 
and conflict is eradicable from politics (2000: 15). 
In concealing such tensions and differences and internalizing boundary negotiations 
(Guston, 2001: 402), this chapter argues that boundary work can reduce the space for re-
articulation and challenge held open through difference being kept apparent. Instead, 
elisions form precarious bonds that allow particular meanings to be advanced over 
others. It is important to consider the relationship between CXC’s translation and 
reproduction of hegemonic power, and the extent to which CXC is enabling the 
legitimation of policy action that fits within the hegemonic discursive value framings 
presented in Chapter 4. As one concerned scientist expressed at the 2013 AGM of CXC 
“in responsive mode, aren’t we just letting policy dictate – the IPCC doesn’t do that?” 
(RN: CXC-AGM 2013). While the frameworks of policy are theoretically open to challenge 
within CXC (as suggested in the Policy Awareness Workshops), pragmatically in the 
operations of CXC call-downs, these were not open to challenge, and challenge is not 
encouraged in the interest of constructing legitimacy both for knowledge and for CXC as 
an organization. The role of boundary work, and translation in particular in de-politicising 
climate change knowledge is therefore foregrounded by drawing on a Mouffian 
approach.   
 
6.3.3 Legitimation through translation: One anchor or two?  
Both this chapter and Chapter 5 suggest that translation is a particular form of boundary 
work that encourages prioritisation of the discursive meanings of the policy audience, 
this is supported by both argumentative and Mouffian theories of legitimacy that 
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emphasise the discursive and hegemonic reference points through which legitimacy is 
constructed. However, Star and Greisemer suggested that boundary objects need to 
account to both sides (Star and Griesemer, 1989). These two contributions to thinking 
about legitimacy could be in conflict.  
Analysis of the translation processes of these three CXC call-downs suggests that the 
specific act of producing the briefing note, as a boundary object, did require legitimation 
within both science and policy, but the relative influence of each side is not necessarily 
equal. Whilst a degree of perceived legitimacy is needed on both sides for legitimation to 
hold, the tethering and anchoring in both science and policy worlds that Guston 
suggested (2001: 405), do not involve equal balances of power. Further the discursive 
value framings of science tended to be methodological or epistemic, and their 
accommodation was seen to be important only in realizing policy goals. In contrast the 
discursive value framings of policy were important at the macro-scale in both successful 
cases but absent in the third less successful example. Legitimation of knowledge in the 
three call-downs appeared to depend on aligning and reproducing dominant discursive 
value framings of policy without losing the discursive value framings of science 
altogether. This importance of discursive alignment with policy values in legitimating 
knowledge echoes Miller’s observation that credibility has a stronger reference point 
within science and legitimacy has a stronger reference point within policy. He suggests 
“boundary organizations appear to need the approval of science for the credibility of 
their knowledge claims as well as the approval of political institutions for the legitimacy 
of their policy orientations” (2001a: 483). 
6.4 Translation and legitimation in summary 
This chapter has examined three examples of CXCs call-down process – a particular form 
of boundary work being termed translation – to consider what makes CXC translation 
successful and how legitimation of knowledge is achieved. Cash et al.’s credibility, 
salience and legitimacy framework (2002) is helpful in understanding knowledge’s appeal 
to policy and their identification of the importance of respecting diverse values is 
welcomed. However, drawing on the production of three call-down briefings, legitimacy 
is not an automatic outcome of following due process, nor secured automatically when 
diverse values are respected. If so, the third call-down example would have been 
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considered a success. This understanding of legitimacy neglects the operations of 
hegemonic power.  
Instead, Hajer’s attention to discursive constitution of legitimacy and Mouffe’s attention 
to the inability to separate discursive legitimation from questions of hegemonic power 
are useful in attending to questions of politics of CXC’s translation. Drawing on Mouffe’s 
approach, the chapter found that discursive alignment with neoliberal economic ways of 
thinking about carbon as a quantifiable and tradeable resource were important in the 
success of two call-down examples, contributing to the legitimation of market led 
responses to carbon mitigation. Non-alignment with a valuing of uncertainty and 
unpredictability that would have legitimated precautionary action contributed to a 
failure of CXC’s translation in the third call-down case. Undoubtedly these were not the 
sole factors in success or failure and, in the third case, wider difficulties including 
diplomatic relations with the Met office and lengthy iterations over wording all 
contributed to perceived difficulties.  The act of translation in CXC creates a moment of 
closure through which narratives of practical usefulness to policy both naturalise and 
rationalise particular forms of knowledge. In this process, the distinction between 
objectivity and power is collapsed, obscuring the contingency of claims and the 
possibilities for alternative forms of knowledge to become legitimated. 
The examples of this chapter epitomize the boundary suspension that Star and 
Griesemer (1989), Guston (2001) and Cash et al. (2002) identify, in which meaning and 
legitimacy in the immediate call-down are constructed on both sides of the science–
policy boundary (Star and Griesemer, 1989). However, the relative influence of each 
domain was not necessarily equal, with discursive value framings of policy predominating 
on the macro-scale. While only three examples make conclusions very provisional, the 
three cases illustrate a politics to legitimation that would benefit from further analysis 
beyond Cash et al.’s approach. It is precisely these questions of power in the emphasis 
on ‘audience’ that warrant further critical engagement with how legitimacy is being 
constructed beyond these three examples, to strengthen the provisional conclusions 
being drawn here. 
It is difficult to specifically attribute the politics of this discursive alignment to CXC’s 
practices of translation, for much of the work of discursive alignment took place outside 
the specific call-down process itself and instead in the longer histories of boundary 
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working outside CXC’s operations. This suggests that any move to demand led science is 
wider than CXC’s model of translation (as supported by wider science-policy literatures 
such as Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). Nevertheless, while discursive alignment might be 
central to both hegemonic and counter hegemonic practices (as Chapter 5 suggests) and 
neither discursive alignment nor extensions of logics of equivalence through nodal points 
are unique to CXC’s translation, rather the language of translation is providing a useful 
discursive tool to emphasise policy discourses as the reference point through which 
construction of legitimate knowledge should take place: positioning policy meanings as 
the meanings that count. Although, much work in the struggle for knowledge authority 
was already underway through wider boundary working, it is important to emphasise 
that such processes of legitimation are never complete. Instead, the CXC call-down 
provides part of a continuous process of knowledge legitimation that is on–going, and 
always only provisionally achieved. These three cases, present some evidence to suggest 
that CXC’s translation as a process is contributing to the legitimation of knowledge 
through policy discursive value frames, fixing and continuously reproducing hegemonic 
framings for knowledge. 
As well as legitimate knowledge, the call-down process constructs legitimacy for policy 
action, for CXC as an organisation, and for particular types of scientific subjectivity. 
Argumentative scholars have indicated that “discourses shape what can and cannot be 
thought, delimit the range of policy options and thereby serve as precursors to policy 
outcomes” (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 178). The MACC call-down in particular, 
legitimates policy responses that are low cost and non-structural, and both MACC and 
Peatlands call-downs involve quantifiable carbon that can be costed and traded. The 
RPP2 suggests quantifiable reductions of carbon by sector but does not yet specify the 
chosen policy measures to deliver these, so at the time of writing it is too early to say 
whether these types of action are predominating in response to the MACC and Peatlands 
call-down provisions.  
Successful translation by CXC also legitimates particular voices and reinforces the 
privilege to speak. CXC as an organisation is constructing legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Scottish Government through cumulative positive experience for policy makers as it 
seeks to become their research provider of choice (Interview CXC-R1).  Still in its early 
years of operation, and in a restrictive economic climate, ClimateXChange has a 
reputation to prove to retain funding from Scottish Government both for itself and for 
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Scottish research, so proving a service that is considered ‘useful’ is of utmost stake 
(Interview CXC-D1). Despite its overall success in demonstrating policy responsive 
knowledge, CXC faces an on-going struggle to demonstrate ‘value for money’ in the eyes 
of the Scottish Government, and the call-down service provides the substantive 
measurable output for CXC, which when compared with Scottish Government financial 
allocation makes the perceived cost investment per call-down expensive knowledge for 
work behind the scenes enabling the call-down to occur is often invisible (RN: CXC-AGM 
2013; Interview SG2). The dependency of boundary organisations in constructing their 
own legitimacy in a precarious economic future, therefore contributes to reducing the 
challenge of hegemonic framings. 
Finally, these processes of legitimation also construct understandings of what is 
legitimate science. Chapter 5 described the way in which CXC researchers were seen by 
the secretariat and any policy actors as arranging themselves into two communities – 
those who are prepared to work in a policy responsive way and those who are not 
(Interview CXC-S3). These moves to establish science in the service of policy are 
generating some vocalised resistance from scientists who are not keen to become 
consultants and want to retain their independence at (Interview CXC-S2; RN: CXC-PAW1). 
Although both scientific positions were at least officially suggested to be ‘valid’ 
(Interview CXC-S3), scientists who were willing to engage with policy and be responsive 
to policy needs were constructed in positive terms, as responsive and forward thinking 
(Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-D2); those who were less willing, constructed as stubborn, 
backward and resistant – in need of a “massive cultural shift” (Interview CXC-D1) and 
pointing to how the “days of the ivory tower scientist are numbered” (Interview CXC-D2). 
Whilst this might not be surprising in an organisation established to make science more 
relevant to policy, it generates normative discursive categorisation over which models of 
science are considered forward or backward thinking. Representation of one community 
as “a very tiny minority of scientists who feel that society as a whole is not of interest to 
them; they're only really interested in the nuts and bolts of a particular soil structure or 
whatever it might be” (Interview CXC-S3) tend to marginalise those who may not feel 
comfortable with the relationship between science and policy being employed through 
CXC. The domains of science and of policy are not static and, as the discussion around 
MACCs showed, science and policy are done differently as a result of these boundary 
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experiences. These designations of legitimate science and the funding allocations that go 
with them shape scientific practice. 
There is therefore a politics to the work of legitimation through translation that neither 
Cash et al.’s definition of due process and respect for diverse values nor Star and 
Greisemer’s understandings of legitimacy on both sides of the science–policy boundary 
capture. This chapter contributes to unpacking how the processes termed translation 
within CXC are active in the construction of legitimacy alongside processes of 
purification. It also demonstrates how CXC’s translation encourages particular forms of 
knowledge to circulate in science–policy boundary work, and particular types of climate 
policy actions to be defined. While the work of CXC’s translation offers clear benefits – 
enabling both policy and science to benefit from mutual interaction, providing specific 
knowledge to assist policy-makers to deliver the climate policy commitments established 
through the Climate Change Act 2009 and supporting scientists to develop ‘impact’ for 
their work – it is also important to be attentive to what this model of science–policy 
restricts. Through the requirement for legitimacy with respect to the values of policy, 
emphasis on translation restricts the ability to challenge to discursive value framings of 
policy. While CXC actors are finding ways to reshape questions being asked, which offers 
scope for challenging policy (Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-D1) and alternative forms of 
legitimation are opening up spaces and subjectivities that enable challenge, as discussed 
further in Chapter 7, it is important to indicate the limited scale and impact of these 
possible challenges. Any deficit of powerful challenges to policy framings further 
encourages their acceptance as natural and neutral rather than culturally and historically 
situated. However according to Mouffe, these processes are always incomplete, and 
differences in values while obscured are not removed. It is precisely in attention to these 
surpluses of meaning, conflicts, exclusions and partial fixations that Mouffe identifies the 
possibility for counter hegemonic struggle (2005a). As Torphing suggests, “there will 
always be something that escapes the seemingly infinite process of signification... The 
partial fixation of identity produces an irreducible surplus of meaning” (Torphing, 2005: 
163). It is to these possibilities for counterhegemonic re-articulations that Chapter 7 
turns. 
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 Chapter 7.
Reclaiming Political Subjectivities: Resistances and  
Re-articulations 
 
A key focus in Mouffe’s work is the potential for re-articulation of counter-hegemonic 
narratives. This attention to alternatives is made possible through recognition of the 
contingency of boundary drawing. Both previous chapters have followed narratives of 
CXC’s translation as a claim to dominate the way that science–policy interaction is 
undertaken and have focused on the restrictive side of constructing legitimacy. However, 
if legitimacy is contingent and hegemony always contested (Mouffe, 2005b: 18) then it is 
no surprise that scientists, and policy and boundary actors are also creatively opening up 
other ways of constructing subjectivity and legitimacy to enable political voice. This 
chapter focuses on these alternative forms of boundary working that enable political 
challenge over the framing of climate change or the relative urgency of action. Whilst 
recognising that these processes hold less discursive weight than narratives of CXC’s 
translation, if there is any chance of taking the plurality of values seriously, then it is 
important to pay attention to these alternative narratives, exclusions, and openings. To 
give an account of the science–policy landscape in Scotland without attention to this 
resistance and diversity of struggles would be to misrepresent the totality of discursive 
power and over-exert the dominance of the process of translation. As Mouffe suggests 
every hegemonic order “is susceptible of [sic] being challenged by counter-hegemonic 
practices which attempt to disarticulate it in order to install another form of hegemony” 
(2009: 549).  
This chapter explores five examples of passionate actors challenging the discursive value 
framing of climate change in Scotland through multiple instances of boundary working 
that enable them to construct alternative subjectivities and forms of legitimacy. This 
focuses on the people who perform boundary work: “the different players in boundary 
arenas – either scientists or policy workers, or those who combine or frequently oscillate 
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between these two roles” (Hoppe, 2010: 111). Practitioner narratives often emphasised 
the importance of key individuals in boundary work and this was also observed during 
participant observation, but rather than understand their agency as autonomous, Mouffe 
enables us to think of resistant and active subjectivities within a discursive understanding 
of power. Such actors identify with various subject, value, and political positions that are 
cleaved open within discourses and it is through these forms of identification that 
Mouffe allows dynamic agency in contesting and redefining relations within her 
discourse theory. Boundary configurations, values, subjectivity and legitimacy, as 
outcomes of practice, are constructed relationally and in different ways. Such struggles 
may or may not be politically deliberate and may also occur through political 
disassociation where the possibilities for re-articulation are not yet known. Through 
these practices of hybrid management (Miller, 2001a) passionate voices are finding many 
ways in which to shape new subjectivities and create alternative spaces through which 
political voices may be heard. In examining these accounts, the argument begun in 
Chapter 4 over the interaction of multiple boundaries is further developed. The chapter 
suggests that actors emphasise one boundary to compensate for attention to, challenge 
of, or breaching of, another. This creates fluid and fleeting boundaries that cumulatively 
establish science policy boundaries that are mobile and therefore highly resistant to 
challenge.  
The chapter starts by evoking Bruno Latour’s call for scientists to embody value explicit 
subjectivities publically, and Sayer’s parallel call to bring values into public debate. While 
both approaches foreground attention to values, both also present overly optimistic 
notions of subjectivity in relation to power. This is the starting point from which it is 
argued that Mouffe’s approach to subjectivity provides a more realistic way of thinking 
about subjectivity alongside a vibrant possibility to identify with, stand behind plural 
value positions. Mouffe’s approach takes seriously the discursive constraints that restrict 
and preconfigure the ability of scientists to respond to Latour’s demand, but at the same 
time offers a more dynamic possibility for agency and resistance than other discursive 
theorists. Building on the introduction to Mouffe in Chapter 2, this chapter discusses her 
conception of political subjectivity in more detail. Mouffe’s understanding of vibrant 
political subjectivity, attentiveness to exclusion in value pluralism, and primacy of 
passions in political identification enables the empirical cases profiled, to be understood 
as the forging of political subjectivities through boundary working in ways that 
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simultaneously recognise the constraints of hegemonic discursive legitimacy and power. 
This demonstrates the helpfulness of Mouffe’s approach in drawing attention to the re-
articulations and possibilities for alternatives that are the very substance that make 
boundary practices contingent. However, in the final stages of the chapter, some 
difficulties with Mouffe’s approach are identified particularly concerning the ability of re-
articulations to escape hegemonic constraints and restriction of reason to rationality. 
The chapter is then summarised in preparation for the thesis conclusion. 
 
7.1 Political subjects  
At the Gifford Lectures 2013, Latour urged scientists to embrace situated and value-rich 
positions, as scientists. 
“Climatologists, who are you representing and what are you fighting for? No 
reason to hide yourself behind the idea of a view from nowhere, held by people 
who belong to no-people… Stand on your own two feet, for God’s sake, instead 
of believing that you have to try to make your science answerable to the 
impossible standard of epistemology requiring you to disembody yourself 
towards a place of no place” (Latour, 2013b: online video, 41:07).  
Driven from Latour’s centring of the hybrid fact-value in science, this call pushes 
scientists to embrace and stand behind their value positions in the face of climate change 
and in doing so refocuses attention on questions of values and agency (2013c). This post-
ANT Latour is no longer content with the absence of commitment that his former flat 
ontological tracing generated. One of the four problems Latour emphasises about ANT 
was “the question of the ‘inside’ of the subject” (Latour 1999, cited in Gad and Bruun 
Jensen, 2010: 62) and recent approaches within STS and post-ANT have begun to bring 
questions of the subject back into focus (see special issue by Schraube and Sorensen, 
2013). Gad and Jensen drawing on Mol suggest that “analysis and description cannot be 
separated from political convictions and normative hopes” (Gad and Bruun Jensen, 2010: 
67) and Wynne suggests “Woven into the disciplined scientific attempt to understand… 
are always ancillary but constitutive concerns and commitments” (Wynne, 2010: 291). 
The fact that Latour, who as Braidotti argues, is not known for his humanism (Braidotti, 
2013: 5), is returning to questions of subjectivity and values (Latour, 2013a; Latour, 
2013c), and his earlier interest in scientists as anthropological subjects, suggest a return 
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to conceptualising the human subject. Whilst still impressing on us the need to consider 
realities as always outcomes of processes that are more than human; the post ANT 
Latour is a very different person to the one who was criticised for propagating a notion of 
actors as vacant cores (Harman, 2009: 21). During questions after the first Gifford 
Lecture, Latour stated that climate scientists 
“are the only ones really afraid… really anxious about every new set of 
data they have – are the ones who are supposed to be the most 
disinterested, the most emotionless, type of people, and that creates a 
completely, and the more I interview them, the more completely 
interesting and puzzling and tragic figure they are” (Latour, 2013a: online 
video, 1:11:30). 
 
Yet, Latour’s call places great pressure on the scientist to stand against conventions of 
legitimation and power, as if indeed there was no reason to hide behind a view from 
nowhere. It is suggested that Latour’s call, although important for responding to climate 
change, pays insufficient attention to these relations between legitimation and power 
that affect how scientists construct and perform their subjectivity in climate science–
policy debates. 
A notable proponent for greater public debate around values is Andrew Sayer whose 
emphasis is on relational subjective attachments to the world through relations of 
concern (2011: 2). Sayer takes Latour’s (1993) lead in challenging the modernist 
dichotomy of fact and value arguing “values and objectivity need not be inversely 
related” (Sayer, 2011: 7) and like Jasanoff (see section 2.4.5), argues that values should 
be brought into what it means to reason (Sayer, 2011: 61). Sayer suggests that relegation 
of values to the private sphere protects them from criticism (Sayer, 2011: 28), keeping 
values as subjective and preventing them being “open to inter-subjective deliberation 
and evidence” (2011: 45). His critique could suggest a form of boundary work through 
which values are simply kept out of public discourse. However, empirical narratives in 
this chapter demonstrate both that some values are being restricted to the personal 
sphere, but also that others are naturalised within dominant discourses, and that 
personal professional boundaries are being employed in more creative ways to enable 
new subjectivities to be constructed. Although Sayer acknowledges that we all value and 
care about different things his conflation of values with ethics and morality foregoes, for 
Mouffe, the possibility of pluralism. Further, Sayer’s call for values to be subject to public 
reasoning, like Latour’s rallying call to scientists, fails to take into account the 
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relationship between legitimation and power that prevents subjects being able to openly 
take this up. Like Latour, Sayer acknowledges his account has little to say about power 
and the struggles through which particular values become legitimated over others. If the 
proverbial ball is to be passed back to the subject in these debates, then it must do so 
with attentiveness to the limited capabilities for agency of the post-structurally 
understood subject whose ability to act is constituted and produced through discursive 
positioning, and to the ways in which subject discourse interaction takes place. These 
include perceptions over acceptability, and the politics of which values come to be 
naturalised and which excluded.  
Mouffe’s approach is helpful in thinking about alternative forms of subjectivity in three 
ways. Firstly, Mouffe articulates a vibrant subjectivity that is nevertheless understood 
within the constraints of discursive power. Secondly she specifically attends to 
marginalised positions, alternatives and potential for re-articulation within specific 
relations of legitimation and power. Thirdly her concept of passions helps to explain 
collective political identification and motivation behind alternative boundary workings 
without relying on essentialist or individualised ideas of motivation. Each will be briefly 
discussed. 
7.1.1 Vibrant discursive subjectivity 
Mouffe builds on Foucauldian discourse approaches that decentred the subject (Litfin, 
1994: 37) and foreground more distributed accounts of agency and power through 
discursive categories that steer actors in their thinking (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 182). 
However, Foucauldian discourse approaches offer little on what binds political forms of 
identification, little emotional attachment to some discourses over others that Berlant 
defines through an affective “a state of attachment” (2011: 6). Discourse captures little 
notion of ‘commitment’ (Smith, 1997; Baxstrom, 2008) or ‘stickiness’ that Ahmed 
describes as “what sticks or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, 
values, and emotions” (2010: 230). What these discursive approaches are less able to 
contribute is precisely what Sayer identifies as why things matter to people (2011). 
Several argumentative theorists became frustrated with the restrictive notions of agency 
in Foucauldian approaches. Hajer (1995) in particular turned to Billing, and has since 
drawn from Howarth (a Mouffian discourse analyst) to highlight that it is in the moments 
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in which “discursive regularities or routines are broken up” that political discursive 
struggles take place and 
 “develop ‘forcings’ that make that previously stable policy discourses lose 
legitimacy and need to be rethought and revised. The power then is not simply 
in the discourse, but in the performance of a conflict, in the particular way in 
which actors mobilise discourses and reconnect the previously unconnected” 
(Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 182). 
This distinctly Mouffian understanding parallels the re-articulation of previously 
disarticulated elements (Mouffe, 2013: 73). Mouffe’s approach builds on Foucauldian 
understanding of the discursive constitution of subjectivity, but in ways that enable a 
more vibrant understanding of agency within discursive subjectivity. Political subjectivity 
in Mouffe’s terms involves 
“the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of ‘subject positions’ that 
can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed 
by a diversity of discourses among which there is no necessary relation, 
but rather a constant movement of over-determination and 
displacement. The ‘identity’ of such a multiple and contradictory subject 
is therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the 
intersection of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of 
identification” (Mouﬀe, 1993: 77). 
 
 
For Mouffe, a subject’s identity is understood within the constraints of discourse but in 
ways that have endless possibilities for being transformed and rearticulated in different 
ways (Mouffe, 2013: 45). The quotation above demonstrates the fragmented nature of 
the subject together with emphasis on contingency, change and politics (Iverson, 2012: 
58). It is the over-determination and contingency of meaning, which disrupts any 
structural relation or essentialist claim to identity (Lewis, 2005: 6) – “there is no essential 
identity, but only forms of identification” (Mouffe, 2013: 45). For Mouffe identities are 
relational and consisted through difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112; Mouffe, 
2013: 45) (see discussion of identity formation in Chapter 5). Taking an anti-individualist 
and anti-essentialist stance to political subjectivity Mouffe instead focuses on the 
formation of political collectives (Mouffe, 2013: 46). These are important markers in a 
post-structural approach to thinking about boundary actors and scientists as subjects. 
Like argumentative theorists who understanding subjects as “at least partially 
constituted by the discursive practices and contexts in which they are embedded” (Litfin, 
1994: 37), Mouffe recognises that any expression of agency is always produced through 
227 
 
the spaces and subjectivities of discourse that are opened up and made available for 
identification through discursive interactions.  
7.1.2 Attention to opening up alternative subjectivities to be occupied 
Mouffe is interested in the potentiality for re-articulation and pays particular attention to 
the capability within discursive arrangements for alternative subjectivities to develop 
new forms of political identification and the conditions (of agonism or antagonism) that 
foster or restrict their development. For Mouffe challenge to hegemonic discourses 
requires new political subjectivities (Mouﬀe, 1993: 18) and this drives her to 
demonstrate the contingency of current hegemonic orders, to highlight exclusion and 
ways in which alternative spaces and subjectivities are being opened up to allow 
collective expression of difference in values. Connecting with her relationship between 
legitimacy and power, discussed in Chapter 6, this suggests that the legitimacy of such 
spaces and subjectivities are constituted through specific relations between legitimacy 
and power. However, such relations always generate exclusions from which the 
capability for relations and boundaries to be drawn otherwise, are always present. 
7.1.3 Political identification through passions 
 Mouffe argues that it is collective ‘passions’ (as described in Chapter 2) that animate 
resistances through the formation of collective political subjectivities. Mouffe 
understands the various forms of commitment to particular discursive value framings 
and actions not as the pursuit of interests, reason or moral considerations, but as 
‘passions’. As Chapter 2 discussed, passions are collective forms of political identification, 
not individualistic (Mouffe, 2014: 149) and describe the emotional attachment to 
particular values over others. Mouffe argues that passions are central to politics as “the 
moving force in the field of politics” (Mouffe, 2002: 8). Throughout her work she 
emphasises "the importance of recuperating passions for political thinking” (Mihai, 2014: 
31). As Hall, drawing on Mouffe, describes, 
“in order to become politically involved, then, people must care about an 
issue, they must have some vision of how things ought to be done, and 
they must have hope that at least some progress can be made towards 
realizing this vision… this caring this vision, this hope are precisely the 
work of passion.” (Hall, 2005: 125) 
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Passions help to understand the collective motivating attachments that drive these 
expressions of agency and exceed discourse’s mere dispassionate presence. If we see the 
narratives of actors in this chapter as moved through identification with collective 
passions, around the need to act in a strong way in response to the science on climate 
change, their drive no longer comes from an essentialist set of values held individually 
and prior to discursive interaction but from political forms of identification. Mouffe’s 
understanding of passions as collective, and relational effects of exclusion that deny 
subjects achieving their identities, offers an important explanation for the motivational 
force that values and passions play that moves away from personal and essential 
understandings. 
7.1.4 Summarising Mouffe’s political subject 
Mouffe’s approach to discursively constituted subjectivity, pluralism in value-
identification and the inevitability of conflict over differences in values offers one way to 
reconcile a Foucauldian emphasis on discursive power with Sayer’s call for attending to 
why things matter to people.  The problem with Latour’s call is that without attention to 
the politics of, and affectual engagement with, hegemonic discourses, an emphasis on 
individual responsibility is imposed on these scientists without attention to wider 
structural and discursive conditions of power. Mouffe’s work offers a promising direction 
by reconceptualising a post-structural subjectivity that rejects appeal to a liberal subject 
formed before participating in democratic politics (Biesta, 2011: 149) and instead draws 
attention to the specific relations between legitimacy and power through which 
particular subjectivities are able to be developed. Despite the emphasis on networks, 
individuals still hold privileged statuses within STS as passage points of legitimate 
knowledge, as experts whose opinion, as well as evidence, counts; who create meanings, 
who translate, lubricate and open up as well as close down, particular channels of 
communication. It is important to better understand and be able to conceptualise the 
role of such actors who form important passage points but are at present theoretically 
discursively eroded, but recalcitrant in empirical narratives. 
Mouffe’s approach provides a starting point from which to approach Latour’s call to 
reanimate the subjectivity of the scientist that requires neither an essentialist view of the 
subject, nor remains blind to their discursive constitution. Yet, like Harman’s notion of an 
object that is not entirely explained through its relational interaction (2009), so the 
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subject is not entirely explained through its discursive constitution. This creation of 
subjectivity, relationally, in the context of practice, shapes our idea of who we are and 
what our values are (Mouffe, 2012). Far from abandoning the human subject, Mouffe’s 
approach contributes “towards elaborating alternative ways of conceptualising the 
human subject” in more fluid and emergent ways (2013: 37). This responds to demands 
within STS to bring out other forms of human subjectivity beyond rational and self-
interested actors (Wynne, 2010; Wynne, 2008) and calls for engagement of “the human 
subject as an active, imaginative agent, as well as a source of knowledge, insight, and 
memory” (Jasanoff, 2003b: 243). The following two sections profile accounts of actors 
from across the science–policy spectrum holding passionate positions on climate change 
and constructing forms of subjectivity and processes of legitimation in new ways. These 
subjects are seeking to reclaim political subjectivity through deploying discourses of fear, 
and of personalisation, by reframing questions, and using the voice of others to find 
alternative ways of stimulating and provoking action outside the formal narratives of 
CXC’s translation and the value neutral claim of boundary work. Bringing a Mouffian 
understanding to how they do so, not as pre-established autonomous agents, but as 
situated within complex discursive relations of legitimacy and power, helps to further 
understand the political subject in boundary work.  
 
7.2 Political scientists? The construction of legitimate 
subjectivities  
During empirical fieldwork, two conflicting narratives of scientist subjectivity were 
encountered. On the one hand, the policy shift from evidence to expert opinion calls for 
scientists to speak not as the voice of ‘science’ but as the voice of a ‘scientist’ – not as an 
impartial voice of evidence, but as experts with opinions and a responsibility to advise: 
“Being an expert, being you know, a top academic in something, gives you 
a bit of responsibility to draw those conclusions” (Interview CXC-S1, 
original emphasis). 
  
This foregrounded subjectivity and value judgements in ways that some scientists, more 
accustomed to the discursive value framings of logical positivism, felt uncomfortable (as 
discussed in Chapter 5).  
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However, on the other hand, a number of scientists are seeking greater political voice 
over the need to respond to climate change. These instances encountered either in one-
to-one interviews, during observed exchanges with other scientists or through public 
speech acts, form the focus of this chapter. This section discusses the way in which 
scientists construct legitimate subject positions and discursive value framings through 
boundary work, in ways that enable these positions to be expressed. In some cases, 
scientists demonstrated frustration at feeling excluded from political debate: 
“Something that is frustrating me is that I don't think that we are 
contributing much to the public debate… In the UK there is a culture of 
not speaking up… a system of subtle coercion… I'm impressed by… Jim 
Hanson… who… because probably he's retiring ((laughs)) says look this is 
the situation and I think I have a responsibility to say these things, you 
know, whether you like it or not – as a researcher – I think the scientific 
community would do well to follow the example of someone who has a 
scientific reputation that is unassailable, so we're not talking about the 
head of Greenpeace, we're talking about someone who has an 
unassailable scientific reputation… who has simply seen what is coming 
and is trying to do something to, to raise awareness… I don't think the 
scientific community is doing enough” (Interview CXC-R10, emphasis 
added). 
 
In this example attention is being drawn to the differences in the way that legitimate 
political subjectivity is constructed culturally, throughout a career and according to 
organisational affiliation. James Hanson, a US climatologist and activist is an example of 
someone who constructed his subjectivity as a scientist in ways that enabled inclusion of 
the right to hold a political voice in relation to his research. For the scientist with whom I 
spoke, Hanson’s example contrasts with his own perceived possibility for political 
subjectivity. This absence of political voice is leading to personal anxiety: 
“What is on the agenda now is very short sighted... we're not looking at 
what's coming in the future years partly because politically its very… very 
controversial… those are extremely serious consequences… the ball’s in 
back in our court, what are we doing to avoid that now? We do nothing… 
if we keep that off the political agenda that would be great… what's going 
to happen to Scotland? Well to Scotland probably not too much but to 
Europe, a plus four degree is something that is something that should be 
as important as (.3) I can't find a more important political issue… we're 
not taking the responsibility we need to take essentially and that worries 
me” (Interview CXC-R10). 
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He described the simultaneous hope generated through Scotland’s target setting in 
terms of international leadership – “all you can do is hope that by doing the right thing 
others will follow” (Interview CXC-R10) – and a loss of hope in the ability to respond to 
climate change, suggesting: 
“In the end the interests are so entrenched I think that there's no hope… 
the world is too complex it’s a big, big, machine… with all our might we 
can't steer the system because you know there are various reasons but, 
its too big an oil tanker to steer” (Interview CXC-R10). 
 
His call to contribute to the public debate resonates with Latour’s call for scientists to 
stand behind what they value. It also suggests that frustration over lack of political 
subjectivity is creating mounting pressure and a crisis in subjectivity for some scientists 
who are experiencing a disjuncture between what their science is suggesting and the 
form of political voice they are able to construct. However, other scientists are finding 
ways to resolve this through alternative modes of boundary working that enable a 
political voice. Two examples are presented of scientists who, operating in boundary 
roles, construct forms of scientific expression that enable a more active vocal 
contribution to public debates. In these examples multiple sites of boundary work can be 
observed to interact, building on the initial reflections presented in Chapter 4. 
7.2.1 Political subjectivity through discourses of fear  
One senior scientist in a Scottish Government Agency discussed, during interview, the 
way in which he had previously utilised fear as a communication strategy when 
presenting on climate change. His account is worth reproducing in detail because it 
illustrates a number of points:  
“I used to do a lot of public speaking and I used to do it very purposefully 
on the basis of wanting to scare the hell out of the audience this was back 
in… 2000 onwards for a few years, I did a lot … I just felt that that was 
probably useful because there's… complacency people don't want to be 
told things they don't want to hear and if they don't want to hear it and 
just exclude it from their thinking, then… they're not even going to be 
passive or acquiescent and have support for what need to be some fairly 
radical changes in the future, so it was instinctive to me… but I got quite 
heavily criticised that that was, internally the wrong thing to do and I 
know there's lots of research stuff that's showing that you get better 
behaviour change by showing the positives what people can get out of it… 
for some reason I just never bought that argument… something about it 
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just didn't seem right to me… so I just went on trying to scare the hell out 
of people, and I'm not saying that's right and I, to this day I know not 
whether it’s right or wrong… it’s just knowing which, which strategy or 
tactic to apply at which particular time” (Interview SGA4; emphasis 
added). 
 
This account goes beyond ‘just presenting information’ that many narratives of science 
suggest is science’s role (Interviews: CXC-R1, CXC-D2). The account is neither impartial 
nor neutral but is being communicated with intent to change people’s thinking, stimulate 
action and encourage acceptance/acquiescence for unpopular policy decisions (Interview 
SGA4). This particular actor openly expressed strong personal commitment to addressing 
climate change describing it as “undoubtedly the greatest threat to the planet bar none” 
(Interview SGA4). In referencing “it’s just knowing which, which strategy or tactic to 
apply at which particular time” (Interview SGA4, above) he suggests a political passion 
that is, at least partially driving this type of communication.  
Many climate scientists describe feeling fear in response to their science, a fear which 
generates a desire to communicate this to others. As another scientist described at a CXC 
workshop, “not much shakes me, but the recent news on sea ice makes me shudder; I 
need to communicate how I feel” (RN: CXC-UW). Communicating fear mobilises 
emotional connections as legitimate science-communication. Legitimacy is always 
precariously achieved, and this carries some risk of failure – of delegitimising the 
individual, the organisation or science itself (although the risk to science is minimised 
through the designation of communication as “science communication” not science 
itself; see Chapter 5).  Conscious of this risk, he suggests that organisationally 
“we need to be quite careful about our vires and what powers and duties 
and responsibilities and functions we have laid on us by, by Government 
through statute and, there's some critical phrasing in our management 
statement… which interprets for us what is meant by the legislation and 
the way we should run ourselves as a business, and one element in there 
that says we should base all our decisions on sound science it doesn't say 
base any of your decisions on ethics or morality! Its sound science… we 
look at the evidence, we assess risks and we take action or intervene, 
within our legal powers, on the basis of that evidence and risk” (Interview 
SGA4, emphasis added). 
 
The notion of ‘vires’ or ‘ultra-vires’ meaning ‘within’ or ‘out-with’ designated powers, is 
common terminology within public sector discourse, describing the legitimate scope or 
remit for organisational action and stepping beyond this remit. Miller has highlighted 
that acting within appropriate jurisdiction is important in the construction of legitimacy 
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for science and for policy (Miller, 2001a: 493). This constructs procedural legitimacy, 
which is at times convenient for an organisation in closing down political debate: 
“We're a very technocratic organisation… statute requires us to do that, 
and on many occasions that is really helpful, because we have the 
evidence here's the argument, that's our decision, Attack us wherever you 
like along that pathway… as soon as you start introducing ethics and 
morals, that's quite difficult” (Interview SGA4). 
 
In this way particular policy actions become legitimated through adherence to process, 
not political debate. Reference to internal criticism suggests that some colleagues felt 
that his approach interpreted organisational remit with too much flexibility, and 
perceived risks to legitimacy were being felt. 
To manage this risk, during the interview when attention was drawn to it through 
questioning, the scientist leaned heavily on a personal/professional distinction. Despite 
clearly mixing his personal and professional identities – describing a personal-
professional boundary that was regularly transgressed when he spent “a lot of my free 
time, personal time as well as some business time… going around just giving 
presentations… on climate change” (Interview SGA4) – he firmly emphasised personal 
and professional distinctions when attention was drawn to boundary blurring around the 
neutrality of science. In order to distance himself from the organisation he suggests:  
“That's my personal position. The Agency itself is obviously controlled by 
statute and we, we mustn't do anything that is ultra vires” (Interview 
SGA4). 
 
A strong boundary between personal and professional capabilities served to bolster the 
legitimacy of the scientific organisation, reconstructing the value neutrality of the 
organisation and reallocating value rich commitments of communicating through fear 
firmly to the personal domain. A number of authors have indicated that boundaries 
around categories may harden either through repeated institutional practice (Halffman, 
2003) or through data infrastructures (Beaulieu, 2001: 368). Here boundaries, like 
borders, may be seen to become hardened during moments of attention, contestation or 
potential controversy. This hardening occurs through the construction of parallel, but 
associated, boundaries that are evoked to bolster any perceived risk to legitimacy that 
might be incurred when attention is directed to boundary blurring – such as through the 
deployment of fear.  
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With values during the interview bounded to the personal domain his description of 
work at the organisational level continued. Whilst official statutory powers and duties to 
address climate change are described as “rather limited” (Interview SGA4) flexible 
interpretation of the role of this scientific organisation means that “we do have certain 
areas where we operate” (Interview SGA4) and “as the Government’s advisor on the 
environment we can sometimes be helpful, if you like behind the scenes” (Interview 
SGA4). The organisation’s climate change plan was described as a space where “our 
intentions to be persuasive” are laid out (Interview SGA4). In a conversation about a new 
data resource network managed by the organisation the connection between science 
and persuasive argumentation was continued when it was suggested “we're not 
particularly good at presenting persuasive, highly publically accessible arguments around 
climate change. We are very actively trying to change that now with the new [web 
platform]” (Interview SGA4). This demonstrates the inability to extract knowledge from 
questions of value, or the passion to influence from professional practice, despite 
temporary hardening of this boundary during our interview.  
When the focus of our interview then touched on the distinction between personal and 
private boundaries, the construction of legitimacy switched back to boundary work 
around organisational neutrality and specifically to the role of science as an information 
provider. It is simply the provision of information that was seen to engage people, 
through choice, not by “bullying” (Interview SGA4). It was suggested political attention 
can be drawn to value implications by simply laying out moral or ethical arguments 
without expressing any preferred option: 
“We can in a kind of dispassionate, independent party way, sometimes 
raise the ethical and moral arguments and indicate to people that there is 
probably an ethical or moral argument to be addressed… it's very hard for 
us to kind of take moral positions, we're on a dreadfully slippery slope 
when it comes to taking cases to court… if we're adopting moral positions 
I, I think we can't. But, in the sense that we're technocrats and scientists, 
we can expose moral arguments, and just lay them out for people to 
make their own judgements on” (Interview SGA4). 
  
Moral positions cannot be held explicitly but can be inferred for others to identify with 
politically. This distances both science and policy from explicit value stances constructing 
their neutral status. Laying out options for others to decide between also reproduces the 
valuing of individual liberty of choice – a characteristic Rose (1999) has described as 
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central to governance under advanced liberalism, even though this freedom is highly 
regulated.  
While a government agency (a public sector organisation that by definition was set up to 
serve various notions of public good), the organisation appears unable to construct its 
legitimacy in value terms but able to have at the heart of its management structure the 
clause that it should ‘act like a business’ (Interview SGA4). Throughout the interview 
acting like a business seemed to refer to operational processes – managing workloads 
through targets, focussing on business efficiency and basing decision making on ‘sound 
evidence’ (Interview SGA4). Here, the neutralisation and naturalisation of acting like a 
business is contrasted with the denial of the legitimacy for acting on the public values in 
the quotation above – public values that Weber referred to as a ‘bureaucratic ethos’ 
(Weber, 1978) and Du Gay describes as a ‘regime of values’ (Du Gay, 2000). Whilst public 
values are deemed non-legitimate in this public-sector organisation, neoliberal values of 
operating like a business – efficiency, target based management and decision-making 
based on evidence appear naturalised and neutralised as principles for operation. 
In summary, while the principles of value neutral scientists are relaxed to allow 
discourses of fear to be mobilised, the boundaries between personal and professional 
are then strengthened to ‘shore up’ this boundary transgression. When focus moves to 
the personal and professional boundary then the demarcation around science is made in 
terms of neutrality and laying out choices for others to evaluate. This alternating terrain 
of boundary work produces a cumulative (yet not discrete) distinction between science 
and policy, between personal and professional and between values and neutrality that 
do not map directly onto each other but serve to construct legitimacy in different ways 
when attention to the blurring of one or more boundaries becomes the subject of 
attention. Swyngedouw argues that discourses of fear and apocalyptic images are 
integral to a neoliberal capitalist logic by displacing the possibility of social redemption 
and political differentiation. Management of fear becomes  “an integral and vital part of 
the new cultural politics of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007)” (Swyngedouw, 
2010: 219). Whilst this scientist was consciously evoking fear as a political strategy to 
challenge the urgency of a climate response, according to Swyngedouw, these strategies 
of fear “foreclose a proper political framing” (2010: 219) because “ideological or 
dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, 
expert management and administration” (2010: 223). The form of political subjectivity 
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this scientist creates is not counterhegemonic but enables a political voice that appeals 
to individual liberty through evoking fear in ways that further reproduce technological 
and managerial approaches. 
7.2.2 Opening up spaces of challenge through personalisation  
The Met Office Chief Government Advisor for Scotland and Northern Ireland uses forms 
of science communication that seek to engage people on a personal level. Analysis is 
based on an online video of a presentation given to the University of Highlands and 
Islands Climate Change Conference 2010 (UHI Inverness, 2010) which was noted to be 
indicative of a wider strategy he employs (Interview Met Office) and became the focus of 
interview discussion in 2012. In this public address he begins with a personal apology to 
the young people in the audience: 
 “The first thing I normally do, is apologise, and I apologise for two 
reasons: the principal one being that my dad’s to blame, and the second is 
that I’m to blame or at least my generation my dad’s generation are the 
ones to blame. We’re the ones who have created this society…. the things 
we expect… we’ve relied upon… plenty of oil, plenty of work done 
elsewhere, and reliance on cheap energy” (UHI Inverness, 2010). 
  
 
Throughout the presentation, he sought to personalise climate change – from 
emphasising friends in Norwich in relation to rising sea levels, to problematizing the 
addictions and habits of the baby-boomer adults in the audience. Starting with everyday 
objects such as a disposable razor, tracing its carbon footprint through circulation 
networks and assemblages and comparing it to the cut throat razor that his grandfather 
used for his whole lifetime, he emphasises our changed relation with goods and services 
and the exportation of supply chain carbon from our footprint accounting. This strategy 
for communicating climate change was not unusual. Personalisation is commonly 
promoted in presentation training courses as a way to make communication more 
engaging. It was suggested by the CXC secretariat that making communication personal 
involves us in what we do, whereas scientific language pushes responsibility away (RN: 
CXC-PAW2). One policy official increasingly described talking about climate change in 
terms of her grand nephew “I think talking about future generations is… a cop-out 
because it distances you from it, whereas actually mentioning somebody by name, yeah, 
then you realise that you have to act” (Interview SG6).  
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In discussing his decision to take a personalising approach during interview, he suggested 
the approach responds to a need to make complex multi-scalar information meaningful 
to everyday decision makings whose usual frame of reference, is short term and 
immediate (especially during periods of recession) (Interview Met Office). Science he 
argued,  “doesn't get through to people”, further describing: 
“Communication was always the problem area; how do you make it real 
to people? And that's what I try to do as much as possible… by giving 
them examples that are comprehensible within their own lives… how do 
you relate that to the human being? That to me is the crucial link” 
(Interview Met Office, original emphasis). 
 
This passion to generate action on climate change developed in relation to the 
predictions from models and datasets he was working with (Interview Met Office) 
demonstrating values held as emergent and constructed through these engagements, 
not predating them. While he describes the “scariness” of the 2002 climate modelling 
output (Interview Met Office), he chose personalisation over fear as his preferred mode 
of communication. Fear nevertheless retains an important role as he creates a striking 
mental image of the four horseman of the apocalypse (a reference to the Christian Book 
of Revelation interpreted to represent pestilence, war famine and death). This image is 
present just long enough to introduce a sense of fear before verbally dismissing appeals 
to fear in favour of more ‘solution orientated’ approaches and presenting science over 
such religious imagery. In this way fear haunts the conversation, more powerful perhaps 
by sensed absence. Tracing consumer assemblages, confessing personal culpable 
responsibility and deploying passionate appeals to encourage people to act go far 
beyond the provision of information that he simultaneously indicated to be the role of 
science (Interview Met Office). During interview, he framed climate change as 
“about the way that we interact with the rest of the planet… increasingly 
and certainly in the Climate Change Act for Scotland, there has to be a 
move towards consumption based carbon accounting… and hence trying 
to bring it into peoples' cognisance so they see that actually everything 
they do has a different impact” (Interview Met Office). 
 
In these acts of science communication the boundary between science and science 
communication plays a strong function in enabling this passionate address without 
threatening the supposed value neutrality of science. During our interview, the 
boundaries around science were again reinforced like in the interview extracts presented 
in section 7.2.1, by emphasising a separation between the personal and the professional, 
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despite this distinction obviously being blurred during professional presentations. He 
suggested: 
“There's a moral imperative for me in some ways, and this is purely 
personal in that the people who suffer most in Scotland in fact, the 
people that suffer most across the world… are those that have the least 
already… it's the weak and the poor that suffer most… for me anyway, 
purely personal… it’s about getting people to think along those lines.” 
(Interview Met Office, original emphasis). 
 
He described the biggest challenge in his role as 
“keeping a balance… a perspective of what I believe is going on as a 
person, as an individual, right, and my reading around climate change - I 
still need to keep that balance… It’s about keeping that ability for people 
to think for themselves, I'm only providing information in that sense and 
trying to put it in a context for people to understand” (Interview Met 
Office). 
 
Here boundary construction between the personal domain and the professional domain 
is important in reconstructing legitimacy for communications that may otherwise be 
seen to transgress the boundaries of legitimate scientific work.  
Personalisation is one way in which this scientist found to carve out an address to his 
audience that went beyond the distancing language of science in an attempt to inspire 
and generate behaviour change. The political emphasis on responsibility not possible 
through the language of science is legitimated through addressing the audience on a 
personal level. With value judgements as legitimate questions within the personal 
domain, personalisation becomes a way in which questions of value become legitimately 
addressed and enable him to conclude his presentation with an imploring personal 
address for action based on his recurrent trope, a LP Hartley quote: “The Future is a 
foreign country; they do things differently there. My suggestion to you as a whole is that 
that’s what you have to do, you have to learn to do things differently, to change the 
world around you. Make as much noise as you can” (UHI Inverness, 2010). 
However, as with fear, personalisation emphasises individual behaviour change. 
Personalisation of responsibility generates a particular form of action that has been 
heavily criticised within academic literature firstly for avoiding structural change, and 
secondly, taking a Foucauldian approach, for ignoring the way in which subjectivities are 
produced through discourse (Paterson and Stripple, 2010). Many boundary practitioners 
in Scotland too were highly critical of such individualised approaches (Interviews: SG2, 
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CXC-S1) observing that individual messaging affects the wrong group of people – making 
people who care feel bad, whilst people who don’t remain unaffected (Interview CXC-
S1), asking people to operate against a tide of opposing incentives, and distracting 
attention from questions of broader structural (Interview CXC-S1) or system change 
(Interview SG2) and being unjust:   
“We can make every car… every fridge, as fuel efficient as possible, why is 
it up to me as an individual consumer because it’s just too hard, it’s too 
much!… I’m not saying we don’t have personal responsibility of course we 
have personal responsibility but one of the things that I think is really 
important for… someone like SNIFFER or… ClimateXChange is to say to 
the government look… there are some institutional framework changes 
here, that that would make much bigger impact” (Interview CXC-S1, 
original emphasis). 
 
Multiple references to the importance of freedom (c.f. Rose, 1999) were encountered in 
Scottish policy narratives, for example increasing emphasis on governing through 
behaviour change (Interviews: SG1, SG3, SG4, Met Office) and rewarding the 
development of particular subjectivities (Interview CXC-S1). As one policy official 
suggested, 
“it’s only going to work if you change the behaviour of the people of 
Scotland… Government cannot tell people what they should do… they can 
give incentives, they can do fines etc. but they cannot say this is what you 
should be doing with that particular piece of land… that’s still the 
prerogative of the owner” (Interview SG6). 
 
This construction of policy boundaries to limit the extent to which Governments can 
infringe on individual property ownership liberties is echoed in the Met Office Advisor’s 
emphasis on personal choice: 
“I'm not a moral philosopher I’m not in a position of being able to make 
value judgements, directly, I can do it personally for myself that's fair 
enough, doing it on behalf of other people I don't think is my task... they 
have to think about it for themselves" (Interview Met Office). 
 
With this form of science communication allowing the public to ‘think for themselves’ 
and ‘make their own value judgements’ was an important way in which legitimacy was 
constructed for a scientific voice that was advocating particular forms of action. Opening 
up onus and responsibility for action through personalisation, like fear, frames particular 
forms of action that once again resonate within current politico-economic approaches 
valuing sanctity of individual freedom of choice.  
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During interview discussions with the scientist in question, his personalisation approach 
appeared not to be a political aware or clearly defined position over responsibility for 
action. Despite all his emphasis on personalisation he suggested, “I'm not sure that we 
really understand. I certainly don't understand... entirely how we as individuals have an 
impact on the globe as a whole” (Interview Met Office), and at one point he explicitly 
expressed unease with the ‘think global act local’ focus of the WWF on account 
uncertainty about the role of individuals. Yet this was juxtaposed a few moments later 
with repeated emphasis on his purpose “to bring it down to an individual scale to let 
them see where they sit in the great big scheme of things” (Interview Met Office). He 
also encouraged attention to SDC’s Sustainability Without Growth Report, expressing a 
strong emphasis on questions of equity and anti-market led approaches, which might be 
considered rather at odds politically with an individualistic approach: 
“my one hope… was that… the 2007-2008 banking crash would have been 
a chance to begin to change a global system, but… all the major politicians 
around the world said go for growth... It was a chance perhaps to begin to 
tone that down a bit but I don't think we took it” (Interview Met Office). 
 
This suggests that such commitments are not coherent and cohesive and illustrates the 
way in which people’s value systems are often cognitively dissonant (Festinger, 1962). 
However rather than causing discomfort as Festinger suggests, such dissonance is instead 
a mundane character of the balancing of plural values and subject positions that can 
never reach closure (Mouﬀe, 1993: 77). 
7.2.3 Summary of scientific passions 
These two narratives demonstrate scientists constructing alternative and multiple 
subjectivities through boundary work that legitimise different forms of political voice. 
They both attempt to redress the difficulty that Swyngedouw identified that “climate 
change… does not call a political subject into being” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 224). Such 
passionate accounts of scientists are not unusual, as Majone highlighted: “many 
outstanding scientists have not been loath to use persuasion when the situation seemed 
to require it” (1989: 37) and Latour and Woolgar described scientists as a tribe (1986: 17) 
“not very different from any other tribe… they have beliefs. They have practices. They 
work, they gossip, and they worry about the future” (Law, 2004: 19). In constructing 
legitimate political subjectivities, flexible multiple boundary working particularly 
between the personal and professional domain (Interviews: CXC-R4, CXC-D2, CXC-R11) 
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and between science and science communication (Interview Met Office) enabled the 
boundary around science to be reconstituted along different lines. Construction of 
legitimacy and subjectivity relies on the cumulative interaction of many boundaries that 
are not always consistent or coherent but through alternating sharpening and blurring, 
serve to strengthen and defend the science policy boundary from attack by diffusing the 
site of boundary dispute.  However, the types of discourse enabled are often still aligned 
with dominant discursive value framings that emphasise individual freedom and 
responsibility. Mouffe understands subjectivities as always constituted through specific 
discursive relations between legitimacy and power, as discussed in Chapter 6. Given her 
emphasis on the role of hegemonic discourse in setting the terms through which 
legitimacy is claimed, these scientific articulations may have been able to achieve 
legitimate political expression precisely because they reproduce an emphasis on 
individual responsibility for action and do not challenge hegemonic power.  
 
7.3 Collective political voice: Resistances within boundary 
work  
In contrast to scientists who appeared able to legitimate strong value positions in a 
personal capacity (as long as distinctions between their personal and professional roles 
are performed) for many boundary actors a division between personal and professional 
conduct appeared more difficult to uphold. During the self-identification exercise 
(described in Chapter 3) one boundary actor challenged division of personal and 
professional capacities suggesting that for many working in the climate change field: 
“This is personal for a lot of people” (Interview CXC-S1). For boundary actors passionate 
voices of scientists are important for communicating a powerful message and for 
challenging policy. One boundary actor described with puzzlement the way that 
scientists often exclude passions from their professional written reports, but would 
speak about it during personal conversations:  
“You know me… I go to people and I ask them so what did you do, when 
did you do it, why did you do it, who did you do it with, what happened? 
((laughs)... that’s how I get my information… because, I find that most 
people write texts that aren’t very inspiring… there’s a lot of personal 
motivation in this and that often gets lost you know people try and hide 
it!… and for me to be able to communicate the importance of things or 
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the relevance of things having some of that, you know, that fire in their 
belly coming through and that very often doesn’t come through, if I ask 
them to send me a page of notes” (Interview CXC-S1, original emphasis). 
   
Here passion and fire find voice in personal verbal communication in a way that appears 
not legitimate for scientists to include within formal written reports (Van Dijk, 1989: 42).  
The third party nature of these passionate voices is important in distancing value 
positions from the boundary actor who retains his/her own claim to neutrality and 
impartiality. This generates different processes through which spaces of challenge might 
be constructed from those of scientist orators. Instead of personal enunciations, 
boundary actors often used their multiple positions to enable these third party voices to 
be heard, or worked subtly behind the scenes to reframing the types of questions being 
asked. This mobilises and circulates marginalised passions without risking the perceived 
neutrality of the boundary actors themselves. These two approaches will be discussed by 
drawing from three examples taken from both CXC and Sniffer. 
7.3.1 Utilising the voice of others – C2020 and difficult issues 
A recurrent feature of boundary work highlighted in Chapter 5 was the multiple 
affiliations of boundary actors. Among other benefits, this enables key individuals to 
speak with different ‘hats’ on behalf of third party communities who remain absent. 
Employing the voice of these third parties enables boundary actors to represent 
particular discourses and values in debates, whilst retaining their own neutrality by 
positioning such values as those of others distanced (temporarily) from the speaker. This 
extends the reach of particular discursive framings into spaces not otherwise able to be 
accessed by these communities directly thereby enabling their discursive circulation. One 
example of this can be seen in the cross-interaction between CXC and the C2020 private 
sector business group upon which the CXC Policy Director sits.  
The wearing of multiple hats by the CXC Policy Director is mutually beneficial for both 
groups. It allows CXC and ECCI to have a seat at the C2020 table, providing organisational 
interest driven benefits as well as the possibility for influencing the meaning of discursive 
nodes - injecting wider sustainability discourses into conversations of C2020 that tend to 
be narrowly carbon focused (RN: C2020-M). It also allows the C2020 to have a useful 
catalyst for activity. The CXC Policy Officer described his involvement in the group: 
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“I got invited on last year, partly because it was seen to be a talking shop 
and there were two or three of us… invited on specifically so that we kept 
on kicking people… we’re being treated… as a useful delivery function… 
they’ll say to me, can you just go off and do it… I’ve got various bits of 
funding that I can sort of draw on to do stuff like that… it means you’re 
starting to produce activity which people then spin off and do other 
things around” (Interview CXC-D1). 
 
One such task and finish activity involved the production of a series of papers on ‘difficult 
issues’ produced under the remit of the C2020 group but written by the CXC policy 
director. Here, utilisation of voices from elsewhere is operating on a number of levels. 
Firstly, the C2020 is a useful third party voice for the Scottish Government. The CXC 
Policy Director explained how the Chair of the C2020 Group “was very aware that the 
Scottish Government… is in a very weak place” (Interview CXC-D1) to enforce social 
behaviour change partly because political buy–in to such programmes is weak and the 
Government are “very sensitive to the fact that if you have the government of the day 
continually hammering on ‘you’ve got to stop doing this, you’ve got to do this… that you 
immediately set up a resentment and a fight back” (Interview CXC-D1). In the interests of 
securing greater public buy-in the Policy Director describes: 
“The aim was to say on some of these difficult issues, we don’t want it to 
be the Government Minister who is saying why aren’t we doing x, y or z, 
you actually want some of the leading businesses to be saying why don’t 
we do x, y or z, because that actually gives a huge amount of political 
space for the politicians to be saying ooh actually look… leading 
businesses are talking about this can we have a conversation about it so 
it’s not seen to be the Government telling people what to do” (Interview 
CXC-D1). 
 
Using the voice of C2020 provides the Government with a way to explore such questions 
through utilising the voice of the C2020 business community. Secondly however, using 
the ECCI/CXC lead with external affiliation outside the C2020 group provides a third party 
voice for C2020. While members of the C2020 identified the ‘difficult issues’, not all 
discussions would necessarily be considered acceptable by C2020 members for 
publication in their name C2020-M). Asking the CXC Policy Director to draft the reports 
on behalf of the C2020 group that can then be signed-off, or not, distances C2020 
members from any report recommendations. This legitimates the C2020 group in the 
eyes of its members, whilst allowing these difficult issues to be pursued on behalf of the 
Scottish Government. As was suggested at the meeting attended, 
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“this is not the C2020 endorsing any position but endorsing the need for 
debate so on that basis we’re happy to support public debate” (RN: 
C2020-M). 
 
Thirdly, the production of such reports would not necessarily be seen as within the 
legitimate remit of CXC (concerned with utilisation of science directly in Government), or 
of ECCI (concerned with generation of low carbon business opportunities). Conducting 
such a report on behalf of the C2020 group legitimates the Policy Director’s involvement 
outside his two primary organisational roles.  
Exactly where the push for this type of political discussion around difficult issues 
originated – the Scottish Government, the chair of the C2020, or the Policy Director – 
remained unclear, but the effect is to create “a dialogue within society, which allows 
some of these really tricky issues… (and) trade-offs… to come to the fore” (Interview 
CXC-D1). It appears that while debates around more political aspects of socioeconomic 
change are desired by a number of different actors, there are difficulties over 
legitimating this debate using ones’ own voice. This collective use of the voices of others 
elsewhere opens space for political debate in ways that the Scottish Government, C2020, 
the ECCI or CXC would have been unable to do on their own. Utilising third party voices is 
understood not as building consensus in this case but as ensuring the distancing and 
always elsewhere nature of passionate voices, that can be mobilised whilst the claim to 
neutrality of the speaker is maintained. This enables boundary and policy actors to stage 
particular political debates, lubricating the flows of particular knowledges and enabling 
difficult issues or challenges to established values to be raised without the responsibility 
of owning them. Creating a dispersed third party voice from which one can personally 
distance oneself is one way to stake claim to a fantasy of neutrality or what Haraway has 
referred to as the God trick (1997: 285). This undermines any notion of a contained, 
intentional actor and instead suggests that such political challenge can only be produced 
collectively and in the presence of an absent other.   
7.3.2 Trust and reframing the question   
A second way in which boundary actors opened up political challenge to the particular 
framings of climate change within policy was through slowly establishing sufficient trust 
to start reframing the questions being asked, which Goerminne describes as “the 
irreducible political moment that is situated at the point of determining what ‘the issue 
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at stake’ is” (2012: 161). The RESAS Manager within Scottish Government described the 
importance of “stepping back and asking you know asking about the rationale behind 
things” (Interview SG2) when providing analytical services to policy teams whose 
information requests generally focus on “asking about numbers… how can we best justify 
the policy… what are the costs and benefits” (Interview SG2). This process of questioning 
the assumptions that frame questions was emphasised within CXC primarily around 
reshaping questions to enable scientists to be able to better respond. However, these re-
shapings also offer the potential for subtle challenge and influence of the types of 
questions being asked. As the knowledge manager described informally after a workshop 
to a colleague who expressed concern that CXC were overly reliant on the Scottish 
Government “but we won’t [name removed], we tell them what their need is and then 
they come to us to do it” (RN: CXC Away-Day).  
Importantly for CXC, this ability depends on an established relation of trust, beyond 
immediate call-down responses, to enable a relationship that includes challenge. As the 
CXC Policy Director described: 
“To me is all about person to person trust… if you trust the person 
opposite when they say something you'll listen, if you don't trust them or 
you don't know them particularly well it’s just another bit of paper and 
you've got lots of bits of paper… so an awful lot of what we're trying to do 
is actually build trust, and once you've got that trust then they start to 
come to you… that's fantastic… because at that point you've then got… 
control of knowledge exchange… you can start to, operate the other way… 
we can start to shape the questions… you can start to shape policy… but 
you've got to get that trust first so you've first of all got to deliver the 
product the service properly and only then will they trust you and then 
you can start to shape going forwards” (Interview CXC-D1, emphasis 
added). 
  
Demonstrating a desire to exert influence on policy beyond just responding to the needs 
of policy makers, this quote exemplifies the important role that trust is seen as playing in 
enabling spaces and relations of challenge to be sustained within the scope of 
organisational legitimacy – challenge too much and trust and legitimacy fail. It is worth 
noting that in this instance, an actor who uses the term translation perhaps most 
prolifically, choses the language of ‘knowledge exchange’ when describing a more 
challenging relationship with policy. For the CXC knowledge officer such trust was built 
on a history of demonstrated value for the audience, without which “you just shout from 
the side-lines and nobody will listen” (Interview CXC-S3). Managing this critical distance 
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was a challenge for which a balance had to be carefully negotiated between traction and 
proximity to the concerns of stakeholders and the need to not being sucked in but keep a 
distance (Interview CXC-S3-2). In the ability to challenge, trust and legitimacy are thereby 
held in relational tension. Owens suggests trust is not simply given, but carefully 
constructed through boundary work building legitimacy and reputation (2012: 14). The 
time required to develop such trust might account for the lack of overt challenge during 
CXC’s first two years of operation. Rein and Shon observe that individuals with strong 
relational trust may use this to resolve controversy (Rein and Shon, 1993: 159) but in this 
case, trust is positioned as essential for generating subtle disruption through challenge. 
Again in this case the legitimation of political voice is both dispersed and achieved, not 
given, and something emphasised as distinctive to CXC “as the Government’s advisor” 
(Interview CXC-S1). 
7.3.3 Alliances of the willing and political collectives  
Accounts of political challenge encountered so far demonstrate a plethora of ways in 
which particular passionate actors are finding ways to legitimate a form of political voice 
through boundary working. However, empirical research also encountered passionate 
yet frustrated voices like that of the scientist that opened section 7.2 who are not finding 
ways to construct legitimacy for a political voice within their professional context. For 
these individuals and organisations, Sniffer plays an important role in creating a 
networked collective, an “alliance of willing” (Interviews: Sniffer 1, Sniffer 2) and hosting 
and staging events and forums through which these voices might be heard. During the 
empirical research there were several examples of events and workshops which Sniffer 
catalysed in partnership with other organisations to create forums for discussion around 
issues that are not always profiled within mainstream public or private sector decision 
making. Examples include a Scottish Government hosted conference on climate justice 
organised jointly with Sniffer and Joseph Rowntree Foundation (held in 2012) (discussed 
in Chapter 5) and a workshop on the role of values in transformational change (held in 
2015). Sniffer described their networks of professionals in different public private and 
community sectors across Scotland as a network of “lonely people in need of support” 
(Sniffer 2). The communications manager elaborated: 
“The people we work with within Sniffer… a single planner here within 
that local authority or some, community group enthusiast, I mean, some 
of these people are very lonely… they have, hhhh a lot of passion and not 
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enough support a lot of the time and you cannot support people by 
making written text available to them, you know, you support people by , 
making them feel good, making them feel like this is worth keeping on 
doing and… they will very often say you know, yeah I want the science, I 
want the climate information, but actually that’s not what they need, 
what they need is a pat on the back and someone saying I totally agree 
with you this is really really important, you know, because it isn’t the 
climate science that’s going to persuade people out there or the 
community group or the rest of the council… we act on feelings” 
(Interview Sniffer 2, original emphasis). 
 
This account brings home the extent to which Sniffer takes seriously the psychological 
consequences of being a marginalised voice within structures which frame value 
priorities differently. Sniffer support goes far beyond science provision but addresses the 
emotional support of marginalised voices, providing both its employees and its network 
a sense of belonging and a collective that counters the alienation felt. Sniffer also stages 
forums through which these voices can be heard more widely – reproducing and 
widening the circulation of marginalised discourses. For example, at the Climate Justice 
conference, one social scientist that works within CXC challenged the Scottish 
Government over their focus on behaviour programmes, rather than growth in industry 
and private sector induced high carbon lifestyles. She described allocation of 
responsibility to a lay public as an injustice that was missing from the conference agenda 
(RN: Sniffer-CJ). Whilst in this instance this challenge was dismissed from further 
discussion, repeated circulation of such discursive frames and debates through 
normalisation at events start to build legitimacy and traction within what policy actors 
and politicians come to expect are the concerns of the electoral public. The work of 
Sniffer therefore helps to support the development of political collectives and to stage 
opportunities for discursive disruptions to hold voice. This is a role that Sniffer is able to 
perform in ways that CXC are not. 
7.3.4 Summary of boundary actors passions 
In summary, boundary actors are constructing channels through which spaces and 
subjectivities for political challenge can be opened up through using or enabling third 
party voices and reframing the questions others are asking, without threatening their 
own claim to value neutrality. This is a way of legitimating the circulation of alternative 
discursive value framings and finding ways to open up subjectivities and forms of 
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legitimation that enable and support wider political voices and the formation of 
alternative collectives.  
One important finding is the way in which different boundary organisations studied had 
differences between them in terms of the type of work or discursive framing perceived 
as legitimate. During one interview this was expressed through the idea of 
‘organisational personality’: 
“I call it organisational personality but it’s to do with who you are because that 
informs so many of the choices about how as an organisation you behave …who 
do you speak to, what kind of language do you use, and that is quite different 
for Sniffer as a you know as a charity, ClimateXChange, Adaptation Scotland, 
Urban Nexus, you know they all have their different little…((tailing off))” 
(Interview Sniffer 2). 
There is significant crossover in terms of shared staff, shared premises and or shared 
projects among boundary organisations in Scotland, with particular people often holding 
multiple different roles and affiliations. It is suggested that such blurring of 
organisational boundaries offers more than straightforward financial and knowledge 
sharing benefits: it is also strategic, enabling flexibility in boundary working and providing 
access to different forms of science–policy interaction that may be considered legitimate 
for one organization but not another. Understanding these different ‘organisational 
personalities’ as legitimating different types of discursive engagement deepens the 
understanding of why many boundary actors have multiple affiliations. As Miller notes in 
the case of boundary organisations “differences and interactions with each other may be 
just as important as their interactions with science and politics, per se” (Miller, 2001a: 
484). 
 
7.4 Analysis of cases of resistance – reclaiming Political 
subjectivity  
The five examples profiled in sections 7.2 and 7.3 demonstrate ways in which scientists 
and boundary actors are finding ways to open up new spaces and subjectivities through 
which they can exert political influence (Table 7.1). 
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These cases demonstrate that boundary work is not just occurring between a singular 
science – policy boundary but through multiple boundaries that are constructed and 
transgressed differently. Both STS and Mouffian literatures highlight the contingency of 
such boundaries. Where Latour’s approach pushes agency onto the scientist, Mouffe’s 
work focuses attention on the construction of the possibility for these alternative 
Table 7.1: Summary of the five empirical cases of alternative boundary workings. 
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subjectivities and moments of re-articulation as temporary fixings within discursive 
relations of power (Mouffe, 2013: 73). With subject positions created through discursive 
openings, this helps to understand why the process of re-articulation is both difficult 
(requiring complex boundary working) and dependant as much on the ability to create 
such openings, as on expression of agency itself, however collective. Mouffe’s account of 
passions, and the inability to fully reach any constructed identity, helps to account for 
the motivational forces for political identification. The plurality of value positions in 
relation to knowledge, provide the discursive fixation around which these identities and 
passions become mobilised. This section builds on empirical findings to consider some of 
the implications raised from these findings, arranged in three themes: the emerging 
nature of subjectivities, values and forms of legitimation; the role of neutrality and 
values in boundary work; and the affectual implications of these interactions on subjects 
themselves.  
7.4.1 Producing values, subjectivities, and legitimacy alongside 
knowledge  
The first point to emphasise is the multiple forms of subjectivity, legitimacy and 
discursive value framings that are constructed during the processes of boundary work. 
These are outcomes from boundary processes in ways not necessarily pre-envisaged. In 
the five examples profiled, actors constructed themselves – as heroic, active, passionate, 
and charismatic subjects - through their relational encounters and performances that 
create orientations towards particular forms of action. As Throgmorten identified, “by 
our choice of how to write and speak, by our choice of tropes, we create images of the 
kinds of characters we are or want to become” (1993: 121). While sometimes there is 
strong awareness of political implications (as in the example of fear), at other-times the 
political implications are less clear to actors (as in the case of personalisation), 
demonstrating the way that meaning always exceeds the intentionality of actors. 
However, in these narratives scientists are redefining their subjectivity – what it means 
to be a scientist and where its boundaries are drawn.  
Likewise, legitimacy emerges in these processes as an outcome of boundary work 
(Jasanoff, 1990). These empirical findings suggest that rather than any single site of 
science–policy separation, such legitimacy is produced through the cumulative 
interaction of multiple interacting instances of temporary boundary hardening that 
251 
 
construct alternative forms of science–policy boundaries in the face of parallel boundary 
transgression. Mouffe suggests “the drawing of the frontier between the legitimate and 
the illegitimate is always a political decision, and that it should therefore always remain 
open to contestation” (2005: 121). In this chapter several examples of the stretching, 
contesting and redefining of the boundaries of legitimacy have been presented. These 
include boundary crossings of 7.2 to the subtle (re)framing of questions and mobilising 
voices in 7.3. Emerging from these accounts are ways that multiple boundaries interact, 
are hardened (simultaneously or a posteriori) in response to perceived weakening of 
legitimacy during transgression, or are softened to accommodate boundary work.  
Values, like subjectivities and legitimacy, are seen to emerge through the production of 
knowledge, not in advance of it, particularly illustrated by sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. As the 
Met Office Government Advisor describes, “fifteen years ago the last thing in the world I 
would have believed in was climate change” (UHI Inverness, 2010). Values emerge 
relationally through the entanglements of experience, models, projections, actions, 
relations with other actors and events. Neither pre-existent nor contained in a discrete 
individualist sense, values instead come into being and effect discursively. Each of the 
accounts profiled in sections 7.2 and 7.3, like other narratives of boundary work, 
demonstrate the inability of separating knowledge and values (Miller, 2001a: 496; 
Backstrand, 2003: 28; Jasanoff, 2003a: 160), disrupting the official value neutrality of 
science to draw attention to the plurality of boundary workings that legitimate value 
engaged political voices at the science–policy interface. Neither Latour’s nor Mouffe’s 
notion of values is essentialist, pointing back to a pre-existent essence, but instead is an 
articulation, pointing forwards to active relational interactions with future states - 
political outcomes about which subjects become passionate. Similarly, each actor 
becomes a passionate voice through his performative boundary interactions. 
Mouffe’s focus on the relationship between legitimacy and power is useful in 
understanding why scientists and other actors do not rise immediately to Latour’s 
request to stand behind their values. With legitimacy constituted through hegemonic 
discursive structures – “within a particular system of meaning and values” (Howarth, 
2000: 115) and subject positions, never given but needing to be articulated through 
struggles of power within these discursive structures (Mouﬀe, 1993: 78) –  these 
scientists only have limited capacity to rearticulate forms of subjectivity and legitimate 
articulations within the scope of hegemonic discourse. These empirical accounts both 
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draw attention to the way in which actors are actively constructing forms of subjectivity 
and legitimacy but also the ways in which these are constrained through the relationship 
of legitimacy and hegemonic power.  
7.4.2 Neutrality and legitimation through boundary work  
The performance of neutrality appears important for all science–policy actors in 
legitimation of their work. In some cases neutrality is managed through emphasis on one 
boundary instead of another, for example the professional/personal, and in others 
through the mobilisation of third person narratives ensuring value-based voices are 
always held elsewhere. In section 7.2, where boundaries between the personal and 
professional were clearly blurred through presentations, these boundaries were 
strengthened when attention was cast to blurring of other boundaries such as those 
around value neutrality. In section 7.3 the mobilisation of voices elsewhere through all 
three strategies of boundary actors – utilising third party voices, encouraging the 
reframing of questions and supporting the development of political collectives – enabled 
boundary actors to circulate more overtly value rich discourses whilst retaining a claim to 
their own neutrality.  
Beneath the surface of these narratives of science, of civil service and of boundary work 
as neutral, impersonal, detached spaces, science–policy interaction can be seen to be 
undertaken by passionate people for whom not only is the separation of values and facts 
difficult to maintain, but for whom such values matter. Exploring discursive associations 
with climate change, through the self-identification and drawing exercises during 
interviews, started to unpack the diversity of these values among scientists, boundary 
and policy actors in Scotland. The recurrence of passionate narratives suggests that there 
is a much bigger iceberg of unheard voices, excluded from constructing legitimacy at the 
science policy interface, prompting questions of what public discourses on climate 
change would sound like if these voices were able to be heard? It seems ironic that many 
of the ‘experts’ to whom Scottish Government is turning for knowledge and solutions to 
climate change are unable to express their value positions developed in relation to their 
knowledge in full recognition of the hybridity of knowledge. Further, these accounts 
draw attention to the relations between boundary work, values and legitimation which 
are allowing other values to be naturalised in public climate change discourses. 
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Sayer suggests that equating values with personal bias (as many participant narratives 
did) has the effect of encouraging values to be discounted in our assessments as 
“personal biases that one ideally should confess to, so that others will at least be able to 
‘take them into account’, that is, to discount them” (2011: 10). This resonated with policy 
actor narratives in which one of the many ways that legitimacy was constructed in the 
Scottish Climate Change Adaptation Programme was through consulting a plurality of 
values such that different values cancel each other out (Interview SG3), and was echoed 
by other policy makers, who described legitimate policy making as involving consultation 
of “a range of experts and then taking the balance of opinions, it’s never consulting one 
expert” (Interview SG6) and those who emphasised getting “a wide spread of expertise” 
(Interview SGA2). This need for multiple views arose from the explicit association of 
values with bias – “everyone's expertise is coloured by value… so, you don't want to have 
just one… we would tend to use a range” (Interview SG4). Seeking neutrality through 
abstraction from competing values draws from a Habermasian understanding of ideal 
discourse in which personal values are eliminated from collective rational debate. 
Engagement with Sayer is useful in drawing attention to the way in which claims to 
public neutrality are made through this ‘discounting’ of values.  
Sayer also suggests the demarcation of values to the private sphere, “protects them from 
challenge” (2011: 28) and is an obstacle to considering how such values influence day-to-
day practices. This was clearly demonstrated in one interview where a policy maker 
described the views of a middle manager as causing significant difficulties in generating a 
strong climate policy response (Interview CXC-R1) and another who described the way in 
which the “personal biases of officials” was recurrently felt as a blockage to activity 
(Interview SG4). While it is tempting to use Sayer’s critique to understand relegation of 
values to the private sphere as a form of hegemonic boundary practice regulating which 
values are able to circulate within public discourse, in the examples profiled in section 
7.2, scientists were able to use simultaneous boundary transgression and construction 
between the personal (private) and professional (public) boundary more creatively to 
enable the voicing of discursive value framings. Further, section 7.2.2 also highlighted 
that not all values are treated the same. Where environmental values are positioned as 
legitimate only within the personal sphere, business values appear to be constructed as 
neutral and legitimate within public decision-making. This suggests that as well as 
protecting values from critique boundary work around what is positioned as a value and 
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what neutral or value free contributes to a practice of hegemony through which some 
values are naturalised and others denied discursive circulation.  
Neutrality, is a complex term understood as the opposite of values but also of bias 
(impartiality), interests (disinterestedness) and passion (dispassionate). These 
oppositions to values are often conflated in a “logic of equivalence” but in disarticulating 
these chains of equivalence it is possible to consider how values might be re-articulated 
with politics (Mouffe), with reasoning (Sayer and Jasanoff) and with knowledge (STS). 
Drawing from Mouffe’s definition of hegemony as a “mutual collapse – between 
objectivity and power” (2000: 24) legitimacy may be understood to be produced for 
some values within public discourse through claims to objectivity and neutrality. This can 
be seen in the instance of business values in section 7.2.1 and through consumer logics 
of change in section 7.2.2, whilst throughout both examples it was maintained that 
values were being kept out of articulation. It is precisely in drawing attention to the value 
dimensions of such discourses that the contingency of their hegemonic status might be 
profiled. 
7.4.4 Affectual dimensions and the legitimation of political voice 
One final notable observation in Scotland was that those who were able to construct 
legitimacy for their voices demonstrated optimism and positivity about the challenges of 
addressing climate change, whereas those who had not, displayed a sense of 
disempowerment and a loss of hope. The scientist using fear in his communication 
(section 7.2.1) suggested:  
“If I didn't feel that I was doing some good in an organisation that does 
some good, I wouldn't be here. I'm absolutely clear about that, I'd be 
straight out the door” (Interview: SGA4, original emphasis).  
 
The scientist taking a personalisation approach (section 7.2.2) stated:   
“What keeps me awake at night?… not a lot – largely because I'm getting 
out there and doing things about it; if I wasn't doing things about it then it 
very well might keep me awake” (Interview: Met Office).  
 
Finally, in section 4.2.5 the Policy Director of CXC whose utilisation of ‘different hats’ 
enabled the construction of a distributed political voice through the voices of others, 
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described the experience of working in Scotland as refreshing in comparison to England – 
stating that “there is a genuine belief that you can achieve something here. And that is 
so, so refreshing I have to say” (Interview CXC-D1). This positive atmosphere was not 
suggested to be the result of any radical difference in environmental thinking, but more 
to do with Scotland’s smaller size and density of networks enabling more sense of 
making a difference (Interview CXC-D1). This can be interpreted as more capability for 
political voice. Participation in public discourse through legitimated forms of political 
expression appears to play an important part in this optimism.  
In contrast, in cases where legitimate political voice is unable to be secured, 
estrangement between existing identities and those of the professional discourses in 
which they work generate a sense of disempowerment and a loss of hope. This is 
manifest in Sniffer’s narratives of lonely people (Interview Sniffer 2), accounts of these 
isolated people themselves (Interview Climsave 3), in Scottish Government policy 
narratives that suggested the inability to tackle entrenched interests or population 
growth means “the most likely outcome is the destruction of most of nature as we know 
it” (Interview SG2). It was also observed in voices of scientists not finding ways to 
construct political voice (Interview CXC-R10) and among boundary actors who, having 
had legitimate political expression in the SDC, felt confinement in the scope of political 
challenge enabled within CXC (AMB). One CXC boundary actor described the weariness 
and despair of the constant difficulty of fighting for systemic change: 
“It’s about our current, economic, or socioeconomic structures… we're 
kind of locked in at present, we haven't managed to work out a way of 
unlocking the system… we are where we are kind of thing (.2) ((sighing)) 
societally, globally… from a personal point of view I kind of feel that, 
we've brought it on ourselves and we kind of perhaps deserve it because 
we're a species that doesn't seem to be able to actually look after itself or 
the planet on which we live, and historically we've been pretty good at 
killing each other and not so good at many other things” (Interview CXC-
S3). 
 
A whole host of passionate actors at the science–policy interface are becoming weary of 
the endless effort of battling against a carbon intensive socio-economic headwind. 
Another boundary actor described:  
“It’s difficult to do because we are living in the system that we’re living in 
and very often I feel ((weary and shaky)) that all this kind of this you know 
the Scottish Government Go-Greener and all these things its asking 
people to go against the system, swim against the tide it’s very hard to do 
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on a personal, there’s a lot of talk of you know, we need behaviour 
change, we need people to insulate their lofts, and turn off their lights but 
actually what we need  is political will or business will or you know, to say 
this system is not the only system. You know?” (Interview CXC-S1, original 
emphasis). 
 
A conversation with one policy actor (economist) started by describing the challenge as a 
personal problem of “discipline and mindfulness” to achieve personal behaviour change 
but his account quickly bled into emphasis on the need for more systemic change: 
“it’s about behaviour change, personal behaviour change, er but really it’s 
about changing the system in which we which we work… really the whole 
economy geared towards growth, it doesn’t work… it’s not enough you 
know to believe that… we can tweak the current system” (Interview SG2). 
 
Whilst the Scottish Government are focussing on addressing behaviour change 
programmes that target individuals, these accounts communicate a frustration amongst 
practitioners around the lack of structural change. What these narratives indicate is that 
the feeling of active political participation is generating a positive feedback in energising 
boundary actors in their work of opening up alternative political discourses, spaces and 
subjectivities, where those who are not finding spaces to create these opportunities are 
becoming despondent and apathetic. 
 In the face of climate change there are no subjectivities waiting to be uncovered 
(Mouffe, 2012) rather these have to be re-articulated and constructed through 
oppositional identities (Mouffe, 2012) in ways that are discursively produced but can 
never be closed nor exhaust their possibilities (Howarth, 2000). This struggle for re-
articulation however demands energised and passionate, not weary subjects. An area for 
further research is the extent to which such weariness is related to not finding 
opportunities for expressing political subjectivity. Supporting re-articulation is therefore 
dependant on hearing voices that are not able to express themselves (Mouffe, 2012). As 
such, Mouffe’s approach provides a source of hope to those marginalised voices who 
Braidotti claims require ‘new frameworks for the identification of common points of 
reference and values in order to come to terms with staggering transformations we are 
witnessing’ (2013: 196). But how might these agonistic expressions take shape in the 
absence of public reasoning? Jasanoff argues that openings and alternatives will always 
have interaction with scientific knowledge and so, like Sayer, suggests attention should 
focus on the “politics of public reason” (Jasanoff, 2012b: 27). Both Sayer and Jasanoff 
makes a clear distinction between rationality and reason (Sayer, 2011: 61-62; Jasanoff, 
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2012b: 281). Rather than being an impasse, it is suggested that this is an area for fruitful 
interaction between the three theorists, and is a debate that is revisited in Chapter 8.  
 
7.5 Multiple boundary working and constructing subjectivity  
In contrast to the previous two chapters that described a restrictive role for boundary 
work in which the possibility of challenging policy values was described as limited, this 
chapter draws attention to ways in which scientists and boundary actors are opening up 
spaces for constructing political voice through alternative forms of boundary work that 
construct subjectivity and legitimacy differently. In these instances multiple boundaries 
interact, to construct legitimacy and subjectivity in different ways; serving as a reminder 
that processes of legitimation are discursively contingent and foregrounding the 
contested politics of boundary work.  
Examples of reclaiming political subjectivity – profiled through narratives of 
personalisation, fear, employing the voices of others, reframing the questions and 
supporting generation of political collectives – have brought to the fore different 
processes through which political challenge to the lack of political action on climate 
change is becoming legitimated. In each case, these examples contest, stretch and 
redefine both where and how this boundary of legitimacy is drawn, and in so-doing re-
politicise boundaries of legitimation. Reconstructing alternative boundaries involves 
interplay between multiple interacting sites of boundary work such that when one 
boundary is breached, attention is directed to another that becomes emphasised and 
hardened in an attempt to reconstitute a clear science–policy boundary. As a result the 
way that legitimacy is constructed differs, but the overall distinction between science 
and policy becomes resistant to attack precisely through the shifting sites of boundary 
work. This illustrates Jasanoff’s argument that: 
“The robustness of policy-relevant knowledge… is constituted, in my view, by a 
cluster of highly specialized, routinized, opaque, and unreflexive micro-
practices, which may add up to hegemonic formations” (Jasanoff, 2011b: 310). 
Multiple, cumulative, overlapping but not coherent or discrete, boundaries serve to 
protect inconsistencies that would reveal their contingent construction. The way in 
which these boundaries interrelate and mutually construct a science policy boundary 
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further illustrate the cumulative interrelating micro-boundaries introduced in Chapter 4 
and constitutes the work that Miller referred to as hybrid management (2001).  
These accounts indicate a more vibrant, active and resistant people than the previous 
chapters allowed, with boundary actors achieving some success in opening up points of 
challenge through mobilising the voices of third parties, emotionally supporting political 
collectives and subtly reframing questions being asked. The scientific narratives profiled 
too demonstrate differences in approach, from neoliberal characteristics such as 
demanding individual responses and promoting change through purchasing power, to 
utilising fear to mobilise civil acquiescence to potentially unpopular policy decisions. 
Although implying greater regulation, this last narrative is also mixed up with prioritising 
private sector modes of operation within the public sector and mobilising imaginaries of 
fear that Swyngedouw after Boltanski and Chiapello suggest is indicative of the cultural 
politics of capitalism (Swyngedouw, 2010). As such they do not appear to escape 
hegemonic discourses of neoliberal governance. Litfin suggests that because “networks 
of resistance… [and] counter discourses are always entwined with the hegemony they 
oppose, the two stand in a relation of ‘conflicted intimacy’” (1994: 38). This prompts the 
recollection of Crowder’s critique of Mouffe in Chapter 2 that suggests that “even the 
most radical normative alternatives we could imagine must be in some way complicit 
with existing structures” (Crowder, 2006: 12). The empirical examples profiled in this 
chapter therefore attest to the difficulty of constructing alternative subjectivities against 
the sedimentation of a non-neutral playing field of discursive relations. Furthermore, in 
the big picture of science–policy interaction, these voices are still relatively small, there 
are many voices remaining unheard. New forms of boundary work are constructing 
divisions between the personal and professional sphere as boundaries around value-free 
science are breached that construct legitimacy in equally restrictive ways. Although 
resisting translation as a process of science–policy interaction, these particular framings 
and subjectivities are still dependant on achieving legitimation through their discursive 
alignment.  
In this process of constructing subjectivities, values and forms of legitimation, results are 
unpredictable, and always escape the subject’s intent – the outcomes of confrontation 
are not pre-figured (Mouffe, 2013: 28). This chapter has sought to complicate the rather 
sterile picture of translation presented in the previous two chapters, by paying attention 
to the diversity of alternatives which Mouffe suggests are always present within any 
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hegemony. Where some actors have been successful in constructing a political voice, and 
appeared hopeful about the future, other voices encountered during interviews had not 
secured a public hearing and were often expressed as frustrated, angry or antipathetic. 
The extent to which hope is related to perceived legitimation of a political voice warrants 
further investigation. Mouffe’s attention to alternatives, exclusions and marginalised 
voices helps to profile these more contested approaches and her emphasis on expanding 
the discursive space to enable political debate around alternative discursive value 
framings nurtures hope for widening the legitimacy of political engagement with climate 
change.  
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 Chapter 8.
Drawing the Thesis to a Close:  
In Search of the Elephant and Elpis 
 
The question of values in science–policy interaction might be described as the elephant 
in the room – with formal narratives of scientists, boundary actors and policy-makers 
alike, upholding narratives of neutrality with respect to their own practices. While many 
recognize values to be important in general, few find values easy to discuss in relation to 
their own work. This thesis has focused attention on the practices of boundary work and 
the complex interactions between values, boundary work and legitimation. This final 
chapter reflects on the findings of research first in relation to the research questions 
posed through the three themes of translation, legitimation and values, which structured 
the research. It then discusses the usefulness of Chantal Mouffe’s conceptual approach 
to science–policy analysis, beginning with what Mouffe’s work enables, and then 
considering what her approach tackles less well and ways in which benefits of theoretical 
dialogue with STS may work both ways. Theoretical and methodological contributions 
made by the research are then set out alongside the research’s limitations, and the 
implications for science–policy practice are discussed. The chapter concludes with three 
areas identified for future research. 
 
8.1 Reflections on research findings 
This thesis began with an aim to explore the value politics of boundary work at the 
Scottish climate science–policy interface. Conceptualizing the problem of climate change 
not as a scientific problem but as a values–based problem, it sought to utilize Mouffe’s 
political theory to complement STS approaches in examining the types of discursive value 
262 
 
framings that were enabled or disabled from circulating during science–policy 
interaction. With relations between values and hegemonic power in particular focus, 
foregrounding values was perceived to offer a potential way of contesting hegemony, 
through de-articulating the collapse between objectivity and claims to power (Mouffe, 
2000: 14).  
The research was structured through three research questions: 
1. How do values and knowledge interact during processes of boundary work at 
the climate science–policy interface in Scotland?  
2. Through what processes is legitimacy constructed for particular discursive 
value framings through boundary work?  
3. What effects do different processes of boundary work have on the types of 
policy action being considered in response to climate change? 
Reflections on these research findings are structured according to the three conceptual 
themes – values, legitimation and translation – that evolved through the research. In 
each case, key findings are outlined then discussed. The specific research questions are 
then briefly addressed by way of a section summary. 
8.1.1 Translation 
Translation within CXC is a particular process of boundary work, one among several 
approaches that CXC uses. Empirical examination of this process suggests that CXC 
translation involves particular political relations expressed through knowledge that 
encourage the reproduction of existing policy discursive value framings.  
Key finding 1: Translation may be understood as an extension of a ‘logic of equivalence’ 
and thereby a practice of hegemony 
Chapter 5 described the way that policy and CXC actors who described the science–policy 
boundary work undertaken as a process of translation, envisaged CXC translation as a 
process of conversion, through which meaning for scientific knowledge is constructed in 
policy terms. Although STS narratives of translation capture the political nature of 
translation as a process that does the work of difference (Law, 2007), involving change in 
knowledge during circulation (Law, 2007; Callon, 1986) and the marshalling of power as a 
passage point (Callon, 1986), the specificity of emphasis on the audience in the way CXC 
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are using the term is not well captured by STS accounts. In such accounts, translation 
could equally apply to any of the various forms of boundary working encountered. Laclau 
and Mouffe’s concept of expanding the chain of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
143-144) enables interpretation of CXC’s translation as a hegemonic practice through 
which the claim to power of particular dominant discourses is reproduced. Translation as 
a claim for equivalence seams together particular discursive value framings in an attempt 
to fix meaning in ways that accord with hegemonic discursive value framings. The focus 
on boundary work as translation within CXC helps to shape particular processes of 
interaction that privilege dominant policy discursive value framings. The concept of 
translation within CXC thereby performs discursive work in the reconfiguration of 
science–policy interactions in Scotland – putting policy values in the driving seat. 
Understanding translation within CXC as an extension of the logic of equivalence 
between policy meaning and scientific knowledge that establishes what scientific 
knowledge on climate change means in policy terms helps to capture the politics at play 
in this form of boundary working. 
Key finding 2: Legitimacy in science–policy boundary work is being constructed through 
translation as well as purification 
Examining translation across chapters 5 and 6, suggests that legitimacy is not just a 
product of the purification function of boundary work as Jasanoff first suggested 
(Jasanoff, 1990; see also Owens, 2012) but is also being constructed through processes of 
translation via the naturalization of claims to meaning in policy terms. Given the crisis for 
legitimacy arising through the inability to maintain purification of fact and value (outlined 
in chapter 2.4), proliferation of interest in demand-led science (in both theoretical and 
practitioner narratives), and reference to understanding legitimacy in policy terms (after 
Cash et al., 2002), it is perhaps unsurprising that the research found legitimacy for 
knowledge being constructed through translation. This thesis demonstrates empirically 
the way in which knowledge legitimacy is being constructed through these ‘connections’ 
with policy (understanding translations in STS terms). It also signals the politics of 
constructing legitimacy for scientific knowledge through discursive value framings of 
policy (understanding translation through Laclau and Mouffe). This opens up a new focus 
for thinking about legitimacy at the science–policy interface and prompts the need for 
critical attention to the work conducted in the name of translation. This is especially 
important given what some authors have argued is a ‘translational turn’ in social science 
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(Bachmann-Medick, 2009; Bassnett, 2011; de Lima Costa and Alvarez, 2014) for as Asdal 
et al suggest, translation does not just describe but brings about the world in particular 
ways (Asdal et al., 2007: 29).  
Impact of thinking about translation 
While not all Scottish science is about translation as CXC deploy the term (CXC scientists 
do work outside CXC and Scottish Government has wider programmes of funding 
‘strategic research’) increasing pressure from the academic impact agenda of the UK’s 
Research Excellence Framework (REF) was cited by the CXC Science Director as an 
important determinate on extending the pressure for meaning to be established through 
policy framings to all scientists: 
“Given the importance of pathways to Impact in research council funding, same 
with the EU… I think that the days of the ivory tower scientist are numbered, so 
you need to be thinking about how you're going to get that Impact out there 
and how that’s going to be translated into something that makes a difference” 
(Interview CXC-D2). 
Critical engagement with the notion of translation becomes an important question more 
widely within academia as the REF becomes increasingly focused on demonstrating a 
“translational pathway” through which HEIs should demonstrate impact (RN: CXC-AGM 
2013). Although there is a proliferation of critical engagement around the REF process 
(Watermeyer, 2014; Pain et al., 2011; Rogers et al., 2014), there is little attention to the 
concept of translation, which is often uncritical deployed (Watermeyer, 2014: 6; Matt et 
al., 2015). This chapter suggests that translation as a boundary process performs political 
work. This section suggests the implications of considering science–policy interaction as a 
process of translation are not just confined to processes of CXC.  
8.1.2 Legitimation 
Mouffe’s attention to the relation between legitimacy and power and attention to 
discursive value framings has demonstrated two additional findings about constructing 
legitimacy for knowledge that complements understanding translation as a process of 
legitimation. 
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Key finding 3: In translation, legitimation is not necessarily equally important on both 
sides 
Star and Greisemer (1989) emphasized the need for accountability for boundary objects 
on both sides of the science–policy boundary. The predominance of policy discursive 
value framings in the construction of meaning outlined in chapter 5 seemed to run 
counter to this suggestion and so chapter 6 focused on constructing legitimacy for 
knowledge during CXC’s translation process, through call-down briefings as boundary 
objects. One option could be to think of these briefings not as boundary objects in Star 
and Greisemer’s terms but as translational objects. However, at this stage there was 
insufficient reason to move away from the boundary object concept. Instead, through 
tracing three call-down examples, it was suggested that while legitimation was required 
on both sides, longer histories of discursive alignment with policy objectives appeared 
more significant in constructing knowledge legitimacy under CXC’s model of translation, 
than the more immediate respecting of epistemic values of science. The requirements 
for legitimation are therefore not necessary equally weighted on both sides. This accords 
with Miller’s suggestion that emphasis for legitimacy is on policy while emphasis for 
credibility lies more with science (2001a).  
Key finding 4: Passionate science–policy actors are legitimating political expression 
through flexible and multiple boundary working 
Where chapters 5 and 6 sought to understand translation as a form of hegemonic 
practice, chapter 7 sought to pay attention to exclusions and attempts to re-articulate 
discursive value framings differently. Attention to the multiple micro-sites of boundary 
work introduced in Chapter 4 and the way in which these interact cumulatively to 
produce an understanding of a science–policy boundary at a macro scale opened up 
attention to the different ways in which legitimacy and subjectivities at the science–
policy interface might be constructed. Alongside the restrictive demands of CXC’s 
translation, a proliferation of openings are also being constructed through alternative 
forms of boundary working that construct legitimacy differently, and enable discursive 
challenge and political subjectivities to be expressed in a range of different ways. Flexible 
and alternating boundary work, across multiple interacting boundary sites enable 
alternative configurations of legitimacy and subjectivity. As well as opening up new 
configurations, the defensibility of any science–policy boundary is increased - for as one 
boundary is transgressed, another may be emphasized such that the target of attack is 
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constantly changing, plural and even contradictory. This hybrid management (Miller, 
2001a) indicates that closure is never complete.  
Mouffe’s approach draws attention to the diverse plural passions of vibrant subjects who 
align and act in politically collective ways signalling fractures that reveal possibility for 
contestation reveal the contingency of hegemony. This complements STS approaches, 
which Jasanoff describes have a long history in showing “the dividing line between forms 
of political engagement is not fixed in advance but continually shifts in the process of 
knowledge making” (Jasanoff, 2008: online). Together they have jointly enabled 
attentiveness to these multiple and contingent boundary workings. Without Mouffe’s 
notion of passions there is little to animate these openings, and her attention to the 
relations with hegemonic power are a reminder of the difficulty such attempts face. 
While the alternatives outlined in chapter 7 should not be underestimated, it is 
nevertheless important to recognize the scale at which these attempts operate in 
comparison to mainstream emphasis on translation through CXC, and while they do 
diversify discursive space, they often do not manage to escape the hegemonic values of 
neoliberalism as Crowder and others suggest (Crowder, 2006; Carvalho and Burgess, 
2005: 1467). This is perhaps no surprise for, with no Archimedean standpoint outside of 
discourse, “the ground on which hegemonic interventions occur is never neutral… it is 
always the product of previous hegemonic practices” (Mouffe, 2014: 151). The dominant 
discursive value frameworks of policy through which legitimacy is constructed, include a 
pressure for legitimacy to be demonstrated in private sector business terms and private 
sector coalitions appeared to play a strong role in constructing or undermining legitimacy 
for policy action. Where Cash et al. highlight respecting different values in constructing 
legitimacy (2002), their approach naturalizes which values are respected and which 
excluded. Mouffe’s recognition of the relation between legitimacy and power in 
conditions of value plurality, and its contingency, makes legitimation always more 
political, more contestable and more conflictual that Cash’s narrative allows. Mouffe’s 
own attention turns to how the relationships with such alternatives are envisaged – as 
legitimate adversaries or antagonistic enemies, in recognition that relations of hegemony 
of one kind or another will be ever-present. 
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8.1.3 Values 
“Can certain of the concepts that we have learned to cherish  
be offered the opportunity for a type of development that the 
much too narrow framework of modernization has not given them?” (Latour, 
2013c: 8). 
Such is the theoretical question with which this research has ended up engaging. In many 
ways this was accidental, for when designing and planning the research the ability to 
refer to values was taken for granted. Where, when and how values operated during 
boundary work was to be the focus of research, but the concept of values per se was 
naturalized not critically engaged. However, the degree to which a notion of values as 
traditionally conceived is problematic within a post-structural framework soon became a 
quagmire in which the research was left with only a hollowed out void for subject 
matter. The thesis could not practically proceed without some conceptualization of 
‘values’ as the object of attention.  
A strategic decision was made to stick with these difficulties around the concept of 
values, as section 3.6 described. This was partly on account of the unavailability of 
alternative language to capture the sticky affectual attachments of discourse that the 
language of discourse, framing, rationalities and norms did not seem to capture. 
Rationalities as ‘ways of thinking’, for example, do not account for why things matter to 
people and why some ways of thinking become the subject of conflict. These are not only 
ways of thinking, but also concerned passionate investments that go beyond rational 
selection. As Sayer suggests, we set up a theory-practice contradiction when we bracket 
off values, normativity and connectedness in a vain attempt to project a disconnected 
rational and objective analysis because we are not treating the subjects of our research 
as we know we act ourselves (Sayer, 2011: 13). Latour’s call for climatologists to answer 
who they are representing and what are they fighting for (Latour, 2013a) is therefore not 
just a question for climatologists, scientists, or those concerned by climate change. If as 
Mouffe suggests, political identification occurs not only through rational thought but also 
through passions, the value orientations of discourse provide the substance through 
which such collective passions are invested. A narrative devoid of values is a discourse 
devoid of meaning and leaves nothing around which a passionate political conscious 
might develop. However, re-emphasizing values needs to be careful not to undo the 
valuable work that discourse theorists achieved in moving away from essentialist 
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thinking and highlighting the distributed constitution of power. Instead, there is a need 
to build forwards a post-structural understanding of what values are, and what they, or 
their absence, claim to be.  
There are several place-markers set theoretically for a more relational understanding of 
values, not only in the science policy literatures reviewed in chapter 2 but also in wider 
geographical literatures. Harvey suggests: 
“Values… are not imposed as universal abstractions from outside but arrived at 
through a living process… embedded in forms of praxis and plays of power 
attaching to the exploration of this or that potentiality” (Harvey, 1996: 56) 
STS scholars such as Wynne emphasise the role of science in generating values 
suggesting that “political activity not only expressed pre-existent values, but it also 
creates them, using even (perhaps especially) scientific knowledge as a medium” 
(Wynne, 1982: 161). For Jasanoff greater trust in science comes from reaffirming 
questions of attachment and interactions with our normative concerns (Jasanoff, 2010: 
237). With Latour encouraging a re-opening of questions of values (2013c: 481) and van 
de Sluij suggesting that “the political climate debate would benefit from clarification of 
the political values and visions that are at play in climate change” (van der Sluijs et al., 
2010: 413), it is suggested rethinking values is both necessary and timely.  
Key finding 5: Mouffe’s notion of values as politics opens up the possibility of theorizing 
values in non-essentialist terms 
Mouffe moves the concept of values away from morality or ethics, which rely on 
essentialist understandings of right and wrong, towards political positions around which 
there can be political debate.  Her anti-essentialist approach and defence of value 
plurality provides a non-essential understanding of values as discursively constituted, 
collective, and ultimately political. As a key post-structural theorist, Mouffe offers a way 
of understanding values as contingent, relational and stabilized (temporarily) in claims to 
what matters. Although not essentialist, values may come to be perceived as stable 
through fixing through relations of power. While existing engagements with Mouffe’s 
work from STS have focused on questions of conflict and legitimacy, this thesis suggests 
her work is also relevant to the rethinking of values. For Mouffe, an anti-essentialist 
stance is necessary for enabling agonistic debate amongst legitimate adversaries in ways 
that encourage recognition of the political resolve of conflict (retaining contingency). 
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This thesis suggests her anti-essentialist view of values bypasses many of the difficulties 
raised against notions of values in argumentative literatures, and therefore helps rethink 
values in anti-essentialist ways. 
In many senses this thesis has been about problem re-framing rather than problem 
solving. The contribution of the thesis lies in theoretically opening up the possibility for 
reframing how we might think about values and the empirical chapters develop only a 
limited contribution to exploring this empirically. Nevertheless, the way in which values 
were encountered in the scientist and boundary narratives profiled in Chapter 7 support 
the theoretical concept of values outlined in the opening chapters – as relational, 
produced through knowledge encounter, through re-articulations orientated to future 
political outcomes. The discursive value framings set out in Chapter 4, and referenced 
through chapters 5 to 7, also offer clear (and conflicting) value orientations that make 
both an epistemic and ontological claims to what is important in Scotland. Further 
empirical work to explore how a post-structural concept of values might survive further 
empirical interrogation is encouraged in the first of three areas identified for future 
research.  
Key contribution 6: A post-structural understanding of values could contribute towards 
hegemonic critique through destabilizing claims to neutrality and universality 
Expanding chains of equivalence constitute a claim to universality (Rear, 2013) that seeks 
to fix claims to meaning beyond values and beyond debate. Mouffe’s definition of 
hegemony as the collapse of objectivity and power opens up the possibility for a 
contestation of hegemony based on foregrounding the value commitments within all 
discourses – even those that claim hegemonic power. Although it is important not to 
conflate objectivity and neutrality, there is commonality in the way that values are set in 
opposition to both, such that hegemonic values claim both neutrality and objectivity as 
part of their claim to power. Foregrounding the situated, partial and value-rich 
orientations of discourses enables an unsettling of these claims to speak for the whole. It 
is precisely the foregrounding of ‘values’ within stabilised hegemonic discourses that 
allows critique of how such discourses secure their universal, rational and objective claim 
as natural and neutral. Considering hegemonic discourses such as economic growth, or 
the neutrality claims of normal science, as ‘values’ disrupts their claims to neutrality. 
Rather than seeing social order as inevitable, it is in emphasising the contingency and 
historicity of social objectivity (Howarth, 2010: 311; Bridgman, 2007: 481) and the partial 
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fixation of hegemony that generates scope for resistance (Mouffe, 2009: 312; Bridgman, 
2007: 481). This is not just about power, but also about passion, partiality and the 
fostering of agonistic relations – even under conditions of unequal power. This research 
has contributed towards a critical politics of values by combining STS and Mouffian 
approaches to foreground values within discourses that claim to neutrality, and 
interrogate processes and practices through which fixation of values takes place. This 
understanding helps to explain the naturalization of particular values over others, and 
expose the value-laden basis of hegemony as one way in which to contest its claim to 
power. 
 
8.2 Evaluation of theoretical framework  
This thesis has explored the applicability of Mouffe’s political theory to science–policy 
boundary work, to complement and extend STS approaches. This section presents some 
reflections on what Mouffe’s approach offers, where problems arise, and where the 
benefits of dialogue with STS might work the other way. 
8.2.1 Mouffe’s contributions to researching values legitimation and 
boundary work  
When Danial Bell proclaimed the end of ideology in 1960 this echoed moves to try and 
make politics scientific. Mouffe demonstrates why questions of politics cannot be 
reduced to questions of science, and are more than mere “technical questions” (Mouffe, 
2005b: 10). What she does not do in making this argument, is to fall back on structuralist 
notions of ideology or values that stand outside of discursive relations of power, but 
instead argues for the intimate relation between values, legitimation and power and the 
contingency of hegemonic relations in order to defend the possibility of a plurality of 
values around which there can be political debate. Torphing highlights the implications of 
taking a Mouffian discourse theory approach is the radical change in the form that 
critique takes that foregrounds the types of values achieving discursive circulation: 
“It is not enough to show the contingency of essentialist claims... We 
should pay special attention to the processes through which this ethical 
substance is constructed” (Torphing, 2005: 169). 
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It is suggested in this thesis that emphasizing the inability to separate fact from value 
does not go far enough in attending to the politics of discourse, there is also need to pay 
attention to the types of values enabled to circulate. Laclau and Mouffe’s focus on 
discourse highlights the way that meaning is ‘fixed’ through politics, power and boundary 
struggles (Iverson, 2012: 58) and empirical attention to science–policy boundary work in 
Scotland have explored the way that particular discursive value frameworks are opened 
up or closed down which “offers insights into the normative implications of such 
demarcations” (van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 112). 
In her emphasis on the contingent and political nature of hegemonic claims, Mouffe 
contests the closure of hegemony and stresses that meaning could always be otherwise. 
As such her work “has been key to exposing (the limits of) dominant narratives and 
critiquing dominant theories… pivotal as a springboard of critique… a most useful lens to 
challenging and disarticulating mainstream modes of thought” (Tambakaki, 2014: 1). 
Hegemonic discourses such as economic growth, or positivist science, stake a claim to 
neutrality that positions them as outside of politics, as stable, natural and universal - 
speaking for the unified collective. Interrogating hegemony through foregrounding 
values, by positioning these discourses as ‘discursive value framings’ enables such claims 
to be problematized by demonstrating their contingency and drawing attention to 
exclusions, which opens up analysis of the politics of power at play in such interactions. 
In this process of attending to exclusions it is important not to over-romanticise “‘voices 
from the margins’ as somehow more authentic, less corrupt, and therefore more 
revolutionary” (Harvey, 1996: 100) but to create a border place, that provides a 
standpoint from which to think and speak critically (Harvey, 1996: 101-104). Positioning 
neoliberalism as a values-laden discourse is not new in our collective lay imaginary, but 
what Mouffe offers is the evocation of values without essentialism to further dispute the 
necessity of its claims.  
Further, a Mouffian understanding of legitimacy insists that legitimacy is constructed, is 
inseparable from relations with hegemonic power, and cannot be grounded in claims to 
rationality or morality if the possibility for plurality and difference is to be retained. This 
offers two important implications for considering the legitimation of value positions. 
Firstly, rather than relying on normative understandings of input and output legitimacy, 
Mouffe’s descriptive approach to legitimacy (shared with argumentative theory), avoids 
essentialist reference points and emphasises discursive frameworks of reference. This 
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ensures that the political nature of legitimacy remains in focus – “always a political 
decision… open to contestation” (Mouffe, 2005b: 121). In this way the construction of 
legitimacy for Mouffe is more political, more contestable and more conflictual that either 
argumentative theories or STS suggest.  
This thesis has been concerned with the multiple ways in which particular values come to 
be rendered legitimate or illegitimate through boundary work. It has built on STS 
approaches to consider multiple interacting boundary workings that enable legitimacy to 
be constructed in different ways, but always through relations of power. Emphasising 
these relations of power is important in understanding why scientists and other actors 
face an uphill struggle in expressing clearly what they are fighting for, and in rendering 
these relationships with hegemonic power visible and contingent. Sciarto suggests that 
Mouffe’s approach to legitimacy opens up, but leaves under-developed, the 
contestability and spatial unevenness of legitimacy (Sziarto, 2008: 410) – a dimensions 
geography is well placed to develop.  Finally application of the logics of equivalence as a 
practice of hegemony helps to understand the specific politics of the way CXC are 
drawing on translation to perform a particular kind of boundary work – one which 
reproduces hegemonic power. 
Mouffe’s work is often read only in the context of her post-Marxist political project of 
radical democracy, yet her approach of agonistic pluralism also offers strong analytical 
tools to denaturalise hegemonic claims without foreclosing the types of re-articulation 
that might result. While Mouffe’s own project is for a radical political-economic shift 
which may or may not be a vision politically shared, her approach is also be helpful in 
focusing attention on broadening the conceptual space in which a broader range of value 
orientations can participate, as adversaries not as enemies. As Tambakaki suggests 
“Mouffe’s work sets out a challenge. It challenges the readers to reflect on what it means 
to work with (in) and against politics” (Tambakaki, 2014: 3, original emphasis). However, 
it is in this moment of dearticulation that Mouffe urges greatest attention to re-
articulation, a position that sets her apart from other agonistic political theorists such as 
Arendt or Connolly (Mouffe, 2012), for it is these moments of disarticulation that there is 
greatest opportunity for re-articulations by others, and in Mouffe’s particular concern, 
greatest vulnerability non-democratic re-articulations. In this sense, the question is 
perhaps whether we can afford not to re-articulate a post-structuralist concept of values, 
in order to ensure any re-articulation is politically not essentially forged? 
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8.2.2 Problematics of Mouffe and the role of reasoning 
At the same time, Mouffe’s approach poses some difficulties. Firstly, she does not offer a 
specific post-structural definition of values, and much of the argument made in this 
thesis has relied on interpreting the way she uses the term. This demands both wider 
interrogation of values in her work, and further and more detailed analysis of the 
empirical application of her approach. Secondly, taking a Mouffian approach also 
foregrounds authoritative and hegemonic understandings of power, which could be 
complemented by broader considerations of the way that power operates through a 
variety of other means (Allen, 2011). Thirdly, the fact that Mouffe’s anti-foundationalist 
stance offers no privileged criteria outside of discourse that can “safeguard either Truth 
or Science” (Torphing, 2005: 155) challenges certain perceptions of science and her 
attack on rationality provokes important questions about possible roles for scientific 
knowledge. This challenges application of her approach in a science–policy domain 
where reasoning plays a strong role.  
Mouffe’s reaction against the historic dominant emphasis of rationality in political 
theory, means her adamant opposition to rationality sometimes conflates rationality and 
reasoning (see Mouffe, 2000: 4). Yet both Jasanoff and Sayer seek to separate reasoning 
from rationality. If their distinctions between rationality and reason hold, bringing values 
within what it means to reason, does not necessarily imply that values are rationally 
resolved.  In evoking values, Sayer, like argumentative theorists such as Healey and 
Fischer, (Healey, 1993: 238) evoke notions of right and wrong. Mouffe’s approach is 
important in moving away from grounding values in right and wrong to think values 
politically in order to preserve the possibility of their plurality. In concluding this thesis, it 
is suggested that Jasanoff’s approach provides a useful correction to Mouffe’s tendency 
to collapse rationality and reason, reminding us that there are more diverse forms of 
reasoning that might contribute to agonistic politics in ways that are more humble that 
the claims of modernist rationality.  
Jasanoff argues for wider forms of public reasoning, suggesting: 
“I see reasoning as one of the essential virtuous practices of modern democracy, 
provided that it remains conscious of its limits and mindful of its shortcoming… 
the challenge is not to let imperialist definitions of reason and rationality crowd 
out the voices of the margins from our painstakingly crafted spaces of 
reasoning” (Jasanoff, 2012b: 281). 
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In emphasising reasoning Jasanoff does not restrict public reasoning to the application of 
rationality, but includes diversity in forms of reasoning and contestation – with wider 
participation being pursued precisely to enable questioning of expert frames (Jasanoff, 
2003a). In restoring “important value conflicts to the public sphere” (Jasanoff, 2011a: 
637) Jasanoff is not simply advocating for the obeying of rules of Rawlsian deliberative 
democracy, but is instead enquiring critically into the practices through which reasoning 
in the public interest occurs, de-naturalising what it means to reason and highlighting its 
contingency by foregrounding the historically contingent social practices through which 
reasoning takes place (Jasanoff, 2012b: 5-6). For Mouffe “the very future of democracy” 
(Mouffe, 2002: 16) is at stake in rethinking the role rationality plays, but this does not 
imply there should be no process of public reasoning, if conducted agonistically. Without 
some form of reasoning it is difficult to see how agonistic debate could occur. Mouffe 
explicitly states that “this is not to say that reason and rational argument should 
disappear from politics; rather, that their place in it needs to be rethought” (Mouffe, 
2002: 16). Jasanoff shares Mouffe’s concerns over the way in which rational argument 
generates exclusion (Jasanoff, 2012b: 280) and her thinking about plural of modes 
reasoning might help the development of Mouffe’s agonistic rethinking of the role of 
reason, and with it a more modest role and expectation for science. While at the same 
time Mouffe’s theoretical argument for why conflict cannot be resolved through rational 
consensus may extend Jasanoff’s powerful critique. 
 
8.3 Contributions of the research 
This section presents the theoretical and methodological contributions made by the 
research, through reflection on the findings presented in sections 8.1 and 8.2. This is 
followed by a review of the limitations of the research. 
8.3.1 Theoretical contributions  
The thesis makes a theoretical contribution to understanding science–policy interface by 
drawing attention to differences in the political implications of different forms of 
boundary working. Translation, as used within CXC as one particular form of boundary 
work, has been presented as a practice of hegemony – extending claims to equivalence 
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that privilege hegemonic policy discursive value framings (Key finding 1). These multiple 
sites and forms of boundary working enable or constrain different forms of political 
subjectivity and involve different processes through which knowledge is constructed as 
legitimate (Key finding 4). One way in which legitimacy for knowledge is being 
constructed in the case of CXC is through the translation as well as purification function 
of boundary work (Key finding 2). In CXC’s translation work, legitimacy as a constructed 
characteristic of knowledge is not necessarily equally important on both sides (Key 
finding 3). This attention to the differential politics of different forms of boundary work 
are important in drawing attention to the different types of knowledge being enabled or 
disabled from circulating and, this thesis argues, to the different discursive value 
orientations that are entailed. 
In this process, the possibility of theorizing values post-structurally is opened up. 
Drawing from Chantal Mouffe’s political understanding of values, values are conceived 
discursively, collectively, relationally and as contingent stabilisations of meaning that 
claim what matters. This claim is not essentialist but political, and therefore open to 
contestation (Key finding 5). Further, it is argued that understanding values post-
structurally may contribute towards hegemonic critique through destabilizing claims to 
neutrality and universality in ways not currently captured by post-structural 
concentrations on power (Key contribution 6). 
In so doing, the thesis makes an argument for greater dialogue between STS accounts of 
boundary work and Mouffe’s political theory. As sections 8.1 and 8.2 outline in detail, 
Mouffe’s political theory brings out relations with hegemonic power in science–policy 
boundary work which often, aside from Jasanoff’s writings (2010; 2003b; 1990; 2004; 
2012a; 2012b), remain under-developed in STS accounts. This has enabled narratives of 
translation in CXC to be understood as an extension of logics of equivalence that seek to 
extend claims to meaning according to dominant policy terms. It has also enabled the 
claims to neutrality and universality of hegemonic claims to be contested through 
foregrounding the value-commitments of their discourse and has focused attention on 
alternative spaces subjectivities and forms of legitimacy that have been cleaved open 
within these discursive relations. STS accounts of boundary work focus on the role of 
boundary work and boundary objects in particular as managing and concealing conflict 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989; Guston, 1999). In contrast, Mouffe’s approach argues that 
space must be made for conflict, to avoid the development of antagonistic relations. It is 
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suggested that STS needs to embrace this space for difference and disagreement and not 
to develop blindness to the politics of hegemonic power in the discussion of demand led 
science. Bringing Mouffe into dialogue with STS offers scope to retain this critical edge. 
Simultaneously, Jasanoff’s wider forms of reasoning and more humble role for science 
could enrich Mouffe’s rather singular opposition to rationality and increase her 
applicability to science–policy debates.  
8.3.2 Methodological contributions  
Researching values and legitimacy empirically has presented several challenges that 
speak to a methodological community interested in researching sensitive topics or 
themes that are difficult to assess through front stage narratives. Interview tools that 
sought to ‘opened up’ interview conversations to explore contested meanings through 
self-identification exercises and using drawings with elite actors, experimented with 
changing the atmosphere of interview conversations. This experimentation with the 
flexibility of discursive space during interviews recognizes boundaries as fluid, relational 
and open to constructive careful expansion in ways that could contribute to other areas 
of sensitive research. Building on the work of Renzetti and Lee (1993), Ratcliffe (2002) 
and Kezar (2003) who critique approaches to elite actor interviews that focus on 
reverence and expert knowledge, the approach to interviews in this thesis argues that 
elite actors also have non-elite knowledge and respond to interpersonal cues which limit 
their boundaries of discursive engagement in ways that are usefully subject to critical 
study. However, at the same time, strategies that gently push up against, and feel for the 
boundaries of legitimate discussion, are successful only to the extent that they examine 
the way these boundaries are constructed in that space and through that encounter. 
Making any sensing of legitimacy, only the starting point for further discussion. 
8.3.3 Theoretical and methodological research limitations  
In evaluating the usefulness of Mouffe’s approach in section 8.2, three limitations to 
utilizing her approach were identified – a lack of definition over key terms in her work 
demands high levels of interpretation over how key concepts such as values are 
deployed; her foregrounding of hegemonic power downplays other understandings of 
the way in which power operates; and her problematisation of reason poses challenge in 
application to a science–policy domain where reasoning plays a strong role. The latter 
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concern is somewhat overcome through further dialogue with STS approaches that 
distinguish reasoning and rationality, and take a broader understanding of the role of 
reasoning. However, the lack of definitions and the limited conception of power remain 
limitations in deploying Mouffe’s approach. 
In addition to the challenges brought forward from using Mouffe’s conceptual approach, 
there are theoretical limitations within the thesis itself. The most significant is the extent 
to which values are theoretically conceivable through a post-structural theoretical lens. 
In seeking to foreground the value orientations of discourse it is necessary to ask 
whether a return to the language of values outweighs its difficulties, and whether the 
language of values is the best way to articulate these affective attachments to discourse. 
As described in Chapter 2, much post-structural social science has moved away from the 
language of values because of its associations with intentionality, discrete subjectivity 
and pre-existent meaning that were considered not constructive to foregrounding 
discourse and more distributed understandings of power and agency. It is precisely the 
necessity of these associations that this thesis contests, and through which it is argued a 
post-structuralist view of values is possible. However, this interpretation could itself be 
contested and the necessity of an essentialist definition argued. It might also be 
considered that using the language of values differently might be outweighed by 
disadvantages and risk implying essentialism. There is more work to be done before it 
can be suggested with sufficient confidence that values can escape their essentialist 
associations, but following post-structural emphasis on the non-necessary connection 
between language and meaning, it is argued that there is space for values to be thought 
differently.  
Methodologically, it is suggested “Mouffe’s theories operate on a level of abstraction 
that makes it difficult to apply them directly to empirical research” (Karppinen et al., 
2008: 18). Interpretation of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse approach has been much 
assisted by the work of Howarth (2000; 2010; 2006). The mixed methodology enabled 
research to focus on processes (of boundary work and constructing legitimacy), points of 
contest/conflict, and began to indicate exclusions. However in many ways the 
methodologies were insufficient in accessing exclusions and omissions, instead providing 
only frustrating glimpses at exclusions, indicating limitations in research design that are 
difficult to address. For example, research would have benefitted from greater in-depth 
research of the call-down process including a greater number of cases, wider 
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interviewing on the process and the ability to shadow processes end-to-end. Access to 
call-downs occurred only late in the period of empirical research. Unfortunately end-to-
end analysis was not possible without more extended participant observation with CXC, 
which was constrained by personal circumstances outside the research. The CXC 
secretariat had already provided generous access to email exchanges and draft iterations 
of reports and so there was a limit to the demands that could be made. Further 
participatory observation of call-downs, wider interviewing, and or access to more draft 
iterations of documents may have enabled greater interaction with exclusions and ability 
to distinguish legitimation from other forms of acceptability, which proved challenging in 
this part of the research.  
Similarly, during interviews, the self-identification exercise and drawings revealed 
significant differences between personal and professional framings of climate change 
that offer potential for considering which discursive value framings are enabled to 
circulate in the professional climate change discourses. With greater time, for example in 
a second interview, these could open up further discussions over how and why these 
differences arise, and whether they constitute exclusions. Instead they were 
insufficiently robust in their current form to be presented as part of the thesis. A 
problem for any further research into discursive exclusions is how to be attentive to 
these informal narratives, to take seriously the affective workings of perceived 
legitimacy, and to formally narrate the work of passions that lie under the formal radar 
(and may rely on remaining so for their success).  This thesis prompts the question what 
would happen if these voices could be heard as an area for further, more focused, 
research. Further, it would be useful to assess the four discursive value framings 
identified in Chapter 4 – economic growth, outcomes orientated policy, Scottish 
Independence and left leaning politics – within a more extensive documentary analysis of 
Scottish policy documentation and develop a stronger analysis of the types of discourse 
that are dominant within Scottish policy-making.  
Other difficulties in research provided moments of learning and creativity, particularly 
around positionality struggles, reflexive challenges during interviews and approaches to 
working with sensitive subjects. Firstly, being better prepared for supporting and sticking 
with emotionally sensitive and fragile narratives, as described in section 3.6, may have 
enabled more prolonged interpersonal discussion and would undoubtedly have 
generated more ethically sensitive practice. Secondly, while less breadth would 
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undoubtedly have allowed more time to be spent on intensive shadowing of call-downs, 
it would have restricted a comparative perspective on CXC’s work. Finally, while 
transitioning my own positionality from practitioner to researcher was at times perhaps 
un-necessarily complicated, it produced a particular kind of engagement during 
interviews that brought its own interpersonal benefits. Recognising what the research 
method allowed and disallowed has meant learning to live with imperfections and the 
messy process of conducting research - to tell a story, situated, rich and sticky in 
methodological contingency. 
 
8.4 Contributions to science–policy practice 
For the CXC secretariat, as practitioners, the challenge is how to better serve policy. It is 
difficult to speak to this challenge when the goal of uncritically responding to policy is 
itself being problematized. Throughout the course of this PhD research, an on-going 
dialogue with CXC has been opened on how these doctoral research findings might 
constructively support CXC moving forwards into their next funded phase 2016-21. This 
has involved several reports and presentations of findings to CXC, most recently a 
Summary of Findings for CXC Report presented at the CXC AGM 2015 (see Appendix F), 
and there has been agreement that these research findings will feed into an internal 
reflections paper to be developed by CXC in spring 2016 based on CXC’s first five years of 
operation and forward trajectory.  
This tension over delivering within policy goals or challenging policy gets at the very 
heart of an internal tension within the organization, characterized by the debates around 
best policy possible/best possible policy discussed in chapter 5. Challenging policy 
framings is not outside the interest of both scientific and boundary actors involved in CXC 
and at the 2013 AGM a conversation between CXC directorate and research scientists 
erupted over the extent to which CXC could be seen to be critical of Government (RN: 
CXC-AGM 2013). Although scientists more often articulated concern with independence 
from policy, the secretariat also raised similar concerns in conversation with me over co-
production. There were clearly fears among the secretariat not to become “instruments 
of political rationality, whose epistemic authority is used primarily as legitimising 
discourse in policy conflicts and decisions” (Owens, 2012: 6). A contribution of the thesis 
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to practitioners at all levels might be the highlighting of questions of power and exclusion 
faced by scientific and boundary voices and in participating with a political voice by 
highlighting the contingency of present relations and in doing so offering some hope to 
these unheard voices.  
However, being critical of policy frameworks is also not necessarily seen as desirable, 
especially by members of the directorate, either in the interests of helping the 
Government deliver against its carbon mitigation targets, or for the future of CXC. Given 
that the climate change policy commitment has been set, attention is focused on 
providing policy with pragmatic help in delivering these commitments, not further 
political challenge. Given this focus on delivery, working within the proposed policy 
framework is understandable. However, there are reasons to remain cautious of this 
approach.  
Firstly, as Chapter 6 began to indicate, the types of knowledges CXC is being encouraged 
to provide (e.g. quantifiable costs, volumes and areas) fill existing pragmatic and 
logistical gaps within current approaches, rather than considering the way that problems 
are being structured within the wider functioning of the socioeconomic system. This 
might be seen as an attempt to ‘carry water in a sieve’ both in a sense that such gaps are 
un-fillable, and that the vehicle itself is considered by many not fit for purpose. Many 
practitioners (Interviews: CXC-S3, CXC-S1, SG2, CXC-R10) as well as academics (Warner, 
2010; Paterson, 2010; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Parr, 2014; Bailey and Wilson, 2009; 
Newell, 2011) point to the limitations of responding to climate change without more 
systemic consideration of political-economic frameworks. There are also political 
questions raised by the current emphasis on individual behaviour change rather than 
structural change (Paterson and Stripple, 2010). The problem of responding to climate 
change is therefore seen as a more radical question of what kind of socio-political and 
economic society is brought about, which becomes a problem of values, not just 
technical implementation.  
Secondly, one scientist suggested policy are now listening to science but throwing ethical 
and political questions back to science (Interview CXC-R11) and commented on the need 
to engage with these questions of perceived independence from policy over the longer 
term: 
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“It’s a real issue I think for ClimateXChange and we haven't really fully faced 
this… but it’s going to come soon… one of these issues is going to come up 
where, what we say in terms of the science really challenges policy, and yet 
we're funded by The Scottish Government… we're meant to be independent so 
we should be challenging policy and yet that's really difficult position to be in… 
you see that now… in England with… Natural England and The Environment 
Agency are being reviewed because… they challenge the development process 
to be more sustainable… there's going to be really difficult decisions to make… 
and that challenges vested interests” (Interview CXC-R11). 
As Owens et al comment at a UK level in the drive for policy responsive science “what 
scientists should do when their findings are politically inconvenient is not very clearly 
explained” (2006: 638). 
8.4.1 Specificity of CXC 
Establishment of ClimateXChange re-envisions the relationship between science and 
policy in Scotland to put policy in the driving seat and make science more responsive to 
policy needs. However, CXC was positioned in Chapter 4 as a product of a wider 
reconfiguration of the science–policy relationship at UK level. At the 2013 CXC AGM 
several senior figures in the Scottish and UK science–policy sector situated this move 
within wider changes in the science policy relationship over time – from first generation 
knowledge diffusion, dissemination and transfer, to second generation two-way 
knowledge exchange, and now third generation knowledge integration, mobilisation and 
uptake focused around translation (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). These wider dynamics 
increasingly encourage what is referred to as “mode 2” knowledge – “shaped by the 
needs and interests of some, at least of the potential users” (Gibbons et al., 1994: 54). In 
this sense CXC is not unique, the model of policy orientated interaction is increasingly 
seen as “central to the future of science globally” (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). This indicates 
that rethinking of models of science–policy interaction go beyond arrangements 
between RESAS and its main research providers and raising broader societal questions, 
over why these changes in science policy interaction are happening now, at this 
moment? 
Nevertheless, ClimateXChange is positioning itself at the front of this change (RN: CXC-
AGM 2013, RN: CXC-AGM 2015) and is both responsive and proactive developing a policy 
led model. CXC directors and secretariat are playing a proactive role in shaping the mode 
of interaction by describing policy as CXC’s ‘customers’, emphasizing translation and 
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focusing on policy needs. As a result CXC is being looked to as a pilot, at least within the 
UK context. The policy director describes a proliferation of interest from elsewhere in 
how CXC operates and suggests, “it could be a blueprint for how you could do this 
elsewhere” (Interview CXC-D1). The current CSA for Scotland is championing the Centres 
of Expertise as a good model for replication UK-wide (Interviews: SG3, CXC-D2) and there 
is consciousness of many eyes watching the model of CXC to appraise its effectiveness 
(RN: CXC-AGM 2013) with one director suggesting that “the journey we’re on is being 
looked at as the way to go” (RN: CXC-AGM 2013). This makes CXC an important 
organization through which to study the potential implications of these changes.  
Being responsive to wider movements in science–policy limits the extent to which 
research findings on the political relation envisaged can be attributable to CXC as an 
organization. In Chapter 6, CXC was seen to be only the tip of much bigger boundary 
work iceberg and emphasis on translation only one useful tool in a wider emphasis on 
policy discursive framings achieved through longer histories of boundary work. A strong 
caveat to any critique of CXC’s limited ability to overtly challenge the Scottish 
Government is also CXC’s status as a new actor at the science–policy interface in 
Scotland. Need to establish trust with the Scottish Government was recurrently 
emphasized by the CXC Secretariat and Directorate, especially given increasing funding 
pressures for without trust and demonstrable policy benefit, CXC and investment in 
Scottish climate related science, could easily be seen as a non-essential luxury in the 
context of UK austerity policy. CXC therefore tread a delicate line in balancing the 
perceived legitimacy of the organisation in policy as well as scientific terms. Chapter 7 
described the importance of timing needed to develop trust to enable greater challenge. 
In recognition of these pressures it is still argued that it is important to examine the types 
of knowledge and policy action that are being brought about through the processes of 
science–policy interaction chosen. 
8.4.2 Specificity of Scotland 
In some senses Scotland’s commitment to early high carbon reduction targets has 
allowed climate change to be high on the agenda and Scottish Independence has 
provided a momentum and energy for change. In other senses discursive alignment of 
climate change within business as usual narratives of economic growth have rendered 
climate change policy at best convenient, often ancillary to, and at worst detracting from 
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more significant challenge of the neoliberal economic growth agenda. During the period 
of research, the specific ‘Scottishness’ of the research context did little more than 
provide a Scottish civic epistemology (mapped through the four policy discourses of 
Chapter 4) and the smaller tighter scale of operations which many actors interviewed 
suggest provided a specific context for science–policy interaction - making interpersonal 
interactions denser (in frequency and connections) and encouraging greater energy and 
bravery to be ambitious in target-setting. However, with CXC being looked to as a pilot 
and a model of best practice in science–policy interaction (Interviews: CXC-D1, SG6, 
Climsave1), this calls for wider attentions within the science–policy community over 
what types of knowledge translation enables to circulate. 
8.4.3 Summary of recommendations 
Recommendations made to CXC in the feedback reports produced in 2013 and 2015 
suggested that CXC should remain attentive to the politics at stake in the types of 
boundary work engaged, and be reflexive over the different roles that the organization 
might potentially play at different times. As Barry suggested, science can be political or 
nonpolitical (Barry, 2007: 290) and “it is partly an empirical question whether scientific 
work opens up or closes down the space of political contestation” (Barry, 2007: 295; see 
also Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). While chapters 5 and 6 point to a narrowing role for 
science through CXC’s translation, Chapter 7 indicated a more expansive role where 
boundary actors in Scotland are finding ways to reclaim a political subjectivity and open 
up political debate, albeit in minor ways. Translation is not CXC’s only mode of 
interaction, and more agonistic exchanges between science and policy occurred at the 
WAW and UW events (although this is not an easy resolve, as highlighted by Lövbrand 
(2011) in section 5.4.4). Where CXC translation seeks to dominate meaning through 
equivalence with existing policy framings, CXC could also develop approaches that value 
differences and offer opportunities for policy at all levels to explore greater values based 
debates and construct legitimacy for a range of possible approaches that could be the 
focus for wider political discussion.  
Science–policy boundary work holds an important role beyond encouraging greater use 
of science within policy making. Owens suggests that a more nuanced understanding of 
boundary work understands boundary actors as “cognitive or discursive agents, whose 
advice and ideas might have real effect, though without the simple linearity” that is often 
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assumed (Owens, 2012: 7). Boundary actors have real capability, with consciousness to 
the politics of their work, to “shape the kind of science, and related, the kind of social 
and political theories about the world, that is effectuated” (van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 
108). As a result there is need to be attentive to the politics of different forms of 
boundary work (and the different work achievable through the organizational 
personalities of Sniffer vs. CXC) in contributing towards or shortcutting political debate 
(Litfin, 1994: 13; van Egmond and Bal, 2011: 124; Nelkin, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2010).  
 
8.5 Future Research 
The journey of the thesis has opened up several further questions in its search for 
answers. Firstly there is a need to further explore the robustness of an anti-essentialist 
notion of values. Secondly, questions remain over potential roles for science in 
responding to climate change. Thirdly, the thesis has in many ways been haunted by 
notions of affectual encounters opening up a further set of questions that would benefit 
for engagement with affect literatures. 
8.5.1 Empirical attention to post-structurally conceived values 
Mouffe’s post-structural values appear to withstand preliminary critiques of falling back 
on essentialism theoretically (see section 2.6) and empirical attention in this thesis to the 
way that values are relationally and discursively constituted, provisionally affirms the 
possibility of a post-structural notion of values. However this thesis has only begun to 
explore whether this theoretical understanding of values can be sustained empirically, 
and a more focused series of analytical and interpretive empirical studies of values would 
be needed to argue this with any greater confidence. This could also explore in more 
depth what it means to take seriously the problem of the pluralism of values at the 
science policy interface through more focused research on excluded voices as well as 
greater attention to the hegemonic value framings and their implications for addressing 
climate change. 
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8.5.2 Role of science 
Potential for further dialogue has been identified between the work of Jasanoff and 
Mouffe (in section 8.2.2), which could benefit both approaches. There are unanswered 
questions around visualizing practical roles for science in policy if not to resolve value 
differences, and in achieving the more humble epistemological claims that encapsulate 
its situated and conditional validity (Wynne, 2010: 301; Jasanoff, 2003b; Latour, 2013b). 
Chapter 7 began to identify different reasons that practitioners in Scotland were turning 
to science some of which extended beyond Pielke’s 4 role model (2007). Potential roles 
for science warrant both further empirical and conceptual analysis, which would be of 
benefit to both theoretical and academic communities. 
8.5.3 Affect in the governance of climate change 
When Pandora opened up the jar in Hesiod’s Greek myth, and let evil spirits into the 
world – Elpis – the spirit of hope was left clinging to the lid. Elpis, understood 
ambiguously as either (optimistic) hope or the anticipation of disaster, was variously 
encountered in the empirical narratives of science–policy actors in Scotland. Chapter 7 
suggested that hope concurs with the ability to express political subjectivity. In contrast, 
participant frustration appeared indicative of antagonistic relations – where the 
realization of a particular outcome was prevented not just from outside, but also inside 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Hope is an important characteristic of a Mouffian political 
theory for it is her ferocious refusal to abandon hope, and emphasis on contingency that 
the irrevocable possibility to be otherwise resides. As Goeminne has suggested, for 
Mouffe “exclusion represents the condition of possibility of inclusion (and vice versa) to 
argue for the very possibility of counter-hegemonic practices” (2012: 160). Hope 
becomes central to the possibility of imagining a radically different world order (Teruelle, 
2012: 46) and as Howarth suggests it is “when the void or undecidability at the heart of 
any social order is made visible by events, new forms of political agency are made 
possible” (2010: 314). For Mouffe, revival of the political is grounded in cherishing and 
opening up alternative spaces and subjectivities – which it is suggested are both a 
necessity for, and constituted through, hope.  
In addition, legitimacy was often felt, not imposed, as forms of ‘anticipated 
acceptability’. This thesis has sought to attend methodologically and conceptually to the 
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tacit, experienced, affectual boundaries that mark out legitimate territories - of science 
and of policy, of boundary actors and of politics, of limits to discourse and possible 
action. Such boundaries and territories are not objective realities, unanimously 
identifiable and fixable at specific geographic co-ordinated, but experienced subjectively 
and affectually. However, this makes such boundaries and territories no less real, no less 
powerful and no less affective or effective. Finally where Hajer emphasizes an arbitrary 
picking up and putting down of values according to the practices in which they engage 
(Hajer, 1995: 69-70), Laclau and Mouffe, and Barad separately draw on notions of 
sedimentation to provide a sense of connection across encounters (Barad, 2007; Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985) While values are not fixed, there is a certain viscosity to things that 
are held to be important, which means that identification is not arbitrary. This too is 
envisaged as an affectual relationship that would benefit from further development 
through engagement with contemporary affect literatures such as Anderson (2006), 
Gregg and Seigworth (2010), Anderson (2011) and Pedwell (2012).  
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
This thesis argues that we miss much of the politics at the knowledge-policy interface if 
we do not concentrate enough on the claims to objectivity and neutrality that are 
achieved through engagement with scientific, technical or expert knowledges and 
through which objectivity and power becomes collapsed. As Jasanoff argues, claims to 
neutrality of policy are, like science, “painstakingly constructed, contested, reaffirmed 
and performed in the routine practices of social actors and institutions” (Jasanoff, 2012a: 
21).  
Back in 1972 Weinburg suggested that “science alone cannot adequately answer policy 
relevant questions” (Jasanoff, 2003a: 160). This thesis concludes by following Sarewitz in 
his suggestion that “progress in addressing environmental controversies will need to 
come primarily from advances in political process, rather than scientific research” (2004: 
399) and suggests that Mouffe’s approach offers one important lens through which to 
bring political processes around values into focus. Reframing approaches to climate 
change away from questioning of scientific evidence towards political questions around 
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how we respond as a collective that will always be divided and hold plural values (both 
multiple and simultaneous) is a task from which politics is being distracted by those 
whose interests are threatened by such ‘trans-valuation’. Responding politically to 
climate change will inevitably involve struggle between different values as policy 
responses are developed. Evoking values–based questions deserves values–based 
debates – not in ways that fall back on pre-existent notions of right and wrong or as 
external arbitrators to decide disputes once and for all, but to attend to whose values are 
being heard, debated and mainstreamed and whose are excluded. Understanding 
processes of legitimation through which particular discourses are legitimated and others 
marginalized, and the role science plays in this process, is important in understanding the 
politics of values at the climate science–policy interface. To take seriously value pluralism 
requires a capability to value different things, and to value things differently. 
Neoliberalism reduces a plurality of values to market values and this performs violence 
to other forms of values. Let us start to have greater agonistic political debate about the 
types of values we might pursue in the face of climate change. 
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Climate change related policy events attended 
Identifier Event Lead 
organization 
Type Location Length 
Broad - Climate Science–policy Exchanges in Scotland 
RN: MH-CII Connect Inform and 
Influence 
Mackay Hannah Delegate 
Conference 
Edinburgh 1 day 
RN: MH-2 Housing, Carbon 
Reduction and 
Climate Change: the 
cost, sustainability 
and supply challenge 
Homes for 
Scotland 
Conference/ 
Mackay Hannah 
Delegate 
Conference 
Edinburgh 1 day 
RN: C2020-
M 
Climate2020 Group 
Meeting 
Climate2020 Main 
Group 
Meeting 
Edinburgh 2 hours 
RN:  
SG-FCM 
Scottish Government 
Finance Committee 
Meeting 5-11-12 
The Scottish 
Goverment 
Parliament
ary 
Committee 
Hawick 2 hours 
RN: SGMP Scottish Government 
Meeting of the 
Parliament 12-12-12 
The Scottish 
Goverment 
Meetiing of 
Parliament 
Edinburgh 2 hours 
RN:  
MH-EPM 
Ethics and Policy 
Making 
Mackay 
Hannah/Church 
of Scotland 
Delegate 
Conference 
Edinburgh 1 day 
RN: SSN SSN Annual 
Conference 
Keep Scotland 
Beautiful 
Sustainable 
Scotland 
Network 
Annual 
Conference 
Edinburgh 2 days 
RN: C2020-
BESG 
Climate 2020 - built 
environment sub 
group 
Climate2020 Sub-Group 
Meeting 
Glasgow 2 hours 
RN: Sniffer-
CJ 
Climate Justice 
Conference 
Sniffer/Joseph 
Rowentree 
Foundation 
Scottish 
Governmen
t 
Conference 
Edinburgh 1 day 
RN: SG-PB TSG Parliamentary 
Business 
Scottish 
Parliament 
Parliament
ary 
Meeting 
Edinburgh 2 hours 
RN: 
Sniffer-CJ 
Climate Justice 
Conference: 
Delivering Socially 
Just Adaptation in 
Scotland 
Sniffer/Joseph 
Rowentree 
Foundation 
Conference Edinburgh 
(Scottish 
Governm
ent) 
1 day 
In-depth Climsave 
RN: 
Climsave 
Climsave final 
workshop 
Climsave Final 
Workshop 
Edinburgh 2 days 
In depth CXC work Shadowing 
RN:  CXC Policy CXC Workshop Edinburgh 1 day 
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CXC-PAW1 Awareness 
Workshop 1 
RN:  
CXC-PAW2 
CXC Policy 
Awareness 
Workshop 2 
CXC Workshop Dundee 1 day 
RN:  
CXC-PAW3 
CXC Policy 
Awareness 
Workshop 3 
CXC Workshop Edinburgh 1 day 
RN:  
CXC-WAW 
CXC Woodlands 
Workshop 
CXC Workshop Edinburgh 1 day 
RN:  
CXC-UW 
CXC Uncertainty 
Workshop 
CXC Workshop Edinburgh 1 day 
RN:  
CXC-CDCCF 
Work Shadowing - 
Climate Challenge 
Fund Meeting 
CXC Meeting Edinburgh 1 hour 
RN:  
CXC-
CDCCF2 
Climate Challenge 
Fund 
ProgressMeeting 
CXC Telephone 
conference 
 20 mins 
RN:  
CXC Away-
Day 
Skype Observation of 
CXC Secretariat away 
day 
CXC Meeting Edinburgh 1 day 
RN:  
CXC-CDWT 
Work Shadowing 
with Ragne CXC 
progress meeting 
with TSG on wind 
turbines 
CXC Meeting Edinburgh 2 hours 
RN: 
C2020PESG 
Work Shadowing 
with Ragne C2020 - 
Public Engagement 
sub-group 
C2020 Meeting Edinburgh 2 hours 
RN: CXC-
AGM 2013 
CXC Annual Meeting 
2013 
CXC Meeting Dundee 2 days 
RN: CXC-
AGM 2015 
CXC Annual Meeting 
2015 
CXC Meeting Edinburgh 1 day 
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List of Additional Empirical Documents referenced  
(This refers to call-down requests, informal communications and draft reports that 
are referenced as empirical sources in the thesis. It excludes published 
government grey literatures, which are included in the references list) 
 
Identifier Document Author/ 
Organization 
Type Purpose 
 D: CXC-Peatland-
CDR 
Enquiry Text Potential 
Peatlands Abatement  
Scottish 
Government 
(Natural Assets & 
Flooding Division) 
Email Formal Request 
for Information 
D: CXC-Peatland-
CD 
CXC Call-down Report 
Carbon Savings from Peat 
Restoration 
 
CXC Report Formal Response 
D: Email 1 Email from secretariat CXC Email Providing 
clarification on 
Information 
Request 
D: CXC- MACC-
CDR 
Call-down Request MACC Scottish 
Government 
(Climate Change 
Team - RPP2) 
Email Formal Request 
for Information 
D: CXC- MACC-
CD1 
Call-down Report MACC1 CXC Report Formal Response 
D:CXC- MACC-
CDF 
MACC Call-down 
Feedback Report 
Scottish 
Government 
(Climate Change 
Team - RPP2) 
Questio
naire 
Providing 
Feedback on Call-
down 
D: CXC-Extreme 
weather-CDR 
Call-down Request 
Extreme Weather 
Scottish 
Government 
(Climate Change 
Adaptation Team) 
Email Formal Request 
for Information 
D: CXC-Extreme 
weather-CD 
Call-down Report 
Extreme Weather 
CXC Report Formal Response 
D: Email 2 Email to secretariat from 
Research scientist 
CXC Email Clarifying changes 
to report 
D: CXC-Extreme 
weather-CD draft 
Dec 2012 
Draft Call-down Report 
Extreme Weather Dec 
2012 
CXC Report Early Draft 
Response 
D: Email 3 Email to CXC research 
secretariat from Research 
scientist 
CXC Email Providing 
Scientific 
support/advice 
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Interviews were conducted between May 2012 and October 2014 
(Names have been excluded to preserve confidentiality) 
 
Identifier Role Organization Type 
Interview CXC-R1 Research Scientist 
(biological scienctist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R2 Research Scientist 
(climate modeler) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R3 Research Scientist 
(statistician) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R4 Research Scientist 
(physicist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R5 Research Scientist 
(social scientist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R6 Research Scientist 
(economist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R7 Research Scientist 
(social scientist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R8 Research Scientist 
(behavioural scienctist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R9 Research Scientist 
(ecological scienctist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R10 Research Scientist 
(ecological scienctist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R11 Research Scientist 
(climate modeler) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-R12 Research Scientist 
(economist) 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-S1 ClimateXChange 
Secretariat -  One of five 
with responsibility for 
day to day management 
and delivery of CXC’s 
organisation activities 
and services. 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-S2 ClimateXChange 
Secretariat -  One of five 
with responsibility for 
day to day management 
and delivery of CXC’s 
organisation activities 
and services. 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-S3 ClimateXChange 
Secretariat -  One of five 
with responsibility for 
day to day management 
and delivery of CXC’s 
organisation activities 
and services. 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
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Interview CXC-S3-2 ClimateXChange 
Secretariat second 
interview 
CXC Telephone 
Interview CXC-D1 ClimateXChange Director 
-  One of three directors 
of CXC responsible for 
organisational direction 
and management. 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview CXC-D2 ClimateXChange 
Director-  One of three 
directors of CXC 
responsible for 
organisational direction 
and management. 
CXC Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SG1 Scottish Government 
Civil Servant (Public 
Sector Reform) 
Scottish Government Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SG2 Scottish Government 
Civil Servant (Rural 
Environmental Science 
and Analytical Services) 
Scottish Government Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SG3 Scottish Government 
Civil Servant (Climate 
Adadptation Team) 
Scottish Government Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SG4 Scottish Government 
Civil Servant (Climate 
Mitigation Team) 
Scottish Government Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SG5 Scottish Government 
Civil Servant (Public 
Sector Duties) 
Scottish Government Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SG6 Scottish Government 
Civil Servant (Chief 
Scientific Advisor) 
Scottish Government Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SGA 1 Scottish Government 
Agency Civil Servant 
Scottish Government 
Agency 
Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SGA 2 Scottish Government 
Agency Civil Servant 
Scottish Government 
Agency 
Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SGA 3 Scottish Government 
Agency Civil Servant 
Scottish Government 
Agency 
Face to face 
recorded 
Interview SGA 4 Scottish Government 
Agency Civil Servant 
Scottish Government 
Agency 
Face to face 
recorded 
    
Interview Sniffer 1 Sniffer Staff Sniffer Face to face 
recorded 
Interview Sniffer 2 Sniffer Staff Sniffer Face to face 
recorded 
Interview Sniffer 3 Sniffer Staff Sniffer Face to face 
recorded 
Interview Sniffer 4 Sniffer Staff Sniffer Face to face un-
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recorded 
Interview C2020 1 Member of C2020 Group Climate 2020 Group Face to face 
recorded 
Interview C2020 2 Member of C2020 Group Climate 2020 Group Face to face 
recorded 
Interview C2020 3 Member of C2020 Group Climate 2020 Group Face to face 
recorded 
    
Interview Met Office Chief Scientific Advisor Met Office Face to face 
recorded 
Interview Climsave 1 Climsave Scientist University Of Edinburgh Face to face 
recorded 
Interview Climsave 2 Climsave Scientist University of East Anglia Face to face 
recorded 
Interview Climsave 3 Climsave Stakeholder Local Government Officer Face to face 
recorded 
Interview NGO 1 Scottish Environmental 
NGO Professional 
Advisor on Sustainable 
Development 
Skype Recorded 
Interview NGO 2 Scottish Environmental 
NGO Professional 
Stop Climate Chaos 
Scotland 
Face to face 
recorded 
Interview IUCN Peatland Programme's 
Research Manager 
International Union for 
Conservation of Nature 
Telephone Recorded 
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Extract from transcript with Scottish Government Civil Servant on experience of 
previous engagement with science 
– Showing a typical scenario of bad communication from the Scottish 
Government’s perspective 
 
CIVIL SERVANT:  When we have done these things internally you know organised 
meetings with researcher’s from the MRPs…the expectation on the 
scientists is to actually either to be there to talk through an issue, and 
you know have a discussion, rather than just a presentation, or if its 
presentations then it’s not about, well, it is about the science, but not 
about how science is done, or you know new developments in 
science, but it’s more about, you know, what is policy relevant about 
this … looking at a topic from the policy side … things that we have 
organized have been a success, and I think things that MRP’s have 
organized are probably less so… they want to talk about science when 
they do something ((laughing)) um, which is fine you know, but it’s 
not necessarily anything to do with what we are interested in 
RM: yes yeah 
CIVIL SERVANT:  um so (.1) it’s yeah it’s about I think it’s very much about you know 
defining the issue properly, and selecting the right people to do the 
presentation.  We had one presentation on biodiversity networks so 
the question is you know how big, how big do the areas have to be or 
it doesn’t make sense to connect up you know nature reserves 
corridors and so on and what and (.2) …the real question well the real 
question was is it useful or not?  It was a bit ‘sciencey’, and you know 
basically … the question ultimately that we had, really had, was (.1) is 
this cost effective? Of course it’s very difficult to say if it’s cost 
effective you know, cost effective compared to what? ((laughing)) er 
but that wasn’t, that wasn’t the question they were really interested 
in or weren’t or perhaps they hadn’t been really asked to to look at or 
think about (.) so I didn’t think that that was a good example of, that 
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wasn’t really a good example of interaction, although people did find 
it interesting ((laughing)) 
RM: mmm, was that question explicit? 
CIVIL SERVANT:  no it [wasn’t explicit].  It wasn’t.   
RM: [yeah yeah] 
CIVIL SERVANT:  It wasn’t very well posed, so it was our fault um but 
RM: but in one sense, but I guess that’s quite a difficult question to pose 
CIVIL SERVANT:  it’s a difficult [question] and difficult to answer, but um I didn’t feel 
that from the science side… they didn’t really have a think from their 
side as to you know what does that mean, what does that mean for 
policy? Why are we talking about this? You know, because it was self-
evident for them to them because they’re working in the field that 
you know that is interesting ((laughing)) 
RM: yes, yeah 
CIVIL SERVANT:  important ((laughing)), but you know, for example they had some 
model you know, so an entirely theoretical model of an animal 
wandering about in the theoretical landscape you know, there are 
obstacles, and is it meeting another animal, you know to mate 
RM: right ((laughing)) 
CIVIL SERVANT:  you know and you can put different decision rule rules on that animal 
to say how likely it is to cross a river or a road you know, um and you 
know, just by random movement with certain decision rules, you get 
them to meet right?  The question is how long does it take? These 
kinds of things are very interesting things… er and …if you play around 
with decision rules they’ve got, you can mimic natural behaviour um 
which is also interesting um (.2) Next step then, lets apply this. right 
let’s how do you apply this to the real world and tell me which 
obstacles do we really need to take out to allow this movement you 
know in order to maintain genetic diversity for example. That 
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question (.1) that was the next question then, they didn’t, weren’t 
really interested in 
RM: they stopped there yeah 
CIVIL SERVANT:  they [stopped there] you know so for us, or for me, the question was, 
how does that translate then for us you know what does it tell us? 
You know, does it tell us that we need bigger areas.  Does it tell us 
that you know that we need to remove obstacles?  Does it tell us that 
actually these ladders work across roads?  … as an economist I know 
people play around with models and never apply it to reality and they 
are not interested in doing that, so fair enough ((laughing)) 
RM: yeah yeah 
CIVIL SERVANT:  but but that’s that is the question we are interested in! you know how 
does it relate to reality you know and what can we learn you know? … 
what does it tell us you know what does it tell us on a larger scale? So 
you find out something about biodiversity in a certain species alright!  
So you know something about this moth.  Is there something bigger 
we can say? And scientists generally will say, well no we did, well we 
were only looking at the species. I can’t extrapolate now for you to 
tell you anything about any, not even another insect right which is fair 
enough yes! ok but arghhh! 
RM: what do I do with it? 
CIVIL SERVANT:  yeah.  Why do you tell me that?  You know if this is only applicable to 
to that moth you know and nothing else.  Actually pffff its it’s 
irrelevant for me! ((laughing)) so it’s that kind of kind of translation so 
you’re going for evidence and then that’s now the hunch aspect right?  
So you’ve got the scientist that says, no no this is this is just this 
species that I can tell you anything about. Ok that’s fair enough. 
Scientifically ok. yeah but! Tell me, what is your expert judgement? 
how that relates to behaviour of other insects, you know,  and what 
are the key determinants of this behaviour that is, that are relevant, 
to the policy issues at hand. That is the kind of thing that is required. 
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REFLECTIONS	  ON	  CXC	  PRESENTED	  TO	  CXC	  AGM	  11/11/2015	  
Ruth	  Machen	  
INTRODUCTION	  AND	  METHODS	  
This	   presentation	   and	   report	   draws	   together	   reflections	   on	   the	   model	   of	   science-­‐policy	  
interaction	  being	  developed	  by	  CXC	   following	   research	  with	   the	  organisation	  since	   inception	   in	  
2011.	  The	  research	  findings	  are	  drawn	  from	  interviews,	  participation	  and	  documentary	  analysis	  
conducted	  with	  CXC	  between	  2012	  and	  2014	  as	  part	  of	  doctoral	  research	  at	  Durham	  University.	  
This	  doctoral	  research	  itself	   is	   less	   interested	  in	  how	  CXC	  can	  do	  what	   it	  does	  better,	  and	  more	  
interested	  in	  attentiveness	  to	  the	  politics	  associated	  with	  conducting	  science-­‐policy	  interaction	  in	  
this	   way.	   However,	   recognizing	   CXCs	   interest	   in	   using	   the	   work	   as	   a	   critical	   friend	   for	  
organizational	  development,	  this	  report	  seeks	  a	  balance	  between	  providing	  practical	  comments	  
to	   improve	   practice	   and	   reflections	   to	   provoke	   more	   reflexive	   debate	   about	   CXC’s	   overall	  
direction.	  
TRANSLATION	  
CXC’s	  work	  –	  especially	  the	  call-­‐down	  service	  -­‐	  was	  often	  described	  as	  ‘translation’.	  The	  language	  
of	  co-­‐production	  was	  also	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  medium-­‐and-­‐long-­‐term	  work.	  This	  stood	  in	  contrast	  
to	  other	  ways	  of	  describing	  science	  policy	  interaction	  encountered	  at	  the	  science-­‐policy	  interface	  
in	  Scotland	  –	  such	  as	  knowledge	  brokerage	  or	  science	  communication.	  Further	  exploration	  of	  the	  
concept	   of	   translation	   revealed	   two	   things.	   Firstly	   that	   the	   language	   of	   translation	   was	   being	  
employed	  by	  CXC	  secretariat	  and	  directorate	  staff	  and	  Scottish	  Government	  policy	  officials	  much	  
more	   than	   CXC’s	   research	   scientists.	   Secondly,	   the	   process	   of	   translation	   envisaged	   by	   CXC’s	  
scientists	  and	  CXC’s	  secretariat/directorate	  showed	  significant	  differences	  during	  exploration	  of	  
the	  concept	  during	  interviews	  –	  these	  differences	  resonated	  with	  a	  natural/social-­‐science	  divide	  
with	   scientists	   understanding	   the	   process	   of	   translation	   more	   as	   a	   process	   of	   (continuous)	  
filtration	  from	  a	  larger	  whole	  and	  policy/CXC	  staff	  understanding	  translation	  more	  as	  a	  process	  of	  
(discontinuous)	  conversion	  from	  one	  domain	  to	  another	  that	  is	  not	  the	  same.	  A	  practical	  point	  of	  
conclusion	  is	  that	  this	  difference	  in	  understanding	  of	  what	  translation	  involves	  may	  be	  hindering	  
the	   practical	   task	   of	   encouraging	   scientists	   to	   perform	   conversion	   of	   information	   into	   a	   new	  
context.	  However,	  there	  are	  other	  implications	  that	  grow	  out	  of	  this	  finding	  that	  are	  also	  worth	  
noting.	  
1. TRANSLATION	  AS	  DISCURSIVE	  WORK	  
Understanding	  the	  push	  among	  CXC	  and	  Policy	  for	  science-­‐policy	  interaction	  to	  be	  thought	  
of	   as	   conversion	   of	   meaning	   into	   a	   new	   domain	   draws	   from	   lay	   understandings	   of	  
translation	   originating	   within	   linguistics	   as	   the	   construction	   of	   meaning	   for	   a	   target	  
audience.	  In	  this	  process,	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  frameworks	  of	  meaning	  of	  that	  target	  
audience	   into	   which	   meaning	   is	   constructed.	   Emphasis	   on	   translation	   can	   therefore	   be	  
seen	   to	   perform	   discursive	   work	   –	   encouraging	   through	   language	   a	   particular	   form	   of	  
interaction	  process	  that	  prioritises	  the	  meaning	  of	  policy,	  as	  audience.	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2. EXPERT	  OPINION	  
This	  pressure	  for	  conversion	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  move	  to	  ask	  scientists	  for	  expert	  opinion	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  evidence.	  A	  typical	  quote	  from	  a	  policy	  maker	  went	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  –	  
‘we	  know	  you	  haven’t	  got	  evidence	  and	  can’t	  be	  certain	  but	  you	  know	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  we	  
do,	  so	  tell	  us,	  give	  us	  your	  expert	  opinion’.	  Rather	  than	  distilling	  directly	  from	  an	  evidence	  
base,	  scientists	  are	  being	  asked	  to	  convert	  what	  they	  know	  in	  one	  area	   into	  opinion	  on	  
what	   might	   be	   the	   case	   in	   another.	   This	   asks	   scientists	   to	   go	   against	   their	   epistemic	  
training	  and	  encourages	  a	  new	  subjectivity	  for	  many	  scientists	  as	  experts	  with	  opinions,	  
rather	  than	  voices	  of	  scientific	  evidence.	  Whilst	  the	  resistance	  of	  scientists	  is	  often	  seen	  
as	   being	   stubborn,	   difficult	   or	   backward,	   such	   demands	   evoke	   questions	   of	   scientific	  
identity.	  This	  problem	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  CXC	  -­‐	  Climate	  change	  as	  a	  ‘post-­‐normal’	  condition	  
for	   science	  demanding	   knowledge	   in	   conditions	  of	  high	  uncertainty,	   high	  urgency,	   high	  
value	   contestation	   (Funtovich	   and	   Ravetz	   1992)	   demands	   a	   move	   away	   from	   logical	  
positivism	   that	   puts	   traditional	   markers	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   traditional	  
subjectivities	  of	   some	  scientists	   in	   threat.	  This	  poses	  a	   challenge	   to	  all	   involved	   in	  CXC.	  
Understanding	   the	   social	   and	   subjective	   dimensions	   of	   this	   cultural	   change	  might	   help	  
work	  through	  some	  of	  these	  tensions.	  
3. SERVING	  POLICY	  –	  REPRODUCING	  THE	  STATUS	  QUO	  
One	  implication	  of	  emphasizing	  policy	  framings	  of	  meaning	   is	  that	  knowledge	   is	  shaped	  
through	  particular	  framings	  of	  understanding	  –	  over	  what	  the	  problem	  of	  climate	  change	  
is,	  what	   solutions	   are	   available	   and	   the	   scope	  of	  possibility	   for	   change.	   These	   framings	  
may	  be	  good	  or	  bad,	  right	  or	  wrong	  in	  different	  people’s	  eyes,	  but	  the	  act	  of	  translating	  
takes	   these	   meanings	   as	   fixed	   points	   –	   naturalizing	   their	   claims	   to	   speak	   for	   what	   is	  
valued	  and	  what	  is	  possible.	  Conducting	  boundary	  work	  as	  translation	  therefore	  enables	  
the	   circulation	   of	   particular	   types	   of	   knowledge	   that	   speak	   well	   to	   these	   existing	  
understandings.	  
COMPARING	   CO-­‐PRODUCTION,	   KNOWLEDGE	   BROKERAGE	   AND	   SCIENCE	   COMMUNICATION	  
Comparing	   the	   processes	   being	   described	   as	   translation	   to	   other	   processes	   of	   science-­‐policy	  
interaction	   undertaken	   by	   others	   in	   Scotland	   suggested	   there	   are	   differences	   in	   the	   types	   of	  
relationship	  between	  science	  and	  policy	  being	  encouraged	  in	  each	  case.	  
Science-­‐Communication	   –	   describes	   a	   one	   directional	   process	   of	   providing	   existing	   scientific	  
knowledge	   to	  new	  audiences.	   It	  envisages	  a	  strict	  boundary	  between	  science	  and	  policy	  where	  
knowledge	  may	  be	  used	  to	  challenge	  policy	  but	  any	  challenge	  of	  the	  knowledge	  itself	  is	  resisted.	  
Responsibility	   for	  what	   is	  done	  with	  knowledge	   is	  distanced	  from	  the	  communicator	  and	   in	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  audience	  
Knowledge	  Brokerage	  –	  describes	  the	  bringing	  of	  people	  and	  knowledges	  together	  by	  a	  broker	  
who	   is	   independent	   from	  both	  science	  and	  policy.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  Sniffer	   (but	  not	  necessarily	   in	  
wider	  brokerage	  literature)	  there	  is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  being	  a	  facilitator	  and	  a	  catalyst	  for	  action.	  In	  
such	   cases	  while	   there	   is	   debate	   around	   application	   of	   knowledge	   in	   new	   contexts	   knowledge	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itself	  is	  relatively	  fixed,	  and	  science	  is	  not	  challenged.	  There	  is	  scope	  for	  policy	  challenge	  but	  this	  
occurs	  through	  empowering	  the	  voices	  of	  those	  within	  policy	  to	  take	  forward	  that	  challenge.	  
Translation	   –	   describes	   the	   framing	   of	   knowledge	   into	   the	   frameworks	   of	   meaning	   of	   policy,	  
interaction	   between	   the	   scientific	   and	   policy	   communities	   is	   mediated	   through	   the	   translator	  
who	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  member	  of	  both	  communities	  and	  therefore	  able	  to	  speak	  the	  language	  of	  both.	  
In	  the	  interests	  of	  establishing	  meaning	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐conflict	  approach	  to	  policy	  although	  there	  
may	  be	   some	  conflict	  with	   science.	  Success	  and	   responsibility	   for	   translation	   is	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  
those	  acting	  as	  translators	  (CSC	  secretariat	  and	  scientists	  involved).	  There	  is	  a	  boundary	  between	  
science	  and	  policy,	  and	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  it	  (not	  least	  to	  require	  the	  services	  of	  a	  translator)	  
but	  the	  boundary	  is	  less	  definite	  with	  push	  back	  on	  science	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  mindset	  of	  policy.	  
Co-­‐Production	   -­‐	   Knowledge	   is	   shaped	   jointly	   by	   scientists	   and	   policy	   makers.	   There	   is	   direct	  
interaction	   of	   each	   community	   with	   or	   without	   facilitation	   and	   Success	   for	   communication	   in	  
hands	   of	   both	   science	   and	   policy	   communities	   jointly.	   There	   is	   mutual	   challenge	   by	   each	  
community	  of	  each	  other	  although,	   that	   is	  subject	   to	  struggles	  of	  power	  and	  too	  much	  conflict	  
could	  be	  detrimental	   to	   the	  process.	   This	  produces	  a	  much	  weaker	  boundary	  between	   science	  
and	  policy.	  
POLITICS	  OF	  BOUNDARY	  WORK	  
	  
FURTHER	  INFORMATION:	  
Please	  contact	  me	  on:	  k.r.m.machen@durham.ac.uk	  .	  As	  this	  is	  a	  draft	  summary	  prior	  to	  thesis	  
submission	  -­‐	  please	  do	  not	  reproduce	  without	  consent.	  
Balancing	  irreconcilable	  tensions	  	  -­‐	  Where	  does	  CXC	  want	  to	  position	  itself?	  
	  
Science	  Led	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Policy	  Led	  
(Policy	  responsive	  to	  science)	   	   	   	   	   	   (Science	  in service	  of	  Policy)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Risks	  at	  each	  extreme	  
	  
	  
	  
Policy	  dictates	  what	  
needs	  doing	  –	  tasks	  
science	  to	  provide	  
how	  this	  might	  be	  
achieved	  within	  
existing	  policy	  
framework	  
Science	  dictates	  
what	  needs	  doing	  
–	  leaving	  policy	  to	  
work	  out	  how	  this	  
might	  be	  achieved	  
Science	  leads	  on	  
what	  needs	  doing	  
–	  works	  with	  
policy	  to	  scope	  out	  
options	  on	  how	  
this	  might	  be	  
achieved	  
Policy	  leads	  on	  
what	  needs	  doing	  
requesting	  
scientific	  scoping	  
of	  options	  on	  how	  
this	  might	  be	  
achieved	  
Science	  Based	  Policy	  -­‐	  removes	  political	  
debate	  around	  values	  and	  politics	  
	  
Policy	  Based	  Science	  –	  science	  becomes	  interests	  
driven	  (due	  to	  influence	  of	  private	  sector	  in	  policy)	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